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Chapter 1 Introduction  
 
The preventive approach against organised crime has gained much attention 
since the early 1990s. On an international level as well as on a national one 
various preventive measures against organised crime have been developed. This 
is certainly true in the European Union and the Netherlands. This introduction 
chapter is divided into three sections. The first looks at the developments that 
led to the preventive approach to organised crime, focusing on the growing 
enthusiasm for the prevention of crime. Subsequently, it highlights the rise of 
the problem of organised crime on the political agenda, in particular in the 
European Union and in the Netherlands. Together these sections illustrate that at 
the beginning of the 1990s the merger of these developments led to enthusiasm 
for a preventative approach to organised crime.  
The second section provides insight into the content of organised crime 
prevention. This section introduces actual preventive measures taken to hinder 
organised crime, at least as European Union and Dutch authorities applied them. 
In an attempt to define organised crime prevention, the main characteristics of 
these measures are highlighted.  
The third section introduces the aim of this research. Here, the enthusiasm 
about the merger between crime prevention and the containment of organised 
crime is questioned. Moreover, this section details the research questions and 
methods.  
 
1.1 Towards a preventive approach against organised crime  
 
1.1.1 Growing enthusiasm for crime prevention 
 
In the course of the twentieth century it emerged that the traditional criminal 
justice system was unsuccessful in handling crime. In this system, the sovereign 
state is equipped with a strong police and justice apparatus focused on arresting 
and processing offenders. However the control and punishment authoritatively 
prescribed has not had the desired effect on the motivation of potential 
offenders. The constantly increasing crime rates in western countries were a 
clear indication of the system’s failure to control crime. As a result, 
governments had to acknowledge the limitations of the criminal justice system. 
Garland (1996: 448) views this development as the erosion of the myth that 
sovereign states themselves are capable of providing security, law and order. 
Moreover, rehabilitation, which is aimed at influencing the motivation of 
potential offenders, proved with few and isolated exceptions to have no effect on 
recidivism (Martinson, 1974: 25). The resulting nothing works slogan of 
Martinson speaks for itself and was widely approved in that period.  
 In the 1970s, the limits of the criminal justice system became a part of 
criminological common sense. With the acceptance that a strong state apparatus 
2 
has appeared insufficient, Garland (1996: 449) notes a two-path development. 
On the one hand he observes the efforts of sovereign states to act with more 
punitive pronouncements in a kind of hysterical denial of their inability. On the 
other hand pragmatic new strategies have been put forth as new modes of 
governing crime. Among these new strategies a key role is reserved for 
prevention.  
In the 1970s in the United Kingdom, Clarke (1980) developed such a 
pragmatic preventive strategy against crime. This strategy was based on a 
renewed interest in classical economic ideas of rational choice. Originally, these 
ideas derive from Beccaria who went beyond the prevailing idea of 
predestination to argue that people are born as rational individuals free to choose 
to commit crime or not. Based on the rational choice of individuals Cornish and 
Clarke (1986) advocate that potential offenders make decisions and weigh 
choices to seek to themselves benefit from their criminal behaviour.1 This means 
that offenders commit crime when they reach the decision that a valued goal will 
be achieved more easily using criminal means rather than non-criminal means.2 
In this new rational choice perspective the decision-making process of criminals 
is traced to two types of decisions (Cornish and Clarke, 1986: 8). First there are 
involvement decisions. These are strategic decisions regarding the readiness to 
get involved in crimes. Second are the event decisions, which are more tactical 
choices focusing on the modus operandi of specific criminal events. Based on 
this perspective, controlling crime involves influencing the decision-making of 
potential offenders.  
Inspired by the interaction between the offender and the environment laid 
down in the routine activities theory of Cohen and Felson (1979), Clarke (1997: 
2) distinguishes two possible perspectives to interfere in this interaction: one can 
focus on the criminal and one can focus on the crime. Whereas Clarke is 
convinced that these two perspectives represent different strategies, he argues 
that explaining crime (the act) should not be confused with the problem of 
explaining the criminal (the person). Moreover, he states that the problem of 
controlling crime should not be confused with the problem of dealing with the 
criminal. Clearly, he differentiates the presence of a motivated offender from the 
circumstances in which crime occurs. With regard to controlling crime, Clarke 
distinguishes the motivational approach aimed at motivated offenders and the 
situational approach focusing on circumstances. Because of the disillusionment 
concerning the ability to influence the motivation of possible offenders – clearly 
illustrated by the nothing works attitude prevailing at that time – it is no surprise 
                                                        
1  This is based on an economic perspective that people strive for maximal pleasure at a minimum of 
costs. Cornish and Clarke (1986) applied this rational choice perspective to committing crime. The 
rational choice perspective is also applied in sociology (Hechter and Kanazawa, 1997). 
2  Contrary to classical rational choice, Cornish and Clarke are aware of the fact that individual’s 
rationality has some limits. They claim that decisions are neither fully rational nor thoroughly thought 
through as the decision-making process is constrained by ‘limits of time and ability and the 
availability of relevant information’ (Cornish and Clarke, 1986: 1). For this the renewed rational 
choice perspective encompasses terms such as limited or bounded rationality. 
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that Clarke was oriented towards influencing the circumstances in which 
offences occur.  
Based on environmental criminologies such as the pattern theory of 
Brantingham and Brantingham (1984), the concept of defensible space of 
Newman (1972) and the crime prevention through environmental design of 
Jeffery (1971), Clarke (1980: 138) posits that the decision to commit crime 
depends on immediate situational variables. In other words, he argues that some 
situational opportunities make certain circumstances attractive for committing 
crimes. As such, Clarke reasons that intervening in these criminogenic situations 
can influence the decision-making process and prevent crime. Thus, instead of 
influencing the motivation of potential offenders by making enforcement visible 
and by executing punishments certainly and fast, as Beccaria phrased, this new 
rational choice approach starts from the circumstances, situations and 
opportunities that could affect the decision to commit crime.  
The role of the environment in the decision-making process is the basis of 
the situational crime prevention approach. Clarke assumes that the level of crime 
not only depends on motivated offenders but also on the presence of facilitating 
situational factors. Simply phrased, the presence of attractive targets, a low level 
of supervision or a low risk of apprehension results in a higher crime level.3 
Therefore, this approach encompasses strategies to intervene in the environment 
to make criminal action less attractive. With the role of the environment central, 
situational crime prevention only involves event decisions. The involvement 
decisions would take place in an earlier phase, meaning the offender’s 
motivation is seen as a given.  
In practice, strategies related to situational crime prevention encompass a 
range of opportunity-reducing measures that involve the manipulation of the 
immediate environment to hinder or prevent crime. At first, Clarke (1980) 
distinguished two strategies: reducing the physical opportunities for offending 
and increasing the chances of an offender being caught. Subsequently, based on 
case studies of successful situational crime prevention Clarke (1992) introduced 
a classification of twelve opportunity-reducing techniques categorised in three 
strategies: increasing the risk, increasing the effort and reducing the rewards of 
crime. In the framework of the rational choice perspective the first two strategies 
affect the costs while the third strategy negatively influences the rewards. For 
example, increasing natural or formal surveillance by installing street lighting or 
employing security guards would increase the perceived risk of committing 
offences. Furthermore, target hardening is a strategy to increase the perceived 
effort required and related costs. For example, installing steering locks in cars 
complicates car theft. Finally, regarding reducing the rewards, it is possible to 
deny offenders their expected benefits. Ink merchandise tags and removable 
fronts on car radios are two means to prevent offenders from enjoying stolen 
products.  
                                                        
3  These three elements clearly correspond with the three variables of the routine activities theory of 
Cohen and Felson (1979): the presence of suitable targets, the absence of capable guardians and the 
attendance of motivated offenders.  
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Over the years such strategies and concrete opportunity-reducing techniques 
have undergone constant change resulting from developments in practice and 
technology. Innovative case studies in which new forms of crime are addressed 
by situational crime prevention have uncovered new techniques. Similarly, 
technological developments have offered new possibilities for interventions. In 
addition, Clarke (1997: 14) adjusted his classification of opportunity-reducing 
strategies and techniques in order to encompass changes in the underlying 
theory. These changes were nourished by concerns about situational crime 
prevention raised by Wortley (1996, 2001) and Newman (1997). The first 
concern involves the excuses that offenders supply for their behaviour and the 
disinhibitors that undermine the usual social or moral inhibitions of offenders. 
For example, income tax evasion and exceeding the speed limit have become 
common offences for which people neutralise feelings of shame and guilt. The 
acknowledgement that the very frequency of these opportunities can reduce 
moral standards resulted in Clarke’s (1997: 16) introducing a fourth opportunity-
reducing technique: removing excuses. Under the strategy of removing excuses 
Clarke tries to restore feelings of shame and guilt. The resulting modification of 
the previous classification left eight techniques untouched, modified the 
remaining four and added four new ones. With this modification Clarke 
certainly did not intend to include long-term changes in dispositions of 
offenders, as that would conflict with the basic fundaments of the situational 
crime prevention approach. Therefore, the measures to induce guilt or shame 
apply only to highly specific categories of offending and to highly specific 
situations in which criminal event decisions are made (Clarke, 1997: 17).  
In 2001, Wortley expressed a second concern, which involves situation-
generated motivation. According to Wortley, offenders act not only upon 
perceived costs and benefits – the basis of Clarke's classification – but 
situational precipitators may induce individuals to commit crimes that they 
would not have otherwise considered (Wortley, 2001).4 In this latter point of 
view offender’s motivation can be provoked or prompted by the situation itself. 
For example, erotic stimuli can trigger sexual arousal and intrusion into personal 
space can elicit thoughtless and even offending behaviour. Therefore, Wortley 
concludes that controlling these precipitators is as important as regulating 
opportunities and establishes a classification of relevant strategies. With this 
concern Wortley argues that not all offenders are beforehand motivated to 
commit crime, which weakens the situational crime prevention’s core 
assumption of a motivated offender. In particular it conflicts with the 
involvement decision that supposedly takes place beforehand. In this new view 
the involvement decision can be made in the crime setting itself, just like the 
event decision. Nonetheless, Cornish and Clarke see substantial agreement 
between the two approaches, as both are based on the interaction between 
persons and situations. While their techniques are directed on the opportunity 
                                                        
4  Wortley distinguishes four types of precipitators – prompts, pressures, permissions and provocations – 
that can arouse immediate motivation to commit crime. 
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side, Wortley’s techniques are directed to the motivational side (Cornish and 
Clarke, 2003: 91).  
Though Cornish and Clarke cannot yet determine whether this new view on 
crime-control techniques provides the missing half of the situational response, 
they acknowledge that the techniques offer an exciting new direction in the 
theory and practice of situational crime prevention. Moreover, Cornish and 
Clarke are convinced that these new techniques can provide a more nuanced 
view of the settings in which crime occurs and of the types of offender. 
Moreover, controlling precipitators could provide better insight into the effects 
of crime-reducing strategies. Based on Wortley’s theory, Cornish and Clarke 
acknowledge that some crime-reducing techniques can be obtrusive and can thus 
provoke criminal reactions. Obviously, such counterproductive measures should 
be avoided. In an attempt to fit in techniques to control precipitators, Cornish 
and Clarke (2003) once more adjusted their classification of existing crime-
reducing techniques and strategies. They (2003: 89) added one more strategy, 
namely reducing provocations, in order to influence the decision-making of 
provoked offenders. To this end they introduced some new techniques and 
rearranged the existing ones. As shown in table 1.1, the result is a new 
classification involving five strategies that arrange 25 techniques.  
According to Clarke (1997: 3) these techniques are as simple as taking 
routine precautions. Like individuals lock their doors in order to prevent 
burglary, retailers must secure their valuables in order to prevent theft, vehicle 
dealers should install immobilisers to hinder car theft and providers of 
telecommunications services should be able to disable cell phones to prevent 
their being stolen. For Clarke such routine precautions are logical, as crime is a 
normal aspect of society. As such, crime requires no special motivation or 
pathologies, but rather is caused by social and economic structures. This 
reasoning is characteristic of the pragmatic new strategies which are also 
designated as the ‘criminologies of everyday life’ (Garland, 1996: 450). These 
everyday criminologies have led to new discourses. One of these involves the 
fact that the new criminologies do not seek to eliminate criminal tendencies or 
the root motivational causes of crime. This certainly applies to situational crime 
prevention, which passes over the problematic issue of offenders’ motives and 
accepts them as given. Due to the lack of attention to the issue of offenders’ 
motives some practitioners do not always take these approaches seriously. 
According to these critics the situational crime prevention approach merely 
suppresses the impulse to offend; it does not attempt to remove the root 
motivational causes. This discussion not only involves a philosophical and 
ethical dimension, it has direct consequences for practice. Namely, in the view 
of the critics these root motivational causes have to be removed otherwise the 
offending will manifest on some other occasion. This possible effect is called 
the displacement of crime.  
Early on in the development of the situational crime prevention approach, 
Clarke (1980: 140) acknowledged the problem of displacement. In fact Clarke 
posits that displacement could occur in four ways: time, place, method and type 
6 
of offence. This means that in reaction to the reduction of certain opportunities 
an offender may choose another moment or another place, develop a new 
method or turn to another form of crime. Nonetheless, Clarke (1987: 934) argues 
that displacement is far from inevitable. In fact he views displacement as 
depending on various aspects, such as the strength of the offender’s motivation. 
For example, for opportunistic offenders who only operate when they see a 
chance, opportunity-reducing measures will likely reduce offences. Regarding 
professional offenders, reducing crime opportunities will probably be less 
effective. Based on the rational choice perspective the potential offender will 
reach a point at which the costs, such as trying out new places or inventing new 
methods, will exceed the benefits, which will cause the potential offender to 
refrain from committing offences. Another important aspect of displacement 
involves knowledge of alternatives (Clarke, 1980: 140-141). Protecting a whole 
class of property makes it more difficult to turn to alternatives. To illustrate this 
reasoning Clarke refers to the introduction of the steering column locks in West 
Germany in 1963 and in the United Kingdom in 1971. In Germany steering 
column locks were made compulsory in all cars, which resulted in an enormous 
reduction of car theft.  
In the United Kingdom the steering column locks were introduced only in 
new cars, which resulted in a displacement of car theft to older cars. Obviously 
the problem of displacement is generally viewed with disapproval. However, 
literature illustrates that displacement often is beneficial. First of all, evaluation 
research shows that displacement never amounts to 100% (Hesseling, 1994: 43). 
There are always some offenders who refrain from committing offences. 
Moreover, crime-reducing strategies can result in a displacement to less 
undesirable offences (Hesseling, 1994: 60). Therefore, Clarke (1997) concludes 
that an effect as obvious as displacement does not make the approach less 
worthy; on the contrary, evident success in practice already illustrates the value 
of this pragmatic new approach.  
A second aspect of the discourse on criminologies of everyday life 
concerns the reponsibilisation of all members of society. Various members of 
society offer situational opportunities for crime. These members should assume 
their own responsibility in taking precautions. As a result, every economic 
sector has to protect their economic dealings from misuse, every shopkeeper 
should secure their merchandise and each individual must guard their 
possessions. Therefore, the situational crime prevention approach not only 
focuses on the criminal justice system, but also addresses agencies beyond the 
state apparatus – private organisations and institutions as well as individuals in 
civil society. Thus, the police is not exclusively responsible for controlling 
crime; the responsibility is shared. Nonetheless, governments have an important 
role to fulfil because they must create the possibilities and promote the 
development of precautionary measures (Clarke, 1997: 3).  
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According to Garland (1996: 452), this so-called responsibilisation strategy 
towards private agencies is the result of authorities’ acknowledging that 
governmental control itself is not an effective answer to crime. Therefore, they 
devolve part of this responsibility on to agencies, organisations and individuals. 
Thus, while the repressive approach remains the sole responsibility of the 
criminal justice system, the preventive approach attributes the responsibility to 
both state and private agencies (Garland, 1996). 
Notwithstanding the criticisms of situational crime prevention, its logical 
assumptions, its apparent validity and its success in practice have attracted 
policy-makers’ attention (Van Dijk, 1985: 333). According to Van Dijk (1985: 
335), the attractiveness of situational crime prevention can be found in the rather 
uncomplicated application of the approach. It is much easier to install technical 
protection and provide various means of supervision than to adjust the social and 
economic structures of society that provoke criminal behaviour. Moreover, Van 
Dijk argues that situational crime prevention is attractive due to its positive cost-
benefit relation (Van Dijk, 1985: 336). Examples illustrate that preventive 
projects can reduce the crime rate and citizens’ feelings of insecurity at 
relatively little cost. By devolving part of the responsibility to private agents, 
part of the costs are devolved as well.5 Finally, the success of this new paradigm 
in controlling crime could be explained by its elements that appeal to political 
parties on the right as well as the left; situational crime prevention offers 
immediate effect without ignoring long-range requirements. On the one hand it 
offers possibilities for fast intervention that focuses on direct results. For 
example, the introduction of steering column locks in Germany had a direct 
impact on vehicle theft and electronic article surveillance resulted in a decrease 
of shoplifting. On the other hand, the approach attaches significance to the 
continuing role of society as a whole in crime-control policy. In this view the 
integrity of various state and private agencies could have an enormous impact on 
crime rates. Such structural interventions in society could have a positive effect 
on the long-term crime rate. In addition, the situational crime prevention 
approach does not include aspects of underlying social-economic justice on 
which there is no consensus on how goals should be achieved.  
Based on these reasons, it is no wonder that governments now seem to be 
promoting a range of preventive or precautionary measures. First, in the 1980s 
the situational crime prevention approach was promoted by the national 
government in the United Kingdom, where Clarke and Cornish were working, 
respectively, as director and co-worker at the Home Office Research and 
Planning Unit. From then on other governments – among which the Netherlands 
– invested in the preventive strategy (Clarke, 1997: 40). In the Netherlands like 
in the United Kingdom the preventive approach was a reaction to a steep 
increase of crime rates. Disbelief in the effectiveness of the criminal justice 
system urged the Dutch government to lay down new principles for the future of 
crime control. The resulting policy document entitled Society and Criminality 
                                                        
5  For a matter of fact, the general public profits from this approach as well. The costs of the private 
agencies are less than the enlargement of the police force would be. 
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(Samenleving en Criminaliteit) of 1985 introduced the preventive strategies. 
With this document the Dutch government clearly devolved the responsibility 
for crime prevention to private agents. This was a real revolution in crime 
control policy. The policy document stated:6 
 
‘maintaining law and order is not exclusively the task of the police and the justice 
system. In the judgment of the government, the rise in petty crimes, mostly committed 
by minors, could and should be halted by inducing an increased sense of responsibility 
in parents, local residents, local authorities and other social organisations with a view to 
crime prevention.’ 
 
At that time the preventive approach was only focused on petty crime. 
Regarding more serious offences and organised crime the government was 
convinced that only a tough repressive approach could work. According to 
Garland (1996: 449), this predilection for a strong repressive approach can be 
seen as a form of denying the limits of the sovereign state. However, the 
punitive pronouncements are also a logical reaction towards a threatening form 
of crime that in fact was still unknown. At that time the Dutch authorities lacked 
clear empirical evidence of the extent and nature of organised crime. As a matter 
of fact, in crime-fighting practice organised crime was neither an important issue 
before the 1985 policy document nor directly after.  
 
1.1.2 Organised crime on the political agenda  
 
Organised crime was formerly only a problem in Italy and the United States, 
both of which dealt with mafia-structured organisations from the early twentieth 
century. The media offered other western countries insight into this sort of 
crime, in particular with movies on Italian and American mafia families. 
Although these movies appealed to people’s imagination, it was generally 
agreed among European countries that except for Italy they had no problem of 
organised crime. This continued for some time. Only in the course of the 1980s 
did international organisations as well as European countries start to 
acknowledge the problem of organised crime in their own territories. What 
caused the sudden rise of the problem of organised crime in Europe? Fijnaut and 
Paoli (2004: 3) extensively describe this development, giving three aspects main 
importance: the process of globalisation, the process of economic liberalisation 
and the fall of the Iron Curtain.  
The globalisation process improved trade between various parts of the 
world. Obviously, criminal organisations benefit from this development as well. 
In particular the illegal drugs industry expanded its markets to other parts of the 
world. At the same time, the process of economic liberalisation reduced 
governments’ ability to interfere and regulate markets and promoted legal 
economic exchange. Criminal organisations make use of this global economy 
                                                        
6  Samenleving en Criminaliteit; een beleidsplan voor de komende jaren. Kamerstukken II 1984-1985, 
18 995, no. 2. 
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too as it also facilitates illegal economic operations with or within foreign 
countries. The threat of this development is best formulated by the United 
Nations, which argues that the globalisation process has had a large influence on 
organised crime as the evolution of a global village offers unprecedented 
opportunities for criminal organisations, such as increased ease in crossing 
borders (Williams and Savona, 1996: 8). Consequently, the United Nations 
developed countermeasures against trade in drugs, which was still seen as the 
most important activity of the illegal international trade. The first anti-drugs 
measures were established in 1970. Later the United Nations developed a 
convention against all kinds of transnational organised crime.7 
In Europe the same processes took place and were even strengthened by the 
fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989. This historic event paved the way for further 
economic trade as it opened the border to eastern countries where democracy 
and capitalism were just starting to develop. With these changes a whole new 
world opened for illegal trade as well. Two years later the potential trade 
activities were once again enlarged when the Soviet Union collapsed.  
The rise of the problem of organised crime was particularly important for 
the European Union, which was in the middle of the unification process that 
included the completion of an internal market and the abolition of internal 
border controls. This process was started in the 1950s with the creation of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (1951), the European Economic 
Community (1957) and the European Atomic Energy Community (1957). In the 
1980s negotiations took place on the further unification of Europe, which 
resulted in establishment of the modern European organisation. With the Treaty 
of Maastricht (1993) and the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) the latest steps of the 
unification process were made and the three-pillar structure of the European 
Union introduced.8 The most important aspect of this process was establishment 
of the single market with its four basic freedoms: the free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital. The European Union guarantees these freedoms by 
formulating directives regarding economic and monetary affairs to promote fair 
competition in a wide range of policy areas. The European Council, aware of the 
direct relation between the unification of Europe and the fight against organised 
crime, argued that it also has a responsibility to undertake action in the latter 
area. In other words, it refers to the unification and open borders as 
opportunities for organised crime. 
The threat that criminal organisations could abuse these freedoms urged the 
European institutions to compose directives with actions to prevent or limit the 
penetration of organised crime in the legitimate environment. First of all, action 
was undertaken in the first pillar, the Community Pillar.  
 
                                                        
7  United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Resolution adopted by the 
General Assembly on 8 January 2001, A/RES/55/25, article 31. 
8  The three pillars of the European Union are, respectively, the European Community, the cooperation 
on the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the cooperation on justice and home affairs. See for 
a complete insight into the pillar-structure for example Kellermann and De Zwaan (2001).  
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The European Council realised that the free movement of capital could be 
abused by organised crime:9  
 
‘…whereas, in order to facilitate their criminal activities, launderers could try to take 
advantage of the freedom of capital movement and freedom to supply financial services 
which the integrated financial area involves.’ 
 
As a result the Council drew up the anti-money laundering directive to prevent 
the abuse of the financial sector. Furthermore, the European Council and 
Parliament turned their attention to the possible abuse of the free movement of 
people and services, establishing directives regarding tendering procedures and 
the possibility to exclude certain untrustworthy bidders.10 Thus, although the 
first-pillar measures concentrate first on protecting the internal market, some can 
be brought into action against organised crime activities as well. 
Further measures against organised crime were taken under the third pillar, 
which involves cooperation on justice and home affairs. This focuses on 
establishing the European Union as an area of freedom, security and justice. 
According to the Treaty of the European Union (articles 29 and 30) such an area 
will be achieved by: 
 
‘preventing and combating crime, organised or otherwise, in particular terrorism, 
trafficking in persons and offences against children, illicit drug trafficking and illicit 
arms trafficking, corruption and fraud.’ 
 
In other words, the third pillar of cooperation is the most suitable environment to 
invoke structural attention for fighting organised crime. This was first 
pronounced in 1996, when the Stockholm conference examined the prevention 
of crime connected with European economic integration and social exclusion. 
This conference resulted in the Action Plan to Combat Organised Crime 
adopted by the Council of the European Union (also referred to simply as the 
1997 action plan).11 This plan is the first, and still the main, policy document in 
the European Union on this subject.  
Organised crime has been an issue on the agenda of the European Union 
since 1997, and different actions and policy plans have been followed over the 
course of time. In 1998, the Council of the European Union established a 
council resolution that emphasised the importance of finalising the 1997 action 
plan.12 That same year, a joint action pact was agreed to make ‘the participation 
in a criminal organisation’ a formal criminal offence in the member states of the 
                                                        
9  Council Directive on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money 
laundering of 10 June 1991. OJ L 166, 28/06/1991, pp. 77-83. 
10  European Parliament and Council Directive 97/52/EC of 13 October 1997 amending directives 
92/50/EEC, 93/36/EEC and 93/37/EEC concerning the coordination of procedures for awarding public 
service contracts, public supply contracts and public works contracts. OJ L 328, 28/11/1997, pp. 1-59. 
11  Action plan of 28 April 1997 to combat organised crime. OJ C251, 15/08/1997. 
12  Council Resolution of 21 December 1998 on the prevention of organised crime with reference to the 
establishment of a comprehensive strategy for combating it. OJ C 408, 29/12/98, pp. 1-4. 
12
European Union.13 This was important as it provided a definition of organised 
crime which presumes that the problem of organised crime had been seriously 
analysed at the European level (article 1):  
 
‘Within the meaning of this joint action, a criminal organisation shall mean a structured 
association, established over a period of time, of more than two persons, acting in 
concert with a view to committing offences which are punishable by deprivation of 
liberty or a detention order of a maximum of at least four years or a more serious 
penalty, whether such offences are an end in themselves or a means of obtaining 
material benefits and, where appropriate, of improperly influencing the operation of 
public authorities.’ 
 
In the following years the European Council stimulated further research on this 
problem as well as on possibilities for containing it. In 2000, the Council of the 
European Union published a new action plan in which it urged finalisation of the 
1997 action plan and recommended that information on successful approaches 
and best practices be made available at a local and national level.14  
Finally, it should be emphasised that policy against organised crime has 
had a new urgency since the terrorist attacks in 2001. According to the Financial 
Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), the fight against organised 
crime and terrorism should go hand in hand. In a recent report the FATF states 
that criminal organisations and terrorist groups basically use the same methods 
in hiding and obscuring the links between the source, destination or purposes of 
their finances (FATF, 2003: 3). Although it is questionable whether organised 
crime and terrorism should be connected, the focus on terrorism has accelerated 
the implementation of certain measures against organised crime, like the new 
and more extensive directive against money laundering.15 
Obviously, the European directives and action plans have had important 
influence on member states. Directives established in the framework of the 
Community Pillar apply directly in the EU member states. This supranational 
authority does not apply for third-pillar policies. Characteristic of third-pillar 
action plans is that member states retain their national sovereignty.16 Here the 
decision-making process is placed outside the procedures of the European Union 
and are based on cooperation between individual member states. Accordingly, 
the success of third-pillar plans depends on the readiness of member states to 
quickly and carefully implement the agreed recommendations. Obviously, such 
implementation depends on consciousness-raising about the threat of organised 
crime in particular member states. Furthermore, this threat is not obvious, as 
                                                        
13  Joint action of 21 December 1998 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on 
European Union, on making it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal organisation in the 
Member States of the European Union. OJ L 351, 29/12/1998. 
14  The prevention and control of organised crime: a European Union strategy for the beginning of the 
new millennium. OJ C 124, 03/05/2000. 
15  Directive on money laundering of 2001. Directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 4 December 2001 amending Council directive 91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of the 
financial system for the purpose of money laundering. OJ L 344, 28/12/2001, pp. 76-82. 
16  The same goes for the second-pillar policy that handles the cooperation on the EU Common Foreign 
and Security Policy.  
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illustrated by the fact that as recently as the 1980s European countries, except 
for Italy, were convinced they were exempt from the problem. Nonetheless, by 
the mid-1990s most European countries had recognised the problem and were 
developing measures against it.17 
In the Netherlands the problem of organised crime arose in the 1970s with 
the emergence of the drugs trade (Kleemans, 2004: 303). Nonetheless, the first 
signs of political interest in this problem derive only from 1985, with the 
drafting of the policy document Society and Crime. Though this document 
involves mainly the preventive approach towards petty crime, in it the 
authorities also point out that criminal organisations are entering Dutch society. 
In fact the policy plan states that a large-scale underworld is trying to root in 
society.18 However, due to a lack of empirical evidence on the threat of 
organised crime in the Netherlands – at that time many criminologists referred to 
the problem as a foreign phenomenon – this insight was mainly based on 
problems and experiences in the United States. Neither did this revelation shock 
the general public; at that time, ideas on organised crime in the Netherlands 
were laughed off as myths. Therefore, it is not surprising that no immediate 
action was initiated.  
Yet the experiences of the Amsterdam police in the late 1980s called 
renewed attention to the organised crime problem. Their empirical findings that 
foreign and Dutch criminal organisations were involved in international 
trafficking of drugs was the first breakthrough on the organised crime problem 
in the Netherlands. As a result, a first nationwide quantitative overview of 
criminal organisations was drawn up.19 Via questionnaires police departments 
throughout the country gave information on possible criminal organisations20 in 
an initiative meant to outline the real threat in the Netherlands. Nonetheless, 
rather than providing a clear overview, this quantitative sketch caused confusion 
on definitions and criteria regarding criminal groups.21  
Remarkably, it was this confusion that transformed the problem of 
organised crime into a major topic on the political agenda as well as in the 
media. Shortly after the publication of the results of this first quantitative 
overview, organised crime was given a definitive place in national policy with 
the 1992 Organised Crime in the Netherlands: Threats and Plan of Action (De 
Georganiseerde Criminaliteit in Nederland: Dreigingsbeeld en Plan van 
Aanpak). This new policy plan heralded a real change of attitude towards 
organised crime. Instead of the repressive approach, as put forward in 1985, the 
                                                        
17  For an extensive overview of the problem of organised crime in a large range of European countries as 
well as policies against this specific crime problem see Fijnaut and Paoli (2004). 
18  Samenleving en Criminaliteit; een beleidsplan voor de komende jaren. Kamerstukken II 1984-1985, 
18 995, no. 2. 
19  See for more information Fijnaut et al. (1996: 15) and Van de Bunt (2004: 682). 
20  It was left to the police forces to answer the questions per group. It later turned out that different 
police forces answered the questions differently and there were also problems with non-response and 
double counting. 
21  As listed in Fijnaut et al. (1996: 15; 1998: 12) 36 groups did not answer to any of the criteria, 61 
groups met one criterion, 54 groups met two, 18 groups met three 3, 17 groups met four and only three 
groups met all five of the criteria. Could all these groups be counted as organised crime? 
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Dutch government now initiated a preventive approach towards organised crime. 
This preventive approach was largely based on the American experiences of the 
New York Organised Crime Task Force, presented at the Dutch-American 
Conference on Organised Crime (Fijnaut and Jacobs, 1991). The disappointing 
results of a tough repressive approach by New York City authorities towards 
mafia-structured organisations forced the New York Organised Crime Task 
Force to develop other measures. Mafia-structured organisations had acquired 
significant power in unions and legitimate industries (Jacobs, 1999: 121). 
Individual criminals were not only to be sentenced, the mafia organisations were 
to be driven away from legitimate economic sectors as well. This resulted in an 
integrated approach in which the public administration and the criminal justice 
system closely cooperated to fight organised crime with various strategies. 
Based on the New York task force’s experiences the Dutch authorities made 
firm statements on organised crime, arguing:22 
 
‘Modern criminal organisations and the legal economy are interwoven to a much larger 
degree than in the past.’ 
 
The reasoning that the interaction between criminal organisations and the legal 
economy offered opportunities for organised crime to subsist and even increase, 
indicates the Dutch authorities’ early interest in the situational prevention 
approach towards organised crime. Remarkably, there was little empirical 
evidence on which to ground these statements. In this case the lack of empirical 
evidence was drawn on to strengthen the statement of the problem:23 
 
‘It goes without saying that all we know about organised crime is merely the tip of the 
iceberg.’ 
 
In the mid-1990s attention to the problem of organised crime reached a peak. 
Possible irregularities in investigative methods and corruption in one of the 
special investigative teams that had been established to act against organised 
crime caused a crisis in the Dutch criminal justice system. Widespread media 
attention to the issue had a great impact on the public. In this period the public 
debate shifted. Whereas earlier threats of organised crime were seen as myths, 
organised crime was now felt to be a severe problem that affected even the 
criminal justice system.  
To repair the confidence in the criminal justice system the Parliamentary 
Inquiry into Investigative Methods (Parlementaire Enquêtecommissie 
Opsporingsmethoden) was set up. This parliamentary inquiry was mandated to 
examine the legal basis of the investigative methods being used and their 
effectiveness in tracing organised crime (Enquêtecommissie 
Opsporingsmethoden, 1996: 11). This inquiry in the mid-1990s emphasised the 
                                                        
22  De georganiseerde criminaliteit in Nederland; dreigingbeeld en plan van aanpak. Kamerstukken 1992-
1993, 22 838, no. 2: 2. 
23  De georganiseerde criminaliteit in Nederland; dreigingbeeld en plan van aanpak. Kamerstukken 1992-
1993, 22 838, no. 2: 3. 
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need for accurate insight into the actual threat of organised crime in the 
Netherlands (Enquêtecommissie Opsporingsmethoden, 1996: 23; Fijnaut et al., 
1996: 8; Fijnaut et al., 1998: x). To obtain such insight an external research 
team,24 named the ‘Fijnaut research team’ after its chairperson Cyrille Fijnaut, 
was charged to carry out the first systematic study on organised crime in the 
Netherlands (Fijnaut et al., 1996; Fijnaut et al., 1998). This research team first 
composed a new definition of organised crime not based on the hierarchical 
mafia-structured characteristics. Instead, the researchers came to a definition 
under which networks and fluid social groups could also be placed (Fijnaut et 
al., 1996: 24-25; Fijnaut et al., 1998: 26-27): 
 
‘Organised crime can best be formulated as what ensues when groups primarily focused 
on illegal profits systematically commit crime that adversely affects society and are 
capable of effectively shielding their activities, in particular being willing to use 
physical violence or eliminate individuals by way of corruption.’ 
 
This new definition enabled the Fijnaut research team to analyse the problem of 
organised crime from a different point of view. In fact, the researchers were able 
to reassure the Dutch authorities as well as the public, as they could find no 
indicators that modern criminal organisations had penetrated the public 
administration or the political decision-making process (Fijnaut et al., 1996: 
141-142; Fijnaut et al., 1998: 203-204). They concluded that there was no 
evidence of criminal groups having used corruption or intimidation to gain 
control over any important government services (Fijnaut et al., 1996: 139, 
Fijnaut et al., 1998, 200). Thus, notwithstanding some incidents of corruption in 
the police there was no decline of the criminal justice system. Nonetheless, they 
observed a rather thin dividing line between public administration and criminal 
groups, at least at the local level. Therefore, the authors recommended that this 
line be carefully guarded.  
With regard to the idea that organised crime is to a large extent interwoven 
with the legitimate environment, the researchers concluded that no criminal 
organisations had gained control of sectors of the legitimate economy by taking 
over crucial businesses or trade unions neither at the national nor at the local 
level (Fijnaut et al., 1996: 142, Fijnaut et al., 1998: 203-204). Instead, the 
research team observed a kind of symbiosis, in which two parties both profit 
from working together. For example, the transport sector profits from 
transportation assignments no matter whether these shipments involve legal or 
illegal trade. Nonetheless, the Fijnaut research team did make one important 
exception: criminal organisations had acquired positions of power in the red-
light district of Amsterdam (Fijnaut and Bovenkerk, 1996: 153). By investing in 
the hotel and catering sector including the related real estate, organised crime 
now controlled a large part of this district. The situation in Amsterdam could not 
be compared with the situation in New York, as in the Netherlands the positions 
                                                        
24  This research team consisted of four professors of criminology – Bovenkerk, Bruinsma, Van de Bunt 
and Fijnaut –, which illustrates the great significance the parliamentary inquiry attached to this 
research. 
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of power were limited to economic dealings and did not involve political 
administrative influence. Still, the Amsterdam City Council as well as the 
national authorities were alarmed. Immediately the city government undertook 
action regarding the red-light district as well as the rest of the city. This was the 
start of a unique administrative approach in Amsterdam to prevent organised 
crime. This approach is characterised by the intervention of administrative 
services, with an integral and integrated enforcement of all rules. With this strict 
maintenance of rules the city council aimed to prevent any facilitation of 
criminal organisations.25 
 The findings of the Fijnaut research team calmed the nerves of the 
authorities as well as of the public at large. To prevent further myths and 
commotion concerning the threat of organised crime, the Research and 
Documentation Centre of the Ministry of Justice in the Netherlands was charged 
to monitor the problem of organised crime (Kleemans et al., 1998 and 2002). 
Moreover, the police departments involved in fighting organised crime were 
entrusted to analyse specific organised crime activities. Their reports involved 
all kinds of activities, such as the logistic processes of Dutch criminal 
organisations (Huisman et al., 2004) and characteristics of criminal 
organisations with special connection to foreign countries such as South 
America and Turkey (see, respectively, Dienst National Recherche 2004a and 
2004b). In 2003, the National Criminal Investigation Service (Nationale 
Recherche) was mandated to analyse the future threats of serious crime and 
organised crime (Dienst Nationale Recherche Informatie, 2004).26 Such analyses 
would enable authorities to anticipate possible future developments. 
The calming of the public and political debate enabled the ministers in 
question to dress up plans and campaigns to contain the actual problems. 
Notwithstanding the finding that the Netherlands was not pressed by mafia-
structured organisations that had penetrated legitimate society, the authorities 
nonetheless had to cope with fluid social groups and networks that made use of 
opportunities in the legitimate environment. Here again, based on empirical 
research it appears that the relation between the legitimate environment and the 
criminal organisations is characterised by a symbiosis (Fijnaut et al., 1998: 128; 
Kleemans et al., 1998: 62). Organised crime needs the legitimate environment 
for its logistics, while members of the legitimate environment known or 
unbeknown profit from dealing with criminal organisations. For example, the 
Netherlands has a good infrastructure for international trade. The Rotterdam and 
Amsterdam harbours, Amsterdam airport and the Dutch road and rail network 
are used as a gateway to the rest of Europe, not only for legal economic dealings 
but also for organised crime. This means that criminal organisations make use of 
                                                        
25  This approach is one of the preventive measures that will be studied in this research on the prevention 
of organised crime (see chapter 4). 
26  This new national police authority embodies the organised crime departments that were located in 
several regions. By centralising the criminal justice system, the competent authorities hope to 
strengthen the nationwide understanding of the problem of organised crime. Moreover, the national 
body had to serve as a focal point for communicating with foreign police and had to improve 
international cooperation. 
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the logistics offered by the legitimate environment. In other words 
characteristics of Dutch society facilitate organised crime. Not surprisingly, this 
finding strengthened resolve to apply the situational approach. 
More recently, research and analyses have led to the conclusion that 
organised crime in the Netherlands might best be described as transit crime 
(Kleemans et al., 2002: 139; Zaitch, 2002; Dienst Nationale Recherche 
Informatie, 2004: 85). This means that a large part of the illegal goods are 
carried through the Netherlands to other countries. In particular, the harbours in 
Rotterdam and Amsterdam and Amsterdam Airport facilitate the transportation 
of goods. The positive aspect of the transit position of the Netherlands is that 
foreign criminal organisations have no interest in settling here. As a result there 
is less chance of these foreign organisations trying to attain positions of power 
(Kleemans et al., 2002: 140). Nonetheless, Dutch criminal organisations do 
invest in Dutch society, and as described later (Chapter 4) Amsterdam has 
established a special approach to deal with such investments. This approach 
illustrates the importance of complementing international efforts to fight 
organised crime with local efforts. After all, the actual activities of criminal 
organisations, like the producing and storing of illegal goods, do take place at 
the local level.  
 
1.2 Organised crime prevention 
 
The popularity of the preventive approach towards crime came together with the 
rising attention to organised crime in the early 1990s. The increasing insight into 
organised crime uncovered opportunities offered by the legitimate environment 
to facilitate criminal activities. Therefore, interfering in these opportunities to 
hinder their abuse for criminal activities seemed to be a useful approach to 
control crimes. From then on, prevention became a new strategy in the 
containment of organised crime. From the Council of the European Union (1997 
action plan, part I, article 5f) the fight against organised crime appears to 
balance repression and prevention:  
 
‘Prevention is no less important than repression in any integrated approach to organised 
crime, to the extent that it aims at reducing the circumstances in which organised crime 
can operate. The Union should have the instruments to confront organised crime at each 
step on the continuum from prevention to repression and prosecution.’  
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The Dutch authorities consider organised crime prevention not only as an 
important approach to contain organised crime, but in fact as an indispensable 
one. In the words of the ministers of justice and of the interior:27  
 
‘It is really unsatisfactory that the government on the one hand invests a lot of time, 
energy and money in the investigation and prosecution of criminal offences and on the 
other hand runs the risk of unintentional facilitation criminal organisations and 
activities, in a direct or indirect way.’ 
 
This clearly indicates the importance the authorities in question ascribe to the 
preventive approach against organised crime. But what does this preventive 
strategy look like in practice?  
 
1.2.1 Preventive measures against organised crime  
 
At the European level, the 1997 action plan lists the most important measures 
against organised crime.28 Section II of this plan involves the preventive 
approach and sums up seven recommendations:29  
 
1. developing an anti-corruption policy within the government apparatus;  
2. making it possible to exclude persons convicted of offences relating to organised 
crime from tendering procedures;  
3. collecting and the mutual exchange of information by member states on legal 
entities and natural persons – pursuant to regulations for the protection of personal 
information ‘as a means to prevent the penetration of organized crime in the public 
and legitimate private sector’; 
4. devoting financial resources from various funds ‘to prevent larger cities in the 
Union from becoming breeding grounds for organized crime’;  
5. developing closer cooperation between EU member states and the European 
Commission to combat fraud where the financial interests of the European Union 
are concerned; 
6. establishing an action programme to invest in the training of individuals to fulfil a 
key role in formulating and implementing preventative policy measures in the area 
of organised crime; 
7. introducing measures for the improved protection of certain vulnerable groups 
against the influence of organised crime, for example via codes of conduct. 
 
These recommendations cover a wide spectrum ranging from proposals to 
facilitate preconditions for executing preventive measures (recommendations 3, 
5 and 6) to proposals to adjust existing directives or introduce new ones 
(recommendations 1, 2 and 3). Recommendation 4 is of a totally different order, 
as it refers to larger social economic interferences to reduce crime.  
                                                        
27  Bevordering integere besluitvorming openbaar bestuur, letter from the ministers of the interior and of 
justice. Kamerstukken II 1996-1997, 25 056, no. 1: 1. 
28  Later, the Council of the European Union published new plans and joint actions, like the Millennium 
Action Plan registered in OJ C 124, 03/05/2000. However, these new plans mainly reiterated the 
general ideas of the 1997 action plan. 
29  Action plan of 28 April 1997 to combat organised crime. OJ C251, 15/08/1997. 
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In the meanwhile some of these recommendations have been codified in 
directive proposals and new policy plans. For example, the directive against 
money laundering is being enlarged to protect vulnerable groups like notaries, 
lawyers and accountants from being exploited by organised crime.30 
Furthermore, the new proposal on public contracts regarding supplies, services 
and works includes enlargement of the possibility to exclude persons who are 
related to organised crime.31  
In addition, the Council of the European Union has undertaken action to 
foster knowledge and exchange information on organised crime prevention 
amongst member states. For this, the Council has adopted exchange, training 
and cooperation programmes to combat organised crime, namely the so-called 
Falcone programme32 and the Hippocrates programme.33 By means of these 
programmes the European Union offers financial support to initiatives by its 
member states to develop crime prevention strategies. Furthermore, the 
European Commission Forum on the Prevention of Organised Crime was 
established in the framework of the Hippocrates programme. This forum has two 
interests.34 First, it consults interested parties on the acceptability and quality of 
preventive measures. Second, it offers a platform for interested parties to 
express their views. A look at the agenda of the Platform on the Prevention of 
Organised Crime illustrates the many activities being organised.35 Meanwhile 
the Falcone programme and the Hippocrates programme are both enclosed in 
AGIS, the new programme on police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters.36 
 Through its recommendations and activities the European Union tries to 
provide necessary conditions for preventing organised crime, to develop 
instruments and to offer a platform for sharing best practices. Still, the council is 
aware that to execute measures at the national and local levels it depends on the 
political commitment of its member states. Unfortunately, such commitment has 
up to now been observed only in Italy and the Netherlands, as other member 
states have not yet adopted a preventive approach towards organised crime 
                                                        
30  Directive on money laundering of 2001. Directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 4 December 2001 amending Council directive 91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of the 
financial system for the purpose of money laundering. OJ L 344, 28/12/2001, pp. 76-82. 
31  Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the coordination of 
procedures for the award of public supply contracts, public service contracts and public works 
contracts. COM(2000), 275 final and OJ C 029 E, 30/01/2001. 
32  Joint action of 19 March 1998 adopted by the Council, on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on 
European Union, establishing a programme of exchanges, training and cooperation for persons 
responsible for action to combat organised crime (Falcone programme). OJ L 099, 31/03/1998, pp. 8-
12. 
33  Council decision of 28 June 2001 establishing a programme of incentives and exchanges, training and 
cooperation for the prevention of crime (Hippokrates). OJ L 186, 07/07/2001, pp. 11-13. 
34  Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. COM(2000) 
786final, pp. 15. 
35  In 2003 there were 10 meetings organised on various subjects such as corruption, human trafficking, 
data protection and product proofing, see http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj
 /crime/forum/fsj_crime_forum_en.htm.  
36  Programme for police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (Programme AGIS), annual work 
programme and call for applications for 2003. OJ C 5. 10/01/03, pp. 5-18. 
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(Fijnaut and Paoli, 2004: 1037). This involves third-pillar plans, which are not 
directly applicable in member states. All member states have implemented the 
1991 first-pillar directive on money laundering.  
The implementation of the preventive approach by the Dutch authorities 
has enjoyed success. As described before, the first preventive measures in the 
Netherlands were based on experiences of the New York Organised Crime Task 
Force. The 1992 policy document Organised Crime in the Netherlands: Threats 
and Plan of Action introduced the first measures to hinder the abuse of 
opportunities that facilitated organised crime.37 The approach was two-sided.38 
On the one hand, a defensive approach concentrated on increasing the 
defensibility and integrity of the public administration against the threat of 
infiltration by criminal organisations, including cooperation with relevant 
professions such as lawyers and accountants to prevent their culpable 
involvement in organised crime. This strategy was incorporated in a campaign 
by the Dutch Ministry of the Interior to increase awareness of integrity at all 
levels of the public administration.39 On the other hand, an offensive approach 
implied intensified efforts by the public administration to keep criminal 
organisations out of economic sectors by not granting them permits and 
subsidies and by excluding them from tendering procedures. However, 
administrative law at that time was not designed for such exclusion, and two 
general obstacles arose (Struiksma and Michiels, 1994). First, the law offered 
few legal grounds for refusal. Second, the public administrators had no legal 
basis on which to obtain the required information. To uncover the possible 
criminal history of persons, the public administration had to have police and 
judicial data at their disposal, data that are protected by privacy regulations. 
Consequently, a new legal framework to enlarge the instruments of 
administrative law had to be created. In 1996 the ministries of internal affairs 
and justice presented their plans for a new act (the BIBOB Act) to create 
grounds for refusal or withdrawal of permits and subsidies and exclusion of 
participants from tendering procedures.40 After years of discussion amongst the 
political parties on the legitimacy and range of the screening procedure, the 
BIBOB Act came into force only in mid-2003.  
 In the second half of the 1990s there was a great deal of political support 
for the strategy of preventing organised crime in the Netherlands. In this climate 
the Minister of Justice established a special Programme for the Prevention of 
Organised Crime to invest in creating the preconditions necessary for crime 
prevention. This programme, established in 1998, focuses on two main subjects 
(Directie Jeugd en Criminaliteitspreventie, 2002: 6). First, the programme 
examines areas vulnerable for abuse by criminal groups. For example, the 
transport and the waste-disposal sector were screened. Second, the programme 
                                                        
37  De georganiseerde criminaliteit in Nederland; dreigingbeeld en plan van aanpak. Kamerstukken 1992-
1993, 22 838, no. 2. 
38  This distinction between the defensive and the offensive approach can be applied to the concrete 
proposals of the 1997 action plan of the European Union as well. 
39  Integriteit in de openbare sector. Kamerstukken II 1993-1994, 23 400, no. 11. 
40  Kamerstukken II 1996-1997, 25056, nr 1. 
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develops new instruments and methods for the optimal use and exchange of 
information. As a result, new bodies to prevent the improper use of public and 
private limited companies were set up within the Ministry of Justice (Seger, 
2003: 21). With the new Judicial Data Act (Wet Justitiële Gegevens) coming 
into force in 2003 these new bodies deal with certificates concerning good 
behaviour not only for natural persons, but also for legal persons. Moreover, 
these bodies asses applications for a certificate of no objection when setting up 
limited companies or when company statutes are changed.  
With this large body of political support it is no surprise that by the end of 
the 1990s the Dutch authorities had developed a range of preventive strategies. 
Consequently, by the turn of the century the Netherlands had developed an 
extensive preventive approach towards organised crime. Amongst other 
activities, this is evident from the active role of the Netherlands in establishing 
article 31 of the United Nations convention on transnational and organised 
crime. This article concerns the preventive approach and contains all Dutch 
suggestions (Directie Jeugd en Criminaliteitspreventie, 2002: 15). As such, 
article 31 presents the Dutch way of thinking about organised crime 
prevention.41 
In addition to the political initiatives and plans, the idea of preventing 
organised crime is supported at the local level. The most obvious example is 
Amsterdam’s preventive approach. In particular, the severe problems concerning 
the position of criminal organisations in the red-light district urged the city 
government to undertake action. In reaction the local government developed 
administrative measures to restore and maintain order. Furthermore, anticipating 
the national BIBOB regulations the city established its own screening strategies 
to bar criminals from the legitimate business environment. Over time various 
municipalities have initiated similar approaches. This goes for large cities, such 
as Rotterdam and The Hague, but also for medium-sized municipalities such as 
Almelo, Venlo and Gouda (VNG, 2002: 13). In addition, the Association of 
Netherlands Municipalities (VNG, 2002) supports the administrative approach 
based on the fact that organised crime occurs not just at the international level, 
but also locally. For example, the storage of illegal products and contacts with 
forwarders take place at the local level. These opportunities require local 
                                                        
41  The most important part of article 31 reads: ‘States Parties shall endeavour, in accordance with 
fundamental principles of their domestic law, to reduce existing or future opportunities for organized 
criminal groups to participate in lawful markets with proceeds of crime, through appropriate 
legislative, administrative or other measures. These measures should focus on: […] 
(d) The prevention of the misuse of legal persons by organized criminal groups; such measures could 
include: 
(i) The establishment of public records on legal and natural persons involved in the establishment, 
management and funding of legal persons; 
(ii) The introduction of the possibility of disqualifying by court order or any appropriate means for a 
reasonable period of time persons convicted of offences covered by this Convention from acting as 
directors of legal persons incorporated within their jurisdiction; 
(iii) The establishment of national records of persons disqualified from acting as directors of legal 
persons; and 
(iv) The exchange of information contained in the records referred to in subparagraphs (d) (i) and (iii) 
of this article with the competent authorities of other States Parties.’ 
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interference. In accordance with the developments in Amsterdam, other cities 
have initiated similar approaches. For the municipalities that have not yet 
brought in administrative actions, the Association of Netherlands Municipalities 
illustrates that with correct application of existing measures, administrative 
authorities already have an arsenal of means to take action against organised 
crime (VNG, 2002: 30-35). 
 Finally, the police authorities in the Netherlands have promulgated the 
preventive approach since early 2000. This support is based on the idea that 
investigative efforts including financial investigations do not result in decreased 
organised crime. Aligned with the popularity of the preventive approach in 
Amsterdam, the Amsterdam commissioner of police introduced the concept of 
stopping crime (tegenhouden). Later the Board of Police Commissioners (2001) 
published a report entitled Crime Can Be Stopped (Misdaad Laat Zich 
Tegenhouden). In 2003 stopping crime became one of the tasks of the National 
Criminal Investigative Service. This strategy was designed to tackle facilitating 
circumstances and disrupt criminal groups’ logistic operations (Korps landelijke 
politiediensten, 2003: 38). At this point, the preventive strategy was still being 
discussed by the competent authorities, as they did not agree on the role of the 
police in it.42 
 
1.2.2 Characteristics of organised crime prevention 
 
Prevention is of course no new concept. Traditionally it is related to the criminal 
justice system, which is supposed to deter the total population (general 
deterrence) as well as convicted offenders (specific deterrence) from 
involvement in criminal activities with the threat and fear of punishment. The 
pragmatic new preventive strategy in the recent crime-control policy has nothing 
to do with these deterrence practices. From the preventive measures described in 
the previous section and subsection it is clear that these measures cover a wide 
range of interventions. How can we define prevention in its modern application?  
In criminological science there are various classifications and models by 
which to define this new type of prevention and to categorise its various aspects. 
The most common classification is based on the insights on prevention in the 
medical world: primary, secondary and tertiary prevention. This arrangement is 
often used in combination with a model that distinguishes the target of 
prevention: offender, victim and situation (Van Dijk and De Waard, 1991). The 
first classification is also combined with two other classifications: the content 
(defensive and offensive) and the object (person and structure) (De Cauter, 
1984). Finally, Cohen and Felson classified preventive measures in their 
research according to the motivation of offenders, vulnerability of targets and 
adequacy of surveillance (Cohen and Felson, 1979). From these various 
classifications it appears that there is as yet no consensus among criminologists 
on how this new kind of prevention should be defined. The most import 
                                                        
42  Naar een veiliger samenleving, letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kamerstukken II, 2003–
2004, 28 684, no. 27. 
23
criticism, however, involves the abstraction of these classifications. The 
classifications all have a theoretical basis that in practice has turned up as 
unusable. The demarcations of categories are often unclear; they are not 
exclusive but rather overlap. Moreover, the classifications are not 
comprehensive and do not enclose all preventive interventions.  
Due to the lack of a clear theoretical framework of preventive measures, 
actual practice applies other distinctions. Often, preventive measures are 
distinguished from repressive measures by the moment of intervention. Whereas 
repressive strategies involve interventions that react upon an offence, preventive 
strategies imply interventions that precede possible offences in order to hinder 
their realisation. Thus, preventive interventions imply proactiveness. However, 
this apparently simple distinction is rather complicated, as criminal acts often 
encompass a chain of activities. Does prevention mean that intervention should 
take place before the first activity? Or may it take place anywhere in the chain as 
long as it precedes the last action. This complication is certainly relevant in the 
prevention of organised crime, which often involves chains of activities. The 
trade in illegal goods encompasses purchasing primary products, producing final 
products, transporting products and selling products. Moreover, the criminal 
proceeds of this illegal trade have to be laundered to invest the money in the 
legitimate environment. Laundering activities also imply various activities: 
displacing money, depositing money, criss-crossing money between numerous 
bank accounts, justifying money and finally investing it in legitimate 
endeavours. If preventive interventions imply only intervention at the beginning 
of such chains, then anti-money laundering measures could not be interpreted as 
prevention. Thus, regarding prevention one should concentrate on a specific part 
of the chain. The focus may be on preventing the transport of illegal products, 
preventing the offering of illegal goods and services or on preventing the 
investment of criminal profits.  
 Another distinction often applied to define preventive interventions is the 
application of instruments. This implies that interventions that are based on 
criminal law and executed by law enforcement authorities are seen as repressive 
interventions. From this point of view all other interventions such as the 
administrative approach, could be seen as preventive strategies. However, this 
distinction is not tenable as both kinds of measures can aim at exactly the same 
objective. For example, the Judicial Data Act and the BIBOB Act both aim at 
preventing the integrity of legal persons from being abused for criminal 
activities. While the first measure is an application of criminal law, the second 
involves administrative law. Obviously, it makes no sense to classify these 
measures differently. 
So what is the common element of this wide range of measures? Based on 
the earlier discussion and description, the situational approach can be identified 
as the common aspect among them.43 All aim at everyday life circumstances that 
                                                        
43  Walgrave (1995: 251-283) defines the situational approach based on the opportunity theory as one of 
the important criminological prevention strategies. In addition to this approach he distinguishes the 
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offer opportunities for organised crime rather than at the dispositions of 
potential offenders. For example, the open borders in Europe and the well-
developed infrastructure in the Netherlands, both installed to stimulate 
legitimate economic trade, facilitate trade in illegal goods and services as well. 
The situational approach to prevention encompasses proactive measures as well 
as reactive ones. Examples of proactive measures are those to increase the 
integrity of the government apparatus by preventing corruptive actions from 
taking place. Another example derives from the Dutch screening approach by 
which permits can be refused based on the likelihood of future criminal 
involvement. Examples of reactive measures are the disclosure obligation of 
financial institutions aimed at tracking criminal profits and the withdrawal of 
certain permits based on committed offences.  
Situational prevention has two important consequences. Because the 
preventive approach focuses on circumstances and not on perpetrators it is 
difficult to derive specific measures for it. The focus on everyday circumstances 
can impact a large public. Interfering in everyday circumstances means that 
preventive measures can also affect people who are not involved in criminal 
activities. In fact, most people using the financial system are not criminals 
laundering criminal profits and most of those who apply for a permit are not 
criminals wanting to take advantage of these permits. Important in this reasoning 
is that for a preventive approach competent authorities should be aware of the 
invasion of the privacy of the larger public; a difficult aspect for policy-makers 
to deal with.  
 Second, the preventive approach addresses society as a whole, by which it 
ends the exclusive responsibility of the criminal justice system to control crime. 
Instead the preventive approach addresses governments, organisations, 
institutions, companies and civilians and tries to make them feel responsible for 
the prevention of organised crime. In order to combine the strength of the 
various partners the preventive approach implies a new multi-agency strategy by 
which public and private agencies cooperate. The European Council devolves 
responsibility for substantial preventive work to institutions and groups of 
persons in a community at the national, regional and local levels.44 Moreover, 
the Council emphasises the responsibility of professions that might be 
confronted with organised crime and their interest groups in the prevention of 
organised crime.45 At the national level in the Netherlands the multi-agency 
approach focuses on cooperation between the criminal justice system, the public 
administration and various private agencies.46  
                                                                                                                                  
punitive approach that aims at the individual benefit, the clinical approach that aims at the individual 
functioning and the societal approach that deals with the societal functioning.  
44  Council resolution of 21 December 1998 on the prevention of organised crime with reference to the 
establishment of a comprehensive strategy for combating it. OJ C 408, 29/12/98, pp. 1-4, 
consideration 4. 
45  Council resolution of 21 December 1998 on the prevention of organised crime with reference to the 
establishment of a comprehensive strategy for combating it. OJ C 408, 29/12/98, pp. 1-4, 
consideration 12. 
46  Samenleving en Criminaliteit; een beleidsplan voor de komende jaren. Kamerstukken II 1984-1985, 
18 995, no. 2. 
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By emphasising the role of various parties in society the preventive approach 
clearly fits the responsibilisation strategy of Garland (1996). The success of such 
a multi-agency approach depends on the willingness of the various partners 
involved. In concrete terms, Garland (1996: 454) posits that governments must 
activate private agencies, set up a chain of cooperative action and coordinate the 
interests of the agencies involved. These three elements are essential. 
Nonetheless, these three elements can present more difficulties than bringing 
into action the traditional criminal justice system (Garland, 1996: 454). 
Obviously, the authorities involved must take these possible bottlenecks in 
consideration in developing and implementing preventive measures.  
 
1.3 The research 
 
1.3.1 The study of preventive measures 
 
This research aims to evaluate preventive measures in order to determine 
whether policy-makers’ enthusiasm about them is justified. To evaluate the 
preventive approach against organised crime, it is necessary to first determine 
the effects of the relevant measures. Literature, however, indicates the difficulty 
of determining the effects of policy measures, since it is often problematic to 
establish causality between measure and effect (Rossi, Freeman and Lipsey, 
1999: 238). Is it the indicated programme that caused a particular effect? 
Determining the causality of an intervention implies that the evaluator must 
compare the outcome of an intervention with the outcome had the intervention 
not taken place. In order to ascertain such differences evaluators ideally must 
fashion a classic experimental design wherein information about impact or 
ouytcomes for participants is compared with that about nonparticipants. In other 
cases evaluators can use statistical approaches that include before and after 
measurements. However, often these ideal research designs are not (fully) 
applicable, especially where effects on criminal behaviour are concerned. As a 
consequence in most cases the causal effects cannot be directly observed, but a 
degree of plausibility is implied (Rossi, Freeman and Lipsey, 1999: 235).  
This is certainly the case for preventive measures against organised crime, 
as criminal organisations do not announce their illegal activities in favour of 
experimental designs and there is no standard of the level of organised crime at 
certain moments. Moreover, with regard to organised crime it is hard to exclude 
rival causal factors or control for other variables that may influence the 
outcome. Levi and Maguire (2004: 405) argue that for organised crime it 
remains largely a matter of belief that there is some effect, as in this area of 
crime control one copes with the greatest difficulties in generating data. Various 
key problems complicate the measurement of organised crime. For example, 
most forms of organised crime are by their nature less susceptible to being 
counted than other crimes. Moreover, organised crime seems to be so complex 
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that one comes up against a host of definitional problems in any attempt to count 
it (Levi and Maguire, 2004: 406).  
Because of these problems in determining the effects of measures taken 
against organised crime, this study is based on an alternative plan shaped by two 
alternative strategies. For the first alternative strategy, this research observes 
plausible outcomes based on a study of the measure in the abstract. For this the 
philosophy underlying the preventive measures is evaluated. This means that the 
evaluation focuses on the set of assumptions regarding the way the intervention 
is supposed to work. To achieve such an evaluation two steps are taken (Rossi, 
Freeman, Lipsey, 1999: 157). Firstly, the programme theory, which 
encompasses the set of assumptions, is explicated and expressed. In other words 
the programme theory underlying the concrete preventive measures is 
reconstructed. Secondly, the quality of the articulated programme theory is 
evaluated; is it reasonable and plausible? To evaluate the programme theory’s 
reasonableness and plausibility, it is judged in the light of criminological 
perspectives that fit the pragmatic new strategies focusing on preventing crime 
and empirical knowledge on organised crime. If the programme theory lacks any 
such foundation, one speaks of a theory failure and the intervention will 
probably be unsuccessful. However, when the programme theory is valid, the 
intervention succeeds the plausibility test. In that case, it is plausible that the 
intervention meets the intended effects and consequently the expectations of the 
policy-makers seem justified.  
 The second alternative strategy is to examine the implementation and 
resulting outputs of the measure. Literature demonstrates that those who try to 
determine effects bring measurable elements to the task. Levi and Maguire 
(2004: 406) argue that evaluation should strive for proxy indicators to measure 
effects. La Spina (2004: 659) argues that from a quantitative point of view it is 
preferable to determine the observed outputs of a measure above assessing the 
outcome of the measure. In his contribution on the anti-mafia policies in Italy, 
observed or physical outputs imply, for example, the number of seizures, arrests 
and sentences, thus deriving a measure, while the outcome of the policies would 
enclose the eradication of the mafia in general (La Spina, 2004: 658). When 
determining the output of preventive measures it is important to realise that their 
functioning depends on their implementation. Is the measure being carried out as 
intended? If not, one can speak of an implementation failure due to which it is 
no longer obvious that the expected effects will be achieved. In short, the output 
of a measure can illustrate its success. And although it says nothing about the 
ultimate effect of the measure, it can strengthen the ultimate outcome’s 
plausibility.  
 
1.3.2 Research questions 
 
To determine the effects of preventive measures taken against crime this 
research thus focuses on two strategies: observing the plausible outcomes that 
can be derived from the programme theory and determining the concrete outputs 
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of implemented measures. To reveal the concrete outputs and plausible 
outcomes this research responds to three research questions. 
 
- What is the programme theory underlying the preventive measures?  
- What is the content of the preventive measures and how are they 
implemented? 
- What are the observed outputs and the plausible outcomes of the 
preventive measures?  
 
Together these research questions encompass the main elements of a programme 
evaluation. A general definition of programme evaluation is ‘the use of social 
research procedures to systematically investigate the effectiveness of social 
intervention programs’ (Rossi, Freeman and Lipsey, 1999). This kind of 
evaluation is frequently used to analyse preventive programmes regarding 
common crime, youth delinquency and problem-oriented policing. In most cases 
the purpose of evaluation is to provide feedback that will generate corrections to 
and refinements of crime prevention (Tilley, 2002: 1). Moreover, programme 
evaluation is necessary for competent authorities to make choices between 
various programmes by which they would obviously prefer the most effective 
and efficient measures. As a result there is already a tradition of evaluating such 
programmes.47 The current research involves a programme evaluation of three 
measures focusing on the prevention of organised crime. Because this research 
was not conducted under the authority of any policy-maker, it only describes the 
nature of the effects without broader purposes. The outcomes of this research 
may nonetheless prove useful in the development of new public programmes or 
the improvement of existing ones (Rossi, Freeman and Lipsey, 1999: 42).  
This research is largely aligned with the theoretical framework of Rossi and 
Freeman (1993: 34), who distinguish three elements in programme evaluation: 
the programme conceptualisation and design, monitoring and accountability of 
programme implementation and programme utility.48 In the more recent manual 
by Rossi, Freeman and Lipsey (1999), these elements are indicated as the 
assessment of the programme theory, the assessment of the programme process 
and the impact assessment. These elements clearly encompass the three research 
questions of this study.  
 
                                                        
47  In the Netherlands there is also criticism on the programme evaluation regarding common crime, 
youth delinquency and problem-oriented policing. Wittebrood and Van Beem (2004: 58) conclude that 
there are still many programmes that go unevaluated and that the quality of the existing evaluations is 
insufficient to uncover the actual effects.  
48  In the more recent edition of their manual on programme evaluation, Rossi, Freeman and Lipsey 
(1999: 22 and 63) divide the programme evaluation into five elements: needs assessment, assessment 
of programme theory, assessment of programme process, impact assessment and efficiency 
assessment. Here, the authors attached more significance to perceived problems as this aspect is 
separated from assessing the programme theory described in the 1993 edition. Furthermore, in regard 
to the programme utility the impact assessment is separated from the efficiency assessment. In my 
research the efficiency assessment can be left out of consideration as it is not an aspect in my research 
questions. 
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Assessment of the programme theory. Every preventive measure has a 
programme theory which encloses the assumptions about the manner in which 
the programme relates to the expected effects and the strategy the programme 
has adopted to achieve its objectives (Rossi and Freeman, 1993: 154). In fact it 
provides the rationale for why the measures should have the expected outcomes. 
Reconstructing the programme theory reveals the justification of the measure. In 
addition, it ascertains the actual objectives and expectations and grounds the 
programme process and its outcomes. When the programme theory is faulty the 
intervention will fail, and the justification of the measure will fail as well.  
Dutch literature on reconstructing programme theories distinguishes three 
sets of assumptions (Leeuw, 1989: 92). First are the causal assumptions, which 
indicate the relation between the causes and the outcomes. These relations 
represent the expectation that the programme will have the intended effects. The 
current study distinguishes between assumptions regarding the problems and 
assumptions regarding the outcomes. The realisation of a preventive measure 
usually starts with an apparent social problem and the resolve to undertake 
organised action to ameliorate it. Because the apparent social problem brings the 
measure into being, it is essential to have an adequate understanding of the 
problem’s nature and scope (Rossi and Freeman, 1993: 58). This is particularly 
important as different interest groups and political parties make use of their 
position of power to influence ideas on the nature and seriousness of a problem. 
An incorrect or exaggerated assumption of the problem may lead not only to the 
acceptance of unnecessary or (too) radical measures; it can result in measures 
that are totally ineffective as well. Therefore, by assessing the programme 
theory, this research starts with the assumptions on the problem before going 
into assumptions on the measures to combat the problem. With regard to 
assumptions regarding the outcomes, Rossi, Freeman and Lipsey (1999: 104) 
distinguish proximal or immediate effects and distal effects. If public 
administrations refuse to give permits to criminal organisations, then these 
organisations cannot make use of certain opportunities in the legitimate 
environment (a proximal effect). If criminal organisations are hindered in use of 
opportunities in the legitimate environment, organised criminals have to stop 
certain activities (distal effects). Rossi, Freeman and Lipsey (1999: 104) 
acknowledge that managing the distal effects is impossible, as this part of the 
process takes place outside of the control of the programme. Consequently, it 
can only be assumed that the distal effect will follow.  
The second set of assumptions involves the normative assumptions 
embodying the relations between the prevailing (political) standards and the 
intended situations. These assumptions refer to the apparent social problem and 
connect a value judgement to it. They often result in rather abstract 
argumentations, such as the belief that crime should not pay and that the 
legitimate environment should not facilitate organised crime. In many cases 
these value judgements make use of common sense argumentations. However, 
prevailing standards are not absolute as they can be the subject of debate and 
evolve over time.  
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The third set of assumptions implies the relations between aims and means. 
These assumptions involve final objectives and strategies to achieve them. 
Regarding the example above, the objective could involve the number of permits 
that the public administration refuses, while the means involve the screening 
procedures by which possible relations to organised crime can be uncovered.  
Assessing the programme theory thus involves uncovering and articulating 
its underlying argumentations and conceptualising the various assumptions. 
Most of the time this is not as easy as it may seem, because in many cases the 
assumptions of the programme theory are not fully articulated and recorded. In 
this research the reconstruction of the programme theory is based on the 
articulated assumptions in official policy documents and on the more implicit 
assumptions distilled from the official policy documents.  
 
Assessment of the programme process. The evaluation of the process focuses on 
the activities executed to implement a particular measure. Evaluating the process 
uncovers whether the activities did indeed take place as they were intended and 
whether the measure is in fact functioning. This part of the evaluation ascertains 
possible implementation failures, which can influence the output and expected 
outcome (Rossi and Freeman, 1993: 36). The evaluation of the process might 
involve a wide range of aspects including the organisations involved and their 
day-to-day activities as well as the appropriateness of the use of staff resources 
and funds (Rossi and Freeman, 1993: 164). The current research does not cover 
all of these aspects, but rather focuses on those that might affect the final output 
and outcome, in this case the prevention of organised crime. The evaluation 
involves two parts. First, the main activities deriving the measure in question are 
described. This description gives insight into how preventive measures in the 
Netherlands look and how they are realised. Second, the implementation of the 
measures is evaluated, therefore providing an indication of what has become of 
these activities. With a view to the crucial elements of multi-agency approaches, 
this study pays particular attention to possible problems in activating the new 
actors in question, in coordinating chains of cooperative action and in 
coordinating the interests of the various parties. Bottlenecks in these three 
elements can reveal possible implementation failures.  
 
Impact assessment. The last part of the programme evaluation involves 
determining the effect of the measure or, put differently, the impact of the 
measure on the problem. As described before, ascertaining the effects is difficult 
due to the problem of causality and the complexity of the phenomenon of 
organised crime. Therefore, the impact assessment is limited to determining the 
observed output of the measures and the plausible outcomes. Essential to 
programme evaluation is that it should not be limited to the description of 
outputs. In addition, data should be gathered and judged to arrive at an 
assessment of actual impact (Rossi, Freeman and Lipsey, 1999: 21). In order to 
determine impact in this research the observed output is judged in relation to the 
posited objectives. This enables us to ascertain to what extent the objectives are 
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achieved and the expectations met. Furthermore, the plausible outcomes are 
judged in light of both the theoretical perspectives on which the new pragmatic 
strategies are based and empirical knowledge about organised crime. In this case 
the aim is to find out if the programme theory is congruent with evidence from 
research and practical experience. The impact assessment involves the 
estimation of whether, and to what extent, the measures produce the intended 
effects. Such an estimation cannot be made with certainty but only with varying 
degrees of plausibility depending on the instruments used (Rossi and Freeman, 
1993: 215). 
 Whereas the effects refer to the objectives achieved, measures can also 
produce side effects. Side effects are additional effects of the measure in 
question. Usually side effects refer to unintended negative impacts of the 
measure. In some cases these effects are known beforehand, enabling authorities 
to try to deal with them. There are also intended or unintended side effects that 
can positively influence the impact of the measure. This research looks into the 
side effects that appear to have influenced the outputs or the outcome of the 
measure.  
 
1.3.3 Methods of the research 
 
In the developments regarding the prevention of organised crime in the 
Netherlands two important measures are evident at the national level: the Dutch 
anti-money laundering intervention and the Dutch screening and auditing 
approach. In addition, the Amsterdam City Council developed a unique local 
preventive approach towards organised crime. These three measures are the 
main preventive measures taken against organised crime in the Netherlands. 
Moreover, these measures illustrate that organised crime is a problem at all 
levels of society and that all of these levels – international, national and local – 
offer possibilities to fight the problem. Therefore, these three measures were 
chosen as the subject of this research. The anti-money laundering intervention 
was selected because it is the first measure to specifically focus on the 
prevention of organised crime. Because it involves the implementation of 
European directives, it is an example of an international strategy to address a 
global problem.49 Notwithstanding the fact that this research concentrates on 
Dutch measures, this intervention clearly indicates that it is impossible to 
exclude international, in particular European, influences on the national scene. 
The screening and auditing approach was selected, because it is, along with the 
previous intervention, the most extensive preventive measure against organised 
crime in the Netherlands. Moreover, this intervention is an example of Dutch 
policy influencing European developments regarding the exclusion of criminal 
organisations from tendering procedures and refusing them permits and 
subsidies. Finally, the administrative approach of Amsterdam was selected 
because it is a project presented by local as well as national authorities as one of 
                                                        
49  See the 1995 United Nations conference report on transnational organised crime (Williams and 
Savona, 1996: 167). 
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the most progressive and unique interventions in the Netherlands and, indeed, in 
the European Union. 
The programme evaluations are the connecting thread in this research. 
Three chapters focus on the selected preventive measures. Chapter 2 looks at the 
Dutch anti-money laundering intervention; Chapter 3 describes the Dutch 
screening and auditing approach; and Chapter 4 looks at the administrative 
approach of Amsterdam. These chapters are composed of the three elements of 
the programme evaluation described earlier. After an introduction to the 
problem and the policy developments, these chapters go on to assess the 
programme theory. A third section concerns the assessment of the programme 
process. Finally, the fourth section comprises the impact assessment.  
Answering the three research questions for each of these selected measures 
makes this research orderly, but also rather extensive. Consequently, it was 
necessary to limit the programme evaluation to its core elements. In order to 
reconstruct the programme theory and uncover the perceived problems of the 
selected measures, the most effort was put into studying the programme 
documents, such as the explanatory memoranda to the acts and the plans of 
action of the measures. The advantage of these sources lies in the fact that they 
are almost always available. Moreover, reasoning based on these documents is 
clearly verifiable. The disadvantage of this method is that the more implicit 
assumptions and various underlying objectives and expectations cannot be 
described. Consequently, the assessment of the programme theory is limited to 
evaluating the policy as it is officially written. As a result, the programme theory 
includes the assumptions explicitated in official documents as well as the more 
implicit theory as it is reconstructed.  
Furthermore, the decision to select three preventive measures made it 
impossible to gather information first-hand or carry out data-aimed research. 
Instead, existing information is used to describe the implementation process and 
the measures’ impact as much as possible. For assessing the process and for the 
impact assessment, the acts and plans themselves and the explanatory 
memoranda are studied, as well as other relevant literature. In general this 
includes technical literature and articles and opinions of persons and institutions 
involved in carrying out the measures. Annual reports and existing evaluative 
studies were drawn upon to determine the outputs of the measures. For the 
assessment of the measures, the programme development stage plays an 
important role (Rossi, Freeman and Lipsey, 1999: 44). The Dutch anti-money 
laundering intervention was established more then ten years ago, meaning its 
outputs and outcomes can be evaluated in order to determine the presumed 
effectiveness. The administrative approach of Amsterdam has been established 
but is still developing. This latter aspect makes it difficult to reach final 
conclusions. The Dutch screening and auditing approach is innovative. Due to 
its short time of implementation some problems in the implementation process 
have yet to be ironed out. The first two measures were recently evaluated. The 
last measure came into force only in mid-2003. Therefore, no evaluation has yet 
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taken place. In this case our impact assessment is mainly limited to general 
remarks and indications.  
 With the understanding that the evaluation of the three measures cannot be 
intensive, one might ask why this method was followed. The subject of this 
research is the preventive approach towards organised crime in the Netherlands 
and the aim is to judge the effectiveness of the preventive approach. Because of 
the wide variety of preventive measures, this study could not be limited to just 
one measure. Neither was delving into all the initiatives taken in the framework 
of organised crime prevention a feasible option. That led to the selection of the 
three main preventive measures taken against organised crime in the 
Netherlands. The systematic use of the same elements of programme evaluation 
gives not only good insight into the different measures, it also enables 
comparison of these insights and for general judgements to be made regarding 
the effectiveness of organised crime prevention in the country. Chapter 5 
presents these general judgements. This final chapter revisits policy-makers’ 
enthusiasm for the preventive approach against organised crime and looks at 
whether this enthusiasm is justified. 
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Chapter 2 The Dutch anti-money laundering intervention 
 
The problem of money laundering was first recognised in the 1900s in the 
United States, where mafia organisations were mixing criminal proceeds with 
legal business. Since 1970, the problem has been actively fought, with the 
introduction of anti-money laundering legislation first in North America and 
then Europe. The United Nations provided the vehicle for Europe’s first 
recognition of and response to the money laundering problem. The European 
Union drafted an anti-money laundering directive in 1991. Soon after, the Dutch 
government established its own anti-money laundering intervention. Thus, the 
expansion of preventive measures against money laundering operations in 
Europe can be typified as a truly top-down process.  
 This chapter focuses on the plausible effects of the Dutch anti-money 
laundering intervention on organised crime.50 The purpose of the chapter, in 
other words, is to reveal whether it is correct to assume that the Dutch anti-
money laundering intervention actually can prevent organised crime. In 
conformance with the methods described in Chapter 1, it responds to the three 
research questions:  
 
- What is the programme theory underlying the Dutch anti-money laundering 
intervention? (Section 2.2) 
- What is the content of the Dutch anti-money laundering intervention and how is it 
implemented? (Section 2.3) 
- What are the observed outputs and plausible outcomes of the Dutch anti-money 
laundering intervention? (Section 2.4) 
 
However, before answering these questions, a first section introduces the 
problem of money laundering and the related policy developments at the 
international and national levels. This section also defines what the term ‘money 
laundering’ entails, which is imperative, since the precise meaning of the 
concept varies from one authority to another. As we will see, this has influenced 
the purposes and effects of anti-money laundering interventions.  
 
2.1 Money laundering  
 
The concept of money laundering originated in the United States, and it likely 
refers to the launderettes that Italian mafia families ran in order to combine legal 
business profits with illegal gains from criminal activities (Stessens, 1997: 
                                                        
50  Thus the chapter does not provide an extensive analysis of the history and content of anti-money 
laundering measures. For overall insight into the problem of money laundering and the anti-money 
laundering intervention see among others Savona (1993), Gilmore (1995), Van Duyne et al. (2003b) 
and Mitsilegas (2003). 
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102).51 In this way illegal profits could be made to look like legally earned 
income. With the Watergate inquiry of the mid-1970s the term ‘money 
laundering’ entered popular usage and it has since been widely accepted 
internationally.  
The main aspect of money laundering is the veiling or hiding of crime 
money and providing a fake but apparently legal origin for it. This is evident 
from various definitions of the term:  
 
‘Laundering is falsely claiming a legitimate source for an illegally acquired advantage 
(Van Duyne, 2003: 69).’ 
 
‘Money laundering is an activity aimed at concealing the unlawful source of sums of 
money (Dini, 1997: 3).’ 
 
‘Money laundering is the process of converting or ‘cleaning’ property knowing that 
such property is derived from serious crime for the purpose of disguising its origin 
(Sherman, 1993: 13).’ 
 
‘Money laundering is the conversion of illicit cash to another asset, the concealment of 
the true source of ownership of the illegally acquired proceeds, and the creation of the 
perception of legitimacy of source and ownership (Gilmore, 1992: x).’ 
 
These definitions all allude to the main purpose of money laundering as 
acquiring an apparently legal source for profits gained by illegal activities. This 
justification of crime money is money laundering in its strict or narrow sense 
(Van Duyne, 2003: 79). All activities related to it, such as transferring money to 
foreign countries or between numerous bank accounts, can be seen as money 
laundering in the large or broad sense. The literature on money laundering 
acknowledges that it can result in a whole complex of activities. In general these 
activities can be categorised in three main phases (see e.g. the description of 
money laundering by the FATF52):  
 
- placement, which is when the launderer introduces illegal profits into the financial 
system; 
- layering, in which the launderer engages in a series of conversions or movements 
of the funds through a series of accounts at various banks across the globe to 
distance them from their source; 
- integration, which is when the launderer re-introduces the funds into the legitimate 
economy, for example, by investing them in real estate, luxury assets or business 
ventures. 
 
                                                        
51  A short semantic analysis on the concept money laundering by Van Duyne (2003: 69) shows that the 
idea of washing dirty, criminally acquired money until it becomes white and it can be spent in the 
legal environment, persists in some main European language. See e.g. ‘witwassen’ in Dutch, 
‘waschen’ in German and ‘blanchissement’ in French.  
52  See the FATF website: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/29/0,2340,en_32250379_32235720_33659 
613_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
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Gilmore (1995: 37), Savona and De Feo (1997:23-28), Van Duyne et al. (2001: 
129-130) and Mul (1999: 7) contain extensive descriptions of and discussion on 
these phases.53 
 Besides the similarity in these definitions, there is also some vagueness. 
For example, all definitions refer to the criminal origin of money, but what is 
meant by illegally acquired advantages and the unlawful source of sums of 
money? What does illicit cash imply? Obviously, the crime money of mafia 
organisations has a completely different origin than the monies discussed in the 
Watergate inquiry. As this study deals with the Dutch anti-money laundering 
intervention it is necessary to determine how the Dutch legislator interprets this 
concept. However, before going into the Dutch situation we first look at 
international developments related to money laundering. This discussion enables 
us to conclude that the scope of interventions do indeed differ from one country 
or international organisation to the next. 
 
2.1.1 Developments at the international level 
 
The United States initiated its first anti-money laundering measures in the 1970s 
with the passing of several pieces of legislation against the laundering of money 
and organised crime.54 Until the mid-1980s, however, the effectiveness of the 
legislation was rather limited because of the tenuous connection with organised 
crime and the limited attention paid to compliance (Mitsilegas, 2003: 36). The 
war on drugs which dominated US policy in the 1980s accelerated interest in 
anti-money laundering interventions. Drugs and money laundering became 
inextricably linked in the public eye. In this political environment the authorities 
assumed that organised crime used laundering operations to generate apparently 
legal income from drugs money and flourished as it did. This led the authorities 
to promise ‘to do everything …necessary to end the drugs menace’, including 
‘an all-out war on big-time organized crime’ (Mitsilegas, 2003: 37). Thus the 
focused effort to combat money laundering in the United States was initially a 
result of its loudly proclaimed war on drugs. 
When the United States in the 1980s reassessed the problem of money 
laundering – as a derivative of drugs trafficking – international and national 
legislators throughout the world obediently followed (Van Duyne et al., 2002: 
61). From then on, internationally too anti-money laundering interventions 
developed into a major thrust of the war on drugs. As a consequence, an 
intergovernmental organisation, the Financial Action Task Force on Money 
                                                        
53  To emphasise the necessity of creating an apparently legal origin, Van Duyne (2003: 79) distinguishes 
two more phases: the justification phase in which the crime-money must be justified, and the 
embedding phase in which the money is woven into the upperworld economy.  
54  It concerns the Organized Crime Control Act 1970, the Bank Secrecy Act and the Drug Control Act 
1970. See for more information on the development of the anti-money laundering intervention in the 
United States Mitsilegas (2003: 36).  
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Laundering (FATF), was established by the G-7 in 1989.55 This chapter 
repeatedly mentions the role of the FATF.  
 Meanwhile, the United Nations, which had already directed its attention to 
the problem of narcotics, brought the anti-money laundering intervention from 
the United States to Europe. The issue of money laundering and drugs has 
remained prominent on the UN agenda ever since. The Commission on 
Narcotics Drugs prepared a convention to fight trade in narcotics and use of 
illegal drugs. This resulted in the Vienna Convention in 1988,56 which 
introduced penalties for laundering illegal profits from the drugs trade. The 
Vienna Convention also had significant influence on the Council of Europe,57 
which in 1990 established its Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (also called the Strasbourg 
Convention).58 While the Strasbourg Convention aims mainly at depriving 
criminals of the proceeds of illegal activities and at improving international 
cooperation in this respect, it is nonetheless also a key convention with regard to 
fighting money laundering, as the penalisation of money laundering 
subsequently appeared in the laws of many of its signatory states. The definition 
used in the Vienna Convention is broader than money laundering in its strictest 
sense – acquiring an apparently legal origin for profits gained by illegal 
activities – and in fact overlaps with activities such as fencing and receiving and 
handling stolen goods. In short, the Council of Europe interprets all property of 
profits from crime including advantages, such as saved taxes, as proceeds. 
According to the Council, laundering involves the receiving and handling of 
these proceeds. Serious offences such as drugs offences, illegal arms traffic, 
terrorist activities and human smuggling are also mentioned in the Strasbourg 
Convention. This is key in that money laundering is no longer exclusively 
associated with drugs trafficking, and anti-money laundering interventions are 
no longer solely connected with drugs offences.59  
As a result of these international developments the Council of the European 
Union formulated its Directive on Money Laundering of 1991 to oblige its 
                                                        
55  Nowadays the FATF consists of 31 countries and territories, including the Netherlands, and two 
organisations, under which the European Commission. The FATF intend developing and promoting 
policies to combat money laundering at the national and international levels. In 1990 the FATF 
published a report with 40 recommendations concerning the fight against money laundering, which 
was updated in 1996 and 2002. 
56  Vienna Convention. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances Adopted in Vienna, 19 December 1988. In: W.C. Gilmore (ed.) (1992). 
International Efforts to Combat Money Laundering, Cambridge: Grotius Publications, p. 75. 
57  The Council of Europe stressed the importance of fighting money laundering in a recommendation 
adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in 1980; Recommendation No. 
R(80)10 Adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 27 June 1980 and 
explanatory memorandum on measures against the transfer and safekeeping of funds of criminal 
origin, in: W.C. Gilmore (ed.) (1992), International Efforts to Combat Money Laundering, 
Cambridge: Grotius Publications, p. 169, Recommendation No. R(80)10. 
58  Strasbourg Convention. Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds 
from Crime, Council of Europe, Adopted in Strasbourg 1990, in W.C. Gilmore (ed.) (1992), 
International Efforts to Combat Money Laundering, Cambridge: Grotius Publications, p. 177.  
59  For an extended discussion on delineating the concept of money laundering see Van Duyne (2003: 68-
73) and Mul (1999: 39-120). 
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member states to put effort into the fight against money laundering.60 The 
directive is enforced under the European Union’s first pillar, as the integrity of 
businesses, in particular of the financial sector in EU member states, is deemed 
to be at stake. The Council of the European Union considered action at the EU 
level necessary for two reasons.61 First, the EU recognised that criminal 
organisations could take advantage of the freedom of capital movement and the 
freedom to supply financial services within the single European market. Second, 
the EU felt that measures adopted by individual states could be inconsistent with 
the completion of the single market. Although the balance sought between the 
single market objective and the aim of combating organised crime was not made 
completely clear (Mitsilegas, 2003: 180), this did not hamper the establishment 
of the 1991 directive,62 which is remarkable since policies against organised 
crime generally originate from the third pillar of the European Union. The first-
pillar anti-money laundering directive affects the member states directly, since 
implementation of directives is obligatory.63 The anti-money laundering 
directive is therefore of utmost importance to EU member states, including the 
Netherlands.  
The European anti-money laundering directive refers to penalties described 
in the Vienna Convention. This means that the scope of the directive is limited 
to drugs offences. However, the directive does stimulate member states to look 
at proceeds of other criminal activities as well:64 
 
‘whereas for the purposes of this Directive the definition of money laundering is taken 
from that adopted in the Vienna Convention; whereas, however, since money 
laundering occurs not only in relation to the proceeds of drug-related offences but also 
in relation to the proceeds of other criminal activities (such as organized crime and 
terrorism), the Member States should, within the meaning of their legislation, extend 
the effects of the Directive to include the proceeds of such activities, to the extent that 
they are likely to result in laundering operations justifying sanctions on that basis 
[italics by CvdS].’  
 
As stated here, the directive goes beyond the war on drugs and aims at all sorts 
of organised crime. As can be seen here, like in the Strasbourg Convention, the 
Council of the European Union was aware of the threat of terrorism in 1991. 
However, as described further below, it was not until the terrorist attacks in New 
York in 2001 that terrorism actually began to influence the money laundering 
intervention.  
                                                        
60  Directive on money laundering of 1991. Council directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention 
of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering. OJ L 166, 28/06/1991, pp. 77-
83. 
61  Directive on money laundering of 1991, second consideration. 
62  In the next chapter concerning the screening and auditing procedures, finding a balance between first-
pillar and third-pillar objectives appeared to be more difficult.  
63  According to article 249 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community a Directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to 
which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods.  
64  Directive on money laundering of 1991, consideration 9. 
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In the meantime, organised crime rose to the top of the European third-pillar 
agenda,65 which resulted in 1997 in the action plan to combat organised crime at 
the EU level. In this action plan the Council of the European Union emphasised 
the importance of extending the definition of money laundering: ‘the reporting 
obligation in article 6 of the Money Laundering Directive should be extended to 
all offences connected with serious crime’ (recommendation 26). The action 
plan did not, however, clarify the concept of serious crime.  
While the third-pillar action plan was binding, it did not affect the member 
states directly. Its effects therefore turned out to be minimal. However, it did 
launch a new discussion on money laundering at the EU level. The European 
Commission argued that ‘the growing trend based on the dramatic increase in 
non-drugs based organised crime’ was an important argument in favour of 
broadening the predicate offences. However, the Commission also advanced a 
side effect of such an extension. It anticipated a possible unwillingness of the 
financial sector, which according to the Commission had ‘expressed 
considerable reticence concerning any reporting requirement that would extend 
to an excessively wide range of offences, even including relatively minor 
ones’.66 Although this argument is perhaps debatable,67 the Commission 
persisted in the idea that the anti-money laundering measures should not be 
based on serious offences, but rather should be limited to ‘activities linked to 
organised crime or damaging the European Communities’ financial interests’.68  
Notwithstanding the Commission’s arguments the EU Parliament and the 
Council of the European Union drew up in 2001 a new directive on money 
laundering in which the concept of serious crime is maintained.69 With this new 
directive the penalisation for money laundering was no longer officially related 
to drugs offences but applied to all criminal involvement in the execution of a 
serious crime.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
65  This pillar encompasses police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. It does not concern 
Community law, as such third-pillar measures are binding but they shall not entail direct effect in the 
member states.  
66  Proposal for a European Parliament and Council directive amending Council directive 91/308/EEC of 
10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering. OJ 
C 177, 27/06/2000, explanatory memorandum. 
67  It is not clear yet if such an enlargement really increases the efforts of financial institutions. Probably, 
focusing on money laundering activities irrespective of the nature of the predicate crimes is less 
complicated. As described below the Dutch legislator chose to encompass all predicate offences in the 
anti-money laundering intervention.  
68  Proposal for a European Parliament and Council directive amending Council directive 91/308/EEC of 
10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering. OJ 
C 177, 27/06/2000, explanatory memorandum. 
69  Directive on money laundering of 2001. Directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 4 December 2001 amending Council directive 91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of the 
financial system for the purpose of money laundering. OJ L 344, 28/12/2001, pp. 76-82. 
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The directive defines serious crime as implying at least the following:70  
 
- ‘any of the offences defined in Article 3(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention;  
- the activities of criminal organisations as defined in Article 1 of Joint Action 
98/733/JHA;  
- fraud, at least serious, as defined in Article 1(1) and Article 2 of the Convention on 
the protection of the European Communities' financial interests; 
- corruption;  
- an offence which may generate substantial proceeds and which is punishable by a 
severe sentence of imprisonment in accordance with the penal law of the Member 
State.’ 
 
Based on this definition one can conclude that European law-makers, influenced 
by policy originating in the third pillar, did not focus exclusively on organised 
crime in formulating the new directive. Moreover, European policy leaves 
spaces to be filled by the member states, giving them some freedom to address 
possible national interests.  
 Since the terrorist attacks in 2001, unravelling the financing of terrorism 
has taken on new urgency at the international level. According to the FATF the 
fight against organised crime and terrorism go hand in hand.71 A 2003 report 
asserts that criminal organisations and terrorist groups basically use the same 
methods of hiding and obscuring the links between the sources of monies, on the 
one hand, and the purposes of their finances on the other (FATF, 2003: 3). This 
connection with terrorism has been accompanied by a subtle change in the 
definition of money laundering.72 Money laundering seems no longer restricted 
to the criminal origin of proceeds, but now encompasses criminal purposes of 
funds as well. The European Parliament and the Council have adopted this 
changing view in proposing a new directive on money laundering that includes 
terrorist financing.73 This proposal introduces terrorism as a separate element 
(article 3) that, next to other serious offences, should be hindered by the anti-
money laundering intervention:  
 
‘The case of lawful property being diverted to finance terrorism is now envisaged as 
part of the definition of money laundering.’ 
 
Notwithstanding this changing view at the political level, the literature still 
indicates a great difference between the origin of crime money and the criminal 
purpose of money (Van de Bunt and Van Dijken, 2003: 55; Ping, 2004: 24). 
From this viewpoint, money laundering with regard to organised crime and 
terrorism appear to be opposite activities. Therefore, it is questionable whether 
                                                        
70  Directive on money laundering of 2001, article 1 under E. 
71  In 2003 the FATF enlarged its mandate and established eight special recommendations on terrorist 
financing.  
72  For example, Johnson defined money laundering as ‘moving funds through financial institutions or 
accounts to disguise its origin and/or purpose’ (Johnson, 2003: 10). 
73  Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention of the use of 
the financial system for the purpose of money laundering, including terrorist funding. COM (2004) 
448 final, 30/06/2004.  
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these activities should in fact be connected. Insofar as the current anti-money 
laundering interventions all emphasise the predicate offences and the criminal 
origin of money, hiding the generating process of funds for terrorist activities 
should not be considered money laundering but as terrorist financing (Ping, 
2004: 24). The differences between the process of terrorist financing and that of 
money laundering also imply that the two should not be placed in the same 
category. Nevertheless, the focus on terrorism has revitalised efforts put into the 
anti-money laundering approach at the European level and accelerated the 
implementation of measures against organised crime, both preventive and 
repressive ones.74  
 
2.1.2 Developments in the Netherlands 
 
In the Netherlands money laundering was a non-issue until the late 1980s. From 
then on, it was firstly associated with black money that ordinary citizens and 
companies tried to hide from the scrutiny of tax authorities. A few years later, as 
a result of the international discussion on the laundering of proceeds from drugs 
crimes, Dutch law-makers made the connection between money laundering and 
the fight against organised crime. While the Dutch anti-money laundering 
legislation was a direct consequence of the European directive, the Dutch 
government was in this period already addressing the issue of organised crime 
penetrating the legitimate environment.75 Consequently, the implementation of 
the European directive met with little resistance.76 
In 1993 the main obligations in the European directive were implemented 
by means of two acts: the Disclosure of Unusual Transactions (Financial 
Services) Act77 and the Identification (Financial Services) Act.78 These have 
since become a cornerstone of the fight against organised crime in the 
Netherlands. Though the Dutch adopted the objectives of the 1991 European 
directive on money laundering, whereas the European directive was formally 
limited to organised drugs crimes the Dutch took a more general approach to 
money laundering. The Dutch anti-money laundering intervention targets all 
financial transactions involving illegal proceeds, irrespective of the nature of the 
crimes connected with them.79 The Netherlands thus broadened the anti-money 
                                                        
74  One of the main consequences of the terrorist attacks in 2001 is the ease with which the legal 
professionals were pulled under the anti-money laundering measures. See also section 2.3.  
75  De georganiseerde criminaliteit in Nederland; dreigingbeeld en plan van aanpak. Kamerstukken 1992-
1993, 22 838, no. 2. 
76  It took however, until 2001 to make money laundering a criminal offence as only then was it penalised 
by a special article in the Criminal Code (article 420bis to quater). Before this, money laundering was 
punishable and could be prosecuted by the penalisation of fencing (Criminal Code article 416 to 417 
bis). 
77  Wet van 16 december 1993 betreffende melding ongebruikelijke transacties bij financiële 
dienstverlening (Wet melding ongebruikelijke transacties). Stb. 1993, no. 705. 
78  Wet van 16 december 1993 houdende nieuwe bepalingen inzake identificatie van cliënten bij 
financiële dienstverlening (Wet identificatie bij financiële dienstverlening 1993), Stb. 1993, no. 704. 
79  European directives are binding with regard to the result to be achieved, but they leave to the national 
authorities the choice of form and methods. As a result member states implemented the directive 
differently. Unlike the Netherlands, Italy, France and the United kingdom initially established an 
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laundering measures to encompass all kinds of offences. Though the Dutch 
intervention is not aimed exclusively at organised crime, the Dutch policy 
explicitly states that the anti-money laundering measures are initially targeted at 
preventing different forms of organised crime.80 As at the European level, the 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 was an incentive to enlarge the anti-
money laundering intervention, with the relation between organised crime and 
terrorism found in the integrity of the financial sector. 
 
2.1.3 The scope of anti-money laundering interventions 
 
The many directives, acts, conventions and policy documents by national and 
supranational authorities, as well as international organisations, illustrates that 
the scope of an intervention depends on the authoring authority and is influenced 
by the political climate dominant at the time of its formulation. Nevertheless, all 
of the anti-money laundering policies are aimed to prevent organised crime; 
while some are limited to a particular aspect of this crime, most operate on a 
larger scale. Over the years anti-money laundering interventions have been 
broadened. As mentioned, the American intervention was at first specifically 
aimed at drugs offences and its main focus was on organised crime. Europe 
expanded the scope of the intervention to all serious offences. Although the anti-
money laundering directives were enacted under the first-pillar structure to 
protect the single market, the development of third-pillar rules for preventing 
organised crime led to the expansion of the first-pillar directive. At the national 
level, the Netherlands broadened its intervention to include not only serious 
offences, but also all predicate offences. While both the European and Dutch 
anti-money laundering interventions include organised crime, they are not aimed 
at it exclusively. Still, organised crime was the main reason for bringing the 
interventions into force.  
 It is clear that national and international authorities and organisations have 
focused on criminal proceeds. However, this is changing as well. Anti-money 
laundering interventions seem no longer restricted to the origin of crime money, 
but now encompass the criminal purposes of funds as well. The categorisation of 
terrorist funding within the scope of the anti-money laundering intervention is 
first and foremost a political move. It illustrates the government’s perception 
that obtaining insight into money flows is the solution to stop criminal activities. 
But is it legitimate to assume that anti-money laundering interventions can 
prevent criminal activities? The next section looks at the assumptions and 
expectations on which the Dutch anti-money laundering intervention is based.  
                                                                                                                                  
intervention towards limited number of predicate offences, like the European Union did. By now these 
countries have recognised that it is impossible for the (bank) employee to determine the predicate 
offices and their anti-money laundering interventions are broadened to the proceeds off all predicate 
crimes.  
80  In different policy documents and in the explanatory memorandum of the Disclosure of Unusual 
Transactions (Financial Services) Act the anti-money laundering measures are described to be 
important for an effective fight against organised crime. Nieuwe bepalingen inzake identificatie van 
cliënten bij financiële dienstverlening. Kamerstukken II 1992/93, 23 009, no. 3: 1. 
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2.2  Programme theory of the Dutch anti-money laundering 
intervention 
 
To answer our first research question this section analyses the programme 
theory, by which the assumptions and objectives of the Dutch anti-money 
laundering intervention are outlined. In accordance with the methods described 
in Chapter 1 this section involves two elements. First, the legislator’s 
assumptions are uncovered. In order to do so attention is paid to causal 
assumptions and the normative assumption underlying the policy, as these 
together form the philosophy or the theory of the intervention. Revealing this 
theory is necessary, as the last section of this chapter judges the theory in the 
light of pragmatic new criminological theories and empirical knowledge of 
organised crime. Second, the objectives of the anti-money laundering 
intervention are examined, as well as the strategies to achieve these objectives. 
This overview of objectives is required for the final section of this chapter, on 
evaluation, as it provides the framework for assessing the intervention’s outputs.  
Explanatory memoranda of the various directives and acts provide clues as 
to the programme theory of the anti-money laundering intervention. Because the 
problems of money laundering and of reinvesting proceeds of crime were not yet 
actually manifest in the Netherlands in the early 1990s, the Dutch government 
based its policy on the expectations of the international authorities. 
Consequently, this section also includes many references to the reasoning of 
these international authorities.  
 
2.2.1 Assumptions 
 
Causal assumptions. Causal assumptions involve the reasoning of law-makers 
and policy-makers regarding a specific problem. Often this reasoning 
encompasses two kinds of assumptions: those regarding the problem and those 
related to the way the problem should be addressed.  
 In the explanatory memoranda of the international and Dutch anti-money 
laundering regulations the assumption appears to be that the main problem of 
organised crime relates to the large profits that criminal organisations can make. 
This is best phrased by the United Nations, which argues that people would not 
be attracted to commit crimes if they were unable to hide the profits from law-
enforcement authorities. Consequently, action should aim ‘to deprive persons 
engaged in illicit traffic of the proceeds of their criminal activities and thereby 
eliminate their main incentive for so doing’.81 In other words criminal profits are 
key in fighting organised crime. This reasoning has resulted in extensive 
international legislation to interfere in criminal profits, such as international 
treaties regarding confiscation of criminal proceeds and prevention of abuse of 
the financial system for the purpose of money laundering.  
                                                        
81  Vienna Convention, preamble.  
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But what threats and problems are actually caused by these proceeds? European 
and Dutch law-makers assert that criminal profits present a significant threat to 
the legitimate environment. This threat is said to be two-sided. First, illegal 
profits can be invested in new criminal activities, in which case there is a vicious 
circle in which crime results in illegal proceeds and these proceeds result in 
more crime. The Council of Europe acted in line with this idea in its 
recommendation R(80)10, ‘to examine the serious problems raised in many 
countries by the illicit transfer of funds of criminal origin frequently used for the 
perpetration of further crime [italics by CvdS]’.82 To protect society this vicious 
circle must be broken. For this, European and Dutch regulations focus on profits 
from criminal activities, with interventions to confiscate these profits. Although 
the anti-money laundering intervention is not primarily aimed at confiscating 
criminal proceeds, it can facilitate confiscation activities.  
 Second, the intertwining of illegal proceeds and legal activities could 
damage the whole of society. This is well stated in the Vienna Convention, in 
which the United Nations speaks of ‘illicit traffic and other related organized 
crime activities which undermine the legitimate economies and threaten the 
stability, security and sovereignty of States’.83 Dutch policy emphasises that by 
investing criminal proceeds in the legitimate environment, criminal 
organisations may be able to build up economic positions of power that could 
result in unfair competition.84 Yet before criminal organisations can invest 
illegally obtained profits in the legitimate environment they must launder their 
profits to obtain an apparently legal origin for them. It is generally assumed that 
criminal organisations often make use of financial service providers for such 
laundering activities. This interaction with the legitimate environment is viewed 
as the Achilles’ heel of criminal organisations, as it is a point at which law 
enforcement can interfere in criminal activities. Consequently, the interaction 
between financial service providers and criminal organisations is an essential 
aspect of the anti-money laundering intervention. In other words, European and 
Dutch legislators focus attention on financial service providers that might 
facilitate money laundering operations.  
To intervene effectively, law-makers have closely examined the attractive 
elements of using these providers for money laundering. Two elements are 
believed to be key: the anonymity with which launderers can perform their 
activities and the ease of discrete and unnoticed operating. From the explanatory 
memorandum of the Dutch anti-money laundering intervention the assumption 
appears to be that intervening in these attractive elements would undermine 
money laundering operations. The intervention was based on increasing 
supervision of financial transactions – the idea being that increased attention for 
                                                        
82  Recommendation No. R(80)10 adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 27 
June 1980 and explanatory memorandum on measures against the transfer and safekeeping of funds of 
criminal origin, in: W.C. Gilmore (ed.) (1992), International Efforts to Combat Money Laundering, 
Cambridge: Grotius Publications, p. 177. 
83  Vienna Convention, preamble. 
84  Wijziging van het Wetboek van Strafrecht en enkele andere wetten in verband met de strafbaarstelling 
van het witwassen van opbrengsten van misdrijven. Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 27 159, no. 3: 5. 
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possible abuse of the financial system would limit launderers’ ability to operate 
anonymously and discretely and therefore would deter laundering activities. 
This reasoning is predicated on a sort of deterrence, as the risk to be caught 
would be high. This is strengthened by the threat of the persons carrying out the 
transactions being identified. Thus, the assumption is that increased supervision 
of financial transactions will hinder launderers in money laundering operations 
and, as a consequence, will reduce money laundering activities.  
Based on the crucial role of financial service providers, the authorities 
placed these providers at the centre of the anti-money laundering intervention. In 
fact they are ascribed two tasks. First they must be aware of possible abuse 
related to money laundering operations. Consequently, financial service 
providers are charged to pay special attention to complicated, unusual or large 
transactions and to any unusual patterns of transactions that lack economic or 
perceptible legitimate purposes.85 Second, these providers must undertake action 
if they notice possible money laundering activities. Such action is two-fold. 
Providers can refuse to carry out transactions that seem to be related to money 
laundering operations or they can alert the competent authority to such 
transactions. In the latter case it is up to the competent authority to undertake 
further action to uncover any illegal money flows and the criminal organisation 
involved. Financial service providers can thus metaphorically be regarded as 
gatekeepers of the legitimate environment, as they have become active partners 
of the authorities in the fight against organised crime.  
The programme theory of the Dutch anti-money laundering intervention 
can be said to encompass the assumption that hindering investment of criminal 
profits in the legitimate environment will make organised crime less attractive 
for criminal organisations. Moreover, by facilitating the confiscation of illegal 
profits the intervention contributes to remove the main incentive for committing 
organised crime. Or as the European Council argues, whereas money laundering 
has an evident influence on the rise of organised crime, combating money 
laundering is one of the most effective means of opposing these criminal 
activities.86 
 
Normative assumptions. The importance of interfering in criminal profits is 
based not only on causal assumptions. From the various directives and acts and 
their explanatory memoranda, several normative assumptions can be found as 
well.  
The assumed problems pointed out above already provide a clear incentive 
for undertaking action against money laundering. From a normative viewpoint 
two additional reasons can be added. First, there is the general assumption that 
crime should not pay. This adage, often invoked by governments in the fight 
against crime, is one of the pillars of national and international regulation 
                                                        
85  FATF (1990) recommendation 15, also referred to by the Dutch government in the explanatory 
memorandum of the Disclosure of Unusual Transactions (Financial Services) Act. Kamerstukken II 
1992/93, 23 009, no. 3: 2. 
86  See for this the third consideration the introduction of the directive on money laundering of 1991. 
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against money laundering.87 The idea is that society will be harmed if crime 
pays. Governments clearly view criminal proceeds as funds with which new 
illegal activities can be organised and which can be invested in the legitimate 
environment and undermine the stability of societies. Obviously governments 
will be prepared to initiate new measures in the face of such threats.  
A second argument is that nobody in the legitimate environment should 
profit from money laundering activities, intentionally or otherwise. 
Consequently, action must be undertaken to strengthen awareness within 
legitimate financial institutions and (later) other financial service providers 
about their possible involvement in money laundering. The argument here is that 
reliable and lawful agencies and individuals should not facilitate crime, since 
such involvement negatively affects the financial system in general, 
undermining public confidence in the system. In addition, participation in 
unlawful activities could affect the integrity of individual financial service 
providers, putting the integrity of other bodies at stake as well, since the 
availability of large profits creates a sphere of influence in which corruption 
might flourish.88 The Dutch government is particularly sensitive to perceived 
threats to integrity, as questions concerning the integrity of public servants were 
brought to the fore in the early 1990s. It was in this period that integrity issues 
moved high on the Dutch political agenda.89 Policy documents present new anti-
money laundering measures first in light of the integrity of government 
agencies, and subsequently in view of non-public agencies, such as the 
institutions and individuals that could facilitate money laundering. The Dutch 
even took a step further, arguing that financial service providers who could 
facilitate money laundering had to take on some responsibility in the fight 
against money laundering. The resulting responsibilisation of the financial 
service providers implied a true change of attitude of these actors, who must 
maintain their activities as commercial businesses. It, moreover, marked the first 
time that non-governmental institutions and persons became integral in law-
enforcement activities. In addition, it was the first time that banking interests 
were combined with social interests.  
The financial institutions themselves also support increased attention to 
scrupulous performance. They do not want to be seen as partners in crime. The 
international financial sector in fact had already shown itself aware of its 
responsibilities. In 1988 the Committee of Basel, in which central banks and 
supervising authorities were represented, established a statement of principles 
(the Basel Statement), which sets out their interests in protecting the financial 
sector. The awareness of their responsibility to act with integrity is based not 
                                                        
87  Wijziging van het Wetboek van Strafrecht en enkele andere wetten in verband met de strafbaarstelling 
van het witwassen van opbrengsten van misdrijven. Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 27 159, no. 3: 1. 
88  Wijziging van het Wetboek van Strafrecht en enkele andere wetten in verband met de strafbaarstelling 
van het witwassen van opbrengsten van misdrijven. Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 27 159, no. 3: 5. 
89  See the 1992 policy document Organised Crime in the Netherlands: Threats and Plan of Action, 
which introduces the defensive approach concentrating on the defensibility of the public 
administration and other professionals against the threat of unwittingly cooperating with organised 
crime.  
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only on normative grounds but also on economic ones. In the period in which 
the anti-money laundering measures were developed the financial institutions 
became aware of the importance of their own public image. They were aware 
that any relationship with money laundering and organised crime would damage 
their reputation and subsequently harm their business.  
 
2.2.2 Objectives and strategies 
 
Following from these assumptions, the Dutch legislator formulated two 
objectives for its anti-money laundering intervention: preventing the abuse of 
the financial sector for money laundering activities and fighting money 
laundering itself.90 The first objective implies a preventive approach in order to 
protect the integrity of all institutions and persons that provide financial services 
by hindering the abuse of their skills. The idea was to increase the awareness of 
the financial sector regarding their integrity and, subsequently, their willingness 
to bring their defensive capabilities into action. The second objective implies a 
more direct repressive approach focusing on gaining transaction information 
with which to start criminal investigations. This strategy is not limited to 
uncovering money laundering activities, but is rather aimed at detecting all kinds 
of predicate offences. Moreover, it was thought that insight into money flows 
could contribute to confiscation of criminal proceeds.  
To achieve these objectives in both Europe and the Netherlands two main 
obligations were implemented: customer identification and the disclosure 
obligation.91 The first requires clients to show identification before financial 
services are provided. The latter entails financial service providers’ reporting to 
competent authorities any transaction that might be connected to money 
laundering.92 The customer identification obligation is probably most important 
in relation to the preventive approach, as it prevents clients from acting 
anonymously. Moreover, with the adage know your customer, the measure 
obliges service providers to identify clients and, if necessary, refuse unreliable 
candidates. This is seen as contributing to preservation and recovery of 
confidence in the financial services sector. The second obligation, that of 
disclosure, entails the duty to report suspicions of money laundering to the 
authorities. This aims primarily at a repressive approach. Financial service 
providers must register information on transactions. Based on this paper trail 
money flows can be analysed. Financial investigations follow these money 
flows to uncover money laundering operations, the predicate offences and the 
criminals in question. In short, by following the money one should be able to 
find the criminal.  
                                                        
90  Nieuwe bepalingen inzake identificatie van cliënten bij financiële dienstverlening. Kamerstukken II 
1992-1993, 23 009, no. 3: 2. 
91  These obligations are implemented in, respectively, the Identification (Financial Services) Act and the 
Disclosure of Unusual Transactions (Financial Services) Act mentioned in the first section of this 
chapter.  
92  The third section of this chapter elaborates on these two measures. 
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Because criminal proceeds are seen as threatening the integrity of financial 
service providers – and of society as a whole – the Dutch regulations assert that 
preserving integrity is its main priority.93 The investigation of criminal offences 
is thus a secondary concern, whereas prevention is considered the more 
important one. At least, this was the intention upon the introduction of the anti-
money laundering intervention. However, it is questionable whether the 
measures are still focused on this primary concern or whether interest has now 
shifted to the second concern. Notwithstanding the priorities of policy-makers, 
both the preventive as well as the repressive approach of the anti-money 
laundering intervention focus on the situational circumstances of organised 
crime, which means they can both be categorised as prevention of organised 
crime. 
 
2.3 Evaluation of the process of the Dutch anti-money laundering 
intervention 
 
In accordance with the methods described in the first chapter, this section 
evaluates the intervention’s process. It involves two elements. The first 
subsection relates to the content of the intervention. Because the anti-money 
laundering intervention grew from a top-down process, the description of that 
process starts with the European directive. Subsequently, the Dutch intervention 
is outlined. The main sources for this part of the evaluation are the directives 
and acts in question as well as their explanatory memoranda.  
The second subsection involves the implementation or functioning of the 
anti-money laundering intervention. This part answers the question, ‘What has 
become of this intervention in practice?’ Two evaluation studies on the Dutch 
anti-money laundering intervention provided this information. The first study 
was conducted two years after the intervention came into force and was aimed at 
providing the legislator with initial conclusions about the reporting system. The 
second study, which wound up in 2004, was aimed at improving the system’s 
effectiveness.  
 As the success and effectiveness of an intervention largely depend on how 
it is implemented, a final subsection looks at a mid-term review that 
encapsulates the main findings so far. This subsection is important as it 
recapitulates the bottlenecks that can occur in preventive measures. These relate 
to the difficulties in activating third parties, in coordinating activities and in 
harmonising interests.  
 
                                                        
93  Wijziging van het Wetboek van Strafrecht en enkele andere wetten in verband met de strafbaarstelling 
van het witwassen van opbrengsten van misdrijven. Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 27 159, no. 3: 5.  
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2.3.1 Content 
 
Because of the top-down development of the anti-money laundering intervention 
our look at the content of the intervention starts with an outline of the 
framework of the European directive. Subsequently the Dutch intervention is 
described, starting with the two main obligations of the intervention: customer 
identification and the disclosure obligation. Thereafter, the actors implicated in 
these obligations are described. Though they form a diverse group these actors 
are indicated by the generic name financial service providers. Finally, the main 
legal preconditions for fulfilling these obligations are highlighted.  
 
2.3.1.1 The disclosure obligation 
 
The disclosure obligation is set out in article 6 of the 1991 European directive on 
money laundering, revised in 2001. It requires financial institutions to report 
transactions for which suspicions of money-laundering operations arise.94 The 
directive requires a compulsorily reporting system, and the European legislation 
excludes the possibility of a voluntary disclosure system in member states. A 
voluntary system existed in Great Britain before the European directive was 
implemented and involved a system in which the competence of reporting was 
granted to the institutions involved.95 Voluntary systems are sometimes referred 
to as a ‘carrot and stick’ approach, since good reporting is rewarded and bad 
reporting punished (Peeman, 1995: 96). When it comes to reporting, the liability 
of institutions involved will be protected. However, when a transaction is 
wrongfully not reported, institutions are subject to prosecution. The European 
legislator viewed the voluntary system as too ambiguous in the framework of 
completing the internal market, and opted instead for compulsory reporting.  
 Generally speaking there are two reporting systems: suspicion-based 
reporting and objective-based reporting (Levi, 1997: 266). In the former, 
financial institutions must report transactions that arouse their suspicions to 
authorities responsible for combating money laundering. The reporting is 
concentrated on suspicious transactions and involves subjective indicators. In 
the objective-based reporting system, financial institutions report all kinds of 
unusual transactions irrespective of whether they are suspicious. As the name 
indicates, here authorities responsible for combating money laundering must 
establish objective indicators. The advantage of the objective-based reporting 
system is that the responsible authorities are informed of a much larger number 
of transactions, including a great number of clues for investigating criminal 
activities. However, a large proportion of the transactions reported do not 
involve money laundering at all. Suspicion-based reporting generates a much 
                                                        
94  In 1991 the directive only involved financial institutions. As described later, in the course of time the 
disclosure obligation was enlarged to all kinds of financial service providers including dealers of high-
value goods and legal professionals.  
95  Almost all western countries have established a disclosure and reporting obligation. However, Canada 
established an efficient system of voluntary cooperation between financial institutions and the 
authorities responsible for fighting money laundering.  
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smaller number of reported transactions. However, from these transactions it is 
likely that a much larger proportion actually does involve money laundering. 
The financial institutions and responsible authorities nonetheless risk missing 
certain money-laundering transactions that at first do not look suspicious.  
 The European system, like those of most countries (Levi, 1997: 226), 
follows the suspicion-based approach. This means that financial institutions 
must disclose any suspicion of money laundering. For this the European 
directive obliges member states to establish authorities responsible for 
combating money laundering to which financial service providers must report. 
These authorities are mostly referred to as financial investigation units (FIUs). 
The disclosure obligation implies a passive duty to furnish the national FIUs, at 
their request, all the necessary information (article 6). This obligation is similar 
to many pre-existing national laws, which require financial institutions to 
register information. The European directive stipulates that transaction data 
should be kept for a period of a least five years from the carrying out of the 
transaction (article 4). The registered information establishes a paper trail which 
aids the investigation of criminal offences. Moreover, the disclosure obligation 
implies an active reporting duty of the financial institutions towards the FIUs 
(article 6). This proactive reporting of suspicious transactions was certainly a 
novelty at the time of its inception (Mitsilegas, 2003: 73). Basically, the idea 
was that financial institutions should refrain from carrying out transactions that 
could be related to money laundering unless they were reported to the competent 
authority (article 7). However, since refraining from services could harm or 
hinder possible law-enforcement activities, the directive also dictates that 
institutions may report to the involved authority immediately after carrying out 
the service (article 7). To protect possible criminal investigations making use of 
transaction information, the directive contains a tip-off prohibition. Institutions 
may not disclose the transmission of information to FIUs to customers or to a 
third party (article 8).96 
 Characteristic of suspicion-based reporting is that the financial institutions 
are ascribed full responsibility for detecting and labelling suspicious 
transactions. They must report any fact that might indicate money laundering 
(article 6). The European legislator hereby assumes that these institutions are in 
the best position to recognise money laundering transactions.97 To ensure their 
best efforts to uncover such transactions they must ‘examine with special 
attention any transaction which they regard as particularly likely, by its nature, 
to be related to money laundering’ (article 5). To support the financial 
institutions, the European legislation mandates the national FIUs to apply their 
experience to draw up indicators to assist in identification of suspicious 
transactions.  
                                                        
96  The secrecy regarding the disclosure of information is important as unreliable clients should not be 
alarmed of possible investigative activities as they can destroy evidence. In this case, the obligation of 
secrecy involves a prohibition to tip-off the client. However, towards reliable clients the secrecy is 
introduced to protect the privacy, nobody, except the authorities, should known which services are 
carried out. In this case the secrecy is in line with the banking secrecy and professional confidentiality. 
97  See Commission Press Release, February 1990, quoted by Stessens (1997: 204).  
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The European anti-money laundering directive leaves a great margin of freedom 
for its member states, though most member states established a similar 
suspicion-based disclosure system. In anticipation of the 1991 European 
directive, the Netherlands started its own informal reporting system, which 
could be categorised as a voluntary system. This system, like that adopted at the 
European level, was based on suspicious transactions. However, after 
implementation of the European directive the Dutch legislator decided to deviate 
from subjective reporting. The Netherlands first opted for an objective-based 
system by which financial institutions were required to report a large range of 
unusual transactions, mainly based on objective indicators. The clearest example 
of an objective indicator is perhaps the fixed sum above which all transactions 
must be reported. In the framework of this objective-based reporting, the Dutch 
FIU was the agency mandated to investigate all reported unusual transactions in 
order to detect the suspicious ones and tease out those related to money 
laundering operations. This proposition resulted in considerable opposition from 
banks predicated on the fact that the objective-based system was much more 
expansive than the system imposed by the European directive.98 Moreover, the 
financial institutions, as represented by the Netherlands Bankers’ Association, 
opposed the fact that it would give too little responsibility to the financial 
institutions themselves. They argued that the objective-based reporting system 
had burdened them with a supervisory task unsuited to commercial companies. 
They did not want to be used merely as an information source. The bankers 
emphasised the importance of their subjective judgement and the principle of 
‘knowing your customer’.99 The financial sector perceived the Dutch reporting 
system as conveying a lack of trust towards the financial institutions. 
Furthermore, they argued that the Dutch FIU had insufficient financial expertise 
and banking experience to detect suspicious transactions (Terlouw and Aaron, 
1996: 45).  
 In the interest of the financial sector, a consensus was reached and a mixed 
system finally created. Suspicion-based and objective-based reporting were 
combined in the Disclosure of Unusual Transactions (Financial Services) Act.100 
This system requires the reporting of unusual transactions (article 9), but defines 
such transactions using objective as well as subjective indicators.101 The main 
objective indicator is the fixed sum of money above which all transactions must 
be reported. In the Netherlands, all cash payments above €15,000 must be 
                                                        
98  This was possible, as the European directive left a great margin to the different member states with 
regard to this provision. 
99  In the explanatory memorandum the legislator issues the main protests and indicates which protests 
gave rise to adjusting the legislative proposal; Nieuwe bepalingen inzake identificatie van cliënten bij 
financiële dienstverlening. Kamerstukken II 1992-1993, 23 009, no. 3: 19. 
100  The mixed system of reporting is also followed in United States and Australia (Levi, 19997: 266). 
101  In order to improve the cooperation between the different parties, the Netherlands Bankers 
Association was added to the study group charged with indicating the objective and subjective 
indicators, where it could defend the importance of the sensitivity of banking employees and the 
subjective indicators. Moreover, in favour of a permanent consultation and good cooperation, a 
monitoring committee was established in which the different institutions and authorities involved in 
the disclosure obligation, such as the Netherlands Bankers Association, take part. 
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reported. The subjective indicators vary but concern mainly the peculiarity of 
clients and of transactions. With regard to clients, indicators relate to problems 
with the identification of a client, observation of strange of nervous behaviour 
and suspicions that a client may be acting as a front man. Indicators concerning 
transactions involve atypical transactions by a client, suspicion that cash 
payments are kept deliberately below the fixed sum quoted in the objective 
indicator and lack of related business activities or other purposes that can 
explain a transaction. The mixed system gives a bit more responsibility to the 
financial institutions, as they are charged to report transactions based on 
suspicions rather than by purely objective indicators. Still, the main 
responsibility for conducting analyses to reveal possible money-laundering 
operations is ascribed to the FIU.  
 Similar to the European directive, the Dutch disclosure obligation imposes 
an active and a passive duty to furnish information to the FIU (articles 9 and 10). 
Furthermore, following the European directive, the Dutch act imposes secrecy 
regarding the reports. The tip-off prohibition applies to the financial institutions 
(article 19) as well as to others involved in the reporting system (article 18).  
 The European directive left the establishment of national FIUs to the 
member states, and the member states vary in the kinds of agencies to which 
financial institutions must report. These authorities or FIUs can be categorised 
into three types: administrative units (as in the Netherlands, Belgium and 
France), police units (e.g. in the United Kingdom and Finland) and judicial units 
(as in Luxembourg and Portugal) (Mitsilegas, 2003: 155). Whereas the police 
and judicial units are, respectively, placed within the national law enforcement 
agency and the public prosecution office, the administrative units are 
independent, as in the Netherlands, or incorporated in the Ministry of Finance, 
as in France. As described later, the differences in units have led to problems in 
international information exchange. 
 The Dutch decision to establish an administrative unit (Meldpunt 
Ongebruikelijke Transacties), followed the policy decision to concentrate the 
reporting system on unusual transactions. This system generates a great number 
of reports on transactions that do not involve possible money laundering 
activities. The idea is that these benign reports should not be transmitted to 
police or judicial units, which is why the unit was created as an administrative 
agency placed outside the investigative authorities. The primary task of the unit 
is ‘to collect, register, process and analyse the data it obtains to establish if such 
data could be relevant to the prevention and detection of felonies’ (article 3). 
Only if the reported transactions indicate a criminal offence are they transmitted 
to the investigative services to start a criminal investigation. Thus, the 
administrative authority serves as a buffer between the financial institutions and 
the investigative services. Nonetheless, to guarantee cooperation between the 
FIU and the investigative law-enforcement authorities, the unit is physically 
situated inside the national Crime Investigation Service.  
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2.3.1.2 Customer identification 
 
The obligation to identify customers is set out in article 3 of the 1991 directive 
on money laundering, revised in 2001. It requires financial institutions to 
identify their customers by means of supporting evidence when entering in 
business relations, in particular opening accounts and offering safe custody 
facilities (article 3.1). Similar to the disclosure obligation the financial 
institutions must keep records for a period of at least five years after the 
relationship with the customer ends (article 4).  
 The customer identification requirement differs in nature from the 
disclosure obligation in that it is not limited to suspicious transactions. In the 
mixed system of objective and subjective indicators it is an objective indicator. 
Identification is compulsory for all transactions of a sum of €15,000 or more, 
whether the transaction be made in one operation or more (article 3.2). In 
addition, identification is always called for when suspicions of money 
laundering arise (article 3.6). The directive suggests that customer identification 
take place before transactions are carried out, as there is no provision to ensure 
proper identification afterwards.  
The customer identification requirement prevents people from acting 
anonymously. To preclude criminals from getting around the identification 
obligation, for example by using front men, institutions and persons must 
scrutinise the client’s identity when necessary (article 3.5). Examining the 
identity is particularly important when transactions seem likely to be related to 
money laundering. In reality, the European directive warns financial service 
providers of clients using fictitious names, clients acting on behalf of a principal, 
clients that exist in legal persons and clients who are not physically present 
during the transaction. In these cases ‘specific and adequate measures’ should be 
taken, such as asking for supplementary documentary evidence (revised article 
3.11).  
As a result of the European directive on money laundering, the existing 
Dutch customer identification requirement had to be adjusted. Financial 
institutions were already obliged to identify all clients in order to provide 
relevant information to tax authorities. With the revised Identification (Financial 
Services) Act, financial institutions were additionally asked to provide 
information to the anti-money laundering authorities. The customer 
identification requirement applies to natural persons as well as legal persons 
(article 3) and the act explicitly states that sectors submitted to the law should 
refrain from services when the identity is not well established (article 8). Thus, it 
is not allowed to identify clients afterwards, an option that remained open under 
the disclosure obligation. Furthermore, records must be kept for a period of five 
years. Like the European directive the Dutch act imposes scrutiny of identity 
when suspicions as to the true identity arise. This is important, as this 
information must be included in reports of unusual transactions. As such, 
customer identification became a key element of the Dutch reporting system. 
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With regard to the possibility of acting anonymously it is noteworthy that 
neither the European directive nor the Dutch act contain measures against high-
tech laundering or cyber-laundering, as this is an important way of acting 
anonymously. Indeed, the specific and adequate measures that must be taken 
when clients are not physically present seem insufficient to prevent cyber-
laundering. 
 
2.3.1.3 Financial service providers 
 
During the last couple of years an enormous expansion has taken place of the 
sectors that must comply with anti-money laundering obligations. At first, the 
European anti-money laundering intervention was addressed only to the 
financial sector, comprised of financial institutions, credit institutions and to a 
certain extent insurance undertakings (article 1). However, European legislators 
wanted the measures to be open for possible extension to other subjects. As 
such, member states had to ensure that the obligations could be broadened to 
other professions or undertakings ‘particularly likely to be used for money-
laundering purposes’ (article 12). Over time, member states made use of this 
provision and consequently a number of inconsistencies arose in national laws. 
This is remarkable, since such discrepancy is out of line with the determination 
to prevent inconsistencies in the completion of the single market in the European 
Union.102 
In the Dutch intervention, the customer identification obligation is 
addressed only to financial institutions. The disclosure obligation, on the other 
hand, is not specifically aimed at the finance sector. Here, the Dutch legislation 
avails of the provision in the European directive that allows enlargement of the 
number of institutions and persons that must comply with the disclosure 
requirement. Instead of enumerating all institutions and persons, the Disclosure 
of Unusual Transactions (Financial Services) Act puts the activity of providing 
financial services first, regardless of the nature of the provider. This means that 
the Dutch legislation enforces the obligation for ‘anyone who provides financial 
services as a professional or a trade’ (article 9). Nine provisions define the 
concept of a financial service (article 9 paragraph 1): 
  
‘1.  taking into custody securities, notes, coins, currency notes, precious metals, and 
other assets; 
2.   opening accounts in which a balance of money, securities, precious metals or other 
assets may be kept;  
3.  renting safe deposit boxes;  
4.   effecting payment in connection with the cashing in of coupons or similar vouchers 
of bonds or comparable negotiable instruments;  
5.   concluding life insurance policies within the meaning of section 1, subsection 1 
under b of the Insurance Business Supervision Act 1993 and to provide 
intermediary services thereto;  
6.   effecting payment under a life insurance policy as referred to in 5; 
                                                        
102  See the second consideration of the directive on money laundering of 1991. 
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7.   crediting or debiting of an account in which monies, securities, precious metals or 
other valuables may be held; 
8.   exchange of money;  
9.   providing other services, to be stipulated by Order in Council (article 1 under b 
Financial Services Act).’ 
 
The provision to address the anti-money laundering intervention to anyone that 
provides such services is a theoretical one. In practice various indicators define 
the transactions that must be reported. These are connected to various types of 
financial service providers. Not surprisingly these correspond more or less with 
those mentioned in the European directive of 1991. Next to the banks the most 
important category of financial institution that has to comply with the 
intervention are the exchange offices. Though exchanging money as such is not 
money laundering, exchanging money often precedes money laundering 
activities. An analysis of 80 criminal investigations shows that illegally gained 
money is often exchanged into other currencies or denominations. These 
transactions might involve large sums of money. One criminal organisation that 
specialised in money laundering exchanged some 114 million guilders (about 
€52 million) in less than a year, and another organisation exchanged 400 million 
guilders (€182 million) in two years (Kleemans et al., 2002: 102). Often these 
laundering organisations work for more than one criminal organisation.  
 An advantage of the Dutch system is that the indicators, and thus the 
sectors that must answer to these indicators, are not enumerated in the act itself 
but by Order in Council. This makes it possible to expand the obligation to new 
sectors without an amendment to the act. Moreover, as indicated by the ninth 
provision of the definition of financial services (see citation above), new types 
of services can be added by Order in Council as well. The explanatory 
memorandum clarifies the necessity of this provision as follows: ‘The anti-
money laundering policy towards these [financial sector] institutions could even 
be so successful that money launderers have to turn to other vulnerable 
economic activities.’103 In this way the Dutch legislator anticipates possible 
future displacement.  
Over the years the Dutch have issued several Orders in Council to broaden 
the sectors coming under the disclosure obligation. In 1995, the anti-money 
laundering obligation was extended to providers of credit cards and to 
casinos.104 Three years later, money transfers became a special category of 
transaction to report.105 Empirical research has underlined the importance of 
money transfers in money laundering operations. FIU analyses showed that 
diverse institutions were providing money transfer services and the obligations 
were thus broadened to cover all of them.106 Though tourists and migrants are 
the main users of such transfers, their advantages, such as the fast and rather 
                                                        
103  Nieuwe bepalingen inzake identificatie van cliënten bij financiële dienstverlening. Kamerstukken II 
1992-1993, 23 009, no. 3: 25. 
104  Wijziging indicatoren wet melding ongebruikelijke transacties, Strct. 1995, 134. 
105  Regeling Wet mekding ongebruikelijke transacties, Strct. 1998, 136: 5. 
106  Wet van 27 juni 2002, houdende bepalingen inzake de geldtransactiekantoren, Stb. 2002, no. 380.  
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anonymous operation, attracted criminals as well. Inclusion of money transfers 
under the anti-money laundering intervention reduced some of these advantages. 
Analysing cases on organise crime, Kleemans et al. (2002: 112) indicate that 
money transfers are often used in human smuggling and trafficking of women.  
The European legislator has also acknowledged the displacement of money 
laundering activities in the course of the 1990s. This knowledge derives from 
the FATF annual reports on money laundering techniques and typologies and 
the 1997 action plan to combat organised crime. These documents report that 
tightened control of the financial sector has prompted money launderers to seek 
alternative methods. The FATF pointed out the possible (unwitting) involvement 
of the non-traditional system in money laundering operations as early as 1991.107 
To avoid checks, money launderers have displaced their activities to non-
financial sectors such as dealers in high-value goods. For instance, criminals 
have tried to conceal their illegal gains by purchasing cars or jewellery and by 
operating restaurants and hotels. Furthermore, in their efforts to evade anti-
money laundering measures, launderers have searched for new laundering 
methods, involving complex transactions that require the involvement of 
professionals such as notaries, lawyers, accountants or auditors (FATF, 1991: 
10).108  
The EU Parliament and the Council of the European Union addressed these 
issues in their new directive of 2001. This time, the directive clearly enumerated 
which institutions had to comply with the intervention in order to overcome 
further inconsistencies and discrepancies in subsequent national laws. The most 
remarkable aspect of the revised directive was the enlargement of its jurisdiction 
from financial institutions to non-financial sectors. This meant it was no longer 
possible to speak of ‘financial institutions’ with regard to the regulation. As a 
result, this study henceforth uses the concept ‘financial service providers’. The 
new European directive reads as follows:109 
 
‘Member States shall ensure that the obligations laid down in this Directive are imposed 
on the following institutions: 
1. credit institutions as defined in point A of Article 1; 
2.  financial institutions as defined in point B of Article 1;  
and on the following legal or natural persons acting in the exercise of their 
professional activities 
3. auditors, external accountants and tax advisors; 
4. real estate agents; 
5. notaries and other independent legal professionals, when they participate, 
whether:[…] 
6. dealers in high-value goods, such as precious stones or metals, or works of art, 
auctioneers, whenever payment is made in cash, and in an amount of EUR 15000 
or more;  
7.  casinos.’ 
                                                        
107  FATF (1991: 10) refers to the involvement of casinos, lotteries, dealers in precious metals, real estate 
and the possible involvement of professionals such as lawyers, notaries and accountants.  
108  This remark was repeated by the 1997 action plan (recommendation 12). 
109  Directive on money laundering of 2001, article 1, paragraph 2. 
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To implement the new European directive both Dutch acts had to be adjusted. 
An act of 13 December 2001 enlarged the concept financial institutions in the 
Identification (Financial Services) Act to institutions. From then on, the concept 
of institutions has included credit institutions, insurers, investment institutions, 
security institutions, agents and sellers of high-value goods and certain 
professionals. That same act modified the concept of financial services into the 
concept services in the Identification (Financial Services) Act as well as in 
Disclosure of Unusual Transactions (Financial Services) Act. Now ‘anyone who 
provides certain services as a profession or a trade’ has to answer the disclosure 
obligation. Also, in the definition of these services the nine provisions were 
extended with a tenth:110  
 
‘Selling, or providing intermediary services with respect to the sale of, vehicles, ships, 
works of art, antiquities, precious stones, precious metals, pieces of jewellery, jewels, or 
any other goods of large value designated by Order in Council.’ 
 
After the establishment of a list of indicators addressed to these non-financial 
sectors, all sellers of these high-value goods were subject to the disclosure 
obligation. From the literature it appears that legal persons involving trade in 
diamonds, art and cars are suitable for exchanging criminal profits to other 
currencies, which as mentioned, is often the first step in a money laundering 
operation (Kleemans et al., 2002: 105). These businesses are suitable because 
they often work with payments in various currencies. For example, Kleemans et 
al. (2003: 105) describe a case in which a launderer used a Belgian diamond 
dealer to exchange criminal monies. Because this dealer often exchanged 
foreign currencies the activities did not prompt a report to the Belgian FIU. 
Afterwards, at a fee the launderer collected the exchanged money. Obviously, in 
this case the dealer in diamonds knowingly facilitated the money laundering 
operation. 
Finally, with the recent Order in Council in 2003 the new European 
directive on money laundering was fully implemented in the Netherlands, as all 
independent legal advisors, lawyers, (junior) notaries, (registered) accountants, 
tax advisors and real estate agents became subject to the acts as well.111 In the 
course of the 1990s empirical research in the Netherlands had already indicated 
incidents of notaries’ culpable involvement with criminal groups. For example, 
Van de Bunt describes a case in which a notary willingly facilitated money 
laundering by carrying out an A-B-C transaction (Fijnaut et al., 1998: 173). This 
involved the three-fold transfer of a deed for one and the same premises in a 
single day. With these transfers the value of the premises increased from seven 
to fourteen to twenty-one million guilders. This provided the criminal an 
                                                        
110  Wet van 13 december 2001, houdende wijziging van de Wet melding ongebruikelijke transacties en de 
Wet identificatie bij financiële dienstverlening 1993 met het oog op het verplichtstellen van de 
identificatieplicht en van de meldingsplicht van ongebruikelijke transacties. Stb. 2001, no. 665, article 
1 under D.  
111  Besluit van 24 februari 2003 tot aanwijzing van instellingen en diensten in het kader van de Wet 
identificatie bij dienstverlening en de Wet melding ongebruikelijke transacties. Stb. 2003, no. 94. 
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apparently legal origin for fourteen million guilders. Sometimes, the assumed 
involvement of independent advisors results in public outrage and intensive 
media coverage. This was the case, for example, of a financial advisor and real 
estate agent who was nick-named the ‘underworld banker’. Since 1993 this real 
estate agent was connected to illegal practices and was the subject of several 
criminal investigations. Although, it was clear that he had tight relations with 
persons with serious criminal records, he was never convicted of a criminal 
offence. In recent years he was involved in several questionable businesses and 
in 2004 was slated to appear before a court concerning forgery and dealing in 
stolen property. However, in May 2004 he was shot dead in public, which might 
possibly confirm his involvement in criminal offences. Perhaps the investigation 
into this real estate agent’s financial records will clear up his relation with 
criminals and criminal organisations.  
Not surprisingly, the involvement of lawyers, notaries and accountants in 
the anti-money laundering intervention evokes debate on the privacy of citizens 
at both the European and national levels. With its new directive, the EU 
Parliament and the Council of the European Union have taken rights into 
account as set out in the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and the Treaty of the European 
Union. The expansion of the directive’s coverage is in fact based on the idea that 
comparable services should be treated in the same manner no matter who 
provides them.112 Where only a part of the services provided by notaries, 
lawyers and other independent professionals relate to the provision of financial 
services, the enlargement of coverage is partial as well. As such, legal 
professionals are compelled to follow the anti-money laundering obligations 
only when providing financial and business services. The obligation does not 
apply to activities concerning the legal position of clients and representation in 
legal proceedings. In this way the directive does not intrude on the essential 
secrecy provisions of this special category of actors. At least, this is how the 
legislators justify the extension of the directive to legal professionals. To 
determine what type of service is to be provided, the legal professional starts 
with an orientation meeting with the client. For this the legal professional does 
not have to answer the anti-money laundering obligations, and the content of the 
conversation remains confidential. The tipping-off prohibition does not apply to 
legal professionals’ informing their clients during the orientation meeting of 
their duties in the framework of the anti-money laundering intervention. 
Notwithstanding the introduction of the orientation conversation, the legal 
professionals themselves disagree with their incorporation under the directive. 
The next subsection discusses this in more detail.  
 
2.3.1.4 Legal preconditions 
 
The anti-money laundering intervention imposes extensive and completely new 
duties on non-law-enforcement actors in the realm of crime prevention. These 
                                                        
112  Directive on money laundering of 2001, consideration 18. 
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new duties have impacts on the liability of financial service providers and on the 
information they must and are allowed to pass on. The possibility of conscious 
facilitation of money laundering requires that the liability issue somehow be 
settled under criminal law. Furthermore, reporting transaction data to FIUs goes 
against banking secrecy and professional secrecy and also requires strong 
regulation regarding civil liability. Finally, transaction data includes personal 
data that cannot be shared without taking data protection regulations into 
account. This subsection provides insight into the legal preconditions towards 
these three aspects.  
 
Liability under criminal law. The European anti-money laundering directive is 
resolute in protecting financial service providers against possible liability. It 
states, ‘disclosure in good faith […] shall not involve the institution or person or 
its directors or employees in liability of any kind’.113 This means that financial 
service providers have no liability under criminal law. This is not surprising, as 
the directive allows financial service providers to carry out transactions 
suspected of being related to money laundering, if they are reported in 
conformance with the act. This provision, aimed at supporting criminal 
investigations into offences and enabling law enforcement to pursue the 
beneficiaries of illegal gains, makes it necessary to release service providers 
from their liability under criminal law.  
Despite an appeal by the Netherlands Bankers’ Association, the Dutch 
legislation does not incorporate the European general release from criminal 
liability. Rather, the Dutch legislation gives more significance to the principle 
that those who are guilty of money laundering should be punished.114 Therefore, 
article 12 of the Dutch Disclosure of Unusual Transaction (Financial Services) 
Act establishes only a limited release of liability under which transaction 
information received from financial service providers under the discloser 
obligation shall not be used for a criminal investigation or a preliminary judicial 
inquiry. However, this does not exclude criminal investigation or prosecution of 
the service providers based on information other than the transaction data. Thus, 
the Dutch act still imposes cooperation in money laundering activities as 
punishable; financial institutions can thus be held responsible for their 
involvement in money laundering operations.  
 
Civil liability. With the general idea that disclosure in good faith releases 
financial service providers from any liability, the European directive guarantees 
that these providers are in a position to contribute to the fight against money 
laundering.115 The financial institutions should not be hindered by banking 
secrecy. Because banks adhering to the disclosure obligation could risk damage 
                                                        
113  Directive on money laundering of 1991, article 8. 
114  Since 2001 money laundering has been penalised by a special article in the Criminal Code (article 
420bis to quater). Before this, money laundering was punishable as well and could be prosecuted by 
the penalisation of fencing (Criminal Code article 416 to 417 bis). 
115  Directive on money laundering of 1991, consideration 15. 
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claims from customers who disagree with the disclosure of information on their 
financial transactions, the directive includes a release from civil liability.  
 In the Netherlands, banking secrecy is not set out in any act or regulation, 
and the banking system has no privilege of nondisclosure. The concept ‘banking 
secrecy’ derives from general banking conditions which stipulate a contractual 
duty to maintain confidentiality. Obviously the disclosure obligation violates 
this confidentiality. Moreover, the tip-off prohibition can affect the bank’s 
relation with its client as well. Giving in to an explicit demand of the 
Netherlands Bankers’ Association, Dutch law-makers established a release from 
liability similar to the European one; disclosure in good faith shall not involve 
the institution, its directors or employees in liability of any kind.116 The concept 
of in good faith is central in this provision. Obviously the release from liability 
does not apply when the plausibility of the disclosure is in question.117 The 
release from civil liability is limited as well. Institutions or persons cannot be 
held liable unless it can be demonstrated that in all reasonableness the disclosure 
should not have taken place.  
 This limited release from civil liability is often seen as insufficient, because 
some risks remain that could affect commercial interests. In particular, the 
financial sector refers to the ease with which American clients institute legal 
proceedings and suggests reservation in reporting transactions of American 
clients (Terlouw and Aaron, 1996: 37). 
 The enlargement of the anti-money laundering intervention to legal 
professionals has required issues of professional secrecy to be dealt with, both in 
Europe and the Netherlands. Professional secrecy, in fact, implies a privilege 
much stronger and more sensitive than banking secrecy. Due to the special 
relationship between legal professionals and their clients, which is based on 
mutual trust, limiting professional secrecy has been deemed unacceptable. The 
European directive strives not to encroach upon the confidentiality of this 
relationship more than necessary. The scope of the release from the disclosure 
obligation was the subject of intensive debate between the Council of the 
European Union and the EU Parliament.118 In the end, a conciliation committee 
reached a compromise, whereby the terrorist attacks of 11 September 
accelerated the process. The compromise consists of dividing the various 
services provided by legal professionals into the practice of legal proceedings 
and the practice of financial economic advice. On the one hand are services 
related to the legal position of the client. Because professional secrecy is of 
utmost importance in provision of these services, they do not come under the 
disclosure obligation. On the other hand, legal professionals increasingly act as 
advisors that handle businesses and financial services. As these services are 
                                                        
116  Directive on money laundering of 1991, article 8. 
117  Wet van 13 december 2001, houdende wijziging van de Wet melding ongebruikelijke transacties en de 
Wet identificatie bij financiële dienstverlening 1993 met het oog op het verplichtstellen van de 
identificatieplicht en van de meldingsplicht van ongebruikelijke transacties. Stb. 2001, no. 665, article 
13. 
118  The Council of the European Union was prepared to limit professional secrecy, while the Parliament 
of the European Union had greater concern for the relation of trust.  
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comparable with those provided by financial institutions, the European legislator 
decided that with respect to these services, legal professionals must comply with 
the reporting obligation. In fact, according to the European directive, the 
disclosure obligation for professions applies to the following:119 
 
‘notaries and other independent legal professionals, when they participate, whether: 
(a) by assisting in the planning or execution of transactions for their client concerning 
the 
(i) buying and selling of real property or business entities;  
(ii) managing of client money, securities or other assets;  
(iii) opening or management of bank, savings or securities accounts; 
(iv) organisation of contributions necessary for the creation, operation or management 
of companies; 
(v) creation, operation or management of trusts, companies or similar structures; 
(b) or by acting on behalf of and for their client in any financial or real estate 
transaction.’ 
 
With regard to protecting a client’s privacy, the 2002 European directive on 
money laundering requires professionals to comply with the disclosure 
obligation for all services except: 
  
‘information they receive from or obtain on one of their clients, in the course of 
ascertaining the legal position for their client or performing their task of defending or 
representing that client in, or concerning judicial proceedings, including advice on 
instituting or avoiding proceedings, whether such information is received or obtained 
before, during or after such proceedings (article 3.6).’ 
 
In the Netherlands, legal professionals did not simply resign themselves to this 
provision. Indeed, the broadening of the anti-money laundering intervention led 
to intense discussion. The duty to maintain confidentiality and the professional 
privilege of non-disclosure is established in a number of acts and rules of 
conduct.120 As such, violation of confidentiality may give rise to criminal, civil 
or disciplinary proceedings. Not surprisingly, the disclosure obligation for legal 
professionals raised serious objections in the Netherlands, in particular from the 
Netherlands Bar Association.121 Some professionals have asserted that all legal 
advice should remain subject to professional confidentiality unless the 
counsellor takes part in money laundering activities (Van der Hoeven and 
Visser, 2003: 1124-1131; Baas, 2002: 21-23).122 This would require a release for 
                                                        
119  Directive on money laundering of 2001, article 2. 
120  In the Netherlands the privileged of non-disclosure is not absolute; the investigative services can 
under certain circumstances apply investigative powers against a lawyer, such as a search of the legal 
office.  
121  For more details on legal professionals in their professional relationship with criminal clients see 
Lankhorst and Nelen (2004). 
122  Some professionals refer to a decision of the Supreme Court which states that the free access to legal 
advise of individuals has priority over the social interest of a state. See Van der Hoeven and Visser 
(2003b: 1124) who refer to the HR, 1 March 1985, NJ 1986, p. 173. Mind you, this judgement is 20 
years old. 
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the legal profession pertaining to almost all of their advisory activities.123 
Nonetheless, the Dutch legislation was implemented including the disclosure 
obligation and the partial release from it as described in the revised article 6 and 
consideration 17 of the new European directive. This means that the Dutch act 
enforces the disclosure obligation for all services provided by legal professionals 
except for activities concerning ascertaining the legal position of a client or 
representing a client in legal procedures and except for advising a client before, 
during and after judicial proceedings. Thus, all information must be reported 
except for that received on or obtained from a client in the course of ascertaining 
the client’s legal position. Placing financial-economic advice under the 
disclosure obligation was justified by the fact that such advice did not require 
the special capacities of the legal professional.124 Moreover, Dutch law-makers 
argued that this division fits the preventive approach to money laundering, as it 
counters possible displacement.125  
The Dutch Bar Association was furthermore aggrieved by the fact that the 
national disclosure obligation was more stringent than the European one. For 
example, the Dutch legislation did not incorporate the European exemptions for 
legal professionals. It also passes on the possibility to exclude legal 
professionals from the prohibition to tip-off clients about disclosure. The 
European legislator deemed such an exoneration acceptable due to the trust-
based relationship between legal professionals and their clients. No wonder that 
the lack of such an exoneration in the strict Dutch act is hard for the legal 
professionals to understand. They reproach the legislator as lacking insight into 
the activities of a lawyer and point out the repercussion of unfair competition in 
the European Union when other member states do exercise their right to release 
legal professions from the prohibition from providing tip-off information (Mens 
and Bouallouch, 2002: 77-87).  
In addition, the Dutch act does not release the legal professional from 
liability, as the European directive proposes. The Dutch act in fact makes no 
exception for the legal profession. Like financial institutions and other service 
providers coming under the disclosure obligation, legal professionals are 
protected by only a limited release from liability under criminal law, as well as a 
limited release from civil liability, including disciplinary measures. Thus, 
                                                        
123  According to the bar association, the limitation of release results from the fact that the Dutch legislator 
wanted the extension of the anti-money laundering provision to come into force as soon a possible, 
after the terrorist attack of the 11th September. In the action plan to prevent terrorism recommendation 
29 and 37 insist on quickening the establishing of the new European directive on money laundering 
and a quickened implementation of these directives. The Dutch legislator thus did not wait for the 
final version of the new directive, and in the final version exactly the consideration 17 was adjusted. 
During the preparation of the proposal for the new Dutch act (d.d. 2 November 2001), the Dutch 
legislator was probably unfamiliar with the 17th consideration (final version d.d. 24 October 2001).  
124   Besluit van 24 februari 2003 tot aanwijzing van instellingen en diensten in het kader van de Wet 
identificatie bij dienstverlening en de Wet melding ongebruikelijke transacties. Stb. 2003, no. 94. 
125  By the realisation of the extended disclosure obligation the legislator justified the extension by 
pointing out that criminal organisations will abuse legal professions for their financial services, 
because of the increased attention to the financial sector. The Dutch legislator assumes that there is a 
displacement of money laundering transactions and partly this is based on empirical knowledge. But 
as described later to a certain extant the empirical foundation for this assumptions is lacking. 
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lawyers cannot be held culpable unless it can be demonstrated that in all 
reasonableness the disclosure should not have taken place. Because the latter 
situation would imply that a violation of professional secrecy had occurred, it is 
not surprising that professionals might feel caught between two obligations. As a 
result, legal offices have often decided that data may be disclosed only after a 
judgment is made by a committee composed of the management and partners 
(Van der Hoeven and Visser, 2003a: 609). In addition, the professionals have 
agreed to consult a confidant of the profession when suspicious activities arise 
(Van der Hoeven and Visser, 2003: 1131). The expertise of the confidant helps 
to determine whether the activities should indeed be reported. This consultation 
should be regarded as protection against wrongful disclosure and against civil 
liability and disciplinary measures. Obviously, such protective measures cost the 
legal offices time and money. 
 
The exchange of transaction data. In contrast to the liability issue, the passing 
on of sensitive information received less attention from the European legislator. 
Nowhere do the European anti-money laundering directives refer to data 
protection. Only in 1999, in a motion for a resolution, did the European 
Parliament make explicit reference to data protection with regard to the anti-
money laundering intervention.126 It states that data collection must be protected 
by full and correct application of the directive on personal data protection.127 
Article 1.1 of the directive on personal data protection states, ‘Member States 
shall protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in 
particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data’. 
However, it includes a series of exceptions as well (defined in articles 3 and 13).  
The applicability of the directive on data protection for the anti-money 
laundering intervention is ambiguous in some respects. First, under the 
exceptions are ‘activities that fall outside the scope of Community law, such as 
those provided for by Titles V and VI of the Treaty on European Union and in 
any case to processing operations concerning public security, defence, State 
security (including the economic well-being of the State when the processing 
operation relates to State security matters) and the activities of the State in areas 
of criminal law’ (article 3.2). This means that the anti-money laundering 
directive, which involves a first-pillar Community law measure, would not fall 
under the exceptions. However, the anti-money laundering intervention does 
concern public security and the economic well-being of the state, which suggests 
that it would be within the scope of the exceptions.  
                                                        
126  Motion for a resolution on the Second Commission Report to the European Parliament and the 
Council on the implementation of the money laundering directive, point 5. In Doc. A4 0093/99, 
26.2.1999, as quoted in Mitsilegas (2003: 179). 
127  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, OJ L 281, 23/11/1995, pp. 31-50. 
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This reasoning is strengthened by the exceptions mentioned in article 13 of the 
directive on data protection, which stipulates that member states may adopt 
legislative measures to restrict the scope of the protection to safeguard the 
following: 
 
‘(a) national security;  
(b) defence;  
(c) public security;  
(d) the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, or of 
breaches of ethics for regulated professions;  
(e) an important economic or financial interest of a Member State or of the European 
Union, including monetary, budgetary and taxation matters;  
(f) a monitoring, inspection or regulatory function connected, even occasionally, with 
the exercise of official authority in cases referred to in (c), (d) and (e);  
(g) the protection of the data subject or of the rights and freedoms of others.’ 
 
The provision offers various arguments to justify non-compliance with the data-
protection requirement. The proportionality of measures of the anti-money 
laundering intervention is of interest here vis-à-vis the scope of the need to fight 
organised crime. This question and an answer to it appear at the end of this 
chapter. 
Dutch law gives more emphasis to the data-protection requirement. The 
explanatory memorandum to the Dutch disclosure obligation act even posits 
that the disclosure obligation should comply with article 8 of the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) 
concerning respect for private and family life.128 Although there is no clear 
definition of the concept of private life, the Dutch legislator asserts that the 
reporting of unusual transactions unquestionably encroaches on private life. 
Nonetheless, the they argue that this encroachment is permissible since it 
complies with the demands of the ECHR, article 8, second paragraph:  
 
‘There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others.’ 
 
The disclosure obligation act provides the legal basis for encroaching on the 
data-protection provision. Establishment of an administrative FIU that 
functions as a buffer between financial service providers and the investigative 
services hinders direct access of investigative services to transaction 
information. This buffer should prevent undue attention, in particular, to 
unusual transactions that have nothing to do with money laundering. 
                                                        
128  Kamerstukken II 1992-1993, 23 009, no. 3: 3-4. 
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Regarding the necessity of the disclosure obligation, the Dutch legislation 
refers to the European directive. Furthermore, it argues that regarding the 
pressing social need, the disclosure obligation is in proportion with its official 
goals. In particular the prevention of disorder and crime and the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others are seen as justifying the collection of 
sensitive information.  
 
2.3.2 Implementation 
 
Together, customer identification and the disclosure obligation are the basis of 
the Dutch unusual transaction-based reporting system. This system involves a 
chain of activities starting with the financial service providers. The providers 
must record data on the identity of clients and on the transactions they carry out. 
Furthermore, they must report all unusual transactions to the Dutch FIU, which 
is responsible for combating money laundering. In this process, the FIU 
examines unusual transactions and when necessary labels them as suspicious. 
The last step in the chain is the transmission of information on suspicious 
transactions to law-enforcement agencies in order to investigate criminal 
offences. The next subsections describe what has become of these activities.  
In accordance with the methods described in the first chapter of this study, 
our evaluation of the implementation of the system is limited to the aspects that 
are important with regard to the prevention of organised crime. This part of the 
evaluation is based on the annual reports of the Dutch FIU and the Bureau for 
Police Support of the National Public Prosecutor (BLOM). In addition, we draw 
on evaluation studies of the Dutch reporting system. The first such study was 
announced upon the establishment of the disclosure obligation and took place 
two years after the system entered into force. The second was completed in 
2004. This second study focused on the bottlenecks of the reporting system and 
helps us to uncover some possible implementation failures.  
 
2.3.2.1 Recording identification and transaction data 
 
We can assume that the reporting system requires a lot of administrative effort 
from the financial service providers. Most of the effort involves customer 
identification, for which all kinds of personal details must be registered, such as 
address, residence or domicile, sort and number of the identity card, as well as 
the time, place and kind of service that is or will be extended. In addition, 
detailed information about the nature and characteristics of transactions are 
required. To encourage the financial service providers to comply fully with these 
requirements, the measures have been made as efficient as possible. For 
example, the European and Dutch legislators have tried to avoid unnecessary 
repetition in establishing identity.129 These have enabled the identification of 
                                                        
129  In certain circumstances, having established the identity in a foregoing transaction is sufficient for a 
subsequent service, and debiting an account opened by a financial institution that already comes under 
the regulation on establishing identity requires no new identification. See, respectively, article 3.8 and 
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clients to be conducted visibly more efficiently over the course of the years. 
Identification of clients, both natural and legal persons domiciled in the 
Netherlands, is mostly carried out without any problem. However, the 
identification of foreign natural and legal persons can give some problems and 
even lead to extra costs.  
First of all, the identification of natural persons takes place on personal 
appearance and by means of a valid identity card. When foreign natural persons 
are involved, departments must build a certain expertise on foreign documents. 
A study on prevention of organised crime cited ‘forged documents’ as a main 
issue in the prevention of organised crime, as false documents pose a 
fundamental threat to all preventive strategies (Van der Schoot, 2003: 29). 
Though this study recommended investments be made in staff and technical 
instruments to check documents, it is unrealistic to assume that financial service 
providers could ascertain the validity of all kinds of national and international 
documents.  
 Another problem involves identifying clients who are not physically 
present. To facilitate their identification, the Dutch legislator amended the 
former Identification (Financial Services) Act to allow clients’ identification to 
be derived from identification provided for previous transactions.130 This less 
strict means of identification applies only if the client has an account at a 
financial institution in one of the EU member states and if the transaction does 
not meet the specifications of an unusual transaction. Neither is such second-
hand identification allowed for transactions designated in European legislation 
as extremely vulnerable to money laundering operations.  
Legal professionals argue that the means of identification for legal persons 
is too complicated. They complain that it is unclear what information constitutes 
a valid identification of legal persons (Van der Hoeven and Visser, 2003a: 609). 
In cases where a recent certified extract from the Dutch Chamber of Commerce 
does not suffice, supplementary data must be provided. Obviously, this involves 
time and effort. In addition, it is difficult to identify foreign legal persons that do 
not have a place of business in the Netherlands, as a statement of a notary or 
comparable official is needed. For legal persons from outside the European 
Union the statement must be verified by a notary accommodated in the 
Netherlands.131 This procedure initially resulted in practical problems and unfair 
competition with institutions in other member states and was therefore replaced 
by a less rigid one. Nowadays, identity must be established by means of a 
certified extract of the official chamber of commerce in the foreign state in 
                                                                                                                                  
3.7 of the 1991 European directive on money laundering. The new directive on money laundering of 
2001 extends the release from establishing the identity to foreign financial institutions that act as 
clients when that particular foreign country has measures similar to the European anti-money 
laundering measures, see article 1.9 under 3 of the new directive on money laundering of 2001. The 
Dutch acts contain more or less the same provisions, see article 2.4 and 4.1 of the Establishing of 
Identity Financial (Services) Act. 
130  Wet van 2 november 2000, houdende wijziging van de Wet identificatie bij financiële dienstverlening. 
Stb. 2000, no. 484, article 1 under C.  
131  Establishing of Identity Financial (Services) Act, article 3,3. 
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question or by means of a statement issued by a notary or official with similar 
qualifications in the foreign state.132  
Notwithstanding the less strict identification, the bar association considers 
it almost impossible to properly identify foreign legal persons. Waiting for a 
certified extract from foreign chambers of commerce or a statement issued by a 
notary might take several weeks. In addition to the administrative costs, this 
involves economic costs as until such a time as the identification can be 
confirmed, no services can officially be provided, as no provision allows for 
identification of clients in retrospect. In practice, one might imagine that 
representatives of legal persons would always have such extracts with them, 
which puts the problem in perspective. Moreover, one could strive for 
standardisation of official documents (Boorsma, 2003: 67). Mul (1999: 161) 
proposed a European identity card for both natural and legal persons. However, 
the increasing commercial relations with all parts of the world means that one 
would need some worldwide standardisation, which again is unrealistic.  
Another aspect of the discussion concerns the release to divulge the 
identification of a client where a fellow lawyer in an EU member state has 
already established the identity.133 This release is not absolute, because the 
lawyer must verify that establishment of the identity was carried out correctly. 
On the other hand, this provision could undermine the customer identification 
rules, as it offers the possibility of derivative establishment of identity where 
clients cannot appear in person. For the lawyer or the authorities supervising 
compliance with customer identification, it would remain difficult to determine 
the validity of the original identification.  
 
2.3.2.2 Dealing with large amounts of information 
 
The decision to implement a reporting system based on unusual transactions 
resulted in a widening of the net of reported transactions with regard to the 
disclosure obligation of the European directive, which is focused on suspicious 
transactions. The fact that the Dutch FIU must deal with large numbers of 
transactions is clear from the FIU annual reports. These annual reports also 
show an overall increase of number of unusual transactions reported over time 
except for the last year (Graph 2.1).  
 
                                                        
132  Wet van 2 november 2000, houdende wijziging van de Wet identificatie bij financiële dienstverlening. 
Stb. 2000, no. 484, article 1 under B number 3. 
133  Wet van 2 november 2000, houdende wijziging van de Wet identificatie bij financiële dienstverlening. 
Stb. 2000, no. 484: under B. 
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Graph 2.1 Unusual transactions reported to the FIU, 1995-2004 
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The increase of reported unusual transactions is due to the simple fact that 
growing numbers of transactions that correspond with the indicators are being 
carried out. Moreover, over time new indicators have been established and more 
financial service providers are required to comply with the obligation. The real 
boom in reported transactions was, however, caused by the addition of money 
transfers to the intervention in 1998, from which time explosive growth of 
reported transactions was observed. This product appeared to be very popular; 
the reported money transfers increased from over 20,000 in 1999 to almost 
43,000 in 2001 and almost 95,000 in 2002 (MOT, 2003: 34). In 2003 the 
reported money transfers reached 123,000 (MOT, 2004: 60). This increase 
accounted for much of the increase in unusual transaction reports, as in 2003 
around 70% of all unusual transactions were money transfers.135  
Computerisation is of utmost importance to handle these huge numbers of 
transactions. In the first two years, however, there was only limited automation 
(Terlouw and Aaron, 1996: 102). Later, all steps of the reporting system became 
computerised. From its inception, the FIU began developing MOTexplorer, a 
computer program which institutions and persons can use to report unusual 
transactions.136 In 2002, 64% of suspicious transactions were reported through 
the MOTexplorer website, 28% were reported by diskette and only 8% on paper 
                                                        
134  Because the numbers in the annual reports differ, I chose to rely on the latest annual report (MOT, 
2004), which gives an overview of the years before, hoping that they include post-publication 
corrections.  
135  According to the FIU (MOT, 2003: 34) money transfers have been rediscovered as a commercial 
service and the financial sector advertises to promote these new services. In particular, currency 
exchange offices have an interest in this new market since, due to the adoption of the euro, they lost a 
large number of currency conversion transactions.  
136  From 1 July 2003 all institutions and persons were obliged to use MOTexplorer. 
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(MOT, 2003: 6).137 Nonetheless, this 8% still represents 11,000 transactions that 
have to be registered by hand. Obviously, this is time consuming. 
Computerisation of the reporting process is therefore a positive development in 
processing reports of unusual transactions.  
Notwithstanding the positive developments, the continuing increase of 
unusual transactions has exerted rising pressure on the reporting system. There 
could come a time when there is simply not enough time or staff to check all 
reports. Obviously, in this case a wide net is not the best option. Thus, it was for 
good reason that the financial sector in 1996 insisted that the effectiveness of the 
indicators be evaluated (Terlouw and Aaron, 1996: 44).  
The evaluation found, first, that most transactions were reported according 
to an objective indicator. Some respondents cited a preference for the objective 
indicator since it involved less effort and risk than a subjective one (Terlouw 
and Aaron, 1996: 100). Reporting on automatic pilot is easier than reporting 
based on own insights. The fact that it is easier to fulfil objective reporting is 
illustrated by reports provided by dealers of high-value goods. In 2003, the first 
year of their reporting, 98% of the unusual transactions met the objective 
criteria. However, this makes the reporting of unusual transactions an end in 
itself. The objective of the reporting system, that is, the investigation of criminal 
offences, falls by the wayside (Terlouw and Aaron, 1996: 36; Faber and Van 
Nunen, 2004: 14).  
Meanwhile, a shift from objective to subjective transaction-based reporting 
is perceptible, at least with regard to the banking system. FIU figures show that 
banks largely report on subjective indicators, up to 80% in 2002.138 In 1997, 
58% of the unusual transactions reported by banks were based on objective 
indicators. From the recent growth of use of subjective indicators, Van de Bunt 
(2004: 693) concludes that banks no longer report all transactions that should be 
reported. In other words, the transactions that correspond with the objective 
indicators are no longer always reported. This changeover from reporting 
according to objective indicators to subjective indicators is also perceptible in 
casinos, although the share of subjective indicators is still small.139 In 2002, 36% 
of the unusual transactions were reported in response to subjective indicators, 
whereas this was only 20% in 2001 (MOT, 2003: 17).  
 This shift to a subjective indicators-based reporting system could be a 
positive development. Already in 1996, Terlouw and Aaron (1996: 102) 
concluded that the subjective indicators are three times more fruitful than the 
objective ones; they are three times more likely to yield information on 
suspicious activities. BLOM compared the effectiveness of objective and 
subjective indicators as well and also underlined the importance of subjective 
                                                        
137  In 2003 reporting transactions on paper had increased to 13% (MOT, 2004: 56). This increase could 
be the result of the inexperience of the new agencies and professionals that came under the reporting 
obligation in 2003.  
138  The most used indicators involve the behaviour of the client and the type of transaction as well as the 
suspicion of smurfing and the suspicion of money laundering. 
139  On the contrary the exchange offices continue to report largely by objective indicators. In 2002 75% 
of the unusual transactions were reported as transactions exceeding €10,000. 
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indicators; suspicion of money laundering appeared to be the most effective 
indicator (MOT, 2003: 27). It is therefore no wonder that Dutch policy-makers 
have stimulated this changeover. In a white paper, the ministers of finance and 
justice announced the change from rule-based reporting towards risk-based 
reporting.140 The new reporting system was to result in less but qualitatively 
better reports. As such, it might seem that that the proven effectiveness of the 
subjective indicators has influenced the attitude of the Dutch legislator. 
According to Faber and Van Nunen (2004: 22), however, this is not the case. 
The shift is not primarily based on reasons of effectiveness but rather on 
administrative effort. The reporting of fewer transactions lightens the burden on 
the reporting system. This line of reasoning is strengthened by the fact that the 
policy-makers have not yet deliberated on the advantages and disadvantages of 
the subjective reporting method.  
What happened to the Dutch government’s reluctance to adopt a purely 
subjective disclosure system and choose instead to institute an unusual reporting 
system based on both objective and subjective indicators? The government’s 
reasons for combining the two types of indicators have not yet been refuted. 
Before a subjective-based reporting system is instituted new guidelines on 
suspicious transactions should be established to demarcate the responsibility of 
financial service providers. More attention should also be paid to information 
supply and training of the institutions and persons in question.141 Moreover, 
enforcing and checking a disclosure obligation based on subjective indicators is 
much more difficult, in particular, as the financial institutions may have 
different interests from those of the regulating authorities. Finally, the liability 
of the reporting institutions and persons should be emphasised. The current shift 
therefore highlights the responsibility of the sectors asked to report unusual 
transactions, as they must deliberate on the risks and report based on their own 
insights. At least, this applies for the financial sector as until now the risk-based 
system concerns mainly them.  
 
2.3.2.3 The converting process 
 
The main task of the FIU is to analyse the reported unusual transactions to 
ascertain whether these transactions indicate criminal offences. This is named 
the ‘converting process’ as it converts unusual transactions into suspicious 
transactions. In this process the FIU applies a dual lens. First, it carries out an 
administrative analysis, which consists of a daily and, additionally, a monthly 
comparison of the subjects in the FIU database and those in the VROS police 
database. VROS records the subjects of police investigations as well as of all 
intelligence work. If a subject appears in the FIU database and in the VROS 
                                                        
140  Integriteit financiële sector en de strijd tegen het terrorisme. Kamerstukken II 2001-02, 28 106, no. 2. 
As the title indicates, this new reporting system goes out to terrorism as well. In the future not only 
suspicious money laundering transactions, but also suspicious transactions regarding financing 
criminal activities should be reported. 
141  Integriteit financiële sector en de strijd tegen het terrorisme. Kamerstukken II 2001-02, 28 106, no. 2: 
46-47. 
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database, then the transaction is labelled as suspicious. To avoid the label of 
suspicious transaction launders sometimes use front men who have no criminal 
record (Kleemans et al., 2002: 104). Transactions carried out by front men 
might not be labelled as suspicious even if they met the objective or subjective 
indicators. Therefore, the FIU has another type of analysis. The second type is 
an FIU investigation of the subjects carrying out individual transactions, the 
nature of the transaction and the activity concerning a certain account. 
Furthermore, the FIU examines transaction patterns in its complete database. 
This can also lead transactions to be marked as suspicious. The transactions 
labelled as suspicious are transmitted to the investigative services entrusted with 
tracking down criminal organisations.  
A secondary FIU task is to assist financial institutions in recognising 
money laundering activities. Its analyses of transactions have made the FIU 
specialised in recognising money laundering operations. By means of training 
programmes and formulating recommendations on new trends, the FIU informs 
financial institutions as well as the public prosecutor’s department about 
progress in the repressive approach to combat money laundering.  
Another FIU task is to maintain relations with foreign financial intelligence 
units. These units may be administrative, police or judicial departments, which 
has been considered a problem for efficient cooperation and information 
exchange. The question of whether the FIU has succeeded in such cooperation is 
one of the implementation aspects discussed later. 
Two years after the disclosure obligation came into force, Terlouw and 
Aaron (1996: 102) asserted that the FIU had in fact carried out its primary task – 
the conversion of unusual transactions into suspicious transactions – in 
accordance with the ideas of the legislator. However, due to the explosion of the 
number of reported transactions, all staff was absorbed in the conversion 
process, so there was no time left to fulfil the other tasks – informing institutions 
of how to deal with unusual transactions in order to improve correct compliance 
with the disclosure obligation and examining advances in the area of money 
laundering and developing improved ways of detecting and preventing this 
offence. As such, the study said that the FIU had been unable to report on 
money laundering techniques and trends (Terlouw and Aaron, 1996: 50). The 
FIU was also criticised for its lack of feedback to the financial institutions 
(Terlouw and Aaron, 1996: 106). Since that report the situation has improved 
tremendously; the FIU now publishes numbers and statistics in annual reports 
and documents interesting cases in various newsletters. Moreover, the FIU 
website is being developed as a channel through which the different partners in 
the reporting system can communicate with one another.  
However, the FIU is still criticised for its lack of financial expertise. 
Pundits say that it is not difficult to produce a huge number of suspicious 
transactions by comparing various databanks. The added value of the conversion 
process is the strategic analysis that should be performed by the FIU. As first, 
little attention was paid to ‘promising’ transactions, meaning they were seldom 
recognised as suspicious (Terlouw and Aaron, 1996: 103). Two years later, the 
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FIU had developed this area of expertise, by 1997 hiring external financial 
experts (MOT, 1997: 8) and over the years refining the automation of the 
conversion process (MOTION) as well.142 Both aspects contributed to the 
improvement of the analyses carried out by the FIU to reveal suspicious 
transactions and conspicuous money flows. Another aspect of criticism involves 
the limited availability of the FIU database for external inquiries. It might be 
useful if the police, for example, could consult the database for information on 
the subjects of an investigation. Though requests for general information may be 
submitted – for instance, in line with an effort to map money laundering 
activities in a certain region – the response to such inquiries was lacking 
(Terlouw and Aaron, 1996: 95, 109). Annual reports, however, illustrate the 
increase of such inquiries from both national investigative services and foreign 
financial intelligence units.  
According to Faber and Van Nunen the problem is not related to the 
number of analyses and inquiries, but to their nature. This is also evident from 
figures presented in FIU annual reports. In 2000, the FIU developed a special 
analysis program for uncovering large networks. This program helped reveal 
1,100 suspicious transactions that year (MOT, 2001: 31). In 2001, the FIU’s 
own analyses revealed 1,500 of the 1,584 suspicious credit card transactions 
(MOT, 2003: 20). Moreover, the analyses of the transactions reported by dealers 
of high-value goods – which led to 73% of the suspicious transactions – 
illustrate the importance of FIU investigations (MOT, 2003: 23). One of these 
strategic analyses involved a young woman from South America who in a short 
time bought at least three cars for €100,000 in cash (MOT, 2003: 23). The 
reports on these transactions led to a criminal organisation that traded in drugs. 
The purchase and export of cars was a cover for the movement of criminal 
monies. Moreover, this organisation made use of money transfers and couriers 
to channel criminal monies out of the Netherlands. 
Thus, it could be argued that the FIU analysis capacity should be further 
developed. Faber and Van Nunen (2004: 19) argue that the FIU database is too 
micro-oriented. This means that transaction data are successfully used in 
concrete criminal investigations. Although the FIU analyses as they are 
currently carried out are useful in the framework of fighting crime, they are less 
suitable for uncovering new criminal offences, which requires more strategic 
knowledge. The added value of the FIU could be its power to detect patterns and 
uncover money laundering typologies and techniques. This is important, as the 
Dutch reporting system, based as it is on a mixture of subjective and objective 
indicators, results in large amount of information. Moreover, the FIU has yet to 
invest in strategic analysis related to important policy themes. Faber and Van 
Nunen (2004: 66) would even prefer the FIU database to be subject to data-
mining analyses and free search. However, the functioning of the administrative 
                                                        
142  From 1997 the office uses the MOT Information Online Network (MOTION) by which the 
comparison of the MOT-database with other databases is enlarged. The data is not only compared 
with police databases, but during the years other databases as VENNOOT (on legal persons), VIS (on 
stolen or false documents) and the Criminal Records Register. 
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FIU as a buffer to protect personal information hinders such extensive use and 
analyses (Faber and Van Nunen, 2004: 19). The data protection requirement 
makes it impossible for other partners in the reporting system to access the 
information.143 Thus, up to now the FIU’s analyses have contributed to the 
investigation of criminal offences, but do not offer an alternative method of 
investigation.  
 
2.3.2.4 Transmitting transactions 
 
As a result of the large number of unusual transactions examined, the FIU has 
uncovered many suspicious transactions. In general, as the FIU states, ‘the 
broader the net, the broader the catch’, in other words, the more data collected 
the greater the amount of data that matches with the intelligence of the police 
databank (MOT, 2003: 7).  
Over the past 10 years, over 100,000 suspicious transactions have been 
uncovered and information about them submitted to the investigative services 
(Graph 2.2). The FIU is proud of this large number of transmitted transactions 
(Faber and Van Nunen, 2004: 195).  
 
Graph 2.2 Number of suspicious transactions, 1995-2004*  
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* Transactions are categorised on the converting date. The converting date differs from the 
reporting date of an unusual transaction. Thus a suspicious transaction could be based on a 
transaction that was reported a year or more earlier.  
 
It points to the large amount of criminal proceeds that may possibly be 
laundered through financial service providers. Most of the reported transactions 
were carried through. In 2002, only 145 of the 24,741 suspicious transactions 
were aborted. This means that a large sum of possibly laundered money could 
have been injected into the legitimate economy. In 2001 the total amount of 
                                                        
143  In this framework the developments regarding such analyses of the FEC, a new expertise centre in 
which all different partners cooperate is very welcome (Faber and Van Nunen, 2004: 19). 
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suspicious transactions hit a record €1.1 billion (MOT, 2003: 7). This amount 
was exceptionally high as the year’s totals included two mega-cases. 
Nevertheless, only two years later, in 2003, a new record was set; that year the 
sum of suspicious transactions amounted to €1.5 billion (MOT, 2003: 7). To 
investigate these possibly laundered monies the FIU transmits transaction 
information to BLOM, which is dedicated specifically to the fight against money 
laundering, and to the investigative services dealing with organised crime in 
general. The problem with the huge amount of transmitted information, 
however, is that it cannot all be used by the investigative services. In practice a 
criminal investigation is seldom started based on transaction information. When 
transaction information is used, it is mainly applied for tactical reasons in an 
existing criminal investigation. Much transaction information goes unused. 
There is simply not enough capacity to process the information (Faber and Van 
Nunen, 2004: 240). Another reason for the limited use of the information is the 
rather small added value of information from mainly micro-analyses (Faber and 
Van Nunen, 2004: 240). BLOM was established in January 1999 to strengthen 
the reporting system. This supporting unit of the national public prosecutor 
carries out additional analyses of suspicious transactions. Moreover, to facilitate 
the use of transaction information in criminal investigations, BLOM established 
the HARM method (hit-and-run money laundering),144 by which it aims to 
search out and prosecute money laundering activities without investigating the 
predicate criminal activities. To carry out these rather short police 
investigations, a special HARM unit was set up under BLOM’s mandate. 
BLOM also works to interest investigative services in the HARM method. These 
efforts have served to increase the use of transaction information. 
At first, all information on suspicious transactions was transmitted from the 
FIU to the investigative services through a special police unit, which refined and 
rearranged the information to stimulate its use by investigative services. Rather 
soon this link appeared superfluous and inefficient, for a lot of information was 
lost in this last phase (Terlouw and Aaron, 1996: 105). Later the transactions 
were directly transmitted to the investigative services, so that the chain could be 
traversed as quickly as possible. The transaction information was placed in the 
databases of the intelligence units of the investigative services. From there, it 
could lead to new investigations or be brought into existing investigations. If 
information was of no immediate concern, it remained in the database for 
possible later use.  
Moreover, the FIU and BLOM established a new database, the Intranet 
Suspicious Transactions (IVT) (MOT, 2003: 52) operational from 1 February 
2000. The IVT is a subject-oriented database in which all transmitted suspicious 
transactions are registered. As this database is digital, the FIU can transmit data 
on suspicious transactions electronically and has since stopped generating paper 
documents of transactions. Moreover, representatives of the various 
investigative services have direct access to this database enabling them to look 
                                                        
144  In 2001, mobilisation of the HARM approach became more evident as money laundering became an 
independent criminal offence. 
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for interesting information. As this database is subject-oriented, it is much more 
attuned to the activities of the investigative services, as criminal investigations 
are related to persons. This simplifies access for police inquiries. Obviously, this 
database only encompasses the suspicious transactions. The reports on unusual 
transactions are still not accessible to the investigative services; the FIU remains 
the buffer to protect the private nature of this information.  
The Dutch FIU is not only responsible for transmitting transaction 
information to investigative services in the Netherlands, it must also respond to 
inquiries from foreign investigative services. Because money laundering to some 
extent involves transnational activities, it is important that different states can 
easily cooperate. Through various conventions, the European Union has 
attempted to improve international cooperation in this regard. An important 
impetus was the 1997 action plan to combat organised crime, which 
recommended a maximum level of cooperation and a two-way information flow 
between the member states’ financial and tax institutions and their law 
enforcement and judicial authorities (article 6g). To facilitate such cooperation 
the European Union argued in favour of a specific system for the exchange of 
information concerning suspected money laundering at the European level 
(recommendation 26a).  
Over the years, the Netherlands has displayed a great interest in multilateral 
cooperation. Together with the United States and Belgium, it founded in 1995 
the Egmont Group, a coordinating organisation for all financial intelligence 
units. In 2002, 11 new members joined the group, which now consists of 69 
countries. The Egmont Group organises education for analysts and researchers 
to help them discern money laundering patterns. Moreover, the group advises on 
the judicial and legal issues involved in exchanging information at the 
international level. This is necessary, because international cooperation is 
hindered by the diversity of the financial intelligence units, as they may be part 
of the police, the judiciary or administrative departments. Despite the efforts of 
the Council of the European Union to ensure that the functioning of these units 
is not affected by their internal structures,145 Mitsilegas (2003: 170) asserts that 
it is extremely difficult for an independent administrative unit to share 
information with a unit that is partially composed of police from another 
country. Moreover, the administrative units face problems in consulting foreign 
police units because they are not part of the international police communication 
system. To overcome this problem, the information exchange task is divided 
between the FIU and BLOM. The Dutch FIU, being an administrative unit, 
processes inquiries from foreign administrative units. BLOM, as supporting unit 
of the Dutch national public prosecutor, has information only on suspicious 
transactions at its disposal, and it maintains contact with police units in foreign 
countries. To keep things simple, the FIU and BLOM jointly established the 
Dutch FIU desk in 2001. This desk is a virtual window, accessible for all foreign 
inquiries.  
                                                        
145  Council decision of 17 October 2000 concerning arrangements for cooperation between financial 
intelligence units of the member states in respect of exchanging information. OJ L 271, 2000, p. 5. 
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In the meantime, the Netherlands has taken the initiative to develop the 
FIU.NET network financed by the European Commission which should make 
the international exchange of information easier, faster, safer and more pleasant 
(MOT, 2003, 56). Possible problems with different languages are avoided 
because when a request is made the system registers the requesting parties and 
the request and sends the encrypted information on to the network. According to 
the Dutch FIU, the system is not only efficient it also increases mutual trust 
(MOT, 2003: 56). 
 
2.3.3 Bottlenecks in implementation 
 
The Dutch reporting system involves a chain of activities: reporting unusual 
transactions, deducing which of these transactions are suspicious and 
transmitting the suspicious transactions to investigative services. This reporting 
system is a multi-agency approach in which the united forces of financial service 
providers, the FIU and investigative services should help prevent money 
laundering and organised crime. The reporting system is a good example of a 
responsibilisation strategy, since it actively involves financial service providers, 
which are private agencies or professionals. The functioning of such a multi-
agency approach depends on some essential elements such as activating the 
actors in question, coordinating chains of cooperative action and aligning the 
interests of the various parties. These requirements can present more difficulties 
than simply bringing the traditional criminal justice system into action (Garland, 
1996: 454). This last subsection therefore looks into how these elements have 
been developed and implemented. Based on this review, we can assess whether 
the implementation of the anti-money laundering intervention includes some 
shortcomings that might influence its output.  
 
Activating financial service providers. The Dutch reporting system is broader 
than the obligations set down in the European directive on money laundering. 
Instead of a system of reporting suspicious transactions based on subjective 
indicators, the Dutch system is based on the reporting of unusual transactions as 
defined by a mix of objective and subjective indicators. As a result of this broad 
reporting system, the Dutch FIU has received over 400,000 unusual transactions 
reports since the disclosure obligation came into force. This large number of 
transactions already indicates that the financial service providers have been 
successfully activated in the reporting system. At least, this applies for financial 
institutions, as they are responsible for the largest proportion of the reported 
transactions. In a couple of years it will be possible to ascertain the reporting 
behaviour of the non-financial sectors, such as legal professionals, as well. The 
large number of reports can also be ascribed to the authorities’ enormous 
attention towards developing lists of indicators for the various actors as well as 
their supervising compliance with the obligations. Based on these findings, 
Terlouw and Aaron (1996: 102) evaluated the reporting system positively.  
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Coordination activities. A recent evaluation study by Faber and Van Nunen is 
less positive. They conclude that all the attention on the development of and 
compliance with the indicators has resulted in a reporting system stuck in its 
first phase (Faber and Van Nunen, 2004: 20). This is illustrated by the large 
number of reported ‘unusual’ transactions. During the system’s first ten years 
much attention was paid to establishing indicators and supervising compliance, 
however, the converting process in which the suspicious transactions are culled 
from the unusual transactions received less care. Therefore, too much value has 
probably been attributed to the objective and subjective indicators. Perhaps more 
effort should be invested in the FIU’s capacity to detect the real money 
laundering activities. Also, the large number of unusual transactions has snowed 
under the FIU, leaving it little time to develop solid financial expertise. 
Consequently, it performs mostly micro-oriented analyses and makes few efforts 
in the direction of strategic analyses in relation to important policy themes. 
These micro-oriented analyses enable the FIU to transmit a large number of 
suspicious transactions to investigative services. However, because little of this 
information aligns with the needs of the investigative authorities a lot of this 
data is left unused.  
 Because of the enormous number of reports and the lack of coordination 
for handling these reports, it looks like the Dutch reporting system is going to be 
transformed into a suspicion-based system concentrating on subjective 
indicators. Such a system would limit the number of reported transactions and 
perhaps give the FIU the space it needs to develop necessary skills and 
expertise. However, according to Faber and Van Nunen (2004: 22), such a 
change is not the solution for dealing with large amounts of information, as it 
also limits the possibilities for conducting extensive analyses. Administrative 
relief would not necessary yield improved results. On the contrary, these 
researchers posit that the huge amount of information that comes from all 
unusual transactions could actually provide far more detailed insight into money 
flows and money laundering activities, provided that strategic analyses are used 
(Faber and Van Nunen, 2004: 67). They argue that many of the possibilities 
offered by objective-based or rule-based reporting systems are yet to be 
discovered and there are sufficient reasons for developing these techniques 
before changing the nature of the Dutch reporting requirements. They suggest 
that it is too soon for a change from a rule-based to a risk-based reporting 
system and that instead the possibilities for analysing transaction information 
should be further developed. 
 
Coordinating interests. A cooperative action problem related to the anti-money 
laundering initiative has also been identified, as the result of a lack of central 
management. According to Faber and Van Nunen (2004: 20), because the 
authorities were unable to strive for a single common objective, the various 
parties in the reporting system settled for their own objectives by which they 
focused on their own interests. The financial service providers concentrated on 
reporting large numbers of unusual transactions, preferably with as little effort 
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as possible. The FIU strived to uncover as many suspicious transactions as 
possible, regardless of whether this information could all be used by the 
investigative services. The investigative services continued their criminal 
investigations, as they did not see an interest in carrying out money laundering 
investigations. Most of their effort is in fact directed to criminal investigations 
of other organised crime activities, mostly drugs trafficking. Obviously, 
transaction information that fit these investigations was used. However, 
investigations were seldom started based on transaction information.  
 With all the attention paid to the first phase of the reporting system, the 
authorities seem to have lost sight of the objective. Goal displacement resulted, 
with the authorities losing sight of the actual aim concerning protection of the 
integrity of the financial service providers and contribution to the investigation 
of criminal offences. What are the consequences of these findings and how do 
they affect the results and outcomes of the anti-money laundering intervention? 
These questions are addressed in the next section. 
 
2.4 Evaluation of the outcomes of the Dutch anti-money laundering 
intervention 
 
This section deals with the last research question: what are the outcomes of the 
Dutch anti-money laundering intervention? In accordance with the methods 
described in Chapter 1 the evaluation of the outcomes involves an overview of 
the observed outputs and plausible outcomes. To observe the outputs we refer to 
the concrete objectives that were uncovered in section 2.2 and to the 
implementation process described in section 2.3. This subsection is based on the 
evaluation studies of Terlouw and Aaron and of Faber and Van Nunen as well as 
the annual reports of the FIU and BLOM. The plausible outcomes are based on 
the assumptions underlying the anti-money laundering intervention that were 
uncovered in section 2.2. These are judged in the light of the pragmatic new 
everyday criminological theories and empirical knowledge on organised crime. 
In addition, the outcomes include side effects to which the legislator must 
respond. Finally, an overall conclusion is drawn on the anti-money laundering 
intervention with regard to the prevention of organised crime.  
 
2.4.1 Observed outputs 
 
Based on its underlying programme theory, it is clear that the Dutch anti-money 
laundering intervention focuses on two main objectives. First, it tries to prevent 
the abuse of the financial sector by increasing the awareness and integrity of 
financial service providers. Second, the reporting system aims to support the 
fight against money laundering by providing investigative authorities insight 
into transactions and money flows. To what extent have these objectives been 
attained?  
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2.4.1.1 Increasing the awareness and integrity of the financial service 
providers 
 
The first important outcome in preventing money laundering involves the 
increased awareness of the traditional financial sector and, more recently, of 
other vulnerable sectors that must answer the anti-money laundering obligations. 
The participation of some of the larger banks and exchange offices in an 
informal reporting system illustrated the early commitment of this sector. 
Nevertheless, first initiatives to establish an objective-based reporting system 
aroused resistance, and hard discussion was needed to come to an acceptable 
compromise. However, with the introduction of the mixed system of reporting 
unusual transactions defined by both objective and subjective indicators, the 
financial sector was successfully activated. This appears obvious from the 
dutifully reported transactions. Moreover, the organisation and communication 
structure within financial institutions has been adjusted and internal intelligence 
units established to facilitate reporting to the FIU. However, displaying 
commitment to the anti-money laundering intervention goes further than this. As 
early as two years after the disclosure obligation came into force, there was a 
real change in attitude which extended from bank employees to managers and 
accountants (Terlouw and Aaron, 1996: 78). Accountants in particular had to 
transform their working methods. They had to approach managers tactfully to 
clear up difficulties and vagueness in the books. Changes in attitude seldom 
come easily. However, with regard to the financial sector this posed no real 
difficulty, and one could even say that the anti-money laundering measures have 
been internalised (Hoogenboom et al., s.d.: 124). In other words, commitment is 
evidenced by the integration of the reporting obligations into normal activities. 
Faber and Van Nunen (2004: 58) considered the increased awareness to be a 
form of compliance. According to them, answering the standards of integrity, 
e.g. proper management of accounts and fast and quality-wise good reporting, is 
being rewarded with the change from the rule-based to the risk-based system, 
with which more responsibility is attributed to the financial sector. At the same 
time, however, if internalisation leads to acting on automatic pilot, the chance 
that institutions will actually become aware of possible money laundering 
activities plummets. 
 With regard to most of the other sectors that must comply with the 
disclosure obligation, e.g. casinos, providers of credit cards, stockbrokers, 
insurance brokers and smaller exchange offices, implementation proceeded 
relatively easily. However, in contrast with the financial sector, here, adopting 
the rules has been based on judicial reasons and not so much out of commitment 
(Hoogenboom et al., s.d.: 133). Because these sectors believe that their services 
are not really vulnerable for money laundering operations (Hoogenboom et al., 
s.d.: 113), there is no real commitment.  
The recent extension of the disclosure obligation to legal professions 
proceeded less smoothly. This sector, in particular the Netherlands Bar 
Association, considers the obligation an obstruction of their activities, by which 
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they mostly refer to the violation of their secrecy privilege. They disagree with 
the categorisation of their services into ascertaining the legal position of a client 
and providing commercial financial and business advice. Without the pressure 
of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, these counterarguments would 
probably not have been so easily rejected. The lawyers’ critical attitude, 
however, does not imply a lack of awareness of possible culpable involvement 
in criminal activities. As early as the 1990s legal professionals, including the 
Netherlands Bar Association, were attentive to such involvement. The possible 
displacement of money laundering activities resulting from increased attention 
to the financial sector prompted the bar association in 1995 to adopt new 
directives for the intensification of preventive measures. These directives were 
aimed especially at preventing lawyers’ involvement with criminal activities. 
They were smoothly accepted, as the bar association itself had established them, 
though in some respects they were even stricter than the disclosure obligation. 
Despite their resistance to the rules, legal professionals have also reported 
unusual transactions.  
From the large number of transactions reported it is clear that financial 
service providers are aware of the possibility of money laundering transactions. 
It is however, unclear how the reporting activities, regardless of the degree of 
internalisation of the anti-money laundering measures, have contributed to the 
integrity of the financial service providers.  
 
2.4.1.2 Contributing to uncover criminal offences and prosecuting criminals 
 
The second objective of the disclosure obligation is to alert authorities when 
unusual transactions are executed. Moreover, based on customer identification 
and the disclosure obligation, financial service providers create a paper trail that 
can be followed to investigate suspicious transactions. In general, this paper trail 
should lead to criminal offences and support the prosecution of the law-breakers 
involved. Transaction information is a particularly important source of 
information for financial investigators, who gather and analyse financial data in 
order to glean new insights into criminal activities.  
 The observed outputs of the anti-money laundering intervention with 
regard to criminal investigations and prosecutions are vital. After all, 
international agencies (e.g. the FATF) attach high importance to the fight 
against money laundering, and results of anti-money laundering interventions 
are expressed in the number of investigations and the amount of confiscated 
proceeds. Nevertheless, the quantitative question of outputs seems difficult to 
answer, at least for the Netherlands. 
 
Criminal investigations. BLOM receives all information on suspicious 
transactions, analyses that information, then transmits it to investigative services 
as ready-made reports, or ‘BLOM files’ that are presented to the investigative 
services.146 Of these, 47% resulted in the start of new investigations and 41% 
                                                        
146  Most of these files are sent to the financial and economic investigative services.  
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were used in existing investigations (Faber and Van Nunen, 2004: 185). More 
generally, Faber and Van Nunen (2004: 202) concluded that 15% of 1,900 
BLOM files had been used as burden of proof for predicate offences and 14% 
for managing or coordinating decisions in investigations and for other purposes.  
 To gain insight into the number of money laundering investigations, Faber 
and Van Nunen consulted the judicial registration system. Since the inception of 
independent penalisation of money laundering in 2001 (Criminal Code article 
420bis to quater), the judicial registration system has recorded the number of 
money laundering investigations. In their study Faber and Van Nunen (2004: 
286) counted 155 such investigations. In 52% of these investigations, money 
laundering was the principle charge. In the other cases, the public prosecutors 
concentrated on other offences and the money laundering activities were listed 
as alternative charges. This could indicate that public prosecutors sometimes 
doubt the effectiveness of money laundering cases and prefer to play it safe by 
charging suspects with predicate crimes. Faber and Van Nunen (2004: 286) 
assert that the number of money laundering cases up to now is too small to make 
firm judgements. Moreover, the registration of cases says nothing about the use 
of transaction information. In fact, many such cases had no relation whatsoever 
to transaction information (Faber and Van Nunen, 2004: 287). 
Next to money laundering investigations, the results of financial 
investigations might provide information about the outcomes of the anti-money 
laundering intervention. Financial investigations centre on the confiscation of 
criminal proceeds and often run analogously with investigations of traditional 
offences, like drugs trafficking and human smuggling. Since 1999, 71 financial 
investigations have been registered (Faber and Van Nunen, 2004: 206). 
However, there are no figures for confiscated proceeds. Furthermore, though 
financial investigations imply an expectation to confiscate criminal proceeds, 
they tell us nothing about the successful use of transaction data.  
 In addition to the time-consuming criminal and financial investigations, 
BLOM established the HARM method (hit-and-run money laundering), 
mentioned earlier. HARM investigations, which aim at searching out and 
prosecuting money laundering without investigating the predicate criminal 
activities, are often restricted to a couple of weeks or months. In 1999 and 2000 
17 HARM actions were executed; in 2001 52 HARM actions took place; and in 
2002 there were 120 such actions. The HARM unit itself executed most of these 
actions,147 which resulted in the arrest of several offenders, seizure of various 
sums of money and confiscation of several stores of drugs and weapons (Unit 
Financiële Criminaliteit i.o., 2001). Although the BLOM annual reports contain 
no systematic overview of results, the HARM method is seen as a success 
(Faber and Van Nunen, 2004: 23), a perception that has been strengthened by 
the establishment of the independent penalisation of money laundering (article 
420 of the Dutch Criminal Code). Notwithstanding the disappointment in some 
of the judicial sentences, the HARM method seems useful for uncovering 
criminal proceeds.  
                                                        
147  Cases can also be passed on to investigative services in the Netherlands or abroad.  
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Court verdicts. Because the independent penalisation of money laundering is 
rather recent, many cases have yet to reach final judgement. Generalisations 
about them are therefore impossible to make. Nevertheless, based on the study 
by Faber and Van Nunen (2004: 288), almost half of the cases seem to have 
resulted in imprisonment (17 of the 38 cases). Only in three cases was 
confiscation of criminal proceeds added to the imprisonment penalty.148 Thus, 
although these preliminary figures should be interpreted with caution, it seems 
that proceeds have been confiscated in only a few cases. Neither are exact 
figures available for confiscated crime money.  
The paper trail established by the anti-money laundering obligations 
facilitates means of fighting organised crime such as the confiscation of 
criminal proceeds. Although this is not part of the preventive approach to 
organised crime, client identification and the disclosure obligation can 
support efforts to confiscate criminal proceeds. A short overview of the 
profits confiscated over the last few years is therefore called for. According 
to Faber and Van Nunen, public prosecutors tried to use the act to confiscate 
proceeds of crime in approximately 9,000 cases between 1996 and 2001. In 
the majority of these cases the amounts of money involved were relatively 
low: in 84% of the cases the estimated amount of illegally obtained income did 
not exceed €45,000. In only 2% of the cases did the criminal profits exceed an 
estimated €450,000 (Faber and Van Nunen, 2004: 461-472). A large number of 
cases were settled out of court or are still awaiting a final ruling. Judges ruled on 
approximately 5,500 cases between 1995 and 2000. The sum of the monies that 
were actually confiscated during 1995-2001 amounted to no more than €27 
million (Nelen, 2003b: 133). This result is small in relation to the sum of 
suspicious transactions. In 2001 alone suspicious transactions amounted to €1.1 
billion (MOT, 2003: 7). Another striking result is the huge gap between the 
value of the deprivation orders passed by the courts (€129 million) and the 
execution of these orders (€9 million) (Nelen, 2003b: 133).  
 
2.4.1.3 Conclusion on the outputs 
 
The description above illustrates the different sources that can be used to reveal 
the scale of money laundering investigations. Because these various sources 
reflect different aspects of laundering activities, no unambiguous figures can be 
presented on outputs of the anti-money laundering intervention. The different 
sources base their figures on different definitions, by which they present 
different values that partially overlap. This means it is impossible to give a clear 
summary of the exact number and scope of money laundering investigations; 
and it is certainly impossible to determine the extent to which these 
investigations are based on transaction information. Consequently, our main 
                                                        
148  In other cases imprisonment is accompanied by a penalty and/or a community service (6 cases) and in 
two cases there was only community service. Of the remaining 10 cases, 8 resulted in acquittal and in 
2 cases the judge was found incompetent. 
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comment regarding the observed outputs is the lack of insight of the Dutch anti-
money laundering authorities into the use of the transaction data gathered. 
 Furthermore, the two main evaluations of the Dutch reporting system 
indicate the likelihood that little has been done with the transaction data. 
According to Terlouw and Aaron (1996: 108), the limited use of transaction 
information is due to the limited expertise on financial investigations in the 
Netherlands.149 Faber and Van Nunen (2004: 21) conclude that the bottlenecks 
of the reporting system are the result of its bad implementation, in that the 
system creates a gap between the Dutch FIU and the investigative services. First, 
this gap results from the fact that the FIU’s micro-analyses offer little added 
value to law-enforcement agencies. Second, the gap is due to the failure of the 
FIU to align their analyses with the needs of the investigative services; FIU 
outputs do not correspond with policy themes, meaning they are not made to fit 
with investigative priorities. The reporting system, in fact, consists of two 
separate worlds instead of a coordinated chain of activities (Faber and Van 
Nunen, 2004: 195). There is an excess of transaction information provided by 
the FIU; yet this information fails to fulfil the needs of the investigative 
authorities, either in terms of content or quality. In short, the FIU does not offer 
what the investigative services need. As a result, transaction information seems 
to contribute only in a small part to the search and prosecution of serious 
offences. However, due to the limited insight into the direct and indirect results 
of the intervention it is impossible to reach a firm judgement. This is an 
important conclusion as well.  
 
2.4.2 Plausible outcomes 
 
The anti-money laundering intervention involves preventive measures against 
organised crime developed in such a way as to effectively contain crime. The 
question is to what extent is this intervention based on the pragmatic new 
criminological strategies that underlie many of today’s preventive approaches. 
To answer this question we test the programme theory underlying the anti-
money laundering intervention and the measures that arise from this theory 
against the assumptions and techniques of the rational choice perspective and of 
situational crime prevention.  
 
2.4.2.1 Rational choice 
 
As described in section 2.2 on the programme theory, the anti-money laundering 
obligations involve an intervention in the interaction between criminals and 
financial service providers. The intervention aims to prevent money laundering 
by increasing the costs and decreasing the benefits for the criminals involved. 
                                                        
149  Nelen and Sabee (1998) and Faber and Van Nunen (2002) confirm the severe lack of knowledge about 
financial matters within the police and in the public prosecutor’s office. Nelen (2003: 134) asserts that 
this is not unique to the Netherlands; studies from abroad also underline the difficulties of actually 
depriving criminals of their assets. 
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The causal assumptions of the programme theory start with a central problem of 
organised crime: the criminal profits. These profits are assumed to be the main 
incentive for criminal organisations. Criminals would not be attracted to 
organised crime if they could not enjoy the profits from their crimes. The 
uncovered programme theory assumes that by hindering investment of criminal 
profits in the legitimate environment organised crime becomes less attractive. 
Moreover, by facilitating the confiscation of illegal profits the anti-money 
laundering intervention contributes to remove a main incentive for committing 
organised crime. 
Based on the rational choice perspective, removing the main incentive for 
committing crime can have a large impact on organised criminality. The 
knowledge that organised crime will not result in substantial criminal profits can 
influence the decision on whether to take part in it. Legislation to deprive 
criminals of their criminal profits perfectly fits this theory. Obviously, this also 
applies to the anti-money laundering intervention, which supports the 
uncovering of criminal activities and the confiscation of criminal proceeds by 
mandating a paper trail be created for all financial transactions. Simply phrased, 
with the intervention the legislator is trying to reduce the benefits of organised 
crime so that the possible benefits no longer counterbalance the risks. This 
reasoning is certainly congruent with the rational choice perspective. 
The rational choice perspective is based on the assumption that criminals 
are free to make decisions on their own and that they are rational in their 
decision making. In particular, organised crime exemplifies rational thinking 
and calculated instrumental behaviour (Cornish and Clarke, 2002). Because 
organised crime is characterised by complexity, organisation, planning and 
economic motivation, it is illogical to think that criminal organisations do not 
act rationally. Levi (1998) seems to confirm this reasoning, as he indicates that 
organised crime should be examined as a business process. While empirical 
research has underlined that organised crime indeed involves rational thinking, it 
has also shown that some of the activities are not reasoned well.150  
With regard to money laundering, one might wonder whether criminal 
organisations indeed make the large profits that legislators ascribe to their 
activities. The whole fight against money laundering is based on the assumption 
that criminal organisations earn large profits. According to national and 
international authorities, these large profits can damage the legitimate 
environment, whether they are invested in new criminal activities or in the 
legitimate economy. This rationale justifies the implementation of the anti-
money laundering intervention. The legislators base their reasoning on police 
and judicial data, which attributes large profits to organised crime. However, it 
must be pointed out that the Dutch government does not have a long history of 
financial policing. Therefore, criminal proceeds can only be roughly estimated. 
                                                        
150  Ruggiero (1996) gives various examples in which criminal organisations do not act rationally. More 
generally, the rationality of crimes is discussed in cultural criminology. In this approach, Ferrel (1999) 
looks at the interesting contrast between avoiding risks that can uncover criminal activities and the 
adrenalin rush that someone can get out of committing crime.  
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Nevertheless, the laundering phenomenon is portrayed as a global threat (Van 
Duyne, 2003: 68), though even at the international level the scope of the 
discerned problems is seldom based on facts. Different studies have illustrated 
the difficulties of determining the scope of the money laundering problem 
(Savona, 1997; Van Duyne et al., 2003). Thus, there is a striking difference 
between the assumption that money laundering is a global threat and the 
difficulty of determining what size that threat actually is. It therefore seems 
necessary to confront the perceived problems with empirical data. If empirical 
studies illustrate that the intervention is based on wrong assumptions then the 
justification for the intervention falls apart.  
Although the idea of organised crime having large profits at their disposal 
is widely accepted, some researchers believe the estimates may be exaggerated. 
In his evaluation study of the Dutch legislation for confiscation of illegal profits, 
Nelen states that in calculating the illegal profits police do not always take 
account of the difference between profit and turnover (Nelen, 2000, 57). Van 
Duyne (1995) argues that large profits are not as self-evident as people generally 
think: organised crime is, after all, an expensive business as well.  
 
2.4.2.2 Situational crime prevention 
 
Situational crime prevention is based on the rational choice perspective and 
includes techniques to influence the cost-benefit balance of crime in order to 
make crime less attractive. Table 2.1 illustrates that the anti-money laundering 
intervention involves techniques that can easily be categorised in Clarke’s 25 
techniques of situational prevention. 
 
Increase the risk. A first technique of situational prevention is to increase the 
risk of the crime by extending guardianship to agencies and individuals beyond 
traditional law enforcement. In addition to their primary function, such agencies 
and individuals can perform a surveillance role by virtue of their position. The 
anti-money laundering intervention implies the guardianship of financial service 
providers. Specifically, the anti-money laundering intervention activates the 
employees who provide direct service to clients. This technique of activating the 
employee can be compared with the utilisation of place managers. These are 
employees who interact with the client and observe whether the client fits 
certain subjective indicators. For example, the employee should be aware of 
how money is offered to the institution or organisation. MOT reports (MOT, 
1999: 31) suggest that criminal organisations still offer large amounts of money 
in unusual packaging, such as plastic bags or cardboard boxes. Employees 
should report such behaviour, since once money is deposited, the manner of its 
delivery might no longer be ascertainable.  
 Furthermore, reducing anonymity can increase the risk involved. 
Obviously, this technique is applied in the anti-money laundering intervention 
by requiring customer identification. The obligation to identify clients should 
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deter those involved in money laundering. Moreover, it helps formal 
surveillance agencies, as it makes it possible to link transactions to persons. 
 Strengthening formal surveillance such as that provided by police and 
security guards is another technique to increase the risk. According to Clarke, 
the presence of formal surveillance implies a threat that may deter potential 
offenders. The anti-money laundering intervention strengthens formal 
surveillance as it extends to financial service providers the duty to alert the 
authorities of possible money laundering operations. Moreover, the paper trail 
that results from the anti-money laundering measures facilitates criminal 
investigations while strengthening broader formal surveillance. This is based on 
the assumption that by following the money one should find the criminal.  
 
Increase the effort. A second strategy of situational crime prevention is to 
increase the effort that potential offenders must make to accrue benefits. The 
more effort that is required the lesser the chance that offenders will turn to 
committing crimes. In this vein, the anti-money laundering intervention prevents 
anonymous acting and hinders discreet and unnoticed placement of crime money 
in the legitimate financial sector. In fact, anonymity and discrete operating are 
considered main features of money laundering – its very purpose being to hinder 
the creation of a paper trail. With the anti-money laundering intervention in 
place, money launderers must increase their efforts to whitewash criminal 
proceeds: front men and front stores must be brought into play and operations 
made more complex. This corresponds with the technique of deflecting 
offenders. Empirical research has shown the success of deflecting criminals, as 
criminal organisations often rely on a small group of people who facilitate all 
the necessary logistic elements. When plans must change, criminal organisations 
are made to rely on new modus operandi and new facilitators who might prove 
less reliable.  
A case described by Kleemans et al. (2002: 98) shows how deflecting 
activities can break down criminal organisations. As a result of a police action a 
money launderer had to change his normal operations, and he took a chance with 
someone new. However, this second-best option turned into a worst-case 
scenario as this new person proved unreliable. Over the years the deflection 
approach has increased in popularity, and significant results have been achieved 
with relatively small efforts (Kleemans et al., 2002: 156). 
 Another technique to increase the effort involved in laundering criminal 
proceeds is to control access to facilities. The anti-money laundering 
intervention at first focused only on financial institutions. However, over time 
more agencies and persons providing financial services were required to comply 
with the obligations. As such, access to these facilities became hindered on a 
wide scope.  
 
 
86
 
R
em
ov
e 
ex
cu
se
s 
21
. S
et
 ru
le
s 
• 
ob
je
ct
iv
e 
an
d 
su
bj
ec
tiv
e 
in
di
ca
to
rs
 o
ff
er
 a
 c
le
ar
 
fr
am
ew
or
k 
to
 c
om
pl
y 
 
22
. P
os
t i
ns
tru
ct
io
ns
 
 
23
. A
le
rt 
co
ns
ci
en
ce
 
• 
in
cr
ea
si
ng
 a
w
ar
en
es
s 
an
d 
in
te
gr
ity
  
24
. A
ss
is
t c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
 
• 
su
pp
or
t c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
w
ith
 ru
le
s b
y 
pr
ov
id
in
g 
ex
am
pl
es
 o
f a
nd
 tr
en
ds
  
25
. C
on
tro
l d
ru
gs
 a
nd
 
 a
lc
oh
ol
 
  
R
ed
uc
e 
pr
ov
oc
at
io
ns
 
16
. R
ed
uc
e 
fr
us
tra
tio
ns
  
 a
nd
 st
re
ss
  
 17
. A
vo
id
 d
is
pu
te
s 
 
18
. R
ed
uc
e 
em
ot
io
na
l  
ar
ou
sa
l 
 19
. N
eu
tra
liz
e 
pe
er
  
 p
re
ss
ur
e 
 
 20
. D
is
co
ur
ag
e 
im
ita
tio
n 
  
R
ed
uc
e 
th
e 
re
w
ar
ds
 
11
. C
on
ce
al
 ta
rg
et
s  
 12
. R
em
ov
e 
ta
rg
et
s  
 13
. I
de
nt
ify
in
g 
pr
op
er
ty
 
  14
. D
is
ru
pt
 m
ar
ke
ts
 
 15
. D
en
y 
be
ne
fit
s 
• 
ob
lig
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 th
e 
re
su
lti
ng
 p
ap
er
 tr
ai
l 
su
pp
or
t t
he
 c
on
fis
ca
tio
n 
of
 c
rim
e 
m
on
ie
s 
In
cr
ea
se
 th
e 
ri
sk
 
6.
 E
xt
en
d 
gu
ar
di
an
sh
ip
  
• 
ex
am
in
e 
tra
ns
ac
tio
ns
 
po
ss
ib
ly
 re
la
te
d 
to
 
m
on
ey
 la
un
de
rin
g 
7.
 A
ss
is
t n
at
ur
al
 su
rv
ei
lla
nc
e 
  8.
 R
ed
uc
e 
an
on
ym
ity
 
• 
id
en
tif
y 
cl
ie
nt
s 
9.
 U
til
is
e 
pl
ac
e 
m
an
ag
er
s 
• 
em
pl
oy
ee
s h
av
e 
to
 
w
on
de
r w
he
th
er
 c
lie
nt
s 
an
sw
er
 to
 o
bj
ec
tiv
e 
or
 
su
bj
ec
tiv
e 
in
di
ca
to
rs
 
10
. S
tre
ng
th
en
 fo
rm
al
  
 su
rv
ei
lla
nc
e 
• 
al
ar
m
 sp
ec
ifi
c 
au
th
or
iti
es
 a
nd
 p
ro
vi
de
 
th
em
 w
ith
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
T
ab
le
 2
.1
 T
he
 te
ch
ni
qu
es
 o
f t
he
 a
nt
i-m
on
ey
 la
un
de
ri
ng
 in
te
rv
en
tio
n 
ca
te
go
ri
se
d 
in
 C
or
ni
sh
 a
nd
 C
la
rk
e’
s 2
5 
te
ch
ni
qu
es
 o
f s
itu
at
io
na
l p
re
ve
nt
io
n 
In
cr
ea
se
 th
e 
ef
fo
rt
 
1.
 T
ar
ge
t h
ar
de
ni
ng
 
• 
hi
nd
er
 c
on
sp
ic
uo
us
 
el
em
en
ts
 a
s a
no
ny
m
ity
 a
nd
 
di
sc
re
te
 o
pe
ra
tin
g 
2.
 C
on
tro
l a
cc
es
s t
o 
fa
ci
lit
ie
s  
• 
on
e 
ca
n 
co
nt
ro
l t
he
 a
cc
es
s 
to
 fi
na
nc
ia
l s
er
vi
ce
 
pr
ov
id
er
s 
 3.
 S
cr
ee
n 
ex
its
  
 4.
 D
ef
le
ct
 o
ff
en
de
rs
  
• 
by
 h
in
de
rin
g 
th
e 
di
sc
re
et
 
an
d 
un
no
tic
ed
 p
la
ce
m
en
t 
of
 c
rim
e 
m
on
ey
, 
la
un
de
re
rs
 h
av
e 
to
 tu
rn
 to
 
ot
he
r m
et
ho
ds
 
 5.
 C
on
tro
l t
oo
ls
/w
ea
po
ns
 
87
Reduce the rewards. The third strategy of situational crime prevention is to 
reduce the rewards of criminal endeavours. One of Clarke’s techniques involves 
denying criminals the benefits of their misdeeds. With regard to the anti-money 
laundering intervention, the legislator has focused on criminal profits. Although 
outputs cannot be quantified, it is clear that the intervention can result in the 
confiscation of criminal gains.  
Based on the assumption that profits constitute the main incentive for 
participation in organised crime, people are likely be less attracted to commit 
crime if they are unable to hide illegal profits from law-enforcement authorities. 
Confiscation of criminal proceeds fits in with this strategy. If illegal profits 
cannot be laundered, they will be much more difficult to enjoy in the legitimate 
environment. This means that criminals would have difficulty using their profits 
as they wish. Moreover, the paper trail can lead authorities to criminal offences 
and their underlying money flows. Uncovering criminal activities and 
confiscating criminal profits thus helps reduce the rewards to a minimum.  
 
Remove excuses. A final strategy of situational crime prevention involves the 
removal of excuses. In this case, this strategy is applicable not to the criminal 
organisations but to the financial service providers. First of all, with the 
established objective and subjective indicators the authorities have set clear rules 
with which financial service providers must comply. Integrity and awareness are 
two main concepts in this intervention, corresponding with Clarke’s technique 
of appealing to the conscience of the institutions and individuals involved. To 
assist in compliance with the anti-money laundering obligations, the FIU 
provides information on trends in money laundering. With this information, 
financial service providers become better equipped to recognise and report 
possible money laundering activities. 
 
2.4.2.3 Effects of the technique 
 
The techniques involved in the anti-money laundering intervention correspond 
well with crime-reduction strategies of situational crime prevention. This 
enables us to conclude, in the abstract, that it is plausible that the anti-money 
laundering intervention leads to the presumed effects. Empirical research has 
also uncovered some successes of these techniques. 
Table 2.3 shows that no techniques to reduce provocations have been 
applied. This is not surprising, since the money laundering intervention was 
designed to avoid confrontation between financial service providers and 
suspected launderers. The most obvious example is the fact that employees 
should not enter into a discussion with a possible launderer, but should carry out 
the transaction and then report it to the authorities, which then can start an 
investigation. Moreover, reducing provocations is a technique that was added to 
the existing scheme in order to include offences that were provoked by a 
situation. It would be illogical to assume that money laundering is provoked by a 
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situation, for it is a premeditated activity at the end of a chain of criminal 
activities.  
 Next to these techniques, Clarke looks at the role of people and institutes. 
Clarke (1997) argues that institutes and people can play two opposite roles: that 
of preventers (who make crime less likely) and that of promoters (who 
carelessly or deliberately make crime more likely). Obviously, preventive 
measures seek to bring into action all kinds of institutes and people as 
preventers. This is actually the essence of the reponsibilisation strategy. No long 
argumentation is needed to show that the anti-money laundering intervention 
involves a similar reasoning concerning the financial service providers. Whereas 
formerly there was nothing to prevent these providers from facilitating and thus 
promoting crime, now these providers are brought into action as preventers. To 
ensure their proactive involvement, the authorities appeal to the conscience of 
the financial service providers as well as monitoring their compliance with the 
rules. As such, financial service providers can metaphorically be regarded as 
gatekeepers and watchdogs of the legitimate environment. According to this 
reasoning it is of utmost importance that these providers are honest and 
unwilling to facilitate money laundering. Thus, the assumption that the integrity 
of these providers is essential to fight money laundering is based on a clear 
theoretical insight. 
Based on this theoretical insight, according to both the rational perspective 
and the situational crime prevention approach, it is plausible that the anti-money 
laundering measures have had a positive impact in reducing organised crime. 
However, the main problem with situational crime prevention is possible 
displacement. In fact, it is this issue that makes or breaks the situational crime 
prevention approach. If displacement occurs, it means that people act out of a 
stronger motivation than just opportunism, in which case the situational 
approach to crime prevention would be less interesting. However, according to 
Clarke (1997: 28) the situational approach illustrates that few offenders are so 
driven by need or desire that they maintain a certain level of offending whatever 
the cost. On the contrary, for most people the elimination of easy opportunities 
for crime may actually encourage them to explore non-criminal alternatives. 
This reasoning implies that displacement will not be 100%, a fact confirmed by 
other studies (Hesseling, 1994). Nonetheless, the following subsection illustrates 
that displacement has played a role in the implementation of the anti-money 
laundering intervention.  
 
2.4.3 Side effects 
 
Next to the observed outputs and the plausible outcomes, any side effects must 
be taken into account in determining the effectiveness of the anti-money 
laundering intervention. Side effects may be positive or negative. We focus here 
on two main negative side effects. Firstly, as a consequence of the barriers put 
up to hinder the abuse of financial service providers, the anti-money laundering 
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intervention results in a displacement of activities.151 Secondly, the emphasis on 
the repressive approach in the reporting system has led to a controlled delivery 
of crime money into the legitimate environment, which does not seem to 
correspond with the objective of preventing organised crime.  
 
Displacement. As described in the introduction chapter of this study, most 
preventive measures face the problem of displacement. Displacement, in fact, is 
seen as a main bottleneck of fighting money laundering – at least, by the 
legislators who decided to broaden the scope of the disclosure obligation. The 
Dutch legislator anticipated the possible displacement of money laundering 
operations by incorporating the possibility to adjust parts of the acts by Order in 
Council.152 In this way, the time-consuming procedure of amending the acts is 
avoided.  
Some geographic displacement of certain financial activities has been 
observed to off-shore centres in countries outside the jurisdiction of the 
European Union. In such ‘tax havens’ criminals can set up corporations with an 
account at the local bank and transfer large sums of money with no supervision 
by authorities (FATF, 1990: 9). To counteract this displacement, the FATF 
(1991: 12) suggested a geographic extension of the anti-money laundering 
measures.153 In turn, the Council of the European Union recommended in its 
1997 action plan closer cooperation with the EU candidate countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe, and with other countries and international organisations, to 
encourage well-organised anti-money laundering interventions and to stimulate 
mutual assistance in criminal matters (recommendations 3, 4 and 16). Over time, 
the FATF began focusing on the vulnerability of the international financial 
system, maintaining a list of non-cooperative countries and territories. By 
addressing deficiencies, the FATF aims to stimulate these countries to adopt 
better regulations and implement the necessary supervision. When countries 
address the FATF recommendations they can petition to be removed from this 
list. For example, in 2004 Guatemala, Egypt and Ukraine were removed from 
the list. Regarding the countries remaining on the list, such as Indonesia, Nigeria 
and the Philippines, the FATF advises financial institutions in member states to 
pay special attention to transactions involving these countries or territories 
(FATF, 2004: 2).  
                                                        
151  Displacement is generally viewed with disapproval. Hesseling (1994: 57), however, argues that 
displacement as a result of barriers put up to hinder certain activities is not only negative. His study 
illustrates that displacement is never 100%. By intervening in an activity there are always people who 
refrain from the activities and those who look for ways to get around the intervention.  
152  For example, the definition of financial services to determine the object of the disclosure obligation 
has the provision that other services can be indicated by Order in Council (see Disclosure of Unusual 
Transactions (Financial Services) Act, article 1). 
153  One geographic area that could be used for laundering activities is the Caribbean. In order to prevent 
anti-money laundering developments in the Caribbean from lagging behind, the Caribbean Financial 
Task Force (CFATF) was established and 19 extra recommendations introduced. In the Netherlands, 
Terlouw and Aaron (1996: 78-79) mention the displacement to Eastern bloc countries that have a cash 
society. 
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There is also the possibility of displacement to other branches and institutions. 
Data in FIU annual reports confirm some displacement to other institutions. For 
example, FIU figures show a clear increase in the use of money transfers (MOT, 
2003: 34). Furthermore, the FIU and FATF annual reports contain examples of 
displacement of money laundering activities to non-financial sectors. In reaction 
to this form of displacement, the scope of actors that must comply with the 
intervention was enlarged. The question is whether money launderers are 
already looking for new sectors that fall outside of the newest scope.  
A third type of displacement involves modus operandi, specifically, the 
likelihood that increased control of the financial sector has resulted in more 
sophisticated money laundering constructions. The implementation of these 
complex constructions, however, requires the expertise and skills of legal 
professionals, and therefore not everyone agrees with the prominence given to 
this form of displacement. Van Duyne (2003: 82) argues that most criminal 
money is simply exported.154 While he does not dispute the fact that loan-back 
methods and fake bookkeeping are used to launder money (2003: 83), he 
concludes that the actual cases display a lot of pragmatism and only a little 
strategy (Van Duyne, 2003: 94). He criticises the blind perception of the cases 
described in FATF reports as typical, since the reports aim to convey striking 
examples with educational value for the member states. They therefore cannot 
be regarded as a survey of general laundering practices (Van Duyne, 2003: 97). 
In the Netherlands, the possible involvement of legal professionals in organised 
crime has been a subject of debate since the early 1990s.155 Several studies 
showed the culpable involvement of these professionals (Van de Bunt, 1996: 27; 
Kleemans et al., 1998 and 2002).156 However, lack of empirical evidence 
(criminal investigation and prosecution of lawyers is rare) makes it impossible 
to assess the scale of the problem (Nelen and Lankhorst, 2003: 46).157  
Another aspect of displacement regarding the modus operandi involves the 
use of modern technology, in particular cyber-laundering. Through the FATF, 
member states have expressed their concerns about the risks and potential use of 
Internet technologies (FATF, 1999: article 27). The computerised world offers 
great convenience for money laundering operations. Internet is easy to access, 
always available, depersonalised and cheap. Most of all, these features obstruct 
                                                        
154  Van Duyne’s study is based on 52 cases involving criminal proceeds of €450,000 or more. 
155  It first came up in the 1992 white paper Organised Crime in the Netherlands.  
156  The concept of culpable involvement used by Van de Bunt (see also Fijnaut et al., 1998: 162) relates 
to involvement in both a narrow and a broad sense. The first exists in the compromising conduct of 
being involved in punishable acts in such a way that it can be prosecuted. The second encompasses 
compromising conduct by which professionals fail to exercise due care in preventing misuse. Thus, 
culpable involvement does not necessarily imply conscious and deliberate collaboration, but it may be 
reproached because of negligence. 
157  A media analysis of culpable involvement of professionals over the period 1999-2001 of Lankhorst 
and Nelen (2004) found five cases of misconduct of real estate agents of which four could be related 
with organised crime; three cases to misconduct of tax consultants and accountants related to 
organised crimes and other criminal activities. In 19 cases lawyers were related to criminal activities; 
eight cases which implied fraud and 11 related to organised crime. Eight cases were found of notaries 
related to criminal activities; three cases implied fraud and five were related to organised crime. These 
figures do not say anything about the possible threat to the society. 
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the identification of clients and record keeping as well as the reporting of 
suspicious transactions. Moreover, supervision of high-tech actions is hindered 
by the fact that the virtual world offers the possibility to encrypt information and 
that these transactions might fall outside of current legislative and regulatory 
definitions (FATF, 1999: article 27). When speaking of high-tech laundering, 
people often refer to the use of Internet, Internet banking, smart cards and 
electronic cash. However, the fact that most of these services are related to an 
existing bank account puts the problem into perspective. The banks do register 
the account activities. However, there is no way to verify the true identity of the 
person using the services.  
 To counter the risk of high-tech laundering and the rapid developments in 
this area, the FATF has established some countermeasures (FATF, 1999: article 
34): 
 
- limiting the functions and capacity of smart cards (including maximum value and 
turnover limits as well as the number of smart cards per customer); 
- linking new payment technology to financial institutions and bank accounts; 
- requiring standard record-keeping procedures for these systems to enable the 
examination, documentation, and seizure of relevant records by investigating 
authorities; and 
- establishing international standards for these measures. 
 
Surprisingly little has been done since the FATF presented these 
countermeasures in 1999. Contrary to other signs of displacement, the problem 
of cyber-laundering is not addressed in the 2001 revised European directive on 
money laundering. Nonetheless, as with more traditional financial service 
provision, identification is an important means of establishing a paper trail to 
support law-enforcement agencies in uncovering criminals and criminal 
offences. 
Finally, there is the matter of displacement to informal value transfer 
systems or underground banking. Though underground banking is often 
associated with criminal activities, these activities often involve legal enterprises 
of communities from China, Pakistan and India. In these communities it is 
normal for family members in richer countries to financially support their kin in 
their country of origin. It is for this reason that such systems are more accurately 
referred to as informal value transfer systems (Passas, 1999: 9). However, 
launderers’ desire to avoid governmental checks might push them to use these 
systems as well. For example, in the Netherlands an informal value transfer 
system that provides transfers to Jordan, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey has been 
used to launder crime monies (Kleemans et al., 2002: 118-121). The problem 
with such informal activities is that situational prevention is no longer possible. 
Van de Bunt and Van Dijken (2003: 55) address this issue with regard to money 
transfers provided by informal providers. For them, extension of the disclosure 
obligation could have two divergent effects. On the one hand, it could lead to a 
disadvantageous situation where clients avoid usage of the services as much as 
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possible. On the other hand, it could provoke providers to submerge even 
further.  
Awareness of these possible effects is key for the prevention of organised 
crime. When crime money disappears in illegal environments the opportunities 
for the legislator to establish preventive measures disappears, for the authorities 
can no longer play a supervising role. Naturally, in such situations law 
enforcement can still intervene in the illegal environment with repressive 
measures, such as investigating criminal organisations.  
 
Controlled or uncontrolled delivery of criminal money. Experience shows that 
the two objectives of the anti-money laundering intervention – prevention of 
abuse of the financial sector for money laundering activities and fighting money 
laundering itself – result in a field of tension. On the one hand, the anti-money 
laundering measures have to protect the integrity of the financial service 
providers. On the other hand, these providers are left to execute unusual 
transactions, even when they are convinced they are collaborating in money 
laundering, provided that these transactions are reported. The disclosure 
obligation exculpates them from any liability.158 Thus, despite the fact that 
maintaining the integrity of the financial service sector was the legislator’s 
primary stated concern, it was clear from the beginning that the reporting system 
was better prepared to provide information to investigative authorities rather 
than to facilitate the integrity of the financial sector.  
 The fact that almost all unusual transactions were in fact carried out has 
resulted in a disclosure obligation that could be said to assist the laundering of 
crime money under the watchful eye of the providers of financial services.159 
This is particularly visible because of the possibility to report immediately 
afterwards, which has become the basic rule. Terlouw and Aaron (1996: 36) 
speak of a controlled delivery of crime money. Van de Bunt (2004: 694) states 
that if it turns out that the reaction of the investigative services and the justice 
system is inadequate, we can speak of an uncontrolled influx of crime money. 
As described earlier, evaluation studies show that indeed too little is done with 
transaction data. This development sharply contrasts with the idea of facilitating 
the integrity of the financial service providers. Instead of refraining from service 
provision when there are suspicions of money laundering, the financial sector 
actively participates in the illegal activities. According to the financial sector, 
this leads to ethical problems for the institutions and worries considering their 
public image (Terlouw and Aaron, 1996: 37).  
The implementation of the intervention seems to indicate that the 
legislator’s priorities have changed and that the integrity of the sectors involved 
is now subordinate to the search and prosecution of offences. In other words, the 
repressive approach against money laundering seems to have gained precedence 
over the preventive one. This also appears from the broadening of the disclosure 
                                                        
158  This does not apply for customer identification. The Establishing of Identity (Services) Act prohibits 
the execution of any transactions when the identification is not yet established.  
159  In 2002 only 145 of the 24,741 suspicious transactions were not carried out.  
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obligation to legal professionals. The Netherlands Bar Association had earlier 
established specific professional directives160 that were stricter in preventing 
lawyers’ involvement with crime money than the money laundering measures 
now mandated by law. In general their own directives required professionals to 
refrain from services when indications of money laundering arise. For the notary 
profession more or less the same remark can be made. These internal directives 
do not really differ from the anti-money laundering disclosure obligation, except 
for the fact that specific suspect transactions were not to have been carried out. 
As a consequence, the integrity of the professionals seems to have been better 
protected by the internal directives than by the legislative acts. Whereas the 
internal directives imply refraining from service provision, the reporting system 
allows these services, provided the transactions are reported. Nonetheless, it 
must be said that in the framework of the disclosure obligation reporting should 
take place at an earlier stage than the stage at which the professional would 
refrain from providing the services.  
 
2.4.4 Conclusion  
 
The Dutch anti-money laundering intervention was brought into force to hinder 
the use of financial service providers for money laundering. Whereas at the 
international level anti-money laundering interventions had focused on 
organised crime or serious crime, the Dutch legislator decided to enlarge the 
scope of its intervention to all kinds of offences. In the Netherlands, the anti-
money laundering intervention was the first preventive measure taken against 
organised crime for which non-law-enforcement agents were brought into 
action. At the time of its establishment, it appeared that these agents were 
willing to comply with the intervention, at least those in the financial sector. The 
anti-money laundering intervention has since been characterised by a ‘widening 
of the net’ of subjects that come under is obligations. Recently, legal 
professionals were added to the list of professionals who must comply with the 
intervention. These recent entrants are not as willing to comply as the financial 
sector. This is probably due to the high costs of the intervention and the limited 
benefit as perceived by these professionals. The costs of the anti-money 
laundering intervention include not only the administrative costs of registering 
information, but also the limitations it poses on the privilege of professional 
confidentiality. According to the professionals, these high costs are out of 
proportion with the incidental involvement of professionals in money laundering 
activities. In addition, the benefits, which are mainly to provide starting points 
for criminal investigations, are good for the authorities but not for the 
professionals themselves. In short, the professionals argue that the costs do not 
counterbalance the benefits.  
What about the effects of the anti-money laundering intervention? This 
intervention was considered a crime-reducing intervention based on the 
                                                        
160  It implies the Bruynincks-directives (Richtlijnen ter voorkoming van betrokkenheid van de advocaat 
bij criminele handelingen). 
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assumption that hindering the abuse of financial service providers would prevent 
money laundering. Assuming that hindering money laundering hinders criminal 
organisations from spending illegal proceeds, the anti-money laundering 
intervention would affect organised crime as well. For this the legislator 
introduced two strategies. The first strategy can be called the preventive 
approach: increasing the awareness and integrity of financial service providers 
and hindering the placement of money in the legitimate environment. The 
second strategy is part of a repressive approach: information on suspicious 
transactions must be reported to the authorities so they can investigate, uncover 
and prosecute criminal offences. In theory, this dual strategy might be effective 
in that it aligns with today’s pragmatic criminological theories. The anti-money 
laundering intervention encompasses various techniques that can be categorised 
in the crime-reducing techniques of the situational crime prevention approach of 
Cornish and Clarke. In particular, these techniques involve increasing the effort 
needed to benefit from crime, increasing the risks involved and reducing the 
rewards. This should make money laundering unattractive to criminals. In 
addition, the techniques involve removing excuses on the part of the financial 
service providers, dissuading them from facilitating money laundering.  
In practice, the effects of the intervention are debatable. It is likely that up 
to now the intervention has had limited impact on organised crime, as its 
implementation is characterised by many shortcomings, particularly in the 
reporting system. Due to the lack of strategic management by the ministers of 
justice and of finance, the institutions involved (the FIU, BLOM and 
investigative authorities) have no mutual objectives at which to aim. As a result 
each has developed their own objectives, meaning that the aims at the various 
links in the chain of the reporting system do not align. For example, the number 
of unusual transactions is so enormous that the FIU cannot submit them all to 
strategic analyses; and the micro-analyses of the FIU bring in such a large 
amount of information on suspicious transactions that it cannot be processed by 
the criminal investigative services. Moreover, the authorities have focused on 
the most concrete aspects of the anti-money laundering intervention. They have 
concentrated on developing indicators to determine which transactions are 
‘unusual’ and on enforcing compliance of the institutions and persons required 
to comply. The emphasis on reporting behaviour, the first phase of the reporting 
system, has led to goal displacement (Faber and Van Nunen, 2004: 20). 
Compliance of the financial service providers became an end in itself and the 
authorities lost sight of the actual objectives: protecting the integrity of financial 
service providers and contributing to uncover and prosecute criminal offences. 
As a result, we can conclude that up to now the anti-money laundering 
intervention has not lived up to the legislator’s expectations. 
However, as this conclusion is not based on the intervention as such, but on 
the shortcomings of its implementation the situation can be changed. Insights 
provided by evaluation studies can be a first step in the further development of 
the reporting system. It is striking that it took ten years to draw this conclusion. 
According to Van de Bunt (1993), goal displacement arises from a lack of clear 
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policy, as vague objectives offer little support and guidance. This means that 
first of all, the Dutch legislator has to recover the actual objectives and rethink 
the benefits of the preventive approach and take a clear position on protecting 
the integrity of financial service providers. With regard to the repressive 
approach, the legislator should invest in the last stages of the system. Investing 
in financial expertise and in cooperation between the anti-money laundering 
authorities and the investigative services could improve the results of the 
reporting system. A key step for the FIU and BLOM is to adjust their efforts to 
the demands of the investigative services. For this, the public prosecutor’s office 
can play an important role. The national prosecutor concerned with the 
disclosure’s act should consult more regularly with the Board of Procurators 
General, which sets the priorities for the Dutch National Criminal Investigation 
Service, which is charged with the fight against organised crime. In setting 
priorities, it should be clear that financial policing as such cannot be a priority: it 
is an instrument, a method, to handle offences. In other words, the anti-money 
laundering intervention is a means to contribute to the investigation of the 
criminal offences that are being given priority by the competent authorities. This 
is exactly the objective the Dutch legislator had in mind when it established the 
anti-money laundering intervention. 
96
 
97
Chapter 3  The Dutch screening and auditing approach  
 
The intertwining of organised crime with the legitimate environment became a 
problem first in countries where mafia organisations tried to infiltrate the 
legitimate world, particularly in Italy and certain parts of the United States, 
especially New York. To combat the problem these countries developed 
administrative measures to bar criminals from the legitimate environment. These 
administrative measures served as an example for law-makers in the Netherlands 
when, in the early 1990s, an encroachment of organised crime into legitimate 
Dutch society was suspected. The local and national measures that were then 
taken provided an incentive for international organisations to follow suit and 
also act against the interlinking of organised crime with legitimate society. In 
particular, measures not only in the Netherlands but also in Italy influenced EU 
policies. The creation of the Dutch screening and auditing approach is one such 
development. The approach developed in a bottom-up fashion, meaning that 
successful implementation of national screening initiatives led to their 
replication at the international level.161  
 This chapter concentrates on the Dutch screening and auditing approach as 
set out in the BIBOB Act.162 In a nutshell, the BIBOB Act establishes grounds 
on which administrative authorities can refuse or withdraw permits and 
subsidies or exclude bidders from tendering procedures. For this the act 
establishes a bureau that, upon the request of an administrative authority, 
conducts a screening to come to an advice whether a permit, subsidy or public 
contract is likely to be abused for criminal activities.  
In accordance with the general methods described in Chapter 1, this chapter 
answers the three research questions:  
 
- What is the programme theory underlying the Dutch screening and 
auditing approach? (Section 3.2) 
- What is the content of the Dutch screening and auditing approach and 
how is it implemented? (Section 3.3) 
- What are the observed outputs and plausible outcomes of the Dutch 
screening and auditing approach? (Section 3.4) 
 
The Dutch screening and auditing approach came into force in 2003. The 
discussion preceding its implementation resulted in a large body of literature on 
which this chapter is largely based. Due to the short period of time that the 
approach has been in place, it is difficult to describe its implementation in detail 
and even harder to present its outputs and outcomes. As a result the final section 
is rather summary.  
                                                        
161  The bottom-up development of the screening and auditing approach is opposite that of the anti-money 
laundering intervention, which was created through a top-down process enforced by the European 
Union and other international organisations.  
162  It thus does not give complete insight into all possible screening and auditing procedures. 
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3.1 The intertwining of the legitimate and illicit worlds 
 
This chapter centres on the Dutch screening and auditing approach and its 
possible effects on organised crime. Screening implies the testing or examining 
of someone or something to discover whether there are irregularities. Screening 
can take place, for example, within organisations to check whether an employee 
is loyal. Auditing involves an official examination of the accounts of a business 
and generally has a more positive connotation, as investigators check whether 
certain activities were done correctly. The best known audits are probably those 
executed by accountants. Another difference between audits and screenings is 
that the first are usually executed by the subjects themselves or on their own 
initiative while a screening is conducted by a third party. This chapter looks at 
the screening and auditing activities enforced by the authorities to gain insight 
into possible involvement in organised crime. Via audits people must illustrate 
that they are reliable partners to work with, and screenings verify that 
prospective partners indeed are reliable. When involvement in criminal activities 
is discovered, people may be excluded from certain public functions, for 
example, they may be denied a permit to open a certain type of establishment or 
they may be excluded from public tendering procedures. 
 This first section deals with the problems and threats of organised crime 
that underlie the Dutch screening and auditing approach and the process of 
realising this intervention. As mentioned earlier, the approach came into being 
through a bottom-up process. This section firstly provides insight into the 
precursors of the Dutch screening and auditing approach. Subsequently, it 
moves to the national level and then to developments in the European Union. 
This is important because EU member states must adhere to certain rules for 
participation in EU tendering procedures. In describing these developments it 
becomes clear that screening and auditing strategies differ from one authority to 
the next.  
 
3.1.1 Precursors to the Dutch developments  
 
Italy. Italy is the first country in the European Union where investigations of the 
antecedents of companies, the so-called ‘criminal audits’, were regulated by law 
and systematically conducted on a national level. Since the 19th century Italy has 
had to deal with the Sicilian Mafia, the Camorra and other such organised crime 
groups. A main characteristic of these mafia-structured organisations is their use 
of their power to infiltrate the legitimate environment in order to control 
economic or commercial activities. In particular they made use of certain public 
services, such as licences, public contracts and subsidies. Due to the enormous 
problems deriving from these mafia-structured organisations Italy developed 
anti-mafia legislation in the 1950s to more effectively address organised crime 
and corruption. In 1965 the anti-mafia legislation entered into force and from 
then on the criminal court could prohibit a person suspected or convicted of 
organised crime from contracting with public administrations (Di Nicola, 2002: 
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252).163 The anti-mafia legislation provides for a warning system to guarantee 
the exclusion of natural or legal persons. This system compels authorities 
involved in granting permits and all contracting authorities to check whether 
applicants are registered on the anti-mafia list. 
The act became a success only in the 1980s after the concept of ‘mafia 
organisation’ was defined. Italian law-makers necessarily distinguished a mafia 
organisation from common organised crime as it implied a different problem, 
and as such needed a different approach. The characteristics of mafia 
organisations can be derived from its definition in article 416 bis of the Italian 
criminal code:  
 
A Mafia-type organisation is an organisation whose members use the power of 
intimidation deriving from the bonds of membership, the state of subjugation and 
conspiracy of silence that it engenders to commit offences, acquire direct or indirect 
control of economic activities, licences, authorisations, public procurement contracts 
and services or to obtain unjust profits or advantages for themselves or others, or to 
prevent or obstruct the free exercise of vote, or to procure votes for themselves or others 
at elections. 
 
From this description it is clear that the abuse of public services is inherent in 
the form of organised crime that the Italian legislator has to deal with.  
 
New York. In the late 1960s the New York authorities were confronted with 
similar mafia-structured organisations infiltrating the legitimate environment. In 
particular, the infamous Cosa Nostra organisation flourished in New York for a 
century. Cosa Nostra wielded significant power in unions and companies in 
various industries, such as construction, waste hauling and even John F. 
Kennedy Airport. It gained this power by selecting staff and claiming tributes 
through numerous rackets and schemes (Jacobs, 1999: 121). Obtaining or 
occupying positions of power in branches of industry is labelled ‘racketeering’. 
The United States gave far-reaching facilities to law-enforcement authorities to 
enable them to effectively combat racketeering. Examples are testimonial 
immunity, enhanced sentencing in organised crime cases, the witness protection 
programme and the Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).164  
RICO was a particularly important instrument, as this act marked the 
beginning of a new approach to fighting mafia-like organised crime. Traditional 
law enforcement tools had proven ineffective for fighting mafia syndicates, as 
they singled out individual criminals and offences. The syndicates simply 
replaced those who were convicted and imprisoned. RICO was designed to 
dismantle whole syndicates by making it a crime ‘to conduct the affairs of an 
enterprise (a legal enterprise or a criminal group) through a pattern of 
racketeering activities (the commission of two or more non-isolated designated 
crimes within ten years)’ (Goldstock, 1991: 139). Consequently, RICO enabled 
                                                        
163  For an extended discussion of this Italian preventive approach see Di Nicola (2000) and Manunza 
(2001). 
164  These facilities became part of the Organized Crime Control Act established in 1970. 
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law enforcers to target companies in which criminal organisations had obtained 
positions of power. Due to the central role of the companies, the major penalty 
under RICO was forfeiture. With this, the US government applied its 
assumption that it was harder to rebuild a successful business than to replace 
individuals.165 Although, ten years later the measures seemed successful, as the 
number of mafia organisations was enormously reduced, the authorities were 
unsuccessful in barring these organisations from legitimate sectors. It became 
clear that criminal law alone was not strong enough to break these organisations’ 
positions of economic power.  
The New York Organised Crime Task Force (OCTF) developed a new 
approach, which resulted in screening procedures in various sectors (Fijnaut and 
Jacobs, 1991; Jacobs, 1999). For example, there was a pre-qualification 
procedure regarding the school construction programme. By means of this 
procedure no companies could tender for a construction contract before the 
authorities – in this case an inspector general aided by representatives of police, 
public procurement services and even financial authorities – had checked the 
answers to an extensive questionnaire that was a part of the application form. 
The questions involved all aspects of the company’s organisation: its owners, 
stockholders, corporate capital, payments of taxes and social security, 
employees with criminal records, previous construction projects, etc. An 
incomplete questionnaire or certain answers to the questions could result in an 
applicant being excluded from bidding for the public contract.  
This procedure included two important aspects. First of all the screening 
involved an integrated approach in which the public administration, the criminal 
justice system and even the tax authorities cooperated. Second, the approach 
aimed at barring or hindering the infiltration of mafia organisations in legitimate 
economic sectors, with a clear emphasis on racketeering. 
 
3.1.2 Development of the approach in the Netherlands  
 
As described in Chapter 1 of this study, Dutch policy on fighting organised 
crime was strongly influenced by events in the United States. In particular the 
Dutch-American Conference on Organised Crime that took place in 1990 had a 
major impact on developments in the Netherlands.166  
American influences could first be found at the local level. In 1990 the 
Amsterdam city government was planning the construction of a new metro line, 
a project estimated to cost €0.73 billion. Given the experiences of the New York 
Organised Crime Task Force presented at this conference, the city government 
decided to try to bar criminal organisations from the tendering procedure. In 
1993 a project group consisting of local officials and police representatives 
                                                        
165  The RICO legislation was also connected to money laundering, as violations of the money laundering 
statutes were included within the definition of racketeering (Mitsilegal, 2003: 39). 
166  This conference was organised by C. Fijnaut, a notable in the criminological circle in the Netherlands 
who praised the task force’s innovative strategies and recommended the introduction of similar 
strategies in the Netherlands. The papers of this conference are published in Organised Crime and its 
Containment: A Trans-Atlantic Initiative (Fijnaut and Jacobs, 1991).  
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developed pre-qualification procedures with which Dutch and foreign 
companies participating in the public tendering procedure could be screened to 
uncover possible connections to criminal organisations. The experiences of the 
United States had taught Amsterdam’s city government that it was particularly 
important that the screening and auditing agency could consult all relevant 
information. The fact that the information needed was not available in 
administrative databases made it necessary to seek information from police 
departments, judicial authorities and tax offices. However, the city government 
came across some judicial barriers in the form of privacy regulations, which 
hindered the sharing of such information.  
Recording and communicating personal data is regulated by the Data 
Protection Act (Wet Persoonsregistratie),167 which exactly describes obligations 
for safeguarding privacy in communicating personal data. The Police Files Act 
(Wet op de Politieregisters) deals with personal data recorded by police 
services.168 Communication of personal data collected by police entities is 
strictly limited, meaning that this data may be shared for police purposes only. 
Because the screening and auditing activities were executed by administrative 
authorities, the police could not provide their information and vice versa, not 
even when these two bodies were cooperating on one project. In the framework 
of Amsterdam’s administrative approach, discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter, the Minister of Justice granted special permission for the exchange of 
information, at least to a certain extent. Yet these obstructions delayed 
Amsterdam’s establishment of its special screening and auditing bureau until 
1996. In 1998 the local bureau commenced its operations.169 These 
developments can be seen as the experimental garden for the national 
developments, which, for that matter, also took a long time to get off the ground. 
The national developments started in 1992 with the Minister of Justice and 
the Minister of the Interior introducing the American screening approach into 
national crime-fighting policy. In the policy document Organised Crime in the 
Netherlands: Threats and Plan of Action the Minister of Justice described the 
administrative approach as necessary for complementing the repressive 
approach of police and judiciary.170 In this plan organised crime was no longer 
seen as criminal activities that occurred in an underworld separated from the 
legitimate environment. On the contrary the Ministry of Justice argued that due 
to large profits deriving from organised crime ‘criminal organisations and the 
                                                        
167  In 2000 the Data Protection Act was replaced by the Personal Data Protection Act (Wet bescherming 
persoonsgegevens) Stb. 2000, no. 302.  
168 Law of 21 June 1990, dealing with regulations on the protection of the personal living situation in 
relation to police files, last revised in 1999, Stb. 1999, no. 244. 
169  The ministers of justice and finance even gave permission to exchange relevant information from 
police and tax authority databases. Such permission fit with Amsterdam’s administrative approach. 
This approach, including rules on exchanging information, is described in Chapter 4. However, this 
special competence was taken away from the local bureau once the national screening and auditing 
procedures entered force. 
170  For more information on this policy plan see Chapter 1.  
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legal economy are interwoven to a much larger degree than in the past’.171 
Although the minister did not use the term racketeering, the idea that criminal 
organisations were gradually becoming embedded in the legitimate environment 
alluded to a problem similar to that observed in the United States. The minister 
argued that the public administration needed new capabilities to operate more 
combatively. These new capabilities are incorporated in the administrative 
approach,172 which as presented in this government policy document, involves 
two main strategies. The first strategy was to investigate the possibilities for 
screening and auditing people in order to exclude criminal organisations from 
legitimate economic dealings. In particular the minister referred to certain civil 
services such as the granting of permits and subsidies and tendering of public 
contracts. The second strategy was to set up a campaign to strengthen integrity 
at all levels of the public administration. This implied increasing the defences of 
the public administration against the threat of infiltration by criminal 
organisations. In practice, this second strategy is one to counter government 
corruption and fraud in general. Integrity in the public administration was 
considered a main precondition for effective screening and auditing; without an 
honest administration screening has no purpose. 
 Notwithstanding the introduction of the administrative approach in 1992, it 
was unclear whether sufficient tools were in place to allow government agencies 
to implement a screening and auditing procedure. To answer this question 
Struiksma and Michiels (1994) investigated the legislative possibilities at that 
time.173 They discussed a range of possibilities for refusing and withdrawing 
permits by means of an audit done by external agencies and consultation of 
criminal records. Yet the researchers concluded that the existing legislation 
likely offered insufficient possibilities to hinder criminal organisations in their 
economic dealings (Struiksma and Michiels, 1994: 70). In particular the fact that 
civil servants could not consult police data was seen as a huge obstacle to 
uncovering possible connections with organised crime and to dealing with 
suspicions of criminal activities. Moreover, there were few grounds for refusing 
permits based on the possibility of criminal activities. Therefore, Struiksma and 
Michiels recommended strengthening the law to enable administrative agencies 
to take action against organised crime. In their opinion, new legislation was 
needed to give administrative authorities the legal power to screen and audit 
applicants for permits and subsidies and participants in tendering procedures 
(Struiksma and Michiels, 1994: 67-69). Moreover, they said that the new 
legislation had to enable all types of information to be used in these screenings; 
and a judicial framework needed to be developed containing relevant grounds 
                                                        
171  De georganiseerde criminaliteit in Nederland; dreigingsbeeld en plan van aanpak. Kamerstukken II 
1992-1993, 22 838, no. 2: 2.  
172  Besides the administrative approach, in the policy plan several measures that fit the repressive 
approach are mentioned, e.g. intensification of cooperation between public prosecutors and police 
officials, formation of regional criminal investigation units, improvement of information exchange 
between police and regulatory agencies (e.g. tax authorities), growth of expertise on organised crime 
and expansion of international cooperation.  
173  This study concentrated on the legislative environment around construction and tendering.  
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for refusing and withdrawing permits and subsidies and for excluding certain 
agents from tendering procedures. The ministers of justice and of the interior 
acted on these recommendations and started a project to develop such 
legislation. 
The development of the screening and auditing approach was postponed by 
a crisis in the criminal justice system in the mid-1990s.174 The parliamentary 
inquiry that investigated this crisis made some recommendations on criminal 
methods, while also emphasising the need to further develop the administrative 
approach. This was remarkable as the research team led by Fijnaut, which the 
parliamentary inquiry had charged to investigate organised crime in the 
Netherlands, had just concluded that in general there was no evidence of 
racketeering in the Netherlands. Criminal organisations had gained no control of 
legitimate sectors of the economy, and neither were there indications that 
organised crime had infiltrated government (Fijnaut et al., 1998: 203). On the 
contrary, the team concluded that, generally, organised crime in the Netherlands 
was mainly confined to the traditional illegal supply of certain goods and 
services (Fijnaut et al., 1998: 203). Thus, based on the recommendation of the 
parliamentary inquiry, the administrative approach no longer needed to be 
exclusively aimed towards combating racketeering in the Netherlands. 
 Nonetheless, the research team did make an exception regarding the hotel 
and catering industry including the related real estate, where there was a certain 
extent of penetration by criminal groups (Fijnaut et al., 1998: 204). In particular 
the team referred to the situation in the red-light district of Amsterdam. Criminal 
organisations were investing in hotel and catering premises so as to acquire 
positions of power there. These positions of power gave criminal organisations 
control over an important part of the economic life in this neighbourhood, which 
they used to influence the boundaries of interventions by the city and law 
enforcement (Fijnaut and Bovenkerk, 1996: 126). Thus, in Amsterdam’s red-
light district racketeering was observed, at least to a small extent. As the 
situation in Amsterdam could not be compared with that in the rest of the 
Netherlands, the Dutch nominal capital remained an exception where additional 
measures were deemed necessary. Chapter 4 further discusses the situation in 
Amsterdam and the city’s response.  
 Thus, the problem of organised crime in the Netherlands was found to be 
generally limited to trade in illegal goods and services. Whereas racketeering 
refers to activities in the legal market, ‘common’ organised crime takes place in 
the unlawful market as it implies trade in illegal goods and services. The big 
difference between racketeering and ‘common’ organised crime is the level of 
penetration into the legitimate environment. With regard to this aspect Fijnaut’s 
research team concluded that the Dutch situation was far less serious than the 
Italian one (Fijnaut et al., 1998: 204, 207).  
                                                        
174  The causes and the results of this parliamentary inquiry are described in the first chapter of this study. 
The criminological research was carried out by the Fijnaut research team (Fijnaut et al., 1996 and 
1998). 
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So why did the parliamentary inquiry recommend the administrative 
approach? The inquiry argued that the level of observed intertwining of 
organised crime and the legitimate environment, even though it did not amount 
to racketeering, was already enough reason for developing an administrative 
approach (Enquêtecommissie Opsporingsmethoden, 1996: 386). The interaction 
between criminal organisations and the legitimate environment was considered a 
problem as it could influence police and administrative authorities. 
Notwithstanding the fact that corruption cases were rare in the Netherlands, the 
number of incidents was considered worrisome and there were no guarantees for 
the future (Enquêtecommissie Opsporingsmethoden, 1996: 387). Furthermore, 
regarding public administration the parliamentary inquiry argued that granting 
public permits, subsidies or contracts to criminal organisations would damage 
the integrity of the administration (Enquêtecommissie Opsporingsmethoden, 
1996: 386).  
There was also a practical reason to develop the approach. The 
parliamentary inquiry argued that the lack of screening and auditing legislation 
had led to an informal exchange of information (Enquêtecommissie 
Opsporingsmethoden, 1996: 286) among various governmental bodies. In 
response to their need for information, these bodies were already creating 
administrative measures by which they could generate information from 
different sources. Although administrators officially had no access to police 
files, in practice the authorities were looking into alternatives for attaining that 
same information. Therefore, the parliamentary inquiry suggested that a legal 
instrument be established to regulate the necessary information exchange.  
Based on the recommendations of Struiksma and Michiels (1994) and those 
of the parliamentary inquiry, the ministers of justice and the interior announced 
in October 1996 the development of an administrative and legal instrument to 
screen and audit subjects in order to refuse or withdraw permits and subsidies 
and to exclude them from tendering procedures if there was a serious threat of 
criminal abuse. In the meanwhile, some incidents of unintentional governmental 
involvement in fraudulent practices through the granting of permits or contracts 
by administrative authorities from the early 1990s had come to light. For 
example, the government had granted subsidies to a waste disposal firm that had 
pretended to offer environmentally friendly ways to process waste.175 This case 
resulted in a scandal when it came to light that the company actually drained 
away its waste in illegal ways (Eshuis and Van den Berg, 1996). Furthermore, in 
awarding a contract for construction of a police station, the government proved 
unaware that illegal subcontractors would be involved. As these examples 
illustrate, the Dutch government was not exclusively focused on organised 
crime, but rather on all kinds of unintentional facilitation of criminal activities.  
                                                        
175  Detailed in the explanatory memorandum to the BIBOB Act. Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 26 883, no. 
3: 3. 
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The resulting instrument to prevent such facilitation was established with the 
‘BIBOB Act’ named from the Dutch acronym.176 Due to the rather extensive 
legal adjustments and the wide discussions on the scope of the new act, it took 
until mid-2003 before the draft bill was passed by parliament.177 Following the 
recommendations of the parliamentary inquiry the BIBOB instrument was 
designed not as focused on racketeering but to prevent the abuse of public 
permits, subsidies and contracts for criminal activities and to prevent public 
facilitation of criminal activities, in particular by the government. The BIBOB 
instrument is unmistakably concentrated on preventing organised crime. 
However, as early as the letter announcing the screening and auditing approach, 
the ministers of justice and the interior asserted that it was unnecessary to 
restrict the scope of the instrument to organised crime.178 They said then that the 
unintentional facilitation of criminal activities should be the focus of the 
instrument irrespective of the kind of crime.  
The explanatory memorandum to the BIBOB Act confirms that the act 
indeed applies to other criminal offences as well as organised crime. In fact, it 
indicates the scope of the instrument includes non-organised crime, at least as it 
seriously affects society and the integrity of the public administration.179 This 
line of reasoning illustrates the policy precedence given to maintaining the 
integrity of the public administration. This aspect is described in more detail 
below.  
 With the act coming into force, the Netherlands is, after Italy, only the 
second country in Europe to have a judicial framework to screen applicants for 
permits and subsidies and subjects vying for public contracts with the view to 
preventing organised crime. Meanwhile, the European Union has been 
developing such a framework as well.  
 
3.1.3 Developments at the European level 
 
At the European level the attention to the screening and auditing approach can 
be divided into two parts. First is the first-pillar directives on procurement to 
complete the single market drawn up in the early 1990s. Second is the 1997 
action plan to combat organised crime which includes recommendations for 
excluding criminals from tendering procedures. It is interesting to see how this 
third-pillar action plan resulted in adjustment of the first-pillar directives. The 
same dynamic can be observed in the anti-money laundering intervention. 
However, the rules on procurement proved much more difficult to adjust than 
                                                        
176  BIBOB is an acronym of the Dutch title of the instrument and Act: Wet Bevordering 
Integriteitsbeoordelingen door het Openbaar Bestuur. 
177  BIBOB Act. Wet van 20 juni 2002, Wet bevordering integriteitsbeoordelingen door het openbaar 
bestuur (BIBOB). Stb. 2002, no. 347. 
178  Bevordering integere besluitvorming openbaar bestuur, letter from the ministers of the interior and of 
justice. Kamerstukken II 1996-1997, 25 056, no. 1: 5. 
179  The only condition the government inserted is the proportionality of the measure compared to the 
offence. Bevordering integere besluitvorming openbaar bestuur, letter from the ministers of the 
interior and of justice. Kamerstukken II 1996-1997, 25 056, no. 1: 5 and 19. 
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the rules involving money laundering. This was due to extensive discussions and 
disagreements regarding the new and sensitive issues related to the screening 
process.  
 The European directives on procurement serve an economic interest, as 
they facilitate the four basic freedoms: free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital. With the directives on public supply contracts, public 
works contracts, public service contracts and contracts in the utilities sector,180 
the Community aims to guarantee a sufficient level of competition with public 
tendering in the European market and to harmonise the tendering procedures 
across the member states. For example, it wants to hinder governments’ reflex to 
keep public procurement inside national borders (Manunza, 2001: 244).181 In 
1997 these directives were adjusted to implement the Governmental 
Procurement Agreement established in the framework of the World Trade 
Organization.182 This agreement set out measures to facilitate transparency and 
tackle corruption in public procurement. With the adjustments of the European 
rules on procurement, the directives concentrated on corruption and fraud, in 
particular where it could hurt the financial interests of the Community. The 
European Union even raised the autonomous European Anti-Fraud Office 
(OLAF) to supervise its member states.183 This supervising body illustrates the 
EU’s awareness of the need for a Union-wide fight against fraud and corruption. 
Up until this point no official connection had been made between public 
procurement and organised crime. This only occurred in 1997, when the Council 
of the European Union concluded that fraud in the European Community was 
also being committed by organised crime:184  
 
‘Case studies show that fraudsters often belong to elaborate transnational criminal 
organizations and the Council stresses the importance of a coordinated transnational 
response to the problem.’ 
 
The fact that the Community easily attracts organised crime could not have been 
a surprise, since in the early 1990s the Commission of the European Union had 
already alluded to the large profits that were considered the mainspring of 
criminal organisations.185 The fact that the Community often deals with large 
amounts of money might have alerted the authorities to possible abuse. 
                                                        
180  Directive on public works contracts. OJ L 199, 09/08/1993; Directive on public supplies contracts. OJ 
L 199, 09/08/1993; Directive on public services contracts. OJ L 209, 24/07/1992. These three 
Directives are adjusted by the European Parliament and Council directive 97/52/EC. OJ L238, 
28/11/1997. Directive on procurement in the field of water and energy management and traffic and 
telecommunication. OJ L 199, 09/08/1993, adjusted by directive 98/4/EG. OJ L 101, 01/04/1998. 
181  There could be a range of arguments to keep tendering procedures inside the national border, e.g. 
stimulating employment in a country, and there are many reasons to hinder foreign applicants, e.g. the 
language barrier and cultural differences.  
182  The European Community is a member of the World Trade Organization (since 1 January 1995).  
183  OLAF stands for Office pour la Lutte Anti-fraud and was replaced in 1999 by the UCLAF which 
stands for Unité de Coordination de la Lutte Antifraude.  
184  Protection of the financial interests of the Communities, fight against fraud, annual report 1997. 
COM/98/0276 final and the Council conclusions PRES/98/157. 
185  See for this reasoning Chapter 2, section 2.1. 
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Nonetheless, the Council’s findings on involvement of organised crime in fraud 
did not give rise to the immediate adjustment of the public procurement 
directives.  
 In the meantime a high-level working group was preparing the 1997 action 
plan to combat organised crime from within the third pillar. This working group 
had observed the problems of organised crime as well. The 1997 action plan put 
forth the first concrete initiatives at the EU level to protect the public 
administration against infiltration by criminal organisations. Its 
recommendations not only involved the abuse of tendering procedures, but also 
concerned the abuse of licenses and subsidies (recommendation 8.13):  
 
‘The European Council stresses the importance of […] taking necessary steps to allow 
the exclusion of criminal organizations or their members from participation in tendering 
procedures, receiving subsidies or governmental licenses. Specific attention should be 
paid to the illicit origin of funds as a possible reason for exclusion from tendering 
procedures.’ 
 
More specifically, the Council of the European Union wanted to establish new 
grounds for refusal, by which members of criminal organisations could be 
excluded from tendering procedures as well as from government licences and 
subsidies. The action plan’s focus was thus wider than fraud, extending to all 
kinds of organised crimes and in particular to money laundering. In any case, the 
action plan recommends that involvement in organised crime be defined as 
sufficient grounds for exclusion from tendering procedures (recommendation 7):  
 
‘The Member States and the European Commission should ensure that the applicable 
legislation provides for the possibility for an applicant in a public tender procedure who 
has committed offences connected with organized crime to be excluded from the 
participation in tender procedures conducted by Member States and by the 
Community.’ 
 
This meant that the Community directives on procurement had to be adjusted. In 
2000 the European Commission indeed submitted a proposal for new rules on 
procurement.186 In this proposal, the procurement rules still centred on 
preventing corruption and fraud,187 however, they now also included the 
possibility to cite as grounds for refusal serious offences committed by people 
participating in the activities of a criminal organisation. 
                                                        
186  Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the coordination of 
procedures for the award of public supply contracts, public service contracts and public works 
contracts. COM(2000), 275 final and OJ C 029 E, 30/01/2001.  
187  In the proposal corruption is defined as ‘having promised, offered or given, whether directly or via 
third parties, a benefit of whatever kind to a civil servant or public agent of a Member State, a third 
country or an international organisation or to any person for the benefit of that person or a third party, 
with the intention that such person will carry out or refrain from carrying out any act in breach of his 
professional obligations’ (article 46 under b). Fraud is still connected to the financial interest of the 
European Community. The proposal refers to Article 1 of the Convention relating to the protection of 
the financial interests of the European Communities established by the Council Act of 26 July 199 (OJ 
C 316, 27/11/1995, 485). 
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The text of the proposal is phrashed as follows:188  
 
 ‘1. Any economic operator shall be excluded from participation in the contract who, at 
any time during a five-year period preceding the start of the contract award procedure, 
has been convicted by definitive judgment: 
(a) of having committed a serious offence by participating in the activities of a criminal 
organisation, defined as a structured association established over a period of time and 
operating in a concerted manner to achieve financial advantage and, where appropriate, 
to influence unduly the functioning of public authorities [italics by CvdS].’ 
 
This directive proposal is focused on criminal organisations that try to abuse the 
public authorities. However, due to the addition where appropriate, the 
definition is not limited to such abuse. On the contrary, it covers all serious 
offences. This proposal thus seems a tremendous improvement, as it strengthens 
the EU’s arsenal of means to fight organised crime. However, this proposal has 
not yet led to a new directive. Until it does the member states must rely on the 
recommendations of the 1997 action plan. Although these third-pillar 
recommendations are less imperative and not directly applicable in the member 
states, EU states do have to comply with them, since they involve an 
intergovernmental decision.  
 
3.1.4 The scope of the screening and auditing approach in the Netherlands  
 
The screening and auditing procedures developed in Italy and New York 
focused on racketeering activities executed by mafia-like organisations. 
Racketeering implies the hiding of involvement in criminal activities and 
acquiring apparently legal positions in the legitimate environment. To protect 
the legitimate environment against racketeering, an administrative approach was 
developed to counter this intertwining of the legitimate and illicit worlds. 
Following the examples of Italy and New York, the Dutch authorities began to 
develop their own screening and auditing approach.  
 The screening and auditing procedures in the Netherlands were first applied 
against another form of organised crime: trade in illegal goods and services. The 
same is true for the European legislation, which in the mid-1990s undertook 
action to hinder the abuse of public administration by criminal organisations in 
the fight against organised crime. Although the EU policy still refers to the 
importance of preventing public authorities from being influenced by criminal 
elements, the scope was larger, covering ‘common’ organised crime as well. The 
Dutch legislation even goes a step farther. The explanatory memorandum for the 
Dutch screening and auditing act reveals that the instrument is not restricted to 
organised crime, but can also be made available for non-organised criminal 
activities with serious social implications.189 This means that the Dutch 
screening and auditing strategy aims firstly at organised crime, but not to the 
exclusion of other crime. Thus, whereas the Italian and New York screening and 
                                                        
188  Directive proposal for rules on procurement in 2000, article 46 under a. 
189  Explanatory memorandum to the BIBOB Act. Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 26 883, no. 3: 5. 
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auditing measures focus on organised crime related to racketeering, the Dutch 
and European instruments concentrate on organised crime involving trade in 
illegal goods and services and other serious crimes with societal repercussions.  
 Although the Dutch screening and auditing approach is much broader than 
the Italian or American one, it would be false to assume that the approach can be 
brought into action in any situation. The framers of the Dutch legislation 
carefully deliberated its proper scope. On one hand they argued that the 
instrument still had to prove itself. Therefore, the approach should be restricted 
to certain sectors in which the risk and threat of criminal involvement are the 
largest. On the other hand, they emphasised the preventive aspect of the 
approach: ‘it not only involves sectors where criminal interference is already 
observed, it also involves sectors that answer certain criteria indicating 
vulnerability for crime’.190 In this reasoning the scope of the instrument had to 
be rather wide. Deliberating on both aspects the legislator decided to apply the 
approach to those sectors considered most vulnerable to infiltration by organised 
crime. Hereby, it aligned itself with the view of the Fijnaut research team on 
organised crime, which listed as the most vulnerable sectors transport, waste 
disposal, construction, hotels and catering and coffee shops.191 The Fijnaut team 
selected these five sectors based on assumptions about their vulnerability to 
criminal infiltration and experiences abroad, particularly in the United States 
(Fijnaut et al., 1996: 33, Fijnaut et al., 1998: 51). In addition to this justification 
of the selected branches, the team explicitly stated that given other criteria other 
branches might have been selected (Fijnaut et al., 1996: 33, Fijnaut et al., 1998: 
51). Consequently, the basis for the selection is not as solid as it is probably 
assumed to be.  
In fact, the BIBOB instrument is not restricted to the sectors in which 
penetration of organised crime was actually observed. If that were the case the 
instrument could be applied only in the hotel and catering industry including the 
related real estate. Nonetheless, the possible problems of criminal organisations 
intermingling in the other sectors were considered severe enough to bring them 
under the scope of the screening approach. Here, the legislator speaks of a 
‘justified need to prevent the unintentional facilitation of criminal activities’,192 
which clearly indicates that from their perspective the legitimacy of the 
screening and auditing approach is not in doubt.  
 
3.2 Programme theory of the Dutch screening and auditing approach  
 
As described in the previous section the Dutch legislator brought the screening 
and auditing approach into action against the unintentional facilitation of 
organised crime. But what is its underlying rationale? This section first provides 
insight into the legislator’s assumptions, which indicate how the intervention is 
                                                        
190  Explanatory memorandum to the BIBOB Act. Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 26 883, no. 3: 5. 
191  Explanatory memorandum to the BIBOB Act. Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 26 883, no. 3: 4. 
192  Explanatory memorandum to the BIBOB Act. Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 26 883, no. 3: 2. 
110 
supposed to work. The causal and normative assumptions are uncovered, which 
is necessary because the last section of this chapter evaluates these assumptions 
in light of pragmatic new criminological theories. This section secondly 
unearths the actual objectives of the approach and the strategies to achieve these 
objectives. These objectives also provide a framework for the final section of the 
chapter in which the observed outputs are evaluated.  
As explained earlier the analysis involves the approach as it is officially 
written. It is based on the explanatory memoranda of the Dutch acts and on other 
related official documents.  
 
3.2.1 Assumptions 
 
Causal assumptions. Causal assumptions are part of the reasoning underlying 
perceptions of a specific problem and the way to handle the problem. For the 
screening and auditing approach, a first causal assumption is the observed 
relation between organised crime and interest in legitimate economic dealings. 
Chapter 2 introduced criminal organisations’ desire to invest criminal proceeds 
in the legitimate environment. The explanatory memorandum of the Dutch 
screening and auditing approach explains that a lot of these investments involve 
certain economic sectors, such as construction, hotels and catering and 
transport.193  
 Investment of illegal proceeds in the legitimate environment could have 
serious consequences for the whole of society. This is well stated in the Vienna 
Convention wherein the United Nations speaks of ‘illicit traffic and other related 
organized crime activities which undermine the legitimate economies and 
threaten the stability, security and sovereignty of States’.194 The Dutch 
legislation is more specific and argues that with such investments criminal 
organisations could build positions of power in legal economic sectors, 
undermine the legal economy and disturb fair competition.195 The idea is 
introduced that criminal dealings could even harm public interests such as public 
health, environmental quality and traffic safety. In addition, criminal 
organisations could use these investments to facilitate and shield criminal 
activities. In other words, criminal investments in the legitimate environment 
could precede new criminal activities. For example, front stores could be 
established to facilitate the transport of illegal goods, and criminal organisations 
could participate in tendering procedures in order to launder money. 
Consequently, the reasoning is that interfering in these economic dealings could 
hinder future criminal activities. To protect society, these investments must be 
curtailed. 
 The framers of the Dutch legislation seemed most disturbed by the idea that 
the public administration could unintentionally facilitate criminal investments 
and consequently facilitate future criminal activities. Such facilitation is 
                                                        
193  Explanatory memorandum to the BIBOB Act. Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 26 883, no. 3: 4. 
194  Vienna Convention, preamble. 
195  Explanatory memorandum to the BIBOB Act. Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 26 883, no. 3: 2. 
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assumed to involve a wide range of activities: e.g. granting permits to 
entrepreneurs to start a restaurant which is used for drug dealing, granting a 
public contract to a company that uses their activities to launder criminal 
proceeds and permission granted to set up an establishment that is used as a 
front store for trade in illegal goods. In the letter announcing the BIBOB 
instrument the ministers of justice and of the interior argued that it is 
unsatisfactory that the government on the one hand invests a lot of time, energy 
and money in the investigation and prosecution of criminal offences and on the 
other hand runs the risk of unintentional facilitation of criminal organisations 
and activities, in a direct or indirect way.196 Moreover, the unintentional 
involvement of administrative authorities could damage the credibility of these 
authorities and create risks for their integrity. An example of unintentionally 
facilitating criminal activities involves the subsidies that the City Council of 
Amsterdam granted to the Hells Angels. The government argued that the most 
effective way to prevent youngsters in this specific subculture from joining in 
criminal activities was to offer them their own clubhouse and support them with 
subsidies (Schutten, Middelburg and Vugts, 2004). However, the government 
underestimated the threat posed by the group, as in the course of time individual 
Angels were involved in offences such as drugs trafficking, human trafficking, 
arms trafficking, murder and extortion. More recently investigative authorities 
classified the Hells Angels as a criminal organisation and started a criminal 
investigation of it. However, up until now there has been too little evidence to 
bring this case to court. 
 Based on the crucial role of the public administration in granting permits 
and subsidies and in tendering public contracts, the public service is indicated as 
the entity that can effectively interfere in activities of criminal organisations. 
Similar to the interaction of criminals with financial institutions detailed in 
Chapter 2, this interaction can be viewed as an Achilles’ heel of organised 
crime. In other words, the fact that the public administration is abused by 
criminal organisations in their bid to obtain access to various economic dealings 
makes these authorities well placed to interfere in organised crime. The 
explanatory memorandum of the BIBOB Act alludes to the assumption that 
intervening in this interaction would have a negative impact on the accessibility 
of the public permits, subsidies and contracts and criminal abuse of legitimate 
economic dealings.  
The intervention as presented involves two approaches. First the public 
administration should be aware of possible use of permits, subsidies and 
tendering procedures for the benefit of criminal activities. Consequently, these 
authorities have to pay special attention to people who apply for permits or 
subsidies or who register for tendering procedures. The adage ‘know your 
customer’ thus applies not only to the financial institutions but also to the public 
administration. This means that the authorities in question need to be able to 
gather information concerning the individuals with whom they deal. Second, the 
                                                        
196  Bevordering integere besluitvorming openbaar bestuur, letter from the ministers of the interior and of 
justice. Kamerstukken II 1996-1997, 25 056, no. 1: 1. 
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authorities have to be equipped to act upon observed abuses. This means they 
should be able to refuse permits or subsidies or exclude individuals from public 
procurement should these individuals aim to abuse the economic dealings for 
criminal purposes.  
Like the financial service providers, administrative authorities are brought 
into action as gatekeepers of the legitimate environment. Their alertness should 
protect society as a whole. Thus, the recovered programme theory of the 
screening and auditing approach involves the assumption that increasing 
awareness and integrity of administrative authorities will hinder criminal 
organisations’ abuse of permits, subsidies and tendering procedures for criminal 
activities.  
 
Normative assumptions. Based on the problems outlined, we can conclude that it 
is considered undesirable for organised crime to spend criminal profits in the 
legitimate environment. Although the legislation does not use these exact words, 
its reasoning concerns the general assumption that crime should not pay. The 
rationale of why such investments should not take place is two-sided. Not only 
do criminal organisations disturb the legal economy with their illegal profits, 
their presence in the legitimate environment also offers them an apparently legal 
position that brings new possibilities for enjoying opportunities in the legitimate 
environment. That last makes it harder to uncover these persons.  
Obviously, the public administration should not facilitate criminal 
operations. As described in Chapter 2, the legislator argues that nobody should 
facilitate organised crime. This applies to financial institutions that could get 
involved in money laundering and, not least, to the public administration that 
should act as an example for others. The unwitting facilitation of criminal 
activities would affect the credibility of the authorities and invade the 
authorities’ integrity. This is certainly out of line with prevailing standards of 
integrity. As early as 1993 the Ministry of the Interior established a policy 
document Integrity in the Public Sector in which integrity issues are 
discussed.197 This policy plan focuses on raising the defensibility and integrity 
of the public administration against the threat of infiltration by criminal 
organisations. Carrying out this policy, the Ministry of the Interior established a 
campaign to raise awareness of integrity at all levels of government 
administration.198 The BIBOB Act is one of the results of this campaign. 
 
3.2.2 Objectives and strategies 
 
With the announcement of the Dutch screening approach the legislator presented 
two objectives: guaranteeing the integrity of the public administration and 
preventing unintentional facilitation of criminal activities.199 These two 
                                                        
197  Integriteit in de openbare sector. Kamerstukken II 1993-1994, 23 400, no. 11.  
198  Integriteit in de openbare sector. Kamerstukken II 1993-1994, 23 400, no. 11. 
199  Bevordering integere besluitvorming openbaar bestuur, letter from the ministers of the interior and of 
justice. Kamerstukken II 1996-1997, 25 056, no. 1.: 1. 
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objectives led to two strategies. The first is strengthening the integrity of the 
public administration, which was seen as of utmost importance.200 The idea was 
that with the screening approach would give the administrative authorities an 
extra, powerful tool to shape the integrity policy.201 This was in line with the 
government’s general policy on integrity in the public administration and 
administrative corruption, both of which were high on the political agenda. The 
1993 policy document on integrity in the public sector distinguished three 
categories of integrity: personal integrity, organisational integrity and relational 
integrity.202 The first two refer to the integrity of the public administration itself. 
The last involves the integrity of the clients and partners of the public 
administration. The screening and auditing instrument was aimed primarily at 
this third element.  
 There was some confusion on this issue at the start of the implementation 
of the screening and auditing approach. In the letter announcing the 
development of the instrument the ministers emphasised its role in protecting the 
integrity of the public administration itself. Later, in the explanatory 
memorandum to the act, relational integrity was underlined.203 The Council of 
State phrased this confusion as follows:204  
 
Parts of the explanatory memorandum to the Act and also the official title convey the 
impression that the legislative proposal in the main offers instruments to guarantee or to 
strengthen the integrity of the public administration. In the opinion of the Council that 
suggests an inaccurate impression. […] However, the legislative proposal intends to 
provide the public administration an instrument with which it can protect itself against 
the risk that criminal activities outside the public administration are facilitated. 
 
The Dutch screening and auditing approach that resulted in the BIBOB 
instrument is thus focused on the integrity of those who interact with 
administrative authorities.205 This implies that the public authorities should be 
aware of the risks third parties can bring. In other words, they should be aware 
of the risk of unintentionally facilitating criminal activities.  
 This reasoning leads to the second objective: prevention of unintentional 
facilitation of criminal activities by government administrations – because, in 
addition to being aware of possible risks, administrative authorities need an 
                                                        
200  Explanatory memorandum to the BIBOB Act. Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 26 883, no. 3: 2, 6, 22 and 
44. 
201  Explanatory memorandum to the BIBOB Act. Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 26 883, no 3: 44. 
202  Integriteit in de openbare sector. Kamerstukken II 1993-1994, 23 400, no. 11.  
203  The personal integrity and organisational integrity of the public administrative remained an important 
issue in other policy documents.  
204  Regels inzake de bevordering van integriteitsbeoordelingen door het openbaar bestuur met betrekking 
tot beschikkingen of overheidsopdrachten. Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 26 883, B: 1. 
205  The changeover from integrity of the public administration to the integrity of third parties with whom 
administrative authorities had contact can also be construed from the name of the instrument. 
Although the acronym of the title of the instrument stayed intact, the underlying words show a small 
change ‘Bevordering Integere Belsuitvorming Openbaar Bestuur’ was changed in ‘Bevordering 
IntegriteitsBeoordelingen door het Openbaar Bestuur’ (the change if from ‘improving integrity’ to 
‘improving judgments on integrity’. 
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instrument at their disposal to recognise and avert the risks in question. The 
BIBOB Act provides such an instrument, giving, as it does, officials the legal 
power to screen certain applicants for permits and subsides and participants in 
tendering procedures. Yet this power was not ascribed to the administrative 
authorities themselves; rather, a national bureau was set up to execute the 
screenings for them. Furthermore, the act provides grounds on which permits 
and subsidies can be refused when applicants are involved in certain crimes. The 
content of the BIBOB Act is more extensively described below.  
 
3.3 Evaluation of the process of the Dutch screening and auditing 
approach 
 
Like the previous chapter this section evaluates the process of the Dutch 
screening and auditing approach. The first subsection looks at the content of the 
approach. What does the screening and auditing instrument entail? Because the 
Dutch legislator must deal with European policy as well, the European rules on 
procurement are described afterwards in the second subsection. The third 
subsection looks at the implementation of the Dutch screening and auditing 
approach. How does the instrument function in practice? This part of the 
evaluation is limited to aspects that are important to the main topic of this study: 
prevention of organised crime. The final subsection describes possible 
bottlenecks in implementation, as these might affect the final outputs of the 
approach.  
 
3.3.1 Content 
 
During the development of the Dutch screening and auditing approach the 
legislator was well aware of the shortcomings of the existing screening 
instruments such as the ‘certificate of good behaviour’. It was also aware of the 
essential demands of a successful approach such as New York’s integrated 
approach. It therefore established four criteria to which the new instrument had 
to respond.206 First of all, the screening had to be based on more than one 
database in order to provide a more complete insight. Second, the administrative 
authority had to have relevant information at its disposal to uncover possible 
criminal activities. Third, the screening was not to involve only the subjects 
themselves, but also their business relations and others directly involved in the 
application. In this way the screening could identify secret constructions and the 
use of front men. Finally, the legislator wanted easy access to information, for 
which applicants would fill in questionnaires and multidisciplinary teams would 
provide additional information. This meant that in accordance with the 
experiences of New York, an audit in which the applicant or tendering 
participant would provide the initial information would be the basis of the 
                                                        
206  Explanatory memorandum of the BIBOB Act. Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 26 883, no. 3: 19-20. 
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screening. All of these aspects came together in the BIBOB Act, making it a 
supplementary instrument for refusing and withdrawing permits and subsidies 
and enabling administrative authorities to apply the rules on procurement to 
exclude criminals from tendering procedures. 
The execution of the BIBOB strategy is in the hands of the administrative 
authorities who deal with permits, subsidies and public contracts and the BIBOB 
Bureau, which performs the screening. In addition, the public prosecutor plays a 
small but key role in supervising the sharing of information. The tasks and 
competences of these three actors are described below. All of the activities 
impact people’s privacy and their legal position. Therefore judicial matters are 
discussed as well.  
 
3.3.1.1 The activities of the BIBOB Bureau 
 
The BIBOB Bureau is mandated to consult various sources of information to 
screen applicants for permits and subsidies and participants in public tendering 
procedures. The bureau executes the screening and then formulates its advice on 
grounds for refusal, if any. The BIBOB Bureau starts a screening upon the 
request of an administrative authority. The bureau cannot start screening 
activities on its own. This is a first element of the proportionality safeguards 
built into the act vis-à-vis protection of people’s privacy: the bureau which has 
sensitive information at its disposal cannot itself start an investigation. Next to 
these main tasks the bureau has a supportive task towards the administrative 
authorities.  
 
Sources. One of the strengths of the BIBOB screening procedure involves the 
wide range of sources that provide information to the BIBOB Bureau. The 
screening starts with the information on the application form distributed by the 
administrative authorities. This information is then completed with data from 
open sources. Afterwards, the closed sources are consulted. The BIBOB Bureau 
has access to or permission to consult the judicial databases, those of police 
departments and those of the tax authorities. For this, the Personal Data 
Protection Act, the Police Files Act and the Judicial Data Act had to be adjusted. 
The information shared even includes secret information, meaning information 
that may not be shared with the subject involved. However, the secret 
information can be applied only to support the making of strategic decisions on 
further screening operations; secret information may not be included in the final 
advisory report. Neither may secret information be exchanged with 
administrative authorities. This is the result of the transparency principle of the 
General Administrative Law Act, which stipulates that the public administrators 
must justify all of their decisions to the subjects in question. This means that all 
information underlying a decision must be made public. This aspect is described 
later in more detail.  
Finally, the BIBOB Bureau makes use of its own information. All 
information derived from screening activities can be retained in a BIBOB 
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database for a maximum period of two years. This database offers the fourth 
source of information. This database is particularly valuable, as the combination 
of sources described above enables the bureau to interrelate various information 
and arrive at new insights. The combination of the sources makes the database 
unique.  
Obviously, all information gathered in this database needs protection 
against possible abuse. Therefore, article 28 of the BIBOB Act stipulates that the 
employees of the bureau as well as civil servants must comply with obligations 
of discretion and confidentiality. Furthermore, article 12 of the act limits 
communication of personal information, meaning that information can be used 
only for advising administrative authorities. Thus, information from the BIBOB 
database cannot be exchanged with other interested partners. Nonetheless, police 
have already indicated their interest in this unique information source. The 
question is whether the regulation limiting communication is sufficient. Van 
Stratum and Van de Pol (1999: 1972) argue that the prohibition to share 
information could become untenable. Refusing to provide certain information 
could disrupt relations with the police department in question on which the 
bureau depends for later screening activities. Therefore, these researchers 
foresee the possibility of exchanges of information through informal channels. 
Of course, this is something that should be watched carefully, especially as in 
previous years there was a similar informal exchange of information between 
the police and the public administration.207 A few years of practice should reveal 
whether this prohibition to share information actually is a problem, and whether 
informal information exchange appears.  
 
Screening subjects. The screening process has various phases. First is the 
verification of the information supplied on the questionnaire filled in by the 
subject – which can be a natural person or a legal person. This information 
relates to the subject’s situation. Attention is focused on organisational and 
financial structures as well as management (if the subject is a legal person). 
Second, relations to both natural and legal persons are mapped. Here the BIBOB 
screening is much more extensive than traditional screening instruments as it 
involves not only the subject, but also persons directly related to the subject, 
such as an applicant’s business relations. With regard to public contracts it can 
include possible subcontractors. In the third phase the BIBOB Bureau starts its 
investigation into the relevant and current antecedents of all persons involved. In 
addition it carries out a quick scan for other possible relations to criminal 
activities or unreliable persons. Finally, if necessary the bureau could perform 
an extensive investigation into aspects that remain indistinct.  
During screening the bureau can ask the applicant or tendering participant 
for supplementary information. For aspects still lacking in clarity, the bureau 
tries to fill in missing information and uncover secrets. This whole screening 
                                                        
207  As described in the first section of this chapter, this informal exchange of information was uncovered 
by the parliamentary inquiry on criminal investigative methods (Enquêtecommissie 
Opsporingsmethoden, 1996: 286).  
117 
process should take place in four weeks during which time administrative 
decisions are postponed (article 15).208 
 The large reach of the BIBOB analysis is the subject of frequent criticism, 
especially its inclusion of third persons. The Netherlands Committee of Jurists 
for Human Rights (NJCM) argues that the invasion of the privacy of clients is 
too severe (NJCM, 2001: 266). The criterion that defines the relation of these 
clients with the actual applicant is said to be too vague. According to the NJCM 
this is even more delicate when these clients are unaware of any screening 
activities, as the BIBOB Act obliges discretion and confidentiality. For the same 
reason Van Stratum and Van de Pol (1999: 1971) insist on changing the 
provision that the simple fact of a business relation could lead to a screening. 
They propose restricting the screening of clients to where there is considerable 
suspicion of involvement in criminal activities in the past or in the future. From 
their point of view, this is necessary to comply with article 8 of the ECHR.  
 
Providing advice. The screening activities end with a written advisory report to 
the requesting administrative authorities regarding grounds for refusal or 
withdrawal. Article 3 of the BIBOB Act sets forth three grounds for refusal or 
withdrawal. First, permits and subsidies can be refused or withdrawn if the 
applicant has committed offences in order to have the administrative decision 
granted (article 3 subsection 6). The two other grounds for refusal or withdrawal 
relate to the serious threat that a permit, subsidy or public contract will be 
abused for certain offences. In particular, two possible threats are described 
(article 3 subsection 1). The first threat involves the abuse of administrative 
decisions to invest proceeds from crimes in the legitimate economy as well as to 
launder these proceeds. The second threat involves the abuse of the civil service 
to commit punishable offences. To comply with the European directives on 
procurement, the BIBOB Bureau also provides advice on grounds for refusal as 
laid out in these directives.209 Various directives stipulate grounds for refusal 
based on the exclusion of non-solid as well as unreliable participants in 
tendering procedures. European grounds for refusal are described in more detail 
later.  
 To assess the threat a subject may pose, the BIBOB Bureau takes into 
account ‘facts and circumstances that point out or reasonably make it likely that 
the person involved is related to offences as defined in article 1 (article 3 
sections 2a and 3a). The first part of this provision implies that the advice could 
be based on suspicions. The seriousness of the suspicion indicates the 
seriousness of the threat (article 3 sections 2b and 3b). This provision aligns the 
Netherlands with only a few European member states who argue that a final 
                                                        
208  In certain circumstances, such as conducting screening activities in foreign countries, the limit can be 
prolonged by four weeks (BIBOB Act article 15). 
209  Directive on public works contracts. OJ L 199, 09/08/1993; Directive on public supplies contracts. OJ 
L 199, 09/08/1993; Directive on public services contracts. OJ L 209, 24/07/1992. These three 
directives are adjusted by the European Parliament and Council directive 97/52/EC. OJ L238, 
28/11/1997. Directive on procurement in the area of water and energy management and traffic and 
telecommunication. OJ L 199, 09/08/1993, adjusted by directive 98/4/EG. OJ L 101, 01/04/1998. 
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judgement is not necessary to exclude subjects from participating in tenders for 
public contracts and to refuse or withdraw applications for a permit or 
subsidy.210 With this provision the Netherlands takes a progressive position.  
The second part of the provision implies that the subject must be related to 
the offences themselves or by virtue of managing a legal person that has 
committed (or is thought likely to commit) the offence (article 3 section 2c and 
3c). In addition, offences may be brought in that are committed by third parties 
who are directly related to the subject: e.g. by financing activities or by having 
authority over part of the activities. Furthermore, the explanatory memorandum 
states that offences or suspicions of offences must be related to the kind of civil 
service being applied for or a participant in. Thus not all offences could result in 
a refusal or withdrawal. This restriction follows the idea of proportionality of the 
act. The legislator clearly states that not all offences are relevant for 
administrative decisions; e.g. shoplifting is of no relevance for the granting of 
environmental permits.211 Therefore, only relevant information shall be part of 
the advisory report. Irrelevant offences may not be mentioned. Nonetheless, as 
described earlier, the relation between applicants and offences is not limited to 
the offences that the applicant has committed. It is even possible for permits or 
subsidies to be refused or withdrawn due to offences committed by third parties.  
 The BIBOB Bureau provides a written report, which first of all, indicates 
whether there is a threat. The bureau indicates the seriousness of the threat by 
use of three modalities: no threat at all, some threat and high threat. The advice 
is valid for two years. The modality must be accompanied by a justification. The 
administrative authorities were not pleased with these multi-interpretable 
categories of threat. They would have prefered a clear answer to the question of 
whether the permit, subsidy or public contract could be awarded (Eiff et al., 
2003: 52). However, a final decision being made by the BIBOB Bureau runs 
counter to the idea of administrative authorities taking responsibility for their 
own decisions.  
 
Administrative support. The introduction of a new instrument requires some 
preparation. In this case, the administrative authorities needed to be made aware 
of the possibilities of the new screening activities. For this the BIBOB Bureau 
set up a wide information campaign before the instrument came into effect. 
Furthermore, it organised several meetings at which authorities were informed. 
Moreover, a BIBOB helpdesk was set up. This permanent helpdesk supports 
administrative authorities who have concrete requests for advice. With the 
expertise that the bureau is developing, the legislator expects the bureau to be 
able to help assess the necessity of a request. Moreover, in the course of time 
                                                        
210  Whereas, in 1997 Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom and Sweden agreed that 
suspicions are not enough, France, Italy and Germany agreed that a final judgment is not necessary 
(T.M.C. Asser Instituut, 1997: 93-99). The Netherlands has meanwhile switched to the second group. 
Furthermore, the issue of whether a final judgment is necessary to exclude subjects from participating 
in tenders for public contracts is discussed at the European level as well. This discussion is described 
later in the section on the European rules on procurement.  
211  Explanatory memorandum to the BIBOB Act. Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 26 883, no. 3: 21. 
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various working groups have been established to formulate indicators to support 
decisions to request a BIBOB advice. In the next subsection on the 
implementation of the Dutch screening and auditing approach this issue is 
described in more detail.  
 
3.3.1.2 Decisions of the public administration 
 
The activities of the administrative authorities are related to two decisions: the 
decision to request advice from the BIBOB Bureau and the decision to refuse or 
withdraw permits and subsidies or to exclude subjects from tendering 
procedures. The authorities have other tasks as well. First they develop 
application forms which subjects must fill in to apply for permits and subsidies. 
These forms are important as they provide a first impression and are the basis of 
the screening process. Furthermore, the administrative authorities must organise 
the procedure to bring the BIBOB Bureau into action and the registration of the 
advice BIBOB provides. That last is vital, since the authorities deal with 
sensitive information that must be handled with due care. As mentioned earlier, 
administrative authorities must comply with obligations of discretion and 
confidentiality (BIBOB Act, article 28).  
 
Decision to request BIBOB advice. The screening and auditing approach in the 
Netherlands is characterised by the discretionary powers of the administrative 
authorities. This implies that only these authorities can decide whether a 
screening should take place. This provision guarantees protection of the privacy 
of the applicant or tender participant. The explanatory memorandum to the 
BIBOB Act states that obligating administrative authorities to request advice 
regarding all applicants and all participants in tenders would be a 
disproportional invasion of people’s privacy.212 Moreover, this discretionary 
power fits the general policy regarding increasing awareness of integrity issues 
within the public administration. Because only a small proportion of the 
applicants and tender participants are unreliable, the authorities are forced to 
develop their own integrity policy. The legislation does acknowledge that the 
decision to request advice from the BIBOB Bureau should be deliberated 
accurately and that discretion should be exercised. This means that 
administrative authorities should develop some kind of policy. The act’s 
explanatory memorandum proposes the involvement of the Association of 
Netherlands Municipalities to establish a framework of subjective and objective 
criteria on circumstances to request advice.213 Although a clear framework 
would be helpful to the transparency of the public administration, it would be 
ineffective to list and publish the objective criteria, as criminals could adjust 
                                                        
212  Explanatory memorandum to the BIBOB Act. Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 26 883, no. 3: 22. 
213  The subjective criteria could include suspicions of serious abuses, which could appear from 
irregularities by administrative checks and in application forms. Moreover, some objective criteria 
could indicate risks involving infiltration by criminal organisations for example regarding public 
contracts above a certain amount of money. Explanatory memorandum to the BIBOB Act. 
Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 26 883, no. 3: 42. 
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their activities to avoid screening (Struiksma, 2000: 269). Furthermore, one 
wonders whether administrative authorities are capable of observing abuse while 
they can only rely on their own information and open sources (Struiksma and 
Michiels, 1994: 16; Struiksma, 2000: 269). 
Notwithstanding the discretionary competence of the administrative 
authorities, the screening and auditing approach is applicable only in selected 
sectors. As described before, the BIBOB Act focuses on those sectors that are 
considered most vulnerable for abuse by organised crime. With regard to the 
granting of permits, the vulnerable sectors are transport, waste disposal and 
hotels and catering including brothels and coffee shops.214 Regarding subsidies 
the screening instrument may be applied only when the subsidy involves 
considerable social and economic significance that could attract criminal 
activities.215 The formal prerogative to request a BIBOB advice should be 
established in the subsidy scheme. Consequently, the administrative authority 
must decide beforehand whether such advice will be necessary. Regarding 
tendering procedures the Dutch legislator first had to implement thresholds from 
the European directive above which screening is required. Furthermore sectors 
were specified in which BIBOB screening may be requested: construction, 
environment and ICT (information and communication technology). The 
BIBOB Act does not exclude expansion of applicable sectors in the future, if the 
instrument works and if other sectors prove vulnerable to criminal activity.  
Use of Orders in Council make the act flexible and rather easily adjusted. 
The choice to start with application to a restricted set of sectors was partly based 
on the idea that the BIBOB instrument had to prove itself.216 Whereas this 
reasoning seems justified, the sector selection lacks a clear empirical foundation 
regarding actual abuse by criminal organisations, though reference is made to 
the vulnerable sectors observed by Fijnaut’s research team. Though these sectors 
seemed most vulnerable based on assumptions and developments abroad, the 
researchers did conclude that in most of them there was as yet no significant 
infiltration of criminal organisations. Therefore, the decision to select all of 
these sectors is rather arbitrary. The act could even stigmatise the selected 
sectors (Van de Bunt, 2004: 700) because the fact that a BIBOB screening and 
auditing procedure can be instigated in these sectors, contrary to empirical 
results, would seem to indicate that the sectors do have some intermingling of 
criminal elements.  
 
Refusal or withdrawal of permits and subsidies and exclusion from tendering 
procedures. The most important aspect of the screening and auditing approach is 
the ability to refuse granting of permits, subsidies or public contracts. The 
legislator argues that because the BIBOB Act invades the privacy of the subjects 
involved it must answer the principle of subsidiarity. Before resorting to a 
BIBOB screening, administrative authorities must apply all other instruments. 
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As described earlier the administrative authorities can check open sources as 
well as administrative data sources and they can employ certificates of good 
behaviour for both natural and legal persons. In addition, private certification 
and auditing are encouraged. When a BIBOB screening is requested the 
administrative authority still has the discretionary power to grant a permit, 
subsidy or public contract, even if the advice turns out to be negative. Thus, the 
BIBOB recommendation is not binding. Authorities can also refuse a permit 
even if the bureau finds no risk of abuse. Furthermore, the administrative 
authority is free to stipulate conditions under which a positive administrative 
decision may be granted (BIBOB Act article 3 section 7). For instance, it may 
require certain financial guarantees as a precondition for being granted a public 
contract. 
 The fact that these authorities are the only competent authorities to decide 
on civil matters is key, since these decisions now come under the General 
Administrative Law Act (Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht).217 The judicial 
framework of this act safeguards the legal position of applicants and participants 
in tendering procedures who are screened. For example, the act states that the 
subjects in question should be given the opportunity to present their viewpoint 
(General Administrative Law Act article 4.8). This applies to others who are 
questioned as well. Furthermore, this act provides for the possibility to register a 
complaint against a decision and to appeal against rejected complaints. Here, 
various aspects involving fair trial are included; e.g. a public hearing (article 7.5 
section 2) and a defensible decision (article 7.12 section 2). In practice this 
means that applicants are able to go to administrative court. Participants in 
tendering processes must turn to civil court as decisions regarding public 
contracts involve a contract between two civil parties. Finally, the General 
Administrative Law Act applies the justification principle, which requires that 
decisions be based on reliable data. In fact, all information relevant to the 
decision must be made available to the subject in question. This is why the 
advice formulated by the BIBOB Bureau cannot involve secret information that 
may not be communicated to the subject concerned. This is why the BIBOB 
Bureau can only use secret information for strategically guiding screening 
activities and not in the advisory report itself. Notwithstanding the restricted use 
of secret information, its use is still criticised by the Netherlands Committee of 
Jurists for Human Rights as harming the legal position of the subjects (NJCN, 
2001: 267). According to this Committee no secretive information should be 
allowed as it is impossible raise objections against this unregistered information. 
 
3.3.1.3 The role of the public prosecutor’s department 
 
The public prosecutor’s department plays an important bipartite role in the 
BIBOB instrument. It first of all supports the preventive screening approach, as 
it is one of the sources the BIBOB Bureau can consult in a screening process. 
                                                        
217  Wet van 4 juni 1992 houdende algemene regels van bestuursrecht (Algemene wet bestuursrecht). Stb. 
2004, no 37. 
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Moreover, the public prosecutor entrusted with the BIBOB procedures has 
insight into all sensitive information, and can thus easily determine subjects that 
should be screened when they are in contact with administrative authorities. 
Therefore, the legislator enables the public prosecutor to inform authorities if a 
screening would be advisable (article 26 of the BIBOB Act). Although this 
advice may not include concrete information, such a suggestion for screening 
can hardly be passed on.  
The appointed public prosecutor also guards the interests of the criminal 
justice system. This means that the public prosecutor checks all BIBOB advisory 
reports before they are sent to the administrative authorities in question. The 
prosecutor’s task is to judge whether the exchange of the information in the 
report could damage possible criminal proceedings (article 14 of the BIBOB 
Act). If this is the case any such detrimental information is removed from the 
report. With these competences the public prosecutor can easily switch from a 
criminal approach to an administrative approach based on what it considers the 
best option. In this way the preventive approach can actually complement and 
complete the repressive approach. The legislator did not explain whether 
switching from one approach to the other is indeed intended. Practice will reveal 
to what extent public prosecutors, who are often true crime fighters, will indeed 
apply the administrative approach as an alternative to the repressive one.  
 Finally, the public prosecutor acts as the intermediary for receiving 
information from other countries. At least this applies to information from 
criminal charges or investigations. As an administrative agency the BIBOB 
Bureau cannot receive information from foreign police authorities. For requests 
on fiscal information, the Ministry of Finance is brought into action. For open 
sources there are no legal restrictions on consulting foreign data sources.  
 
3.3.1.4 Judicial matters 
 
With the coming into force of the BIBOB Act, the legislator was well aware of 
the potential invasion of people’s privacy. However, the explanatory 
memorandum to the act states:218 
 
‘adequate protection of the integrity of governmental bodies and the positive effects of 
it regarding the fight against (organised) crime is of such importance that it justifies the 
invasion of people’s privacy, at least within boundaries that must be determined later.’ 
 
This reasoning implies that screenings are justified if there is a balance between 
the interests of the administrative authority and the invasion required of personal 
privacy. To guarantee this balance the requirement of due care and the principles 
of proportionality and subsidiarity are emphasised.  
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Privacy. Notwithstanding the justification for invading the privacy, Van de Pol 
and Stratum (2002: 51) argue that to protect privacy the screening should be 
based on fixed and controllable criteria and on legitimately required 
information. In addition, it is important that the applicants and tendering 
participants are informed of the procedures and the legal guarantees. According 
to the NJCM the BIBOB Act includes many vague elements, which complicates 
the controllability of the procedures. Much criticism revolves around the 
possibility to refuse or exclude subjects based on suspicions, as this violates the 
principle of innocence as laid down in article 6 subsection 2 of the ECHR 
(NJCM, 2001: 265). The Dutch legislator claims that this criticism is not 
applicable, as the BIBOB instrument does not fit the scope of this article.219 
Article 6 subsection 2 of the ECHR applies only to criminal law procedures or to 
similar procedures that determine someone’s guilt of certain offences. The 
BIBOB instrument purportedly does not have this as its objective, as it involves 
no punishment. However, we may question whether refusing a permit, subsidy 
or public contract can be seen as a punishment. Also, there is more than this 
formal reasoning. We may question whether the applicability of suspicions is in 
line with the rule of proportionality. Unlike other aspects, the legislator did not 
elaborate on the matter of proportionality. 
 According to Dutch law-makers, the supreme test of the legitimacy of the 
BIBOB Act is testing the act against article 8 of the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and against article 10 of the Dutch 
Constitution. Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms involves the ‘right to respect for private and family life’:220 
 
‘1. Everyone has the right to respect for his [sic] private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence.  
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’ 
 
The Dutch legislator states that the BIBOB Act responds to the criteria deriving 
from the second section of this article.221 First, the act’s entering into law fulfils 
the principle of legality. Second, the instrument is legitimate as it concentrates 
on the prevention of criminal offences. For the third criterion, involving whether 
the invasion of privacy is necessary, the legislator refers to the pressing social 
need to fight organised crime and to protect the integrity of the public 
administration. Moreover, the legislation complies with the principles of 
proportionality and subsidiarity, and some essential judicial aspects are 
safeguarded in the screening process such as the quality of information, the legal 
position of people involved and the availability of fair trial in accordance with 
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article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. Therefore, all aspects of the BIBOB Act are well deliberated 
regarding proportionality. 
 
Requirement of due care. The BIBOB Bureau has the exceptional competence to 
bring together all kinds of information on a subject, including sensitive 
information from police, judiciary and tax authority databases. This access to 
such a wide range of sources might at first seem an invasion of people’s privacy. 
However, the government argues that this complete insight into a subject’s 
situation actually protects the subject’s privacy: 
 
‘Although it looks paradoxical the consultation of various sources in fact justifies the 
invasion in people’s privacy. After all the risk of an inaccurate picture of the business 
and the persons involved is minimised.’222  
 
The combination of the sources helps guarantee that the BIBOB Bureau draws a 
reliable picture of the specific case. Comparison of facts should prevent 
incomplete and unreliable information from being distributed to the 
administrative authority in question. The combination of all information should 
provide solid insight, which is said to justify its use. One could even argue that 
the number of sources is still too limited and too oriented towards police and 
judiciary (Van Stratum and Van de Pol, 1999: 1970). Information from financial 
institutions, financial advisors and insurance companies could offer a totally 
different viewpoint and certainly could be an important supplement. However, 
the legislator argued that it is unnecessary to bother these professions since most 
of the financial information can be acquired through police databases; the 
BIBOB Bureau may obtain information from the tax authorities and from the 
Dutch Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) as well.223 
 
Proportionality and subsidiarity. As described before the legislator advocates 
proportionality to guarantee a balance between fighting organised crime and 
invasion of people’s privacy.224 Proportionality implies that the intervention be 
no more than necessary to achieve the objective. Whereas in this case the 
objective is fighting organised crime, the BIBOB Act is nonetheless limited to 
the sectors in which a threat of abuse by organised crime is deemed present. Yet 
this balance has been called in question (Van Stratum and Van de Pol, 1999, 
Buruma, 1999; Struiksma, 2000, NJCM, 2001). 
The broad concept of threat has also been criticised, as it is said to 
undermine the legal position of the subjects. Analysing the concept of threat, it 
must be concluded that despite the limitations built in to safeguard the 
proportionality, the notion of threat includes a large range of activities (Van 
Stratum and Van de Pol, 1999: 1969). Firstly, the danger can be related to 
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criminal offences as well as minor offences. Secondly, the BIBOB Bureau looks 
at offences from the past as well as into the future. Thirdly, all forms of 
participation in offences, as well as preparation of offences are taken into 
account. Finally, the offences for which a decision not to prosecute was taken 
and for which a settlement was reached – thus for which no final judgement is 
known – are included in the decision. Not surprisingly, this rather vague notion 
of danger has led to criticism. The NJCM considers the concept of threat as 
defined in the BIBOB Act unacceptable (NJCM, 2001: 265). Certainly, 
regarding the specifications on privacy in article 8 of the ECHR the Committee 
argues that the Dutch government must redefine the concept more strictly.  
Van Stratum and Van de Pol (1999: 1969) point out that risks are inevitable 
in business. According to them the risks that could lead to refusal or withdrawal 
of permits, subsidies or public contracts must be more specifically defined. They 
suggest restricting the concept of danger to offences related to organised crime. 
This would reconnect the screening instrument to its original purpose, 
prevention of organised crime.  
In addition, the BIBOB screening procedure was introduced as a 
supplement to existing instruments. This means that the BIBOB Act should 
comply with the principle of subsidiarity which states that the least radical 
options should be brought into action first. Indeed, the legislator points out that 
before screening and auditing is begun other interventions that imply a lesser 
invasion of privacy should be carried out first. In fact, the explanatory 
memorandum of the act enumerates various less far-reaching instruments, such 
as the certificate of good behaviour, investigations of antecedents and the 
existing auditing and certification instruments. In other words, the BIBOB 
screening and auditing procedure should only be brought into action as an ultum 
remedium. Only if the other instruments fail to offer the possibility to respond to 
a perceived threat would the BIBOB procedures be used.  
 
3.3.2 Implications of the European rules on procurement 
 
The European Union has established various rules on procurement that oblige 
the member states to undertake actions on irregularities in tendering procedures. 
Notwithstanding the fact that these rules are mainly focused on economic 
regulation, they also include possible exclusion of persons involved in organised 
crime. Because all member states have to reckon with these European rules, the 
main implications are described below.  
 
3.3.2.1 Grounds for refusal 
 
The directives on procurement established in the first pillar of the European 
Union relate not to problems of organised crime but to completion of the single 
market.225 As such the directives have mainly an economic purpose; 
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encouraging a harmonious, well-balanced and lasting development of economic 
activities within the Community. In this framework, the directives encompass 
two kinds of criteria, of which only a small part is important for preventing 
organised crime. First, there are selection criteria, which test subjects’ financial 
resources and economic means. Only when there is evidence that a company is 
financed by illegal profits could these criteria be effective against organised 
crime. This provision could be connected to the confiscation of illegally 
obtained profits. However, the limitations to this provision make its employ less 
suitable for preventing organised crime (Manunza, 2001: 286). Second, the 
directives include a list of criteria to test the reliability of participants in tenders. 
Two of these criteria are useful in preventing organised crime. According to the 
directives, any contractor may be excluded from participation who:226  
 
‘(c) has been convicted of an offence concerning his professional conduct by a 
judgment which has the force of res judicata;  
(d) has been guilty of grave professional misconduct proved by any means which the 
contracting authorities can justify.’ 
 
These criteria are not compulsory. The lack of binding force means that 
authorities are not obliged to exclude entrepreneurs that fit one of these criteria. 
Although the literature sees this as a limitation it could also be viewed as an 
aspect of proportionality by which the administrative authority is the only one 
suitable to assess the actual threat. This reasoning is also the basis of the Dutch 
screening and auditing act. In addition, there are some other important restraints. 
The notion of participants in public tenders covers contractors, suppliers and 
service providers and only includes natural persons. This makes it impossible to 
exclude legal persons that answer these criteria (Manunza: 2001: 281). The most 
important limitation is the fact that exclusion can only be based on convictions. 
At least, this limits the applicability of the first-pillar rules, as the 
recommendations in the 1997 action plan go much further. In this action plan the 
Council of the European Union suggests studying whether and under what 
conditions it is possible to exclude applicants who are currently under 
investigation or prosecution (recommendation 7). With this recommendation the 
Council introduced a novelty: that suspicion of connections with organised 
crime, which implies that no final judgement is needed, could be sufficient to 
exclude a participant from tendering procedures. Considering the preventive 
approach, the Council argues that it would be unwise to limit possible exclusion 
to final judgements. Waiting for a final judgement could harm the public 
administration, as criminal organisations could continue their economic 
dealings. This broadening of the scope of the grounds for exclusion was not 
easily accepted in the first-pillar directives on public procurement. This is 
remarkable as the same action plan put forth recommendations regarding the 
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fight against money laundering, and these recommendations resulted in a hasty 
adjustment of the anti-money laundering intervention.227  
Finally, it is noteworthy that the European legislator at the first-pillar level 
as well as at the third-pillar level, focuses only on offences that took place in the 
past. In the European framework, the possibility to exclude tender participants 
based on the threat of future offences has not yet been discussed. The Dutch 
screening and auditing approach does include the possibility to exclude subjects 
based on risk analyses of threats of future irregularities.  
 
3.3.2.2 Future grounds for refusal 
 
As described earlier, the recommendations of the 1997 action plan resulted in a 
directive proposal for rules on procurement submitted by the European 
Commission in 2000. This proposal takes up some of the 1997 
recommendations. The limitation to legal persons was easily adjusted. The 
proposal changed the concept of tender participants into ‘economic subjects’, 
which covers both natural and legal persons.228 The issues of compulsory 
exclusion and the expansion to include suspicions of criminal involvement met 
more difficulties, as did the newly proposed grounds for refusal. The revised 
article 46 states that any economic operator – both natural and legal – shall be 
excluded from participation in the contract if at any time during the five-year 
period preceding the start of the contract, they have been convicted by definitive 
judgment of having committed a serious offence by participating in the activities 
of a criminal organisation, corruption or fraud.229 
Regarding this new provision we can conclude that the proposal is 
bipartite. First, it introduces an obligation to exclude applicants related to 
organised crime. It still involves a final judgement regarding the offences; 
however, then the exclusion is compulsory. This provision is much stricter than 
the BIBOB Act, which gives administrative authorities the discretionary 
competence to undertake action. Second, the proposal offers contracting 
authorities the possibility to exclude participants on grounds of fraud, especially 
when it hurts the financial interests of the Community. In these cases the 
exclusion is without obligation, but no final judgment is required. Apparently, 
the Commission is calling for an enlargement of the rules on procurement. 
However, it does not agree with the Council of the European Union that 
suspicions of involvement in organised crime are sufficient grounds for 
excluding a participant from a tender, at least as it does not involve the financial 
interest of the Community.  
The proposal is already an improvement on the earlier directives as it 
clearly strengthens the Community’s arsenal of means to fight organised crime. 
In particular the binding grounds for refusal can be seen as a necessary 
adjustment to fight organised crime. However, the improvement is only minor, 
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as in most cases a final judgement is needed to exclude a participant from a 
tendering procedure. According to Manunza (2001: 288), this grounds for 
refusal is inadequate. She argues that to effectively fight organised crime it is 
necessary to operate in a preventive sphere, which means the period in which no 
offences have yet been committed (Manunza, 2001: 248). This implies acting on 
suspicions, as the 1997 action plan prescribes. Thus, up until now there is still a 
huge difference between the first-pillar initiatives and the third-pillar plans. This 
difference seems contradictory and it begs the question of which measures the 
member states should implement.  
At first, this question may appear easily answered, as first-pillar directives 
are more imperative than third-pillar decisions. Based on this reasoning it is not 
surprising that in the millennium strategy of 2000, which is the plan to follow up 
the 1997 action plan, the Council of the European Union concluded that the 
recommendations had not yet been carried out. However, according to Manunza 
(2001: 267) this answer is not as obvious as it seems. Although the first-pillar 
and the third-pillar rules may seem contradictory, she shows that this does not 
have to be the case. She argues that the European legislator does not prohibit 
any measure to prevent crime and the first-pillar directives on public 
procurement leave open the possibility to formulate supplementary conditions 
(Manunza, 2001: 291, 308). In her opinion it is possible for member states to 
add additional specific conditions, such as suspicions of involvement in 
organised crime, to the limited list of objective indicators laid out in the 
directives on public procurement (Manunza, 2001: 361). This reasoning leaves 
member states the possibility to exclude criminal organisations from tendering 
procedures based on suspicions of criminal activities. Accordingly, waiting for 
new directives on procurement does not appear necessary. The Netherlands 
followed this reasoning in including suspicions of future offences in the BIBOB 
instrument as a valid reason to refuse or withdraw permits and subsidies or to 
exclude a subject from a tendering procedure.  
 
3.3.3 Implementation 
 
The Dutch screening and auditing approach starts upon a request by an 
administrative authority. Subsequently, the BIBOB Bureau conducts a screening 
of the subject using a wide range of sources, which ends in a report formulating 
advice on the possible threat that the administrative decision could be abused for 
criminal activities. The BIBOB Bureau’s screening staff consists of two senior 
analysts, six researchers and two research assistants. These researchers perform 
desk research to verify data by checking relevant information sources. In 
addition, two employees are engaged full time in informing and supporting 
administrative authorities. After the screening and auditing activities, the 
administrative authority in question decides whether a permit or subsidy is to be 
granted or whether a subject is to be excluded from a tendering procedure.  
What has become of these activities? In accordance with the previous 
chapter and general methods of this study, we now look at the main aspects that 
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have influenced the implementation of the approach, at least those aspects that 
are important regarding the prevention of organised crime. Because the BIBOB 
Act entered into force only in mid-2003, it is still too early to present adequate 
insight into its implementation. In a few years the first insights are expected, as 
the BIBOB Act provides for an evaluation within three years after it enters into 
force (article 45). Moreover, the BIBOB Bureau has not yet presented an annual 
report. Such a report is expected mid-2005. A pre-evaluation has already been 
conducted (Eiff et al., 2003), also called the ‘Berenschot study’, after the name 
of the organisation that carried it out. This pre-evaluation outlines the situation 
before the screening and auditing measure came into effect and will be used to 
compare the situation three years after the instrument has been in force. Our 
examination also draws on information from newspapers and parliamentary 
questions regarding the screening instrument.  
 
3.3.3.1 New working procedures for the administrative authorities 
 
To implement this new procedure, the administrative authorities must 
understand the measure and be willing to accomplish it. Although the BIBOB 
Bureau launched an extensive campaign to inform authorities, the Berenschot 
study (Eiff et al., 2003) indicates that even before the act came into force, 
problems with its implementation had already appeared.  
 
Organisational changes. In the first months of 2003 a large part of the 
administrative apparatus seemed ill prepared for the BIBOB Act. In fact, the 
preliminary study showed that a large proportion of the administrative 
authorities were as yet unfamiliar with the act (Eiff et al., 2003: 43). Only 41% 
of respondents indicated they knew of the act and that the act is clear.230 
Moreover, 56% of responding authorities said that the role and tasks of the 
BIBOB Bureau were unclear.231 Because of the lack of knowledge about the 
new act, it is not surprising that many authorities were unable to start 
implementing the act; the organisations lacked the capacity as well as the 
financial resources to put the new working procedures into effect (Eiff et al., 
2003: 38). Only 19% of the respondents reported that their organisation had 
sufficient capacity and only 13% were content about the available financial 
resources. This lack of organisational change to accommodate the act can be 
perceived as a type of resistance to the act. This resistance probably results from 
the cultural change that had to take place within the administrative authorities. 
These authorities were used to operating with a customer-oriented attitude. 
However, they now had to adopt some scepticism. The new approach was also 
perceived as being at the expense of bona fide entrepreneurs who in general had 
good relations with the civil servants.  
According to the Berenschot study, the willingness of administrative 
authorities was still minimal in February 2003 (Eiff et al., 2003: 48). Less than 
                                                        
230  In regard to this statement 28% disagrees. 
231  In regard to this statement 21% disagrees. 
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half of the respondents stated that their organisations supported the BIBOB Act 
(43%) and 13% agreed that in the administrations and organisations where they 
work, enough attention is paid to the development of the BIBOB Act in regard 
to granting permits. Regarding the granting of subsidies and public contracts the 
figures were 9% and 15%. Considering these figures it is not surprising that half 
of the respondents (49%) report that their organisation was not working to 
implement the act (Eiff et al., 2003: 58).232  
 Nonetheless, things have been changing since 2004. Administrative 
authorities are increasingly endeavouring to implement the necessary 
organisational changes. Application forms are being adjusted to include the 
information required for a BIBOB screening and authorities are beginning to 
organise interviews with applicants. To aim these changes in the right direction, 
the Amsterdam city government was the first to establish concrete working 
meetings with the BIBOB Bureau at which local and national level procedures 
could be aligned. In the meanwhile, the BIBOB Bureau arranged similar 
meetings with 99 administrative authorities (Brouwer, 2005: 25). To coordinate 
requests from various municipal authorities, the Amsterdam City Council 
established a coordinating bureau to manage requests sent to the BIBOB Bureau 
(Gemeente Amsterdam, 2004: 10). An important advantage of this coordinating 
agency is to align the decisions of the various city departments. A similar 
development has taken place in the Central and West Brabant region, which has 
also appointed a BIBOB coordinator. This coordinator is unique in that the 
position operates for 27 municipalities (Brouwer, 2005: 27).233  
 
Establishing general policies. The BIBOB Act gives administrative authorities 
the discretionary competence to decide on the necessity of a BIBOB request. 
However, to prevent arbitrary decision-making the act advises municipalities to 
draw up general policies on screening and auditing in granting permits, subsidies 
and public contracts. Therefore, the authorities were asked to establish general 
policies indicating when a BIBOB screening had to be requested. In the lead-up 
to the BIBOB Act, no administrative authorities had as yet established such 
policies and only 5% of respondents were working on it (Eiff et al., 2003: 47).  
In the course of 2004 administrative authorities began to pay attention to 
setting up these general policies. For this, the BIBOB Bureau drew up five 
central elements the administrative authorities should be aware of in processing 
an application: the application itself, the applicant, the structure of the company, 
the organisation of the company and its financial construction (Visser, 2005). In 
order to work out these central aspects in more detail, a so-called lead group 
(kopgroep in Dutch) was established.234 This lead group brings together various 
administrative authorities to give a first impulse to application of the screening 
                                                        
232  Only 32% of the respondents state that their organisation is working on the implementation, the other 
19% does not know or has no opinion (Eiff et al., 2003: 58). 
233  See press release of 3 Septermber 2003 of the municipality Moerdijk, http://www.moerdijk.nl. 
234  Examples of such indicators are the presence of prostitution in an establishment, changing licensees 
and remarkably high or low rents that have to be paid for the establishment. 
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and auditing approach by drawing up concrete policies, manuals and even 
information guides.235 Subsequently, a BIBOB website was created with 
examples of policies that have been effective in various municipalities.236 Now 
118 administrative authorities have established such general policies (Brouwer, 
2005: 25). These policies with concrete indicators are meant to support the 
administrative authorities and the individual civil servants in mapping out 
possible threats so as to ground decisions to ask for a BIBOB advice.  
Whereas the individual civil servants play a crucial role in recognising 
possible threats, one would expect civil servants making such decisions to have 
some financial and judicial expertise at their disposal. It is remarkable that such 
expertise is seldom available. Nonetheless, the City of Amsterdam has started 
training civil servants in how to recognise and uncover unusual financing and 
funding structures (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2004: 7).  
 
Costs of a BIBOB screening. Finally, the cost of a BIBOB screening could 
hinder the implementation of the act (Eiff et al., 2003: 50). Although 50% of the 
respondents reported that a cost of €500 was not a problem, 37% considered this 
cost a constraint to request a screening. However, it should be remarked that 
56% of the respondents stated that their organisation had not yet taken account 
of the costs (Eiff et al., 2003: 60). For 70% of the respondents it was yet unclear 
how the costs would be dealt with. In the meanwhile, it appears that 
municipalities are trying to apply the BIBOB requests as purposefully as 
possible. Particularly the larger cities are investing in formulating a BIBOB 
policy to support the local security policy. For example the City Council of 
Rotterdam announced that BIBOB procedures would be brought into action for 
deprived urban areas known for problems and degeneration.237 Also, the City of 
The Hague announced that the BIBOB screening would be primarily applied in 
problem areas that in some cases even are indicated as ‘no-go’ areas for public 
servants (see case The Hague in VNG, 2002: 70).  
 
3.3.3.2 The role of the public prosecutor’s department  
 
With the BIBOB Act the public prosecutor is given a new competence: the 
possibility to advise administrative authorities to request a BIBOB screening. 
Based on the insights of the prosecutor such a suggestion could be interpreted as 
an indication of likely abuse. However, this competence could conflict with the 
prosecutor’s role to protect the interests of the criminal justice system. 
Administrative measures could reveal information that alerts criminals to 
possible criminal investigations, of which they were not as yet aware. 
Obviously, in such cases criminals could stop their activities or use new 
methods which would hinder investigation. Or if a criminal is not under current 
                                                        
235  In the lead group the BIBOB Bureau cooperates with administrative authorities of Amsterdam, 
Almelo, The Hague, Eindhoven, Rotterdam, Venlo and the Association of Netherlands Municipalities.  
236  See http://www.justitie.nl/bibob.  
237  See http://www.rotterdam.nl. 
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investigation, the public prosecutor could prefer availing of administrative 
measures instead of doing nothing. Therefore, time will tell to what extent the 
public prosecutor is willing to contribute to the administrative intervention. 
Nonetheless, structural use of this competence enables the administrative 
authorities to interfere in an early stage. For this the prosecutor must be aware of 
the persons that have applied for permits and subsidies.  
In order to stimulate the exchange of information between the public 
prosecutor’s department and the administrative authorities, a structural 
consultation mechanism has been established in various districts (e.g. in The 
Hague, Rotterdam, Dordrecht en Haarlem).238 Amsterdam has gone so far as to 
establish a structural meeting between the police, the public prosecutor and the 
BIBOB coordinator (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2004: 10). The Minister of Justice 
has established a working group to promote the use of the special competence of 
the public prosecutor.239 Over time it should become clear how the prosecutor 
deals with this competence. Until then, a public prosecutor tipping off 
administrative authorities still seems to be the exception (Visser, 2005). 
 
3.3.3.3 Use of the various information sources 
 
In a simulation conducted just before the act came into force, it appeared that 
not all sources were as yet open for BIBOB consultation. This lack of access to 
information sources and the fact that the administrative authorities were as yet 
unprepared led to the decision to postpone the enactment of the BIBOB 
instrument from January to June 2003. These extra months were to give the 
bureau the opportunity to execute a new simulation to help guarantee smooth 
proceedings. The difficult start of the screening and auditing procedure 
strengthened the realisation among the BIBOB employees that investing in good 
relations with those in place to provide information is crucial. However, this is 
not obvious, as the obligations of secrecy and confidentiality hinder the BIBOB 
employees from making BIBOB information available to third parties.  
 Practice has illustrated some problems as well. First, it appears that the 
competence to use secret information strategically in the decision-making 
process was not obvious, as the BIBOB Bureau must justify its choices. In some 
cases it is better not to know certain information, as it cannot be openly used. 
The same goes for information orally obtained. In accordance with the 
explanatory memorandum of the BIBOB Act, the Provisional Measures Judge 
ruled that information orally obtained may not be used in a BIBOB advice.240  
 Furthermore, it appears difficult to uncover financial operations in which 
money is borrowed from third parties, as these third parties do not have to 
explain where the money came from. Practice illustrates that in certain cases 
                                                        
238  See 
http://www.justitie.nl/bibob/images/implementatie/vergunningen/milieu/praktijkvoorbeelden_milieu/g 
 s_voorstel_beleidslijn.doc.  
239  Kamerstukken II 2003-2004, Aanhangsel, 1868, 3955-3956. 
240  Rechtbank Groningen, 14 april 2004, nr. 71150KG/ZA 04-103, LJN-nr. A07830. 
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applicants may depend on loans from family in foreign countries (Visser, 2005). 
For the BIBOB Bureau it is impossible to uncover the origins of this money. In 
general it appears difficult to gain information from foreign countries, as the 
bureau depends on cooperation of the authorities abroad. Though such 
information is to be exchanged through the mediation of the Dutch public 
prosecutor’s office, foreign countries are not always willing to supply 
information for administrative purposes (Visser, 2005).  
 The difficulties in gaining information have an important impact on the 
period of time the bureau needs to formulate its advice. According to article 15 
of the BIBOB Act the bureau has four weeks for its screening procedure and 
when necessary this period can be extended by another four weeks. In practice, 
however, the bureau almost always needs the prolonged period of eight weeks 
(Brouwer, 2005: 27). This is understandable since gaining information often 
takes at least two weeks. Receiving information from foreign countries takes 
even more time. In addition, the check on the legitimacy of the advice executed 
by the judicial department of the BIBOB Bureau takes about two weeks. 
Consequently only a maximum of four weeks is left to perform the screening.  
 
3.3.3.4 Consequences for applicants and tender participants  
 
Obviously the BIBOB Act can have serious consequences for the entrepreneurs 
that apply for permits or subsidies and for those participating in tenders for 
public contracts. The legislator wants to prevent the BIBOB Act from weighing 
down businesses disproportionately. However, subjects will inevitably bear 
some extra costs and efforts.241 First there is the administrative effort for the 
applicants to collect and report all information required on the application forms. 
Furthermore, the cost of the screening could be charged. To guarantee that 
businesses are not saddled with all of these costs, the administrative authorities 
are charged only a small amount for the screenings, so that the extra costs to 
businesses will be insignificant. However, the economic costs caused by the 
delay in the granting of a permit, subsidy or contract could not be avoided. The 
screening investigation can last four weeks and in certain circumstances this 
term is extended by another four weeks. During this whole period the 
administrative decision is deferred.  
Yet other costs, and possibly the highest ones, are the possible damage to 
reputation caused by screening activities. Though it is not the intention of the 
BIBOB Act, the starting of screening activities can raise suspicions of possible 
criminal involvement. A general policy on requesting advice in the BIBOB 
framework would ease this consequence. Moreover, the argument is made that 
reliable companies that fully cooperate need not fear wrongful violation of their 
reputation.242  
Following this reasoning one can even argue that a positive advice after a 
screening can serve as a kind of guarantee that the company is reliable. In this 
                                                        
241  Explanatory memorandum to the BIBOB Act. Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 26 883, no. 3: 58. 
242  Explanatory memorandum to the BIBOB Act. Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 26 883, no. 3: 59. 
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regard the businesses’ efforts can contribute to a subject’s reputation. The 
question is whether the business will react this way. When companies indeed 
unjustly lose their good reputation the impact of this preventive measure can be 
more harmful than repressive measures. However, for repressive measures the 
legal guarantees of using suspicions as starting information are stricter. Finally, 
the costs include possible judicial procedures when a company decides to 
complain against an administrative decision. In these cases it is up to the court to 
decide whether the decision was legitimate and whether the person in question 
can count on compensation.  
 
3.3.3.5 The BIBOB procedure as ultum remedium 
 
As a result of the principle of subsidiarity the BIBOB procedure should be 
brought into action only as an ultum remedium. First the administrative 
authorities should bring into action other instruments. One of the most important 
instruments is just asking the applicant. The BIBOB Act enables administrative 
authorities to pose direct questions. For example, applicants must indicate how 
they gathered the capital needed for an investment. Moreover, when a first 
answer is insufficient or appears false, the authority may return to the applicant 
who has to explain. As such, one of the neighbourhood councils of Amsterdam 
was able to interrogate an applicant on his capital. The applicant reported that 
the capital was only from his own savings, though the first screening results 
showed that he had received a large gift (Van Houten, 2004: 22). Formerly, 
applicants did not have to answer such questions. Now any lack of transparency 
could result in refusal of a permit.  
Administrative authorities can also turn to certificates of good behaviour, 
an investigation into antecedents and the auditing and certificating instruments 
previously in place. In practice article 15 of the Police Files Act (Wet op de 
Politieregisters) appears to be an important alternative instrument.243 This article 
regulates the communication of personal data recorded by police and provides a 
legal basis for police and the mayor to share relevant information concerning 
maintenance of the public order. Based on this competence it is already possible 
to refrain from awarding permits in the hotel and catering industry. Important is 
that the mayor as well as the police can take the initiative for this information 
exchange. Nonetheless, the success of such a measure depends on the 
embeddedness of consultation between both parties. Therefore the local 
government of the city of Rotterdam established a special framework in which 
this kind of information is exchanged almost automatically (see case Rotterdam, 
VNG, 2002: 54). This cooperation results in an optimal utilisation of available 
information.  
Obviously, jurisprudence should enlighten the extent to which it is lawful 
to refuse or withdraw permits and subsidies or exclude subjects from a tendering 
procedure. Up until now only one lawsuit has taken place. This involves an 
                                                        
243  Wet van 21 juni 1990, houdende regels ter bescherming van de persoonlijke levenssfeer in verband 
met politieregisters laatst gewijzigd 1999, Stb. 1999, no. 244. 
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objection to a withdrawal of a permit in the hotel and catering industry and 
appeared before the Provisional Measures Judge of the Regional Court in 
Roermond.244 The court ruled in favour of the administrative authority, as the 
municipality was convincing in demonstrating that the applicant was related to 
drugs trafficking and that the establishment could be used for money laundering. 
The court did not judge the correctness of these suspicions but judged whether 
the procedures were executed in conformance with the law. Because the 
authority in question answered all regulations, the court upheld the decision. 
Though the applicant can appeal this decision, for the time being this decision 
supports the authorities’ prerogative to act preventively upon crime.  
 
3.3.4 Bottlenecks in implementation 
 
The Dutch screening and auditing approach involves cooperation between the 
public administration and the BIBOB Bureau as well between this bureau and 
the police, the public prosecutor’s department, the tax authorities and other 
organisations that can provide relevant information. As such the approach is a 
real multi-agency initiative. The success of the approach depends on some 
essential elements such as activating the new actors in question, coordinating the 
activities of the various actors and coordinating the various interests. Based on 
these elements we can judge whether the implementation of the approach 
includes some shortcomings that might influence its output.  
 
Activating the public administration. The BIBOB Act had a slow start, but this 
cannot be held against the act. Rather, it points to a lack of organisation within 
the administrative apparatus and a degree of unwillingness to implement the act. 
The figures described earlier clearly show that the BIBOB Bureau’s information 
campaign failed to achieve its aims, as it had not reached all administrative 
authorities. Of the responding authorities, 67% even admitted being unfamiliar 
with the BIBOB information (Eiff et al., 2003: 46). As a result the bureau 
increased its efforts. It continued to publish in several specialist journals and to 
organise conferences and workshops. It also set up a website to which 
authorities could address their questions. Moreover, a multidisciplinary working 
group was set up to inform the public prosecutor’s department. This working 
group focused on giving greater publicity to the public prosecutor’s role in the 
screening process.245 Because a suggestion from the public prosecutor to an 
administrative authority can be interpreted as a direct warning, the prosecutor 
could play an important role in the screening and auditing approach. However, 
until now, the question remains whether the public prosecutor will use this 
competence.  
The continuing efforts to promote the BIBOB approach appear to have 
been successful. After this initial period the authorities began investing 
                                                        
244  See, the press relaese of the municipality Venlo, http://www.justitie.nl/bibob/images/bibob_persberich 
 t_21jan05.doc. 
245  Kamerstukken II 2003-2004, Aanhangsel, 1868, 3955-3956. 
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increasing energy in preparing for the BIBOB approach. Various indicators were 
established to implement the BIBOB procedure in different sectors and sub-lead 
groups were established to support and activate municipalities to implement the 
act.  
 
Coordinating activities. To coordinate the Dutch screening and auditing 
approach, lead groups from various municipalities, the Association of 
Netherlands Municipalities and the BIBOB Bureau formulated some general 
policies. These were to be the starting point for all administrative authorities’ 
efforts and serve to coordinate BIBOB implementation throughout the country. 
In addition, some administrative authorities appointed a BIBOB coordinator and 
set up meetings with the BIBOB Bureau to work out procedures. However, it 
must be mentioned that as these civil servants play a key role in evaluating 
applications it is remarkable that they often have no financial or judicial 
expertise on which to base their judgements. Therefore, the initiative in 
Amsterdam to train civil servants should be followed by more authorities.  
Regarding the screening process, various problems have arisen in 
consulting information sources. In particular gathering information from abroad 
comes up against a lot of problems. Foreign authorities are not always willing to 
share information with an administrative agency. Also, gaining information 
from foreign authorities often takes time. With regard to sources in the 
Netherlands that are obliged to share information with the BIBOB Bureau, there 
is also the problem of time. It generally takes two weeks to receive information 
from sources, which is a considerable period relative to the total time span of 
four to eight weeks in which the screening should take place.  
 
Coordinating interests. Whereas the Dutch screening and auditing approach 
only involves governmental bodies, it could be assumed that all of these bodies 
have the same interest, namely preventing the unintentional facilitation of 
criminal activities. However, the competence to request a BIBOB advice and the 
final decision remains the responsibility of the individual authorities; the 
authorities are not obliged to implement the BIBOB Act. Consequently, 
authorities that see no threat of organised crime have not been enthusiastic about 
implementing the BIBOB Act (Eiff et al., 2003). In the meanwhile, the 
consciousness-raising has increased enthusiasm for the initiative, and more 
authorities now see the benefit of the screening and auditing approach. 
Following the larger cities smaller municipalities are increasingly showing 
interest. Nonetheless, screening and auditing applicants will always reflect a 
balance between maintaining customer-friendly services and protecting the 
integrity of the civil service apparatus. Moreover, the local situation can result in 
specific economic or social interests. For example, a prestigious hotel is less 
likely to be suspected of questionable dealings and become subject of a 
screening than a coffee shop (which is a type of café in the Netherlands where 
cannabis can be purchased). This could be seen in the case of the prestigious 
sea-side Kurhaus hotel in Scheveningen. The Hague approved the sale of this 
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hotel without knowing the new owner. Though lack of knowledge about the 
buyer could be a reason for bringing the screening instrument into action, 
smaller and less reputable establishments like coffee shops are more likely to be 
screened, even when there is no immediate cause for suspicion. The difference 
between the hotel and the coffee shop could seem legitimate, however, the 
screening method can function well only if the authorities focus on all possible 
abuses.  
 In addition, the role of the public prosecutor could result in a conflict of 
interest. A suggestion from the prosecutor’s office to bring the screening 
instrument into action might conflict with the public prosecutor’s first priority, 
namely, to execute criminal investigations and prosecute offenders. To what 
extent these different responsibilities will result in conflicting interests remains 
unknown for now.  
 
3.4 Evaluation of the outcomes of the Dutch screening and auditing 
approach  
 
In accordance with the methods described in the first chapter of this study this 
section gives an overview of the observed outputs and the plausible outcomes of 
the intervention. The fact that the BIBOB Act entered into force for only two 
years ago makes it difficult to evaluate the outcomes. Yet this section presents a 
first look at the observed outputs and plausible outcomes of the Dutch screening 
approach as it impacts organised crime. Furthermore, based on an expert 
meeting organised for the Berenschot study it is possible to provide some insight 
on possible side effects. While the side effects can only be ascertained for 
certain after the approach has been in force longer, this study looks at some 
experts’ expectations. Finally, notwithstanding that little is known on the effects 
of the screening and auditing approach a first conclusion on the approach is 
drawn. 
 
3.4.1 Observed outputs  
 
The Dutch screening and auditing approach focuses on two objectives, presented 
in the second section of this chapter: preventing the unintentional facilitation of 
criminal activities (which could be indicated by the number of BIBOB advice 
reports requested) and increasing the awareness of the public administration.  
 
3.4.1.1 Number of BIBOB advisory reports requested  
 
In the explanatory memorandum of the BIBOB Act the legislator estimated that 
500 BIBOB advisory reports would be requested in the first year.246 Although 
these figures were computed based on the cost of the advice and the length of 
                                                        
246  Explanatory memorandum to the BIBOB Act. Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 26 883, no. 3: 57. This 
explanatory memorandum also states that in later years this could increase to thousands. 
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the screening period, the BIBOB Bureau considered the figure a rough estimate 
with little foundation (Eiff et al., 2003: 62). The bureau itself reckoned on an 
initial peak, as some municipalities were known to be holding cases for a 
BIBOB screening (Eiff et al., 2003: 62). The BIBOB Bureau also expected 
many administrative authorities to wait to see how the judicial frameworks 
would hold up and whether the BIBOB Act could prove its added-value.  
As described, the BIBOB Act had a slow start. After the first year the 
number of BIBOB requests lagged far behind the estimations. An interview with 
the director of the BIBOB Bureau published in one of the Netherlands’ larger 
newspapers resulted in parliamentary questions on this figure.247 The Minister of 
Justice indicated that one year after the act came into force, the BIBOB Bureau 
had received only 29 requests for advice.248 The minister attributed this low 
number of requests to the fact that many municipalities had not yet implemented 
the act, due to a lack of awareness, priority and support. This applies mostly to 
the smaller municipalities.249 However, even the larger cities had requested 
screening for only a few subjects. In the first six months Amsterdam applied for 
only one screening. It was expected that Amsterdam, the municipality facing the 
most problems of organised crime infiltrating the legitimate environment,250 
would request many more BIBOB screenings.  
Regarding the proportionality of the BIBOB Act, the City of Amsterdam 
brought local administrative measures into action first.251 The use of other 
grounds for refusal is actually a positive outcome as it indicates the Amsterdam 
City Council’s compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. (See Chapter 4 in 
this study and Huisman et al., 2005.) To what extent this same reasoning can be 
applied towards other municipalities is unknown. Nonetheless, it indicates that a 
low number of requests does not imply bad implementation of the BIBOB Act. 
In the second year the BIBOB Act became better known, and the number of 
requests is still increasing. In two years’ time the BIBOB Bureau completed 
about 100 screenings (Brouwer, 2005: 27). Most of these involve the hotel and 
catering industry including brothels (Visser, 2005). This is not surprising as this 
is the main sector on which the authorities are focused.  
What do these screenings imply? Two-thirds of the advisory reports 
indicated some threat or a serious threat and only one-third indicated no threat at 
all (Visser, 2005). However, up to now no overview has been made of the final 
decisions taken by the authorities in question. So, we have no insight as yet into 
the total number of cases in which the administrative authorities refused or 
withdrew a permit or subsidy, and the number of cases in which subjects were 
excluded from tendering procedures.  
                                                        
247  Weinig gemeenten screenen criminelen, de Volkskrant, 1 June 2004. 
248  Vragen van de leden Van Haersma Buma en De Pater-van der Meer. Kamerstukken II 2003-2004, no. 
1868.  
249  Antwoord van Minister Donner op de vragen van de leden Van Haersma Buma en De Pater-van der 
Meer. Kamerstukken II 2003-2004, no. 1868. 
250  See the description of the problem of organised crime in the Netherlands in Chapter 1 of this study. 
Moreover, Chapter 4 elaborates on problems in Amsterdam as well as measures taken. 
251  As described in the next chapter, Amsterdam has developed an administrative approach. 
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3.4.1.2 Increasing the awareness of the public administration 
 
The Berenschot study (Eiff et al., 2003: 39) illustrates that, notwithstanding the 
lack of preparation, awareness within the public administration has been on the 
rise. Of those surveyed, 63% of respondents agrees with the statement that their 
organisation has paid more attention to possible unintentional facilitation of 
criminal activities. Moreover, 41% of respondents say that the BIBOB Act is 
one of the reasons for this increase. Because a wide range of policy measures 
focuses on integrity it is difficult to determine to what extent this increasing 
awareness results from the BIBOB Act. In any case, the combination of 
measures, of which the BIBOB Act is one, does seem to have had some success 
in achieving this objective. Now that the BIBOB Act is operational, awareness is 
likely to increase even more.  
 
3.4.1.3 Conclusion on outputs 
 
The lack of observed outputs makes it as yet impossible to indicate effects on 
organised crime. We may even question whether the effect on organised crime 
can be determined once clear outputs are available. For this, one has to uncover 
to what extent the authorities were facilitating organised crime before the 
screening instrument came into force and whether this has decreased. However, 
the administrative authorities have no insight in the extent of their previous 
unintentional facilitation of criminal activities (Eiff et al., 2003: 23). Before the 
BIBOB Act came into force the authorities screened applicants and participants 
in tenders regarding technical aspects, not possible criminal records. As a result 
there are no figures on possible abuse, only estimates. In the Berenschot study 
5% of the respondents states that their organisation had been assessing possible 
risks regarding applications for permits and public contracts, however actual 
unintentional facilitation would occur only in some cases (Eiff et al., 2003: 
57).252 Still, 11% of respondents had dealt with such facilitation regarding 
granted permits in the past (Eiff et al., 2003: 22). For subsidies and public 
contracts these percentages drop to, respectively, 1% and 2% (Eiff et al., 2003: 
23). In such cases it is logical to assume that refusing these permits hindered 
facilitation.  
This reasoning is subscribed to by many experts, who agree that the 
BIBOB Act will lead to a reduction of unintentional facilitation (Eiff et al., 
2003: 53). The experts are less optimistic on whether this will reduce criminal 
activities in the sectors concerned. Only 33% believe the intervention will really 
affect organised crime (Eiff et al., 2003: 53).253 However, this evaluation is 
based on opinions and not empirical evidence, meaning the figures can be 
presented only as general expectations, albeit of experts. 
                                                        
252  Regarding subsidies, only 1% said they assess threats with all applications.  
253  44% of experts disagreed with the statement that the screening instrument would decrease criminal 
activities in the sectors involved (Eiff et al., 2003: 53). 
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3.4.2 Plausible outcomes 
 
In the absence of concrete findings it is interesting to indicate the extent to 
which it is plausible that the screening and auditing approach will be effective 
against organised crime. For this, the programme theory of this approach is 
judged in the light of pragmatic new criminological strategies that represent the 
common preventive approaches and the empirical knowledge on organised 
crime.  
 
3.4.2.1 Situational crime prevention 
 
The recovered programme theory involves the assumption that increasing the 
awareness and integrity of administrative authorities would hinder criminal 
organisations’ abuse of permits, subsidies and tender procedures for unlawful 
activities. In addition, the BIBOB Act provides grounds to actually bar those 
who want to abuse permits, subsidies and tendering procedures from committing 
criminal acts. Based on the principle that organised crime depends on certain 
administrative decisions it is plausible that the Dutch screening and auditing 
approach can prevent unintentional facilitation. This reasoning follows from the 
rationale of situational crime prevention as designed to reduce opportunities 
(Clarke, 1997). The BIBOB Act hinders opportunities to abuse administrative 
authorities and it hinders the use of certain economic dealings for criminal 
activities.  
This subsection looks only at the main strategies and underlying techniques 
used in the screening and auditing approach. This is similar to the process used 
to examine the anti-money laundering intervention in Chapter 2; the techniques 
are similar as well. Situational crime prevention includes crime-reducing 
techniques that influence the realisation of criminal activities. These techniques 
involve increasing the risk, increasing the effort, reducing the rewards, reducing 
provocations and removing excuses. Table 3.1 presents the techniques deriving 
from the Dutch screening and auditing approach and illustrates that these 
techniques fit the classification of Cornish and Clarke (2003: 90).  
 
Increase the risk. First of all the BIBOB Act increases the risk for criminal 
organisations as administrative authorities are brought into action as extra 
guardians. Obviously, with such extended guardianship the risk that criminal 
involvement will be uncovered is much larger. This extended guardianship not 
only concerns the authorities; in practice it involves a responsibilisation of civil 
servants in their workplace. These public servants must be alert for possible 
irregularities and unusual constructions that may indicate criminal purposes. 
While it is the civil servant who in interaction with an applicant or tender 
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participant could uncover these irregularities, this technique is also comparable 
to the technique that Cornish and Clarke (2003: 90) define as utilising place 
managers.  
Furthermore the auditing activities that are part of the application process 
for permits and subsidies or the registration for public procurement reduce the 
possibility to act anonymously. According to Clarke, reducing anonymity is a 
technique to prevent crime.  
Finally, the screening and auditing approach provides the opportunity to bring 
into action formal surveillance when offences are uncovered. For example, 
criminal investigations can be started to look into offences in more detail. 
According to Clarke, the presence of formal surveillance implies a threat that 
would deter some potential offenders. The execution of the BIBOB procedure in 
Rotterdam has shown that deterrence indeed takes place, as in two cases 
applicants withdrew their application after a BIBOB screening was to be 
requested and additional questions were asked (Visser, 2005). 
 
Increase the effort. The screening and auditing approach not only reveals the 
identity of applicants or participants in public tenders, it also hinders the 
concealing of criminal activities or purposes. Simply phrased, it makes it more 
difficult to conceal irregularities and obtain the permit or subsidy in question. 
Clarke (1997: 17) defines this technique as ‘target hardening’. It implies that 
criminals must increase their effort to achieve their aims. Regarding the 
screening and auditing approach, the subjects have to increase their effort to 
conceal their true identity and their criminal activities or purposes. This 
technique also fits the technique of deflecting offenders, as in practice criminals 
might have to think of more complex constructions, for example, using front 
men and front stores.  
 Another technique that implies increased effort is the control of access to 
important facilities. In this case access to the permits, subsidies and tendering 
procedures necessary to take part in specific economic dealings is implied. 
Permits, subsidies and tendering procedures are only accessible through 
administrative authorities, and these authorities can easily control the access. In 
contrast to the anti-money laundering intervention, applicants have no recourse 
to other providers. As such the monopoly of the administrative authorities 
strengthens this technique to the maximum.  
 
Reduce the rewards. Reducing the rewards is probably the most concrete 
strategy. As a result of the screening instrument, certain economic dealings can 
be denied to criminal organisations. In fact, permits and subsidies can be refused 
or withdrawn and criminal subjects excluded from tendering procedures. These 
are the means that can be brought into action with the BIBOB Act. Moreover, 
when a screening uncovers criminal offences, then other possible measures can 
be brought into effect: criminal investigations can be started, administrative 
fines can be imposed and tax authorities can resort to additional collection.  
142 
 
R
em
ov
e 
ex
cu
se
s 
21
. S
et
 ru
le
s 
• 
ge
ne
ra
l p
ol
ic
ie
s 
sh
ou
ld
 p
ro
vi
de
 
in
di
ca
to
rs
 fo
r 
re
qu
es
tin
g 
a 
B
IB
O
B
 
ad
vi
ce
  
   
22
. P
os
t i
ns
tru
ct
io
ns
 
23
. A
le
rt 
co
ns
ci
en
ce
 
• 
in
cr
ea
si
ng
 a
w
ar
en
es
s 
an
d 
in
te
gr
ity
  
 
24
. A
ss
is
t c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
 
 25
. C
on
tro
l d
ru
gs
 a
nd
 
al
co
ho
l 
  
R
ed
uc
e 
pr
ov
oc
at
io
ns
 
16
. R
ed
uc
e 
fr
us
tra
tio
ns
  
 a
nd
 st
re
ss
  
 17
. A
vo
id
 d
is
pu
te
s 
 18
. R
ed
uc
e 
em
ot
io
na
l  
 a
ro
us
al
 
 19
. N
eu
tra
liz
e 
pe
er
  
 p
re
ss
ur
e 
 
 20
. D
is
co
ur
ag
e 
im
ita
tio
n 
  
R
ed
uc
e 
th
e 
re
w
ar
ds
 
11
. C
on
ce
al
 ta
rg
et
s  
 12
. R
em
ov
e 
ta
rg
et
s  
 13
. I
de
nt
ify
 p
ro
pe
rty
 
  14
. D
is
ru
pt
 m
ar
ke
ts
 
 15
. D
en
y 
be
ne
fit
s 
• 
re
fu
si
ng
 a
nd
 
w
ith
dr
aw
in
g 
pe
rm
its
 
an
d 
su
bs
id
ie
s  
• 
ex
cl
ud
in
g 
ap
pl
ic
an
ts
 
fr
om
 te
nd
er
in
g 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 
In
cr
ea
se
 th
e 
ri
sk
 
6.
 E
xt
en
d 
gu
ar
di
an
sh
ip
  
• 
ex
am
in
e 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
ns
 fo
r 
po
ss
ib
le
 c
rim
in
al
 p
ur
po
se
s  
7.
 A
ss
is
t n
at
ur
al
 su
rv
ei
lla
nc
e 
  8.
 R
ed
uc
e 
an
on
ym
ity
 
• 
co
m
pl
et
e 
qu
es
tio
nn
ai
re
s t
o 
un
co
ve
r i
de
nt
ity
 o
f 
ap
pl
ic
an
ts
, t
he
ir 
en
te
rp
ris
es
 
an
d 
th
ei
r b
us
in
es
s r
el
at
io
ns
 
9.
 U
til
is
e 
pl
ac
e 
m
an
ag
er
s 
• 
in
di
vi
du
al
 c
iv
il 
se
rv
an
ts
 
ha
ve
 to
 w
on
de
r w
he
th
er
 
cl
ie
nt
s f
it 
ce
rta
in
 in
di
ca
to
rs
  
10
. S
tre
ng
th
en
 fo
rm
al
  
 su
rv
ei
lla
nc
e 
• 
ad
m
in
is
tra
tiv
e 
au
th
or
iti
es
 
ca
n 
br
in
g 
in
to
 a
ct
io
n 
fo
rm
al
 su
rv
ei
lla
nc
e 
w
he
n 
of
fe
nc
es
 a
re
 u
nc
ov
er
ed
 
T
ab
le
 3
.1
 T
he
 te
ch
ni
qu
es
 o
f t
he
 D
ut
ch
 sc
re
en
in
g 
an
d 
au
di
tin
g 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 c
at
eg
or
is
ed
 in
 C
or
ni
sh
 a
nd
 C
la
rk
e’
s 2
5 
te
ch
ni
qu
es
 o
f s
itu
at
io
na
l p
re
ve
nt
io
n 
In
cr
ea
se
 th
e 
ef
fo
rt
 
1.
 T
ar
ge
t h
ar
de
ni
ng
 
• 
qu
es
tio
nn
ai
re
s a
nd
 sc
re
en
in
gs
 
hi
nd
er
 th
e 
co
nc
ea
lin
g 
of
 
cr
im
in
al
 p
ur
po
se
s o
f 
ec
on
om
ic
 d
ea
lin
gs
 
2.
 C
on
tro
l a
cc
es
s t
o 
fa
ci
lit
ie
s  
• 
le
ga
l g
ro
un
ds
 fo
r r
ef
us
al
 o
r 
w
ith
dr
aw
al
 e
na
bl
es
 
co
nt
ro
lli
ng
 th
e 
ac
ce
ss
 to
 
ce
rta
in
 e
co
no
m
ic
 d
ea
lin
gs
 
3.
 S
cr
ee
n 
ex
its
  
 4.
 D
ef
le
ct
 o
ff
en
de
rs
  
• 
by
 sc
re
en
in
g 
fo
r c
rim
in
al
 
ac
tiv
iti
es
, c
rim
in
al
 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
ns
 h
av
e 
to
 tu
rn
 to
 
ot
he
r o
r m
or
e 
co
m
pl
ex
 
m
et
ho
ds
 
5.
 C
on
tro
l t
oo
ls
/w
ea
po
ns
 
143 
All of these actions have their costs. According to Clarke (1997) the knowledge 
that benefits can be denied prevents some of the criminals from committing the 
offence. Uncertainty about profits would influence the cost-benefit balance, 
perhaps leading to a change in the decisions of criminal organisations.  
 
Remove excuses. A final strategy involves the removing of excuses. This 
strategy does not focus on the criminal organisations but on the administrative 
authorities that unwittingly facilitate crime. In fact this strategy is the basis for 
the Dutch screening and auditing approach. By increasing the awareness and the 
integrity of the administrative apparatus the screening approach applies the 
technique of raising consciousness. By raising the conscience of administrative 
authorities, the abuse of these authorities should be hindered.  
Moreover, the general policies to implement the BIBOB procedure 
established by the lead groups implies a framework of rules on which the 
authorities can rely. However, in contrast to the anti-money laundering 
intervention, these rules are not clear and binding, so authorities can deviate 
from them.  
 
3.4.2.2 Effects of the techniques 
 
The assumptions and techniques of the Dutch screening and auditing approach 
easily fit situational crime prevention and as such it is plausible that the BIBOB 
Act can indeed hinder criminal activities by interfering in the process by which 
criminal activities occur. Practice already illustrates that bringing the BIBOB 
procedures into action might result in the withdrawal of requests (Brouwer, 
2005: 29), so apparently, the screening procedure does deter certain applicants. 
However, an important aspect of this pragmatic new approach is possible 
displacement. Before looking at the problem of displacement, the possible 
effectiveness of the BIBOB Act is judged in light of empirical knowledge on 
organised crime.  
 
3.4.2.3 Empirical knowledge on organised crime 
 
As described in the first section of this chapter the Dutch screening and auditing 
approach is based on the integrated approach developed in New York City. This 
approach consists of a screening in which the public administration closely 
cooperates with the police, the public procurement services and even with 
financial authorities. In New York this approach proved successful against 
racketeering, as it actually barred Cosa Nostra groups from core economic 
sectors (Jacobs, 1999: 223). As such we could likely conclude that this approach 
can succeed in the Netherlands. However, is it possible to copy an approach 
from New York City and apply it in the Netherlands?  
A policy programme can be successful only if it is geared to the problem 
confronting the policy-maker. Regarding the problem of organised crime, the 
literature indicates that the Dutch government deals with another sort of crime 
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than New York City’s government. In New York the approach was applied 
against racketeering by criminal organisations, which takes place in the 
legitimate environment. The Dutch authorities are confronted with organised 
crime mainly confined to the traditional illegal supply of certain goods and 
services (Fijnaut et al., 1998: 203). This means that in the Netherlands organised 
crime is mainly situated in illegal markets. Signs of racketeering have been 
found only in the hotel and catering industry, especially in the red-light district 
of Amsterdam (Fijnaut and Bovenkerk, 1996: 126). Consequently, one might 
wonder whether the Dutch screening and auditing approach could be effective 
against the illegal supply of goods and services in the same way as it was 
effective against racketeering. This question involves the scope of the 
administrative approach.  
According to Kleemans et al. (1998: 61; 2002: 65) and Huisman et al. 
(2003: 36) organised crime situated in the illegal environment touches the 
legitimate environment in many ways. These interfaces offer opportunities for 
an administrative approach and should be seized for interventions. Examples of 
these interfaces are the transfer of criminal proceeds by providers of financial 
services and granting of permits for criminals’ legal persons by relevant 
administrative authorities. The first interface offers opportunities for the anti-
money laundering intervention, as described in the previous chapter. The second 
offers opportunities for administrative regulation, particularly for a screening 
and auditing approach. As such the Dutch screening approach does not focus on 
racketeering activities, but on the activities that support criminal undertakings. 
Based on insights into Dutch organised crime, Huisman et al.  (2003: 36) 
argues that an administrative approach could be effective, but that the 
opportunities for interfering are limited. Consequently, because Dutch organised 
crime offers fewer opportunities to interfere than racketeering in New York, the 
expected results should be adjusted to reflect the more limited extent of 
opportunities. This reasoning is confirmed by Van de Bunt (2004: 701) who 
warns against too much optimism: the BIBOB approach could have some value, 
but given the nature of criminal organisations in the Netherlands, we should not 
expect too much of the BIBOB Act as an instrument to contain organised crime. 
 
3.4.3 Side effects 
 
Based the plausible outcomes, the Dutch screening and auditing approach is 
likely to be effective to some degree. The extent of this effect depends partly on 
the extent of the side effects that influence the outcomes. Side effects can imply 
positive as well as negative actions. We describe here the main side effects that 
could have a negative impact on the outcomes.  
 
Displacement. As described in Chapter 1, most preventive measures have to deal 
with displacement. This is certainly the case for interventions based on the 
situational approach. In fact, displacement could develop into a real bottleneck if 
the preventive measures leave open enough alternatives to which criminals can 
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turn. As described in the previous chapter, Clarke was aware of this possible 
side effect. However, based on the idea that situational intervention increases the 
costs and reduces the benefits of crime, he assumes that in the decision-making 
process criminals would refrain from criminal activities if situational 
intervention is in place. Still, Clarke (1980: 141) realises that some potential 
offenders will search for alternatives. In particular he refers to changes in time, 
place, method and type of offence. In addition, Clarke argues that the extent to 
which potential offenders definitively end their activities depends on the scale of 
alternatives. Therefore, the extent of displacement depends on the scope of the 
intervention; focusing on a whole class of opportunities would be more effective 
than focusing on just a part (Clarke, 1980: 141).  
Regarding the scope of the Dutch screening and auditing approach, some 
aspects of the BIBOB Act could enlarge the risk of displacement and other 
aspects reduce such risk. First, the fact that the Dutch screening and auditing 
approach is aimed at certain sectors makes it likely that criminal organisations 
will switch to other sectors where no screenings take place. For these other 
sectors, the authorities have no strong rules to hinder unintentional facilitation. 
This reasoning is strengthened by the fact that the BIBOB Act is being 
implemented in stages: the authorities are focusing first on the hotel and catering 
industry and brothels. Thus, this initial period offers various alternatives. The 
question is to what extent are potential criminals interested in these alternatives. 
One may wonder whether a criminal who wanted a restaurant to facilitate money 
laundering would turn to waste disposal or to the construction sector. Each 
sector requires some specific knowledge and experience. It is questionable 
whether criminals would invest in acquiring such new expertise. The situational 
crime prevention approach says that such dilemmas would deflect offenders.  
Moreover, the slow start of the various authorities in implementing the 
BIBOB Act leaves open the possibility of geographic displacement. In 
particular, the smaller municipalities seem less prepared to carry out the 
screening and auditing procedures. As a result of a refusal or withdrawal of a 
permit or subsidy in one municipality, it seems likely that a criminal would turn 
to another municipality where the screening and auditing approach is not yet 
implemented. Finally, difficulties in obtaining information from abroad, in 
particular on legal persons established in foreign countries, could provoke 
displacement. Criminals who are aware of these difficulties could establish 
foreign legal persons to hinder screening. To avert such developments the 
BIBOB Bureau suggests that it would be more effective if in such cases the 
applicant has to provide proof of the legitimacy of activities, such as the origin 
of money and the structure of foreign legal persons.  
 Second, the BIBOB Act is focused on economic dealings for which the 
interference of administrative authorities is required. Unlike the anti-money 
laundering intervention, criminals have no other providers to which they can 
turn. In this sense the Dutch screening and auditing approach indeed focuses on 
a whole class of opportunities. An optimal execution of this approach would 
then seem to prevent an extensive part of possible unintentional facilitation.  
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Additional side effects. At the meeting organised as part of the Berenschot study 
the experts agreed that the BIBOB Act could result in a large range of side 
effects. They pointed out the juridification, longer procedures, heavier burden 
for judicial power and displacement of crime to other sectors (Eiff et al., 2003: 
55). They also raise questions on the lack of safeguards of legal rights and 
possible stigmatisation of applicants and sectors (Eiff et al., 2003: 55). 
Notwithstanding that these side effects are likely, it is impossible at this point to 
discern whether they will actually occur and if so to what extent. For an 
evidence-based insight into side effects, we must wait for the evaluation study.  
 
3.4.4 Conclusion 
 
The Dutch screening and auditing approach was developed to hinder the 
unintentional facilitation of criminal activities by administrative authorities. This 
approach is based on two pillars. The awareness of possible unintentional 
facilitation and increasing the level of integrity of the public administration. 
These two elements are basic conditions for organised crime prevention (Van de 
Bunt and Van der Schoot, 2003: 70, 72). The approach also provides an 
instrument to actually bar criminals who try to abuse administrative decisions. 
For the actual screenings, the Dutch legislator introduced a national bureau, 
which has authority to consult all kinds of sources (police, judicial and tax 
records). The programme evaluation illustrates that such sensitive information is 
necessary to obtain complete and reliable insight into the possible threat of 
abuse. In the Netherlands the screening and auditing approach has been 
discussed intensively, both within and outside the parliament. For the legislator 
it is obvious that the fight against organised crime and protecting the integrity of 
the public administration justifies some invasion of people’s privacy. To come 
to a legitimate balance, provisions have been established regarding the principle 
of proportionality and subsidiarity to guarantee subjects’ legal position.  
 Nonetheless, various aspects are still criticised. One of these is the fact that 
suspicions of future offences are sufficient grounds for refusing or withdrawing 
a permit or subsidy or excluding a subject from a public tendering procedure. 
With this provision the Netherlands takes a progressive position and is one of 
the only EU member states to implement recommendation 7 of the 1997 
European action plan to combat organised crime. Nonetheless, this provision is 
still under discussion at the European level, as it is not yet included in the new 
directive proposal on public contracts. At the national level the Dutch legislator 
has countered this criticism by pointing out the wide range of databases that the 
BIBOB Bureau can access. This, they say, guarantees a complete and reliable 
picture of the subject in question. Moreover, subjects are protected by the 
General Administrative Law Act that guarantees transparency in the decision-
making of public administrators. 
The implementation of the BIBOB Act had a slow start. The BIBOB 
Bureau indicates that the number of requests is increasing. About 100 screening 
reports have been completed. Unfortunately, it is unknown what the authorities 
147 
did with these reports. This number is much lower than the 500 requests forecast 
to be handled each year. On the one hand, this is because administrative 
authorities must take care that requests for advice from the BIBOB Bureau 
conform with the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. Few requests 
could indicate a well-deliberated use of the instrument vis-à-vis other less 
invasive grounds for testing an applicant. On the other hand the caution in 
requesting a BIBOB screening, could be based on the fear of lawsuits to fight 
the administrative decision and claims for damages regarding possible 
administrative failures (Heddeghem et al., 2002: 71). Such caution could cripple 
the BIBOB procedures’ effectiveness in achieving its objectives. Particularly for 
attempts by organised crime to conceal their criminal activities the more in-
depth screening by the BIBOB Bureau would be necessary. In addition, it is 
likely that authorities would refuse an application or exclude subjects from 
tenders only if the BIBOB Bureau advice indicates a serious threat of abuse. 
Here again the screening approach would fail to meet its objectives, as in this 
case the authorities would agree to cooperate with persons that are some extent 
upright.  
Jurisprudence in the coming years will enlighten this reasoning. Only one 
lawsuit on the BIBOB procedure had as yet taken place in 2005. That case 
showed that the BIBOB procedures were applicable beyond organised crime. 
The Regional Court of The Hague ruled that the administrative authority did 
have the right to refuse a permit in the hotel and catering industry.254 The court 
judged that the BIBOB procedure was applied correctly and thus the refusal was 
lawful. The structural violation of rules and constant police intervention in the 
applicant’s former catering establishment, as well as the double bankruptcy of 
this establishment and the involvement of a foreign legal person, were sufficient 
reason to assume that violations would also occur in the future. The court even 
referred to the parliamentary history of the BIBOB Act to show that the act not 
only opposes abuses regarding organised crime. 
Based on the situational prevention theory it is plausible that the screening 
and auditing approach indeed deters criminal organisations, as it increases the 
risk and diminishes the rewards. While the BIBOB Act focuses only on the 
economic sectors in which unintentional facilitation is deemed most likely, it is 
possible for criminals to displace their activities to other sectors. In addition, the 
slow implementation could encourage geographical displacement. However, the 
administrative authorities’ monopoly to interfere in these economic dealings 
implies an enormous restriction of possible displacement. This strengthens the 
plausibility that the screening and auditing approach will be effective.  
One main objection to the BIBOB Act is the problem of national 
boundaries. It has proven difficult to gain information from foreign countries 
and it is hard to screen foreign companies wanting to settle in the Netherlands. A 
second objection that can be raised to the BIBOB Act is that it is not precisely 
designed to fight organised crime in the Netherlands. The approach is based on a 
similar approach that was successful in New York. However, while New York 
                                                        
254  Court of The Hague, AWB 05/601, 730, 1055 and 1056, LJN AS 9631. 
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has to fight racketeering by mafia organisations, organised crime in the 
Netherlands involves trade in illegal goods and services. We will therefore have 
to wait some years to determine the intervention’s real impacts.  
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Chapter 4  The administrative approach of Amsterdam  
 
Chapter 1 mentioned the City of Amsterdam’s development of an administrative 
approach to contain organised crime. This administrative approach was the 
city’s answer to the specific crime problems it faced in the 1990s. Obviously, 
this development in Amsterdam did not take place in a vacuum. The success of 
administrative approaches in the fight against organised crime in countries such 
as Italy and the United States had enormous influence on the development of the 
Amsterdam policy. In the Netherlands the administrative approach was unique 
as it included progressive structural measures for organised crime prevention. 
With the support of the national government Amsterdam became an 
experimental garden for crime-fighting policies. For example, the city 
introduced local screening and auditing procedures that later contributed to the 
development of the national BIBOB Act described in the previous chapter. 
Amsterdam’s approach also seems unique in Europe as it is discussed 
internationally in the framework of best practices (Seger, 2003).  
 Like the two previous chapters the purpose of this chapter is to reveal 
whether it is correct to assume that Amsterdam’s administrative approach 
actually can prevent organised crime. In conformance with the methods 
described in the first chapter this chapter answers the three research questions:  
 
- What is the programme theory underlying the administrative approach 
of Amsterdam? (Section 4.2) 
- What is the content of the administrative approach of Amsterdam and 
how is it implemented? (Section 4.3 and 4.5) 
- What are the observed outputs and plausible outcomes of the 
administrative approach of Amsterdam? (Section 4.4 and 4.6) 
 
The structure of this chapter is similar to the two previous chapters except for 
the fact that this administrative approach does not exist as one intervention, but 
in a range of approaches. Section 4.1 introduces the problems that led to the 
administrative approach. Section 4.2 elaborates on the programme theory on 
which the administrative approach is based and introduces the main elements of 
the Amsterdam approach. Two of these are detailed: the integrity approach and 
the Van Traa approach. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 involve, respectively, the 
evaluation of the process and the evaluation of the outcomes of the integrity 
approach. Sections 4.5 and 4.6 involve, respectively, the evaluation of the 
process and evaluation of the outcomes of the Van Traa approach.  
 The Amsterdam city government started development of the administrative 
approach in the early 1990s. Over the years the local government has reported 
on this approach in progress reports and annual reports. It even published a 
public information book to introduce and explain this new approach (Fijnaut, 
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2001; 2002).255 Furthermore, Amsterdam’s administrative approach is discussed 
in Organised Crime: Best Practice Survey of the Council of Europe (Seger, 
2003) and in the Belgian study on administrative approaches (Van Heddeghem 
et al., 2002). The Van Traa approach was evaluated only recently. Although this 
evaluation is not yet completed (Huisman et al., 2005) some findings and main 
conclusions have already been presented at conferences and seminars. These 
preliminary findings and conclusions are presented in this study, as they provide 
deliberated insight into the implementation and results and effects of the 
Amsterdam administrative approach.  
 
4.1 Organised crime in Amsterdam 
 
The administrative approach of Amsterdam is a direct answer to the increased 
problems regarding organised crime perceived by the city government during 
the 1990s. But what problems was the city government dealing with? This 
section provides insight into the problems of organised crime in Amsterdam. 
First, the problems in the early 1990s are described. Second, the problems that 
directly resulted in Amsterdam’s administrative approach are outlined.  
 
4.1.1 The problem of organised crime up until the early 1990s 
 
The Amsterdam police department has had a great influence on the organised 
crime-fighting policy of the Netherlands. This is because organised crime in this 
city was more developed than in the rest of the country. The Amsterdam police 
department indicated as early as the 1970s that organised crime in the 
Netherlands was changing (Fijnaut and Bovenkerk, 1996, 32). In the following 
decennia two important developments unfolded. The first change involved the 
enormous increase of foreign criminal organisations. Especially in Amsterdam 
the police had to deal with organised crime groups of different nationalities, 
mostly Italian, Chinese, Yugoslavian and Turkish. These organisations were 
involved in trade in illegal goods and services. Mainly this implied drugs 
trafficking, but weapons and women were also the subject of illegal trade. Based 
on its observations, experiences and investigations the police concluded that the 
problem of organised crime was no longer limited to Dutch criminal 
organisations, but that Amsterdam had become an important intersection of 
international trade in illegal goods and services in which many nationalities 
participated. Later, empirical research confirmed the importance of the 
Netherlands and in particular Amsterdam as an international marketplace where 
supply and demand of illegal goods and services could easily meet (Kleemans et 
al., 2002: 46; Huisman et al., 2004).  
At the same time the Amsterdam police department observed a change in 
the criminal activities of Dutch groups. Whereas their activities had at first 
                                                        
255  This public information book was translated into English, see Fijnaut et al., 2002.  
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concentrated mainly on the trafficking of hashish, later these activities were 
expanded to hard drugs, cocaine and heroine. For the drugs trade and other 
trafficking activities, large networks with a lot of foreign contacts were created. 
According to the police these Dutch organisations characterised themselves by 
corrupting and intimidating police officers and customs officers and by investing 
criminal proceeds in legal dealings. They not only profited and lived an 
expansive life style, they also invested in property and legal persons, which 
facilitated other illegal activities such as illegal gambling and prostitution. In 
particular the latter took place in the red-light district of Amsterdam. The 
Amsterdam police considered these investments worrisome, as they seemed to 
indicate a shift of Dutch organised crime towards the Italian and US models. In 
other words the Amsterdam police warned of mafia-structured organisations 
trying to penetrate the legitimate environment. 
The Amsterdam police argued the importance of staying informed of 
different organised crime groups. However, there were in this period no 
empirical studies to confirm this insight. Only in the late 1980s did organised 
crime become a subject of criminological research in the Netherlands. The 
earliest discussions on organised crime had already made clear that the problem 
could exist in many forms. This idea was confirmed during the Dutch-American 
Conference on Organised Crime in 1990, as the US speakers emphasised that 
not all criminal organisations had typical mafia structures (Goldstock, 1991: 11-
12). At the conference it even became clear that the criminal organisations in the 
Netherlands differed from the ones in the United States. For example, in the 
Netherlands there was no evidence of systematic corruption, blackmail or 
intimidation and there was no question of organised crime having strong hold 
over certain sectors of the economy (Fijnaut, 1991: 21). Notwithstanding the 
conclusion that there were no mafia-structured organisations in Amsterdam, the 
city government wanted to reckon with possible future changes.  
The intention to undertake action against organised crime was probably 
strengthened by the fact that in the early 1990s various famous criminals were 
shot dead in public. In particular the murder of crime boss Bruinsma and the 
extensive reports in the Amsterdam newspaper Het Parool alarmed the city 
government of possible mafia-like activities. Subsequently, inspired by the 
experiences and success of the New York Organised Crime Task Force (OCTF), 
presented at the Dutch-American conference, the city government urged 
introduction of screening and auditing procedures to supplement law-
enforcement interventions.256 With this new approach the city government 
wanted to seek out the possibilities for using the civil service apparatus in the 
fight against organised crime; the public administration had to be equipped to 
bar criminal influences. In addition, the city government emphasised the need 
for integrity in the public administration. For this, the Amsterdam human 
resources department organised a seminar titled Corrupt or Correct to prepare 
new policy on this matter.  
                                                        
256  See Chapter 1 for more details on this Dutch-American Conference on Organised Crime.  
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With the introduction of these two approaches the Amsterdam city government 
was the first to carry out the 1992 national policy plan on organised crime, 
Organised Crime in the Netherlands: Threats and Plan of Action.257 This policy 
document emphasised the role of the public administration in containing 
organised crime. An honest, open, independent and checkable administration 
was seen as necessary to hinder organised crime as well. From then on integrity 
of the public administration was placed high on the political agenda, at a 
national as well as a local level.258 A defensive approach was to help the public 
administration resist efforts by organised crime to take advantage of 
irregularities. In addition the offensive approach was to provide public 
administrators with the tools to refuse permits to criminal organisations. In the 
first half of the 1990s developments towards this approach were started in 
Amsterdam. However, the real breakthrough of the new strategy several years 
later resulted from the parliamentary inquiry into criminal investigation 
methods.  
 
4.1.2 Insight into the organised crime problem in 1996 
 
Notwithstanding the developments described above, it took until 1996 for the 
Amsterdam city government to really become aware of the problems and threats 
deriving from organised crime. In this year the Fijnaut research team presented 
the results of its extensive criminological study on organised crime, performed 
under the authority of the parliamentary inquiry into criminal investigation 
methods.259 Although the study looked at organised crime in the whole of the 
Netherlands, a part of the report focused especially on the situation in 
Amsterdam (Fijnaut and Bovenkerk, 1996). The findings of this section alerted 
the Amsterdam city government. This was remarkable, since the research team 
did not present any new empirical evidence, but only confirmed the insights of 
the Amsterdam police department. In fact its research was based on data 
available from the police department. The research team described that the 
capital was indeed an intersection of international trade of illegal goods and 
services where criminal organisations of different nationalities and ethnical 
origins were involved (Fijnaut and Bovenkerk, 1996: 32). The researchers were 
able to overcome the compartmentalisation of the Dutch police and combine the 
information on organised crime from different services. The fact that an external 
team was able to present a more complete insight into the problem of organised 
crime than the police department indicated the severe lack of communication at 
the time between the different police offices. Furthermore, the researchers were 
able to overcome the distance between police and administrative authorities.  
The combination of sources enabled the research team to present some 
additional insights into the specific problems of organised crime that the 
                                                        
257  See Chapter 1 for more details on national developments in fighting crime. 
258  The Association of Netherlands Municipalities was put into action to increase awareness of the 
municipalities; Integriteit in de openbare sector. Kamerstukken II 1993-1994, 23 400, no. 11.  
259  The causes and results of this parliamentary inquiry are described in Chapter 1.  
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Amsterdam city government was facing. The key problem the research team 
observed was the possible intertwining of legitimate and illicit worlds and the 
role of legal economic sectors in willingly or unwillingly facilitating criminal 
activities (Bruinsma and Bovenkerk, 1996). This part of the study was 
important, as it was not based on police data, but on information from economic 
actors themselves. As described in Chapters 1 and 3, there is in general no 
racketeering in the Netherlands; criminal organisations do not hold positions of 
power in legal economic sectors. Whereas in New York mafia-structured 
organisations invested in legal sectors, in the Netherlands such investments did 
not seem to be taking place. The criminal organisations in Amsterdam were 
mainly focused on trade in illegal goods and services by which they hardly 
disrupted legal sectors. However, if these organisations were not investing their 
criminal profits in legitimate sectors, where did these monies go?  
According to the Fijnaut research team, one of the alarming aspects of 
organised crime was the lack of insight into its money flows. However, 
regarding the situation in Amsterdam the researchers referred to studies done by 
the local police on ownership of hotel and catering establishments. The team 
confirmed the idea that organised crime was investing in the hotel and catering 
sector, in the gambling industry and in real estate, at least in the red-light district 
of Amsterdam (Fijnaut and Bovenkerk, 1996: 151).260 Based on a study by the 
Hotel and Catering Intervention Team of the Amsterdam police department it 
was known that criminal organisations had control of 20% of the hotel and 
catering establishments in Amsterdam (Enquêtecommissie opsporingsmethoden, 
1996: 62). The Fijnaut research team concluded that these investments were 
mainly based on their functional use,261 which implies the aim of facilitating 
illegal activities. For example, criminal organisations invested in bars, 
restaurants and hotels for the distribution of illegal goods and services. 
Moreover, these establishments could serve as a safe meeting place for criminals 
and these establishments were suitable for money laundering processes. 
However, in some cases the research team observed investments that went 
beyond this functional use. In particular in the red-light district in Amsterdam a 
substantial part of the premises were in the hands of criminals who were 
building positions of power (Fijnaut and Bovenkerk, 1996: 151). In fact, 
together these (former) criminals had such power in the area that they controlled 
important parts of economic life there.  
Obviously, such power marks the boundaries of interventions by the public 
administration and law-enforcement authorities. For this part of the city the 
research team concluded that the functional use of investments had already been 
changing into a kind of racketeering (Fijnaut and Bovenkerk, 1996: 118). Still, 
the situation could not be compared with that in New York. In the red-light 
                                                        
260  Regarding these investments, the Fijnaut research team observed culpable involvement of notaries and 
lawyers (Van de Bunt, 1996: 49; Fijnaut et al., 1998: 161). As described in Chapter 2 such 
involvement could consist of advising on purchases of premises with which possibly criminal 
proceeds are laundered. 
261  These activities are ascribed to Dutch criminal organisations: they know all procedures and they want 
to invest in their own environment, just like foreign organisations invest in their country of origin. 
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district in Amsterdam the positions of power were limited to economic dealings; 
criminal organisations had no political or administrative influence as in New 
York. In other words corruption was not structural (Fijnaut and Bovenkerk, 
1996: 126). Nevertheless, the research team concluded that the city government 
had lost part of its scope for policy-making (Fijnaut and Bovenkerk, 1996: 153). 
Based on these conclusions the parliamentary inquiry stressed the need for the 
city government to react in order to bar criminal influences from the policy-
making process (Enquêtecommissie opsporingsmethoden, 1996: 425).  
A second important problem observed by the Fijnaut research team was the 
connection between organised crime on the one hand and common crime and 
degeneration in deprived urban areas on the other. The team concluded that the 
presence of organised crime could have a negative impact on the environment, 
as it affects the social security and the liveability of neighbourhoods (Fijnaut and 
Bovenkerk, 1996: 104, 126). This was especially the case in the Amsterdam red-
light district. The presence of organised crime had been causing degeneration 
and common crime: e.g. wandering drug addicts, presence in the neighbourhood 
of drug dealers’ premises and the prostitution of heroine addicts. By connecting 
organised crime to common crime and degeneration, the researchers distanced 
themselves from the national-level crime control policy, in which policies 
towards common crime and organised crime are traditionally separated. In doing 
so, it opened the door to integrated policies towards crime as such.  
 
4.1.3 Problem analysis of the Amsterdam city government 
 
The criminological study of the Fijnaut research team furnished a relatively 
clear insight into the nature of organised crime in Amsterdam. In general the 
research team concluded that organised crime was mainly a problem of trading 
illegal goods and services. However, some signs of incidental racketeering were 
observed. These insights revealed Amsterdam as a special case regarding 
organised crime. The geographical location and the diverse population provide a 
suitable infrastructure for illegal trade in goods and services (Enquêtecommissie 
opsporingsmethoden, 1996: 61). Although the Amsterdam city government was 
already aware of a number of problems concerning organised crime – the police 
had already indicated most problems – the conclusions of the Fijnaut team came 
as a severe confrontation and impacted hard on the city government (Fijnaut, 
2002: 25). In particular the worrisome development of criminal organisations 
penetrating the legitimate environment urged action. Consequently, the 
Amsterdam city government took the recommendations of the parliamentary 
inquiry (Enquêtecommissie opsporingsmethoden 1996: 470) as an impetus to 
further install the administrative approach. 
 The city administration duly examined the conclusions of the report related 
to Amsterdam. Remarkably, this examination was not limited to the sectors or 
areas where problems were observed, but included no less than 25 sectors and 
areas that could be affected by criminal organisations. Furthermore, the city 
government established a working group on the administrative approach to 
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organised crime in Amsterdam (Bestuurlijke Aanpak (Georganiseerde) 
Criminaliteit in Amsterdam) to conduct an analysis of risks and causes. In 
practice the working group is referred to as the Van Traa working group, after 
the chairperson of the parliamentary inquiry that emphasised the need to develop 
the administrative approach. Considering the awareness of the problems and the 
later successful implementation of administrative measures, it was decided not 
to outsource this new analysis. Instead, the Van Traa working group consisted of 
civil servants complemented by police officials as well as representatives of the 
public prosecution services. As a result, a lot of people from various authorities 
were involved in the analysis. Furthermore, the Van Traa group drew in the 
opinions of experts by interviewing lawyers, notaries, real estate agents, 
contractors and university researchers, as well as by discussing the findings of 
the analysis in various expert meetings (Jansen Schoonhoven, 2002: 44, 46).  
This working group and all persons involved started with an analysis of 
risks and causes to determine the exact crime problems the city had to deal with. 
Following the Fijnaut research team, the Van Traa working group firstly 
concentrated on the interaction between organised crime and the legitimate 
environment in general.262 First, the group connected this interaction to some 
general developments at the international and national level that had resulted in 
the welfare state the Netherlands now enjoys. The findings of the Fijnaut team 
on the alarming role of immigrants (Bovenkerk en Fijnaut, 1996: 208) urged the 
working group to pay special attention to groups of immigrants, legal residents 
as well as the illegal residents, who often face difficult social circumstances. In 
regard to this kind of problem in Amsterdam, the working group argued that 
ineffective care of immigrants and prejudiced police authorities had led 
immigrants to have fewer chances in the legitimate environment, prompting 
them to choose alternative careers in informal scenes. These informal scenes, 
often based on ethnicity, were a perfect place for criminal organisations to 
recruit workers. Moreover, criminal organisations helped immigrants to come to 
the Netherlands with fictitious marriages and human trafficking.  
Second, the Van Traa working group analysed the way criminal 
organisations were trying to penetrate the legitimate environment. The group 
found that criminal organisations influence legitimate markets by distorting 
competition, buying market access through front men and drawing on the use or 
threat of violence (Fijnaut, 2002: 45). The intermingling of illegal and legitimate 
activities arises from opportunities in the legitimate markets to launder criminal 
proceeds. Moreover, revenues from dealings in legitimate markets could be 
applied to new criminal activities. In this case, money from organised crime 
would be invested in legal markets and backwards.  
                                                        
262  The analysis of risks and causes is written in one of the reports of the working group Van Traa; 
Werkgroep ‘Bestuurlijke Aanpak (georganiseerde) criminaliteit in Amsterdam’ (s.d.), De bestuurlijke 
aanpak van de (georganiseerde) criminaliteit in Amsterdam; De ontwikkeling van een effectief 
instrument, Probleem- en oorzakenanalyse en Verslagen van expertmeeting, Amsterdam: Sander 
Pinkse Boekproductie.  
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In studying the interaction between criminal organisations and the legitimate 
environment, the Van Traa group was particularly interested in the role of the 
public administration. To what extent was the public administration facilitating 
criminal organisations? It was already clear that by setting rules, granting 
permits and subsidies, and by auditing and enforcing compliance various 
authorities played an important role in the marketplace (Fijnaut, 2002: 45). The 
analysis of risks and causes showed that the public administration was less than 
efficient in using its powers. First, the analysis uncovered problems in enforcing 
compliance with rules. Inaccurate handling of municipal services and inefficient 
rules caused vagueness and contradictions, which were exploited by criminal 
organisations. Furthermore, the working group ascertained shortcomings in the 
organisation of the public administration, which could damage its integrity. 
Failing internal procedures, tolerance of undesirable behaviour and the lack of 
clear standards could facilitate organised crime. This was particularly important 
as organised crime could try to influence the decisions of the public 
administration by means of intimidation and infiltration (Fijnaut, 2002: 45). 
Finally, the public administration had no information on organised crime at its 
disposal. Such information is registered in police databases. Privacy provisions 
bar municipal services from accessing this information, meaning they have no 
insight into the possible criminal involvement of those who apply for permits, 
grants or public contracts.  
 
4.2 Programme theory of the administrative approach of Amsterdam 
 
In order to answer the first research question, this section analyses the 
programme theory by which the assumptions and objectives of the Dutch 
legislator are outlined. In accordance with the methods described in Chapter 1, 
this section first elaborates on the assumptions of the Amsterdam city 
government in developing the administrative approach. Second, the objectives 
and strategies of the administrative approach are revealed. The assumptions and 
objectives of these specific projects are first uncovered in order to establish a 
framework for the impact assessment, which is described in the final sections of 
the chapter. The programme theory is based on official documents regarding 
Amsterdam’s administrative approach in general and specifically the two 
selected projects.  
 
4.2.1 Assumptions 
 
Causal assumptions. Causal assumptions reveal the rationale of the intervention. 
They present the reasoning of the policy-maker on the problems it is confronted 
with and the ways these problems are set to be handled. In this case this involves 
the reasoning of the Amsterdam city government. The Amsterdam city 
government focused first and foremost on the role of the civil service apparatus 
on the interaction between organised crime and the legitimate environment.  
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The Van Traa working group observed that criminal organisations had acquired 
positions of power in the red-light district. As a result of these positions of 
power the city government was partly deprived of their policy-making tasks 
related to public order and decency (Fijnaut, 2002: 24). The threat implied by 
this loss of policy-making power is that this neighbourhood would become 
breeding grounds for further criminal activities and that criminal organisations 
could further extend their powers.  
 To address these problems the city government wanted to restore order in 
the area and regain the policy-making power of the city. For this many things 
had to change. At the official presentation of the administrative approach the 
city announced the steps that had to be taken (Köbben, 2002: 73):  
 
‘Efforts must be […] continually focused on an honest, well informed authority that 
implements policy also with a view to combating crime, that consistently maintains 
policy and acts with due care in the marketplace.’ 
 
This quotation includes two important elements – being honest and being well-
informed – as basic conditions for combating crime. First, the city government 
indicates that city councils and municipal services should know what happens in 
the urban areas. In particular authorities must be aware of what happens behind 
the facade of premises. For this they should be able to bring municipal data 
sources to the task. Moreover, the city government argued that if necessary 
information should be shared with parties such as the police, judiciary and tax 
authorities.263 The combination of these data sources should provide the 
authorities with reliable insight into the situation and uncover irregularities. The 
need for authorities to be well-informed is based on the assumption that a weak 
government, that is, a government unaware of possible irregularities, facilitates 
crime. Stated differently, the government assumes that a strong, well-informed 
public administration would hinder crime.  
 In addition, the city government argues that an honest organisation is a 
basic condition in the administrative approach to fight organised crime. The 
objective to raise integrity is based on the assumption that intrusions on integrity 
could facilitate organised crime. The reverse of this reasoning involves the 
assumption that the public administration must be reliable and upright in order 
to hinder organised crime. To establish such an organisation, the civil service 
apparatus must become aware of its vulnerable position regarding its actions in 
markets. Regarding that last, the city government spoke of the need for a 
transparent organisation. This means that the civil service apparatus must be 
constantly alert to possible internal as well as external infringements of integrity. 
Internal infringements imply integrity violations by civil servants within the 
apparatus; external infringements involve actions from persons outside the 
apparatus who want to abuse the apparatus for criminal activities. This two-
                                                        
263  The parliamentary inquiry pleads for the exchange of police data with the public administration in 
order to determine the actual threat to the legal system (Enquêtecommissie opsporingsmethoden 1996: 
285-288, 433, 470). 
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sided approach towards organised crime aligns with the defensive and the 
offensive approach on fighting organised crime, described in the policy 
document of 1992.264  
Thus, to prevent intrusions by criminal organisations, the public 
administration needed reliable information at its disposal and it must have 
integrity. This is not always obvious as the public administration has a wide 
range of tasks and interests which can cause contradictions in its dealings. For 
example, there could be tension between economic and political interests or 
between enforcing compliance and condoning certain activities (Burgemeester 
en wethouders, 1998: 1158). Therefore, the city government considered it 
necessary to prescribe six conditions to which all policy should apply 
(Burgemeester en wethouders, 1998: 1155). These conditions had to guarantee a 
transparent and alert civil service apparatus, which offers no chances for 
intrusion by criminal organisations.  
The first condition was obvious; integrity must be a integral element 
throughout the civil service apparatus in general and the public administration in 
particular. In the administrative approach the concept of integrity encompasses 
transparency, independence and alertness. Integrity in a civil service apparatus 
prevents opportunities for corruption and intimidation by criminal organisations. 
Moreover, part of the important role of integrity was the idea that the 
Amsterdam civil service apparatus had to serve as an example to others. How 
could the public administration expect compliance if the organisation itself 
breaks its own rules? This became even more important in the 1990s when the 
media brought some major integrity scandals into the public limelight.  
 The second condition was obvious as well. The public administration had 
to act cautiously in the marketplace. For careful handling the public 
administration must be certain with whom it is dealing. The city government 
argued that it was of utmost importance for civil servants to be able to reveal the 
background of persons applying for public services such as permits, subsidies 
and contracts. This meant that rules on screening needed to be developed and 
that grounds for refusal or withdrawal of public services should be introduced.  
 The third condition focuses on the provision of information, as certain 
conditions had to be fulfilled to enable the administrative authorities to 
effectively combat organised crime. The civil service apparatus including the 
public administration could be alert only if it was aware of what was happening 
on the streets of Amsterdam. Therefore, information from the various local 
authorities as well as from law enforcement needed to be shared.  
The fourth condition is that all policy should focus on crime reduction. This 
means that all policy should be tested for contradictions and side effects of 
which organised crime could take advantage.  
Moreover, the city government determined a fifth condition, which 
involves the consistent implementation of all policies. Consistent policy 
implementation is a must for fighting organised crime, as not enforcing 
                                                        
264  De georganiseerde criminaliteit in Nederland; dreigingsbeeld en plan van aanpak. Kamerstukken II 
1992-1993, 22 838, no. 2. See Chapter 1 for the main aspects of this policy plan. 
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compliance could result in an undesirable breeding ground for criminal 
activities. Moreover, constantly enforcing compliance should have a 
discouraging effect on abusing public services.  
 The last condition is a little different from the previous ones, as it relates to 
the attention that the competent authorities should pay to the integration of 
ethnic communities given their predilection for involvement in crime. With this 
condition the city government clearly refers to the findings of the Fijnaut 
research team on the alarming role of immigrants in organised crime. For this 
the city government aimed to strengthen immigrants’ social and economic 
position by creating jobs and cutting the number of high school dropouts.  
With these six conditions the city government hoped to create an honest 
and transparent public apparatus that could serve as a barrier against intrusions 
by organised crime. According to the city government these conditions had to be 
fulfilled as a normal part of administrative activities (Burgemeester and 
wethouders, 1998: 1159). In other words these conditions had to be 
implemented throughout the civil service apparatus. This is important as the city 
administration could take the lead, but the actual performance of most 
administrative tasks is left to the civil servants in the different departments. 
Implementation of these six conditions would involve a change in mentality in 
the whole of the civil service apparatus. With this reasoning the city government 
had a clear effect in mind: the reduction of crime and organised crime. Because 
this study focuses on organised crime, the rest of this chapter is limited to this 
aspect.  
 
Normative assumptions. Based on the analysis of risks and causes the city 
government argued that the interaction between organised crime and the 
legitimate environment had to be broken. The important role of the public 
administration in this interaction illustrates that the public administration could 
not ignore its role in combating this kind of crime (Fijnaut, 2002: 45). Therefore, 
the city government argues that the public administration should not facilitate 
organised crime. Similar to the measures discussed in the two previous chapters, 
involvement in organised crime is assumed to have a negative impact on the 
integrity of reliable and lawful units of the public administration. From this 
perspective, the Amsterdam city government argues that public administration 
should take responsibility for its own vulnerability (Jansen Schoonhoven, 2002: 
42). In fact, this responsibility is not limited to certain areas or sectors but 
applies to the whole civil apparatus. Consequently, the new administrative 
approach had to be a city-wide approach that included all municipal services and 
made no distinction with regard to geographic area. Accordingly, the Van Traa 
working group started development of this new strategy.265 In close cooperation 
with the city government and with external partners such as the police and the 
public prosecutor’s office an action plan was developed, The Administrative 
Approach to (Organised) Crime in Amsterdam (Burgemeester en wethouders, 
                                                        
265  The development of an administrative approach is not new as first initiatives were taken as early as the 
beginning of the 1990s under the influence of successes in New York (see section 4.1). 
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1998). They presented this action plan to the city council, which accepted the 
text on 8 April 1998. Based on the relation observed between organised crime 
and common crime, the Amsterdam city government decided that its 
administrative approach should focus on all kinds of crime. This is why the 
word organised is placed in parentheses in the action plan’s title. Thus, 
Amsterdam’s administrative approach is not specifically focused on organised 
crime. In fact, the city indicated that the approach should have a broader reach, 
focusing on prevention and containment of crime in general, including common 
crime. Accordingly, the administrative approach had to be seen as additional to 
the already existing safety policy (Burgemeester en wethouders, 1998: 1150). 
 The city government also argued that the administrative approach was a 
necessary supplement to the repressive approach. The Van Traa working group 
agreed that a repressive approach was not enough (Burgemeester en wethouders, 
1998: 1153). Referring to the growth of organised crime in the last decennia, the 
city government concluded that law enforcement could have only a partial 
effect. This is because not all offences are reported to the authorities and only a 
small percentage of reported offences are solved, prosecuted and punished. As a 
result the general preventive effect of penal law is limited. In addition, the city 
government attached limited importance to special prevention, as in their 
opinion rehabilitation had little effect. Moreover, the shallowness of law 
enforcement was considered an important limitation; it could not fight the 
complex underlying causes of crime.  
 Consequently, the city government agreed to develop a new administrative 
approach, which would give the public administration excellent supervising 
instruments with which to handle these complex causes and the observed 
interaction.  
 
4.2.2 Objectives and strategies 
 
Based on its own analysis of risks and causes and based on the basic conditions 
formulated by the city government, the Van Traa group completed its action 
plan with concrete actions. In 1998 the plan encompassed 77 such concrete 
actions. Most of these can be grouped in three categories. Actions involving the 
internal organisation of the civil service apparatus are brought under the 
integrity approach. In the screening and auditing approach category are 
activities related to the vulnerable position of the public administration in the 
market. Actions regarding the specific problems of the red-light district were 
grouped under the Van Traa approach. The screening and auditing approach is 
left out of consideration in this chapter as it was discussed in Chapter 3. 
Consequently, this chapter on the administrative approach of Amsterdam 
concentrates on the two other elements.  
 
The integrity approach. Integrity problems became an issue in Amsterdam in 
1995 when the human resources department organised a seminar titled Corrupt 
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or Correct.266 The conclusions of the Van Traa working group gave new impetus 
to this issue with the introduction of a city-wide action plan Corrupt or Correct? 
The Integrity of the Administration and the Civil Services Apparatus of the City 
of Amsterdam. Obviously, this approach fit the central assumption that a weak 
government facilitates crime – and the reverse: an honest and transparent public 
organisation hinders organised crime. In this framework the integrity approach 
relates to the vulnerability and the defensibility of the public organisation. By 
increasing the defensibility and reducing the vulnerability to fraud and 
corruption inside the civil service apparatus as well as within the public 
administration the city government assumes that organised crime will have no 
chance to develop (Bureau Integriteit, 2000: 14; Bakker, 2002: 33). This is the 
main assumption that will be judged in light of criminological theories to 
determine the plausible outcomes of this approach.  
To detect vulnerable activities and situations, all municipal organisations 
had to be audited for risks of fraud, corruption and manipulation (Bakker, 2002: 
31). The integrity approach was established for these audits.267 It was explicitly 
written that this approach would not focus on uncovering fraudulent activities in 
order to investigate them. Rather, the approach was to give an impulse to 
discussions on integrity by pointing out vulnerable situations and activities. In 
practice, the integrity approach has two objectives. First, the approach should 
result in a consciousness-raising in which all services and individuals become 
aware of their vulnerability and their own responsibility. Second, the approach 
focuses on compliance with integrity rules. In the end an integrity bureau was 
established to handle these tasks. These two objectives form the framework by 
which we will judge the outputs of the integrity approach later. However, we 
first look into the process assessment of this approach. 
 
The Van Traa approach. The severe problems in the red-light district, in 
particular the findings of the Fijnaut research team that the city government had 
lost a part of its scope for policy-making in this area (Fijnaut and Bovenkerk, 
1996: 153), urged the city council to undertake immediate action. As the city-
wide approach would take to long time coming, the city began the Wallen 
project in September 1997. This project, named after the Dutch name of the 
Amsterdam red-light district, consisted mainly of a Wallen manager appointed 
by the city government to restore order in the red-light district. Later, together 
with a couple of employees this manager formed the Wallen team. The team was 
active from 1997 to 2000. In this period there was a strong interaction between 
the Wallen team and the team charged with developing the city-wide approach. 
From 2000 the working space of the team was enlarged from the red-light 
district to the whole city. From then on the name was changed to the Van Traa 
team and the project named the Van Traa project. Under responsibility of the 
Inner City Service the Van Traa team and the Van Traa project was further 
                                                        
266  See section 4.1.  
267  By changing the word order – putting correct before corrupt – this project seems to indicate a more 
positive attitude.  
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implemented. Thus, the Wallen project involved only the red-light district and 
the Van Traa project involves a city-wide effort. This study refers to the 
development and implementation of both projects as the Van Traa approach.  
 Because the severe problems in the red-light district urged the city 
government to take immediate action, the Wallen manager had to develop a new 
approach. Nonetheless, the main starting point was obvious; the whole civil 
service apparatus had to take on responsibility in fighting crime. This starting 
point is based on the assumed interaction between organised crime and the 
legitimate environment and the role of a negligent civil service apparatus in 
unknowingly facilitating crime. Because the Fijnaut research team explained 
that the lack of administrative decisiveness had resulted in a breeding ground for 
illegal activities the Wallen manager firstly wanted to restore the city 
government’s administrative powers in this area and ensure that there was no 
question of who owns the red-light district (Wallenproject, 1997: 3). As such, 
the Wallen manager responded to the finding of the Fijnaut research team that 
the loss of control in the red-light district had created fertile breeding grounds 
for illegal and criminal activities (Fijnaut and Bovenkerk, 1996: 123). This 
finding resulted in the key philosophy that the Van Traa approach had to address 
breeding grounds for crime and organised crime.268  
According to the Wallen manager this implied that to fight organised crime 
all civil services had to be in order. Furthermore, the Wallen manager argued 
that the city government had to have clear insight into what goes on in the city, 
or in this case, in the red-light district. In addition, the city government should 
be able to combine forces and act together with other agencies. In short, this 
reasoning is based on the assumption that with increased supervision of certain 
economic dealings organised crime would have less chance to abuse or benefit 
from these dealings.  
 The rush of the city government to fight the problems in the red-light 
district resulted in the Van Traa approach having to develop its own instruments. 
Subsequently, developing and executing instruments for the administrative 
approach became the main objective of the Van Traa project. The Wallen 
manager described his task as follows: ‘to cluster administrative instruments to 
enhance the combating of greater criminal penetration of the Wallen district’ 
(Wallenproject, 1997: 3). Moreover, after two years, the instruments developed 
had to be integrated into the regular organisation of the civil service apparatus 
(Fijnaut 2002: 25). In this way the existence of the Van Traa approach would 
become superfluous in several years. Therefore, the integration of the Van Traa 
approach into the existing apparatus can be seen as the third objective. These 
assumptions and objectives provide the framework for our later evaluation of the 
                                                        
268  At the European level, which traditionally has little interest in local problems, such analyses created 
awareness of the connection between organised crime and social economic problems. In the 1997 
action plan to combat organised crime the European Council explicitly recommended structural funds 
to assist the labour market and urban programmes to prevent large cities in the Union from becoming 
breeding grounds for organised crime (recommendation 9). 
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outcomes of the Van Traa approach. However, before going into the outcomes 
the process of the Van Traa approach is evaluated (section 4.5). 
 
4.3 Evaluation of the process of the integrity approach 
 
In the previous section we saw the focus of Amsterdam’s administrative 
approach is on the performance of the civil service apparatus. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that an integrity approach was established as part of the framework. 
But what does this approach entail and how are the activities resulting from the 
approach implemented? These questions can be answered through an evaluation 
of the intervention’s process.  
In accordance with the methods described in Chapter 1, this part of the 
evaluation involves two elements. The first is a description of the content of the 
approach along with the approach’s main activities. Second is the evaluation of 
the implementation of these activities. It also looks at a mid-term review that 
reveals the main implementation bottlenecks. This is important as it introduces 
the possible difficulties that can influence the outputs of the measure, which are 
more fully described later. The evaluation of the implementation is limited to the 
elements that are important for the overall subject of this study: the prevention 
of organised crime. The administrative approach is more extensive, however, as 
it focuses on common crime as well as organised crime. The main sources for 
this part of the evaluation are the documents from the programme itself, such as 
its annual reports and the study of the integrity violations carried out by Nelen 
(2003a).  
 
4.3.1 Content 
 
The content of the integrity approach is illustrated by the main activities carried 
out in its framework. The first activities are executed as part of the project 
Correct or Corrupt?, established by the city government in 1997. These 
activities include registering fraud and corruption, auditing all municipal 
services and developing a centre of expertise. In addition, the Amsterdam city 
government itself was a main actor. Its two most important activities were 
developing a code of conduct and establishing internal rules on whistle-blowing. 
 
4.3.1.1 Registering violations regarding fraud and corruption 
 
Amsterdam’s decentralised structure means that all local authorities and 
neighbourhood councils deal with their own integrity problems. This means the 
city had little insight into the overall extent and nature of the integrity problem. 
Therefore, the municipal government set up the Central Register for Fraud and 
Corruption to gain insight into the problems that municipal services were 
dealing with, in particular problems of fraud and corruption. Installation of the 
Central Register was deemed so important that it was established in 1997, even 
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before the city-wide approach was adopted. This bureau registered and analysed 
all concrete incidents of fraud and corruption of civil servants and delegates of 
the City of Amsterdam. Incidents were registered only if they were reported to 
the police or if administrative measures had been taken against the persons 
involved (Burgemeester en wethouders, 1997: 490).  
The Central Register was to become a centre of expertise, advising and 
supporting civil services. For this, however, it had to widen its focus, to look at 
not only concrete incidents, but also suspicions of fraud and corruption so as to 
uncover risky procedures or rules that could provoke fraud and corruption. 
Notwithstanding all the information at the Central Register’s disposal, the city 
administration stressed the fact that the agency could not itself conduct 
investigations on fraud and corruption. Dealing with concrete violations would 
remain under the competence of the managing director of the municipal service 
in question (Burgemeester and wethouders, 1997: 492).  
 
4.3.1.2 Auditing all municipal services 
 
The second activity of the project Correct or Corrupt? involved the auditing of 
all municipal services for vulnerable situations in which integrity violations 
could easily occur. These audits focused on abuse of official knowledge or 
competences in order to gain improper advantages or passing on improper 
advantages to outsiders (Bureau Integriteit, 2000: 14). In practice it looked into 
risks of fraud and corruption. In addition to inventorying vulnerable actions of 
municipal services, the project aimed to increase the awareness and defensibility 
of the civil service apparatus as a whole (Bureau Integriteit, 2000: 14). To raise 
awareness of integrity issues the municipal services were charged to audit 
themselves. Therefore, the audits were performed through a self-investigation 
process in which employees of all different levels were involved. All 54 
municipal services – neighbourhood councils and local authorities – produced 
self-reports on the vulnerabilities of their organisation with recommendations 
for future developments.269 These 54 reports were brought together in one city-
wide report, to which supplementary provisions were added for improving 
defences against erosions of integrity.270 This overall report showed that 
violations of integrity generally resulted from the organisational structure or 
organisational culture.271  
 Most recommendations related to the organisational structure (Bureau 
Integriteit, 2000: 32). This is not surprising, as a transparent administrative 
                                                        
269  At the moment Amsterdam is divided into 15 neighbourhood councils which operate rather 
autonomously, and there are 37 local authorities managed at the municipality level. This means 
together 52 bodies participate in the integrity policy. For more information on the organisation of the 
city of Amsterdam see its website www.amsterdam.nl. 
270  Based on the reports of all different services a final report at the city level was presented (Bureau 
Integriteit, 2000).  
271  The organisational structure is taken to mean the entirety of formal rules and provisions for the benefit 
of honest functioning of the organisation. The organisational culture encloses the social interplay 
between employees and organisations (Bureau Integriteit, 2000: 15 and Bakker, 2002: 33).  
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organisation is seen as the basic condition for improving integrity (Bakker, 
2002: 31). According to various municipal services, oversight and transparency 
of working processes had to be improved and these processes formalised in 
writing (Bureau Integriteit, 2000: 21). They argued that clear regulations, tasks 
and competences were needed that are known to all employees, as vagueness 
and ignorance might lead to undesirable interpretation of regulations. 
Furthermore, for vulnerable areas, the municipal services recommended making 
organisational changes, such as separating certain work processes. The second 
category of recommendations involves the need to enforce compliance with 
these clear regulations, tasks and competences. The report points out that 
organisations have to supervise correct behaviour of employees, and that 
organisations must respond to violations (Bureau Integriteit, 2000: 31). 
 The renewal of the organisational structure was viewed as essential for 
improving integrity. However, the audit also showed that organisational changes 
alone were not sufficient. The integrity of an organisation depends on individual 
actions as well. Employees, administrators and civil servants were considered 
each to have a responsibility to act in conformance with the rules. Moreover, 
they were considered to have a collective responsibility for all that happens 
inside the organisation. This behaviour is dictated in part by the organisational 
culture, which is much harder to influence. There were therefore fewer 
recommendations in this area. Most attention was given to internal 
communication (Bureau Integriteit, 2000: 32). To safeguard integrity it should 
be possible to discuss behaviour on a horizontal and vertical level without regard 
to the particular persons involved. This cultural change was to be made possible 
by introducing integrity as a normal issue in the working environment; e.g. in 
the daily discussions of progress, in hiring new employees and during 
performance appraisal interviews. According to the final report of the Correct or 
Corrupt? project, a shift in attitude would result in which civil servants were 
constantly aware of vulnerable situations and of the consequences of their 
actions (Bureau Integriteit, 2000: 21).  
 
4.3.1.3 Developing a centre of expertise 
 
With all its attention on integrity, the city government wanted to increase the 
defensibility of the civil service apparatus. The project Correct or Corrupt? had 
to provide measures for reacting when ‘individual personnel deliberately or 
accidentally act without due care’ and it was explicitly formulated that the 
project was ‘not started up to check on possible fraud’ (Jansen Schoonhoven, 
2002: 33). In other words, the project was initiated to deal with risky situations, 
but not to investigate integrity violations as such. Regarding the Central Register 
for Fraud and Corruption, the city administration paid special attention to this 
restriction.  
The findings of the auditing report resulted in a wide range of new 
activities. First, the Amsterdam government decided to install an integrity 
bureau to ensure the continuation of the integrity approach. In 2001 this bureau 
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was established in the Amsterdam Public Administration Department, which 
supports the central public administration. In practice the integrity bureau 
became the city-wide centre of expertise, which took over all auditing activities 
and incorporated the Central Register. Second, the integrity audit started a whole 
new discussion on integrity that eventually resulted in formulation of a code of 
conduct and internal rules on whistle-blowing.  
 
4.3.1.4 Developing a code of conduct 
 
The first audits that came out of the integrity approach related integrity to 
vulnerable actions for which there was a risk of fraud and corruption. After all, 
these were the actions that could be utilised for intrusions by organised crime. 
However, after these firsts audit thinking about integrity became wider and came 
to include more and different behaviours. As a result, the concept of integrity 
changed. The developments to improve the transparency of the civil service 
apparatus and to change the attitude of civil servants urged the city government 
to clearly demarcate the guiding standards and values for civil servants and 
administrators. As described above, it became necessary to embed clear 
regulations, tasks and competences. To this end, the city drew up a mandatory 
municipal code of conduct indicating activities and behaviours which are 
permissible and those not or no longer acceptable (Burgemeester en wethouders, 
2001: 1-22).  
The code of conduct came into force in 2001. It is comprised of two 
conduct codes, one for the city executives and another for civil servants. The 
special attention given to the behaviour of city executives follows the idea that 
public servants must set a good example for the rest of society. With respect to 
the content, both codes discuss more or less the same issues: e.g. how to deal 
with invitations, how to handle gifts, how to arrange working in additional jobs 
and how to manage confidential information. For example this code dictates 
how to deal with smaller gifts such as a bottle of wine and larger gifts like 
dinners and trips. Because the city government considered it impossible to 
demarcate all actions and behaviours, the code introduces some basic values as a 
central point of reference (Burgemeester and wethouders, 2001). These basic 
values – activeness, openness and integrity – serve as criteria for the desirability 
and legitimacy of civil servants’ activities and they offer third parties criteria 
with which to evaluate civil servants’ behaviour.  
In contrast to the concrete regulations, tasks and competences described in 
the code, the basic values are rather vague, and they actually do not provide 
more than general guidance. According to the city government this is no 
shortcoming; in accordance with the recommendation from the overall report of 
the Correct or Corrupt? project, this would stimulate discussion on integrity in 
the municipal services. Good internal communication existing in consultation 
with executives and other employees should result in agreements on what 
integrity is as well as increasing awareness of what is acceptable and what not 
(Bureau Integriteit, s.d.: 6).  
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With the code of conduct coming into force the idea of the public administration 
being an organisation of integrity was no longer only related to fighting 
organised crime. Similarly, vulnerable actions were no longer limited to 
incidents of fraud and corruption. Instead, the city government had enlarged the 
concept of integrity in 2002 by adopting a directive on integrity violations. From 
then on, all integrity violations fitting the following criteria had to be 
reported:272 
 
‘-  conflict of interests;  
- theft and embezzlement; 
- fraud and corruption; 
- manipulation of abuse of information or of the access to information; 
- abuse of competences; 
- incompatible functions and activities;  
- waste and abuse of municipal property; 
- use of violence, threat and intimidation;  
- (criminal) offences committed in non-working hours, at least as these offences are 
connected to the functioning of the civil servant involved and as the offences are of 
extremely serious nature.’  
 
The enlargement of the concept of integrity did not contribute to the clarity of 
the problems to be handled. In fact, the behaviour connected to integrity 
problems became increasingly vague. Whereas fraud and corruption must fit the 
definition for criminal penalisation, which is clear, other violations can hardly 
be defined. For example, how is a conflict of interests defined? Economic and 
political differences can easily lead to a conflict of interests; but in what cases 
can one speak of an integrity problem, let alone an integrity violation? 
Consequently, the integrity approach seems to have experienced a net-widening 
of behaviours; it no longer focuses on the interaction with organised crime, but 
aims at the functioning of individual civil servants. This new focus certainly 
raises questions on the relation between this wide range of violations and 
possible intrusions committed by organised crime. This question is addressed 
later in the discussion of the results and effects of the integrity approach.  
 
4.3.1.5 Developing internal rules on whistle-blowing 
 
The code of conduct indicates which activities and behaviour are permissible 
and which are no longer acceptable. However, as important as formulating clear 
rules is, enforcing compliance with these rules is considered even more 
important (Burgemeester en wethouders, 2001: 22). The Dutch Criminal Code 
(article 162) obliges civil servants to report certain offences to the police, 
especially serious offences committed by a civil servant. However, to encourage 
actual reporting of serious integrity violations in sensitive cases the city 
government introduced the directive referred to earlier on suspicions of integrity 
                                                        
272  See the last version of the directive involving the supply of information regarding integrity violations 
adopted by the mayor and aldermen on 30 September 2003. 
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violations (24 September 2002). This directive includes rules on whistle-
blowing.  
First of all this directive commits every civil servant to expose suspicions 
of abuses involving their own organisation or council (directive involving 
suspicions of integrity violations, article 2). According to article 1 of this 
directive, suspicion of integrity violations is understood to mean: 
 
‘- reasonable grounds for suspecting abuses of enough importance, regarding: 
an offence; 
-  a serious violation of rules; 
-  the deception of judicial authorities; 
-  a major danger to public health, security or environment, or 
-  the deliberate withholding of information on these facts.’ 
 
Before going into the content of this directive, it should be remarked that over 
time the city administration has let go of the idea that reporting should only 
include concrete incidents. Whereas the Central Register for Fraud and 
Corruption at first was to report definite incidents, this directive obliges the 
report of suspicions of integrity violations as well. Reporting suspicious 
incidents has subsequently been simplified. Whereas before, a police record or 
threat of administrative discipline could be a barrier to reporting a suspicion, 
now all suspicions of integrity violations can and must be reported immediately.  
The directive on suspicions of integrity violations says that violations and 
suspicions of violations must be reported. In general, the directive is based on 
internal reporting and internal settlement. This means that in the first instance 
the report of violations is dealt with within the organisation. As such, the 
handling of cases would contribute to raise awareness of risks and violations. 
Therefore, reports of suspicions of abuses should be addressed to the civil 
servant’s executive. When the civil servant feels unwilling to turn to the 
executive (or their direct supervisor), it should be possible to turn to a confidant. 
A last option is reporting to the Integrity Bureau. Reporting to this bureau is 
mandatory if the violation concerns the executive of the civil servant. 
Furthermore, reporting to the bureau is possible if there are good reasons to 
believe that there will be no response within the organisation. Subsequently, 
investigations must be executed by the executives of the local authorities or the 
neighbourhood councils (article 4) or the Integrity Bureau (article 15). Finally, 
the executives of the city administration or the executives of the neighbourhood 
councils decide on the proper reaction, if necessary supported by an integrity 
committee.273 The final decision and response must be announced to the civil 
servant who reported the abuse or violation as well as to the Integrity Bureau. 
The latter registers the information and utilises it for other tasks.  
                                                        
273  The Integrity Committee is the highest organisation involved in the integrity policy. Chaired by the 
mayor, one aldermen and several executives of local authorities the committee guards the progress of 
the integrity policy (Bureau Integriteit, 2002: 8). Furthermore, the committee has an advising role in 
relation to the settlement of integrity violations and it is the organisation that civil servants turn to in 
case they disagree with the reasoning of their executives.  
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Internal reporting and internal settlement could also have its consequences. 
Notwithstanding the different options for reporting, the city government 
recognised the vulnerability of persons who stick out their necks. Therefore 
supplementary provisions – internal rules on whistle-blowing – were adopted. 
According to the directive on suspicions of integrity violations (article 10), all 
reports must be treated with confidentiality and care. Moreover, this article 
determines that when a report results from acting in good faith the position of 
the reporter cannot be damaged in any way. In fact the article determines that in 
such a case, the reporter cannot be dismissed within two years of the report, at 
least not without permission by the city administration or the executives of the 
neighbourhood councils.  
 
4.3.2 Implementation 
 
In just a short period of time integrity became a central issue in the civil service 
apparatus of Amsterdam. The integrity approach resulted in a flood of activities. 
This section provides insight into the implementation of these activities. Like 
Chapter 3 and in accordance with the general methods of our research, this 
subsection looks at the main aspects that influenced implementation, at least 
those aspects that are key regarding the prevention of organised crime. The data 
presented here derives from annual reports and progress reports of the 
Amsterdam Integrity Bureau. In addition, some of the figures are based on a 
study by Nelen (2003a), who evaluated the reports documented by the Central 
Register for Integrity Violations, which replaced the Central Register for Fraud 
and Corruption.  
 
4.3.2.1 Centre of expertise: the Integrity Bureau 
 
With the establishment of the Integrity Bureau in 2001, Amsterdam’s city 
government had a centre of expertise in mind, which would be charged to 
develop, encourage and embed the integrity policy.  
The city government apparently considered a city-wide policy to be very 
important. Establishment of a single, central Integrity Bureau was even more 
remarkable because in that period Amsterdam was in the middle of a 
decentralisation process. Although the independent neighbourhood councils and 
the municipal services remained competent to conduct internal investigations 
and settlements, they had to comply with the city-wide policy. Obviously this 
might have resulted in some tension between the parties. The city government 
also attached great significance to the development of a capable bureau, which 
in 2003 was equipped with a staff of 15 persons. At the start of 2001, the 
Integrity Bureau had only four employees. A former public prosecutor was 
appointed to lead the bureau (Bureau Integriteit, 2003: 25). In view of the 
decentralisation process, one might wonder whether such a manager could gain 
the confidence of the municipal services.  
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The Integrity Bureau’s tasks were mainly in the framework of prevention: 
supporting municipal services and civil servants to raise their ‘integrity 
awareness’. In other words, the Integrity Bureau had to make integrity issues 
common good. For this, the bureau focused on the organisational structure as 
well as organisational culture. With regard to the first, it performs organisational 
audits to map risks and suggests solutions. In late 2002 the Integrity Bureau had 
a new instrument at its disposal to execute risk analysis. By the end of 2004 
integrity advisors were to have finished eight risk analyses. Regarding 
individual employees, the Integrity Bureau was looking into the possibility of 
screening personnel. For this, functions in municipal services were divided into 
three sorts: confidential functions, vulnerable functions and remaining functions. 
Confidential functions refer to the Security Clearances Act,274 which is related to 
national security. At first it seemed that at the local level there were no functions 
answering this criterion. Yet, the act has in fact been applied in four cases. With 
regard to protecting vulnerable functions, which are functions with higher risks 
regarding integrity violations, the Integrity Bureau was able to point out various 
risky factors; e.g. solitary handling, dealing with large amounts of money and 
pressure on the market civil servants are dealing with (Bureau Integriteit, 2003: 
14). Regarding the third category of functions the Integrity Bureau draws 
attention to existing possibilities for screening, such as checking references. 
Furthermore, the Integrity Bureau organises trainings involving integrity 
dilemmas which aim to contribute to developing integrity of individuals as well 
as of organisational culture.  
Next to the duties in the preventive framework, the Integrity Bureau plays a 
role in the repressive approach regarding integrity violations. According to the 
directive involving suspicions of integrity violations the managing directors of 
municipal services are obliged to start an investigation when violations are 
observed. Formerly, municipal services brought in private investigation agencies 
to carry out such investigations. Now, the Integrity Bureau offers its own help 
for free. There are three investigators engaged to carry out this work.275 In 2002 
the Integrity Bureau executed 45 internal investigations. Moreover, the bureau 
engaged an expert in civil service law, who formulated 25 advisory reports and 
supported 13 written objections and three appeals proceedings (Bureau 
Integriteit, 2003: 16). This involvement of the Integrity Bureau in internal 
investigations regarding integrity violations implies a huge change from the 
original objectives of the integrity approach. At the start of the approach it was 
clear that actions were initiated to deal with risky situations, but not to 
investigate integrity violations as such. Regarding the Central Register for Fraud 
and Corruption, the city administration paid special attention to this restriction 
(Burgemeester and wethouders, 1997: 492). Nowadays however, the bureau is 
                                                        
274  Wet van 10 oktober 1996, houdende regelen inzake het verrichten van veiligheidsonderzoeken. Stb. 
1996, no. 525. 
275  In June 2002 there were two investigators. From January 2003 the Integrity Bureau employed a third 
investigator. Due to the increasing attention to integrity, the bureau’s expectation is that the number of 
investigators will increase (Bureau Integriteit, 2003: 15).  
171 
seen as competent to replace the use of expensive private investigation agencies. 
We must conclude however that with its investigative tasks, the Integrity Bureau 
is no longer focused on a preventive approach. It also brings about an 
administrative reaction or repression of integrity violations.  
 The surplus value of the Integrity Bureau seems to be the combination of 
all its tasks. The connection between the registration of violations, audits or risk 
analysis, dilemma trainings and internal investigations enables the bureau to act 
as a centre of expertise.276 The Central Register succeeded in providing insight 
into the integrity violations at the city level. These insights were presented in 
periodic reports directly to the city administration and the Integrity 
Committee.277 Moreover, these reports, which are anonymous, are accessible to 
all civil servants and third parties as they are published on the Internet; at least 
since the second half of 2003.278 This accessibility of insights on integrity 
violations corresponds with the idea of developing common awareness. The 
reports are important for internal purposes as well, as they form the basis of the 
bureau’s expertise. Based on the reports the Integrity Bureau is able to map 
developments and trends in integrity violations. Moreover, certain violations 
serve as cases in the dilemma trainings. This is particularly important since 
internal communication on integrity issues is viewed as an important instrument 
to achieve common awareness.  
 Finally, the Integrity Bureau has its role in registering integrity violations. 
All municipal bodies have to report violations to the Central Register for 
Integrity Violations, which is now under the authority of the Integrity Bureau. 
At first, this only included violations of fraud and corruption. However with the 
code of conduct and the directive involving suspicions of integrity violations in 
the workplace, this now applies to all suspicions of integrity violations. The data 
of this Central Register are presented in the next subsection.  
 
4.3.2.2 The Central Register for Integrity Violations 
 
Due to the enlarging of the kinds of violations that the municipal services have 
to report, the Central Register changed its name so as to reflect its broadened 
scope. The Amsterdam city government attaches great significance to the 
integrity of the whole civil service apparatus; and the developments described 
above clearly illustrate that its concern is not limited to good intentions. 
Moreover, the city asked the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam to perform an 
evaluation study on the integrity violations reported to the Central Register for 
Integrity Violations (Nelen, 2003a). Not only the fact that such an evaluation 
was requested, but also the cooperation of civil servants in carrying it out, shows 
the seriousness of the city government on this issue. Normally, administrative 
integrity as well as fraud and corruption are seen as sensitive issues on which no 
                                                        
276  This is also the experience of the Integrity Bureau itself (Bureau Integriteit, 2003: 14).  
277  Nowadays these reports are included in the annual reports of the planning and controlling department 
of the City of Amsterdam.  
278  See http://www.amsterdam.nl/contents/pages/00000393/2ehalfjaarrapportage2003cri.pdf. 
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information should be distributed to third parties. The Central Register, 
however, has gone some way to breaking this taboo.  
 The reports of the Central Register for Integrity Violations clearly indicate 
an increase of integrity violations over the years (see table 4.1). From the start of 
the Central Register in 1997 the number reports increased almost every year.279 
Only in 1999 and 2001 did the total number of reports decrease or remained 
stable.  
 
Table 4.1 Number of integrity violations, 1996 to 2002 
 Number of reports
1996  4 
1997  17 
1998  27 
1999  19 
2000  61 
2001  61 
2002  97 
Total  286 
Source: Nelen (2003a: 8). 
 
This increase, however, has different causes. First, the increase of reports could 
be the result of the increasing awareness of integrity violations. The Integrity 
Bureau predicted that the number of reports would increase in the first years 
because of the increasing attention to the subject (Bureau Integriteit, 2002: 7). 
Second, the code of conduct that came into force in 2000 enlarged the concept 
of integrity. From then on, the reports not only encompassed fraud and 
corruption, but also extended to other areas of the functioning of individual civil 
servants. Consequently, the net-widening of integrity violations resulted in an 
increase of the number of violations as well. Currently, most violations reported 
to the Central Register for Integrity Violations concern five phenomena: fraud, 
embezzlement, waste and default, theft and corruption (see table 4.2).280  
 
Table 4.2 Nature of integrity violations,1996 to 2002 
 Number of reports  
Fraud  80 
Embezzlement  49 
Waste and default   49 
Theft  38 
Corruption  33 
Total  249 
Source: Nelen (2003a: 10). 
 
 
                                                        
279  The reports that are categorised in the year 1996, before the installation of the Central Register, were 
reported afterwards. 
280  The 249 reports comprise 88% of the total number of violations (286 reports) reported to the Central 
Register.  
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The large number of reports on fraud stems from the focus on fraud in the first 
years of the Central Register. Nonetheless, corruption, one of the most serious 
violations, occurred only a couple of times. In fact, Nelen and Nieuwendijk 
(2003: 15) explain that of the 33 reports only 8 cases actually involved 
corruption.281 In the other cases the suspicions were incorrect or they turned out 
to be other forms of integrity violations. 
 The limitation of this register is that it can only document what is reported. 
The Integrity Bureau, which operates the Central Register, cannot search out 
violations. This means that civil servants are the only ones who can report 
violations or suspicions thereof. According to the internal rules they must do 
so.282 However, based on the difficulties of supervising compliance with these 
rules, it would be advisable to reconsider the competence of the Central 
Register. If it could actively search out violations, it might gain insight into the 
number of unreported integrity violations.  
Notwithstanding this criticism, what do these numbers tell us? Are these 
numbers of violations high, normal or low? It is difficult to interpret these 
numbers because there is no material for comparison (Nelen, 2003a: 38). No 
other Dutch cities have similar databases to which to compare. Consequently, 
we can conclude only that over the years the number of reports in Amsterdam is 
increasing.  
 Is it possible to compare the Amsterdam councils and authorities with each 
other? Such comparison reveals that departments with field staff report the most 
integrity violations (Nelen, 2003a: 24). According to the respondents of Nelen’s 
evaluation (2003a: 24) this is the result of the extensive decision-making power 
of the field staff and the lack of supervision of their activities. For example, 
some major cases of fraud came to light from the department in charge of 
managing public parking, with some civil servants pocketing revenues from 
ticket dispensers (Nelen, 2003a: 23). Furthermore, respondents of Nelen’s 
evaluation (2003a: 34) refer to job satisfaction and profession-related pride as 
important aspects influencing awareness of integrity in an organisational culture. 
Large-scale integrity violations of civil servants resulting from opportunities in 
the organisational structure can have a negative impact on other employees. In 
some cases it may even cause low job esteem, a climate in which integrity 
violations can flourish even more. This example also illustrates the interaction 
between organisational structure and organisational culture. Moreover, Nelen’s 
study shows that integrity violations depend not only on internal processes but 
also on external ones. Nelen’s respondents argued that operating in fraud-rife 
environments can have a negative impact on civil servant behaviour (Nelen, 
2003a: 24) lowering the threshold to violate integrity rules.  
                                                        
281  Nelen refers to a definition used in a previous study that involved corruption by police officers (Nelen 
and Nieuwendijk, 2003).  
282  According to the current directive local authorities and neighbourhood councils must report incidents 
three days after the start of an internal investigation, the report of the incidents to the police or the 
moment that a disciplinary measures is taken.  
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A comparison of the various councils and authorities can thus give some 
background on integrity issues. However, these insights cannot be taken as 
certainties. There are other local authorities with operational field staff which 
are confronted with the same elements, but which report fewer integrity 
violations. For example, the construction department and the department 
involved in town and city planning report few integrity violations. Are there 
explanations for the lower number of integrity reports? Are there fewer integrity 
violations than in other departments? According to Nelen the lower number of 
reports is due to what is in the literature called collusion (Nelen, 2003a: 25). The 
tight relation between civil servants and the organisations they check can lead to 
blind spots towards unreliable practices. 
 
4.3.3 Bottlenecks in the implementation 
 
Activating municipal services. The Integrity Bureau, installed in 2001, had by 
2003 become a centre of expertise with 15 employees that supported the 
municipal services. This rather large team at the central level operating under 
the direction of a former public prosecutor might have been construed as a threat 
to the independence of the neighbourhood councils and municipal services, 
causing a natural tension between the parties. Nonetheless, the evaluation of the 
process indicates that these services in general are willing to comply with the 
new measures. Over the years most of the 54 city councils and administrative 
authorities have reported more and more integrity violations. However, not all 
municipal services are willing to cooperate. The evaluation by Nelen (2003a: 
37) illustrates that nine municipal services never reported a violation and that six 
services only reported once. Although some differences can be explained by the 
size of the services and by the sort of activities they facilitate, it also reflects the 
willingness of these services to report violations.  
 
Coordinating activities. Because the integrity approach involves only the 
municipal services – city councils and administrative authorities – it is not so 
much a multi-agency approach. Therefore, the implementation is not really 
hindered by difficulties in coordination of activities, like the anti-money 
laundering intervention was.  
 
Coordinating interests. The activities of the Integrity Bureau can be divided into 
two strategies. First, there is the focus on increasing the awareness to prevent 
possible integrity violations, as was described upon the launch of the integrity 
approach. For this, the city government introduced the obligation to report 
integrity violations. While these reports were not primarily aimed at 
investigating offences but at hindering possible intrusions by criminal 
organisations, this strategy can be indicated as a preventive strategy. Second, 
with the code of conduct coming into effect it was important to enforce 
compliance with these rules. Therefore, the city government wanted a clear 
handling of all violations. Implicitly, this became the second objective of the 
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integrity approach. The handling can exist in administrative or criminal 
measures which both come under the repressive approach. One might wonder 
whether in the course of time the interest of the city government changed from 
the preventive approach to the repressive approach. Obviously, such a change in 
emphasis could have a major impact on the effects.  
In addition, the net-widening of integrity violations that must be reported 
raises the question of the relation between integrity violations and possible 
intrusions by organised crime. By their focus on the functioning of individual 
civil servants it seems that the city government lost sight of one of its earlier 
objectives: prevention of organised crime. What are the consequences of these 
findings and how do they affect the outcomes of the integrity approach? This is 
discussed below. 
 
4.4 Evaluation of the outcomes of the integrity approach 
 
In order to answer the last research question this section deals with the outcomes 
or effects of the integrity approach. In accordance with the methods described in 
Chapter 1 the evaluation of the outcomes involves an overview of the observed 
outputs and the plausible outcomes of this approach regarding organised crime. 
The outputs are judged in the framework of the objectives described section 4.2. 
To judge the plausible outcomes the assumptions are evaluated in light of 
pragmatic new strategies to prevent crime. In addition, the outcomes involve the 
side effects the legislator has to deal with. Finally, an overall conclusion is 
provided regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the intervention.  
 
4.4.1 Observed outputs 
 
To fortify the civil service apparatus against organised crime, Amsterdam’s 
government paid a lot of attention to the integrity of this apparatus. Over time, 
the integrity approach resulted in a number of activities, which can be grouped 
into two strategies. First are activities specifically focusing on increasing 
awareness to prevent possible integrity violations. Second, with the code of 
conduct coming into force, it was considered important to enforce compliance 
with integrity rules. For this latter strategy it is interesting to look at some 
reactions to the reported integrity violations.  
 
4.4.1.1 Increasing the awareness within the civil service apparatus 
 
The data from the Central Register for Integrity Violations clearly illustrates an 
increase in reports over the years. However, it would be premature to conclude 
that based on this increase the level of integrity is declining. There are simply 
too many elements that could influence the level of violations as well as 
attitudes towards reporting. In particular one might wonder whether an increase 
of violations indicates less integrity in the organisation or an increased 
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awareness of integrity violations. It is even impossible to compare city 
neighbourhood councils and local authorities with each other. Although three 
larger neighbourhood councils are responsible for a large part of the reports 
(Nelen, 2003a: 21), it is impossible to ascertain whether these neighbourhood 
councils are less upright than the others, whether they are just more aware of 
integrity violations or whether there are simply more problems in these areas.  
 Despite these remarks, the municipal services seem to have become more 
aware of the importance of addressing integrity problems. In particular, the code 
of conduct is seen as a positive step and the basic values as a central point of 
reference has resulted in debate on integrity as planned (Nelen, 2003a: 33). To a 
large extent this is caused by the main interventions influencing the 
organisational structure and culture (Nelen, 2003a: 5)  
Furthermore, there are indications that the integrity problem in Amsterdam 
is decreasing. Figures from the Central Register for Integrity Violations seem to 
indicate that any integrity problems that Amsterdam has had are related to some 
rotten apples and not to a rotten organisational culture or organisations. 
According to Nelen (2003a: 8), 80% of the 286 cases of integrity violations are 
related to individual behaviour. In the other cases, three or more employees were 
involved. Though the figures should be interpreted with caution, respondents in 
this study seem to confirm that the number of integrity incidents in which large 
groups of civil servants are involved has been on the decline in the last couple of 
years (Nelen, 2003a: 16). This could be due to the changes in the administrative 
organisations and the strengthening of the municipal authorities. However, more 
data is needed to draw such a conclusion. 
 
4.4.1.2 Enforcing compliance with integrity rules 
 
According to Nelen (2003a: 31), the city councils and administrative authorities 
have handled integrity violations decisively, at least the ones that were reported 
to the Central Register for Integrity Violations. In fact, 43% of all reports ended 
in a settlement in court, an administrative settlement or a combination of both 
(Nelen, 2003a: 28). This result seems an important indication of the credibility 
and legitimacy of the integrity policy. 
Regarding how these violations were handled, 40% of the reported 
violations remained internal issues and 38% resulted in a report to the police 
(Nelen, 2003a: 27). Unfortunately, one in three reported cases could not be 
resolved because of unknown offenders or lack of evidence (Nelen, 2003a: 27).  
 In the period 1996 to 2002, 83 civil servants were confronted with criminal 
law proceedings (Nelen, 2003a: 28). This number is equivalent to a quarter of all 
civil servants registered in the Central Register. Nelen’s (2003a: 28) evaluation 
indicates that most cases handled by the police concerned embezzlement and 
fraud. There were hardly any cases of corruption. According to Nelen (2003a: 
28), corruption is seldom settled in a criminal court as in most cases evidence is 
lacking. Table 4.3 shows the numbers of settlements by criminal court. On one 
hand the settlements were successful, as in more than half of the cases a criminal 
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punishment was enforced. These criminal punishments imply irrevocable 
convictions existing in penalties, community service orders or suspended prison 
sentences (34%). In addition, in 20% of the cases a compromise was reached. 
On the other hand some cases resulted in acquittal (4%) or a decision not to 
prosecute (18%). The remaining criminal cases were not yet closed or the results 
remained unknown.  
 
Table 4.3 Settlements by a criminal court in the period 1996-2002 
 Number of civil servants Percentage 
Decision not to prosecute  11 13 
Compromise 17 20 
Irrevocable conviction 28 34 
Acquittal  3 4 
Criminal case is not finished yet 15 18 
Unknown  9 11 
Total  83 100 
Source: Nelen (2003a: 28). 
 
With a view to administrative settlement, the city government has an arsenal of 
means that can be brought into force against civil servants violating the rules. In 
fact, different administrative measures can be combined. That is why the 
numbers in table 4.4 cannot be added to arrive at the total number of reports. An 
important finding regarding the administrative settlements is that in 35% of the 
cases the contract of employment was brought to an end. In 23% of the cases the 
severance was initiated by the employer and in 12% of the cases the employees 
themselves initiated the resignation. 
 
Table 4.4 Administrative settlements 
 Number of civil 
servants 
Number of cases Percentage* 
Reprimand/warning 46 28 10 
Suspension  63 46 16 
Transfer 7 7 2 
Resignation by the civil servant 36 33 12 
Suspended dismissal 27 20 7 
Dismissal  82 66 23 
Source: Nelen (2003a: 30). 
* Percentage of the total number of reported violations (n=286). 
 
An administrative settlement can also be combined with a settlement by criminal 
court. This was certainly the case for the most serious offences. In 25 cases that 
resulted in a dismissal and in 10 cases in which the employee resigned, the 
public prosecutor’s department commenced proceedings against the employee as 
well (Nelen, 2003a: 30).  
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4.4.1.3 Conclusion on the outputs 
 
It is difficult if not impossible to determine causal relations between measures 
and effects. The increase in the number of reports of the Central Register for 
Integrity Violations does not automatically imply an increasing problem 
regarding the integrity of the organisations involved. The increase in integrity 
violations could be the result of the increased attention to this problem. First of 
all, the increase in integrity violations has resulted from enlarging the concept of 
integrity. In addition, the increase in reports can be due to the fact that integrity 
has been introduced as a normal subject in the organisational culture (Nelen, 
2003a: 39). Still, it is possible that the increase in reports indeed indicates an 
actual increase in violations. If this is the case the preventive approach seems to 
have had no effect on the integrity of municipal services. Obviously, the 
increasing number of violations could be the result of a combination of both 
causes. These scenarios illustrate the lack of insight into the effect of integrity 
violations reports. It is simply impossible to conclude whether the actual 
violations have increased. This makes it impossible to judge whether the 
differences in numbers of reports is the result of a low level of violations or a 
low level of awareness.  
This problem can be illustrated with an example. Nelen (2003a: 24) shows 
that in general integrity violations are more common in municipal services 
among field staff, who tend to have a large amount of individual decision-
making power. Even so, there are differences between departments with field 
staff (Nelen, 2003a: 23-25). The department in charge of parking management 
reported many violations, while the city planning department and the 
construction department reported only a few. According to Nelen (2003a: 26) 
the differences in reporting could be the result of collusion. Collusion involves 
the relation between entrepreneurs and the civil servants who grant and 
supervise these third parties. This relation can in fact be so tight that it causes a 
blind spot towards unreliable practices (Nelen, 2003a: 26). Subsequently, civil 
servants could be unaware of possible integrity violations. Whether this is the 
case with the departments involved in city planning and construction is unclear. 
Accordingly, it is still an open question of whether all the attention to the 
integrity of the civil service apparatus has actually prevented intrusion by 
organised crime. 
 
4.4.2 Plausible outcomes 
 
In contrast to the screening and auditing approach, the integrity approach does 
not focus on potential criminals but only on the civil service apparatus that could 
facilitate crime. To hinder intentional or unintentional facilitation of organised 
crime, the Amsterdam city government wants to strengthen the defensibility of 
its administrative apparatus. This was deemed necessary since a weak 
government was believed to facilitate crime. An upstanding and transparent 
public organisation was assumed to hinder crime. Therefore, the integrity 
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approach aims at reducing the vulnerability of the apparatus in order to prevent 
fraud and corruption. Over time the integrity approach came to include all kinds 
of vulnerabilities related to the functioning of individual public servants. This 
section looks at the extent to which the integrity approach can be judged in the 
framework of situational crime prevention and with regard to empirical 
knowledge on organised crime.  
 
4.4.2.1 Situational crime prevention  
 
Table 4.5 provides insight into the extent to which the techniques of the 
Amsterdam integrity approach fit the classification of Cornish and Clarke. A 
part of the techniques focus on the criminals; these techniques involve 
increasing the risk and effort involved in benefiting from crime. Other measures 
involve the removal of excuses. However, where Clarke and Cornish apply the 
strategy of removing excuses to criminals, in the integrity approach these 
techniques aim at the civil service apparatus.  
 
Remove excuses. In order to increase the defensibility of the civil service 
apparatus the city government must set clear rules with which the civil service 
as well as the individual servants must comply. According to Clarke (1997: 24), 
setting clear rules is a technique of situational crime prevention, as any 
ambiguity in rules and regulations will be exploited to the advantage of an 
individual public servant. The Amsterdam city government set clear rules by 
writing out tasks and competences. With such transparency in the organisational 
structure, civil servants know what behaviour is expected of them and what they 
can expect of others. The addition of the code of conduct can influence the 
organisational culture.  
 A second strategy to remove excuses involves alerting the conscience. As 
described in the previous chapters, Clarke (1997: 24) argues that measures that 
stimulate conscience will prevent violations. By making the whole apparatus 
aware of possible abuses the city government is alerting the conscience of 
individual civil servants. In fact, the city government is attempting to realise a 
constant level of high conscience regarding integrity dilemmas in the municipal 
services. This is necessary, because alerting the conscience is mostly effective 
when applied at the point of contemplating the commission (Clarke, 1997: 24).  
 Finally, the city government provides structures that encourage compliance 
with the set rules and procedures. This strategy fits Clarke’s reasoning on 
assisting compliance. First of all, the rules on reporting integrity violations and 
suspicions of integrity violations stipulate that civil servants must report the 
violations they come across. These same rules provide a clear framework on 
how these violations must be reported, which facilitates compliance. Such a 
clear framework is particularly important where people hesitate to act. Reporting 
an integrity violation of colleagues is probably such a situation. It is likely that 
in the absence of clear rules, civil servants would rather refrain from reporting 
violations, as they do not know how to go about it.  
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In addition, the city government has assisted compliance by establishing rules on 
whistle-blowing. These rules protect the ones who dare to stick out their neck. 
This is particularly important since exposing behaviour of colleagues or a 
superior could cause problems for the one reporting the violations.  
 
Increase the risk. Whereas the integrity approach is mainly focused on the civil 
service apparatus and individual public servants’ compliance with the rules, it is 
also important to increase the risks involved in violating integrity rules. With the 
attention paid to integrity problems in the civil service apparatus, the city 
government has tried to stimulate surveillance by supervisors and other 
employees. According to Clarke, such surveillance increases the risk of being 
caught. Clarke attributed such surveillance to employees (Clarke, 1997; 20) and 
later to place managers (Cornish and Clarke, 2003: 90) who deal with the public. 
In other words, people who by virtue of their position have good insight into 
certain behaviours are charged with surveillance. In the case of Amsterdam’s 
integrity approach the employees and place managers supervise their colleagues.  
 In addition, the integrity approach could bring formal surveillance into 
action. In the rules on reporting suspicions of integrity violations the city 
government requires each violation to be investigated. In the first instance the 
municipal service itself must deal with investigations and settlements. However, 
it is possible to hand over serious violations to the investigative authorities such 
as police or tax authorities. 
 
Increase the effort. Notwithstanding the fact that the integrity approach focuses 
on the civil service apparatus, there is one technique that aims at criminals who 
want to abuse civil services’ facilities; that is, controlling access to these 
facilities. Like the anti-money laundering intervention and the screening and 
auditing approach, the central issue of the integrity approach is to prevent 
unwitting facilitation of criminal activities. To prevent such abuse it is necessary 
to control access to these facilities (Clarke, 1997; 17). To control access, the 
Amsterdam government has increased the awareness of the civil servants who 
provide such facilities. Similar to financial service providers and administrative 
authorities, the Amsterdam municipal services must be alert as to with whom 
they are dealing. Thus, the adage ‘know your customer’ is important at the local 
level as well.  
 
4.4.2.2 Effects of the techniques 
 
Based on the situational crime prevention approach it can be assumed that an 
upright civil service apparatus exerts more control over facilities. Consequently, 
it increases the efforts that criminal organisations must make to infringe on these 
facilities. In other words, by making the civil service apparatus more upstanding 
and transparent the various services and the individual public servants can be 
defined as preventers, making crime less likely (Clarke: 1997). However, the 
integrity approach is mainly focused on the civil service apparatus and hardly on 
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potential criminals. As a result this approach includes fewer techniques of 
situational prevention. Thus, criminal organisations have fewer barriers to 
overcome.  
 
4.4.2.3 Empirical knowledge on organised crime 
 
In a Falcone study exploring possibilities for preventing organised crime, it 
became clear that increasing integrity and awareness could contain a fair number 
of potential facilitators (Van de Bunt and Van der Schoot, 2003: 71). For 
example, awareness of possible abuse in welfare service flats could hinder the 
abuse of such accommodation for storerooms and remove a considerable 
facilitating factor for drugs and human trafficking. Therefore, awareness of 
facilitators of possible abuse is a basic condition for crime prevention (Van de 
Bunt and Van der Schoot, 2003: 72). It plays a pivotal role. This requires public 
agencies to be well aware of their own vulnerabilities. Awareness presupposes 
good governance and, at the very least, the integrity of government agencies. 
The prevention of organised crime entails a constructive attitude in the working 
of an organisation, meaning the creation of more transparency in the decision-
making process, the consolidation of procedures and the instruction of 
personnel. Such remarks concerning awareness presuppose that the private and 
public parties involved are themselves bona fide.  
Nonetheless, awareness is not sufficient to guarantee the success of 
situational prevention. Next to being aware, facilitators must have integrity (Van 
de Bunt and Van der Schoot, 2003: 72). This means that facilitators have to take 
preventive measures against possible misuse. A constructive attitude aiming for 
transparency in organisations, consolidation of procedures and clear instructions 
for personnel are needed. Obviously, this approach can be effective only when 
the parties who take them are upstanding themselves. Should this not be the case 
– e.g. when organised crime has deeply penetrated legitimate parts of society – 
the situational approach will be totally ineffective. 
 
4.4.3 Side effects 
 
The main side effect ascribed to situational prevention is displacement. 
However, according to Clarke (1980: 140), displacement not only depends on 
the offender’s strength of motivation, but also on the range of alternatives 
offenders have available. Therefore, Clarke argues that protecting a whole class 
of property would leave few alternatives and thus will be highly effective 
(Clarke, 1980: 140). One could say that the Amsterdam civil service apparatus 
aims at eliminating a whole class of targets, namely the abuse of all of the 
facilities they provide. Because the civil service apparatus has a monopoly on 
certain facilities, it unlikely that displacement will take place. Even more, the 
integrity approach could affect other sectors in Amsterdam. Such development 
is described as ‘diffusion of benefits’ (Clarke, 1997). This would be a positive 
side effect, as it would mean that not only the city government, but also other 
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sectors were paying attention to integrity and had become aware of possible 
abuses. Such developments fall out of the scope of this research, however, so no 
insight into them can be given. 
A different side effect of the integrity approach is the possible hardening of 
the response to smaller violations in the name of the so-called prevention of 
organised crime. Reports based on suspicions alert the city government to 
possible offences, but could result in excessive reactions. Care must be taken 
with suspicions until there is some certainty on the accusation involved. 
Investigations can seriously damage the reputations of the persons concerned. In 
an atmosphere in which so much attention is paid to integrity, the simple fact of 
an investigation being started might make a person seem guilty. This is 
particularly a problem when a case lacks confidentiality and information leaks. 
In such cases people can be publicly attacked, even without being found guilty. 
Remarkably, in such cases a local integrity investigation and possible media 
attention could be even more damaging than a penal sanction. This means that 
the preventive approach can damage subjects even more than repressive 
measures, though the suspicions may be mistaken. Such failures and the 
resulting public judgement represent a hardening of the preventive approach. 
 An example from 2003 illustrates such a situation. The managing director 
of one of the larger museums of Amsterdam was accused of fraud. The co-
director reported suspicions regarding the managing director to the Integrity 
Bureau. Consequently, the mayor, who was informed according to the rules, 
ordered an internal investigation and the Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation 
Service started its own investigation. Furthermore, the mayor decided to 
postpone the official farewell party for the managing director, which had long 
before been planned. The postponing of such a prestigious party, to which even 
the queen had been invited, obviously received a lot of attention. The news was 
published in all newspapers and the good reputation of the managing director 
and the museum were damaged. In the end the incident appeared to involve a 
disorderly transaction regarding the loaning of paintings by which taxes were 
not paid. In this case, the farewell party was organised after all, however the 
director’s good reputation could not be recovered as easily. The former 
managing director phrased this as following: 
 
‘For more then a year I was wrongfully accused. People constantly asking about it 
affected my professional integrity. Moreover, it contributed to the complete 
misrepresentation in the media that my last years at the Stedelijke [museum, CvdS] 
were a failure.’283 
 
This quotation illustrates the severe personal impact that integrity investigations 
can have.  
 
                                                        
283  Rudi Fuchs niet vervolgd om Appels, NRC Handelsblad, 4 November 2003.  
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4.4.4 Conclusion 
 
The Amsterdam policy to increase awareness of integrity issues was originally 
aimed to make the civil service less vulnerable and more defensible against 
intrusions from criminal organisations. In theory it is plausible that the integrity 
approach supports the defensibility of the civil service apparatus. In addition, 
based on situational crime prevention it would be realistic to expect that 
increasing integrity would decrease opportunities for organised crime. Empirical 
knowledge points out that increasing integrity is not only a basic condition, it is 
a necessary precondition for prevention as well. Without an upstanding civil 
service apparatus, no preventive measures can be taken seriously. However, the 
implementation of the integrity approach has gone through some changes that 
probably affect its outcomes.  
 The developments regarding the integrity policy involved two types of 
expansion. First, the attention to integrity issues resulted in a code of conduct in 
which the concept of integrity was expanded to include a wider range of 
behaviour. While at first integrity violations involved only fraud and corruption, 
they now varied from theft and embezzlement to conflicts of interest and waste 
of municipal property. This expansion made it difficult to define integrity 
violations. While the definition of fraud and corruption is clear, conflict of 
interests can involve a wide range of behaviours.  
The second expansion of the integrity policy was the obligation to report 
suspicions of integrity violations. This marks the hardening of the preventive 
approach towards integrity violations. In an environment in which integrity is a 
central issue, the start of an internal investigation could be perceived as a 
conviction. Moreover, despite the rules on confidentiality, in cases in which 
incidents are made public the person involved may be publicly attacked even 
without any evidence. In these cases, a preventive approach can be even more 
damaging to people than repressive measures, though suspicions can be wrong. 
Moreover, during the years the city government even changed the objective of 
the approach. At first it was explicitly written that the integrity approach was not 
intended to investigate fraudulent activities. However, the new directive 
explicitly dictates settlements be determined for all such violations. 
 Both expansions imply a net-widening, meaning that more and more 
subjects are drawn into the intervention. Such net-widening is characterised by 
the blurring of boundaries between crime, deviance and non-deviant behaviour. 
Consequently, integrity has widened into an almost meaningless concept, and 
there are still many blind spots regarding this problem. Moreover, the net-
widening of the integrity approach has resulted in goal displacement. Whereas 
integrity violations were at first a means to fight criminal organisations, the 
handling of violations is now a goal in itself. Also, the expanded definition of 
activities that are seen as integrity violations makes the fight against them more 
difficult. As a result of the net-widening and goal displacement, the city 
government lost sight of its actual objective; the prevention of organised crime.  
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These changes have made the Amsterdam’s integrity approach appear to be less 
preventive than it was first described. Whereas the preventive tasks of the 
Integrity Bureau were seen as its main duties, most attention is now paid to the 
repressive approach. The evaluation study by Nelen shows the resulting 
settlements, but no evaluation study has been performed of the preventive 
effects. Notwithstanding the importance of clear settlements, which can have 
preventive effects as well (deterrence), respondents in Nelen’s evaluation study 
argued shortcomings in the preventive approach. For example, they argue that 
integrity is still not a normal subject of discussion in performance interviews and 
in the recruitment of new employees. Civil servants may even be engaged in a 
municipal service shortly after their dismissal for dubious reasons from another 
service. Obviously, much remains to be done. The good thing is that 
improvements do not have to cost much. Regarding the example above it could 
be sufficient to check the references of former employers.  
Moreover, the approach is not aimed at organised crime. Although the 
integrity approach was initiated as the result of severe problems with organised 
crime, the city government focuses the approach on all sorts of crime. As a 
result the approach is likely to have less impact on organised crime than 
expected. Still, the approach is one of the most logical steps that can be taken 
against organised crime. Because integrity is a basic and necessary condition for 
crime prevention the problem of organised crime could be much worse without 
it. 
 
4.5 Evaluation of the process of the Van Traa approach 
 
The Van Traa approach is a direct reaction of the Amsterdam city government 
towards the severe problems observed in the red-light district. Like other 
preventive measures taken against organised crime, this approach is evaluated in 
order to gain insight into the process through which the measure is realised. In 
accordance with the methods described in Chapter 1, the evaluation of the 
process involves two elements. First, the content of the approach is described. 
This description involves the main activities that have taken place in the Van 
Traa approach. Second, the implementation of these activities is evaluated. This 
discussion is limited to those aspects that are important to the main topic of this 
study: the prevention of organised crime. Bottlenecks in the implementation that 
could affect the outputs of the Van Traa approach are also described. 
 The evaluation of the process is based on the large documentation of the 
Van Traa team. Over time this team, including the Wallen manager, published 
an action plan, several annual reports, progress reports and a public information 
book on the Van Traa approach.284 In addition, information was acquired from 
                                                        
284  This section cannot elaborate on all aspects of the Wallen project. The analysis is limited to the 
aspects that are most interesting for our study of the prevention of organised crime. However, for 
those who are interested, several reports on the progress of the Wallen project are published, see 
Wallenproject (1997, 1998), Projectbureau Manager Wallengebied (1998, 1999) and Van Traa 
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seminars and lectures by Freek Salm, who was the Wallen manager from 1997 
to 2000. Furthermore, the Van Traa approach was recently evaluated (Huisman 
et al., 2005). This study includes the main findings and conclusions of that 
evaluation.  
 
4.5.1 Content  
 
As described in section 4.2 the Van Traa approach encompasses the Wallen 
project and the Van Traa project. The Wallen project existed from 1997 to 2000 
and was restricted to the red-light district. With the enlargement of the approach 
from the red-light district to the whole city in 2000, the project was re-named 
the ‘Van Traa project’ after the parliamentary inquiry that recommended 
development of the administrative approach. Here we first look at the content of 
the general approach. The integral and integrated enforcement of rules is 
described as well as the cooperation between the partners involved and the 
exchange of relevant information. Subsequently, a short description is provided 
of the main subprojects of the Van Traa approach. 
 
4.5.1.1 The general approach 
 
Integral and integrated enforcement of rules. The Wallen project concentrates 
on the development of an administrative approach to fight the specific problems 
of Amsterdam’s red-light district. The approach turned out to be unique in that it 
includes an integral and integrated maintenance of crime problems, which was 
unprecedented. Describing the Van Traa approach Fijnaut (2002: 25) defined 
integrated maintenance as the mutual cooperation of all city departments 
including the police. In fact, this integrated cooperation includes the public 
administration, police, judicial authorities, tax authorities and in some cases 
even semi-government corporations and private organisations. In other words, 
the integrated approach is a multi-agency approach, including a wide range of 
actors. Fijnaut did not define integral maintenance, but from its general use, it 
probably indicates consistent enforcement of all legal rules. In practice this 
means that the approach covers consistent enforcement of compliance with all 
legal rules. 
 
Operating procedure. The operating procedure of this integrated maintenance is 
characterised by a two-step approach that basically corresponds with 
intelligence-led policing. The first step is collecting and analysing data on 
organised crime. For this the Wallen team and later the Van Traa team make use 
of all kinds of open sources, the register of the chamber of commerce, municipal 
registers (e.g. those of the Building and Housing Inspectorate, Social Services, 
                                                                                                                                  
team/Wallenproject (2000). See also the public information book on the administrative approach of 
Amsterdam in which one chapter involves the Van Traa approach (Köbben, 2002). In 2001 the Dutch 
version was published and in 2002 the English version. These publications provide information for 
this section as well. 
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Environment Service, Licensing Department and Population Register) and the 
closed registers of police, justice and tax authorities.285 By combining all 
information, an assessment can be made of criminal involvement. This wide 
range of data sources makes the approach integral and multidisciplinary. 
Because the combination of information is the basis of the administrative 
approach, one can refer to it as information-led policing. 
The second step is to undertake strategic decisions on the measures to be 
taken based on this assessment. For this step, the Wallen project and the Van 
Traa project use an integral or multidisciplinary approach as well. The 
responsible authorities can decide on a range of interventions. They can 
undertake administrative measures, such as refusing or withdrawing permits, 
they can decide to start a criminal investigation or they can decide to submit a 
fiscal claim. The Van Traa approach even makes it possible for authorities to 
take civil measures, such as the purchase of premises (see one of the following 
key subprojects).  
 The Van Traa approach exists in various subprojects that involve rectifying 
deficiencies in maintaining or enforcing rules. Some of these subprojects focus 
on geographic areas or branches of economic activity in which the Wallen team, 
and later the Van Traa team, assumed are related with organised crime. These 
assumptions may be based on problems or degeneration of deprived urban areas 
or on possible involvement of persons or companies in criminal activities. The 
geographically oriented subprojects usually start with the collection of 
information involving the premises. This means that regarding all premises in 
the selected area the ownership, rent, financing and occupation are observed. 
Moreover, the team analyses the businesses that are accommodated, the licenses 
distributed, the actual activities taking place as well as the relations between 
these legal persons and the natural persons involved. All collected information is 
written in a matrix or a fact sheet that during a subproject is constantly 
updated.286 Such matrixes illustrate irregularities based on which the authorities 
in question can undertake action. Thus, these subprojects actually imply strong 
operational aspects. The subprojects that focus on branches usually involve 
strategic aspects. Here, the gathering of information is focused on mapping 
possible risks of criminal abuse and possible criminal investments in the 
selected branches. This applies, for example, to the hotel and catering industry. 
However, in some subprojects insights result in actual interventions, such as 
against illegal casinos.  
A second part of the subprojects involves the deficiencies present in the 
organisation and administration of the various civil services which hinder the 
application of the administrative approach. One of the crucial deficiencies 
involves the information position. This is remarkable as the administrative 
approach is an information-led policing that should have a certain level of 
                                                        
285  Later the competences necessary to exchange this data are described. 
286  A matrix or fact sheet indicates owners, tenants, managers of establishments; it shows how activities 
are financed and which permits are obtained and by whom; it registers the remarks from 
administrative checks and sanctions.  
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information at its disposal. Consequently, various subprojects aim at providing 
such a level of information. These subprojects appear during the whole 
execution of the Van Traa approach, as the team has to deal with various 
bottlenecks that stand in the way of the administrative approach.  
 
Organisational structure. At the start of the Wallen project its team consisted of 
the Wallen manager supported by only a small group of co-workers: a policy 
advisor, two legal advisors, a project manager for urban renewal and an 
administrative employee (Köbben, 2002: 75). This team was responsible for 
developing and coordinating the new administrative approach and for 
implementing it in all urban districts and municipal services. However, for 
strategic decisions and the actual execution of the project, they had to rely on the 
authorities involved. The Wallen manager described the official organisational 
structure in the project’s first working plan (Wallenproject, 1997). Most of the 
consultations for the Van Traa approach were based on the existing ‘tripartite 
consultations’ which involved representatives of the police, the public 
prosecutor and the public administration. Tripartite consultations can exist for 
different geographic areas and for special topics.  
 Regarding final responsibility, the Van Traa approach was placed under the 
formal guardianship of the local tripartite consultations of the urban district 
‘Centrum’ (the centre of town). This tripartite body meets once a month and the 
Van Traa approach became a continuing topic on its agenda. The Wallen 
manager also had a place at these consultations. In addition, a steering 
committee was established with representatives of the same authorities.287 This 
steering committee had the strategic task to coordinate and initiate activities. In 
short, it decided what action would be most effective and which partner was best 
qualified to act in a certain situation. With the changeover from the Wallen 
project to the Van Traa project the steering committee ceased to exist. Strategic 
decisions were then taken by a new body of tripartite consultations that was 
established to fight serious crime.288 In these consultations the Van Traa 
approach was discussed and new subprojects earmarked. This earmarking was 
necessary as it was a basic precondition enabling the exchange of information. 
This is discussed in more detail below.  
A core group made up of representatives of the four authorities involved 
was established as well. This core group is responsible for execution of actions, 
meaning that these representatives had to manage employees in their own 
organisations in order to gather information on selected areas and branches and 
to execute the measures the steering committee decided on. Over time it 
appeared inefficient to work with one core group. Therefore, a special core team 
was established for each of the subprojects initiated. This was necessary, as each 
subproject demanded different expertise. With the start of the Van Traa project 
                                                        
287  The steering committee consists of a district chief of police, a public prosecutor, an official of the tax 
authorities and the Wallen manager, as representative of the local authorities. 
288  This tripartite consultation exists in the heads of the departments of police and public prosecution that 
are involved in fighting serious crime as well as the head of the Van Traa team.  
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it was formally decided to put together specific core groups adjusted to each 
subproject.  
Finally, a broad team was established of representatives of various public 
and private agencies to act as a sounding board for the Van Traa approach, to 
advise and inform the steering committee. However, the broad sounding board 
was never effectively initiated, and advice was later distributed via informal 
channels. This organisational structure is aimed at guaranteeing cooperation 
amongst the various authorities at all levels.  
 With the changeover from the Wallen project to the Van Traa project the 
administrative approach became city-wide. The project was placed under the 
Amsterdam Public Administration Department which is charged with 
maintaining public order and safety. Until 31 December 2002 the Van Traa 
project remained an independent project with its own management and budget. 
From 2003 the project was officially embedded in the civil service apparatus. It 
became part of the city department for public order and safety.  
 
4.5.1.2 Key subprojects 
 
The Wallen manager’s first job was to gain in-depth knowledge of the crime 
problems in the red-light district. This was done by interviewing a large number 
of people about the problems and the range of administrative measures that were 
put to use against the problems. Moreover, the manager made frequent visits to 
the area to experience the problems and general atmosphere. The diversity of 
criminal behaviour in the district made it impossible to fight these crimes all at 
once. Therefore, the Wallen manager and the project team started different 
subprojects, each focusing on one branch or area. These subprojects were laid 
out in an action plan (Wallen project, 1997). Some of key subprojects (Köbben, 
2002: 79) are described below.  
 
Grey premises project. A key subproject is the ‘grey premises’ project. Grey 
premises are premises of which the actual function is unknown to the 
authorities. Thus, this subproject is a perfect example of rectifying deficiencies 
in maintaining or enforcing rules. The Wallen team was interested in these 
premises since they could be used for criminal purposes. For example, grey 
premises were revealed to be used as illegal accommodations for which usurious 
prices are asked. Such accommodations are rented to illegal immigrants, persons 
seeking political asylum and tourists. In many cases these premises do not 
comply with the legal rules such as for licences and fire safety; neither do they 
comply with the city zoning plan. The Wallen manager argued these were 
exactly the sorts of situations in which the administrative approach could 
prevent criminal activities. The reaction of the Wallen team to such 
infringements is a clear example of a multi-agency approach and consistent 
enforcement of compliance with legal rules.  
Moreover, this subproject is a perfect example of the two-step approach. 
First, with regard to the consistent enforcement of compliance with legal rules, 
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the Wallen team started to gather information from different local authorities to 
determine concrete offences. Second, with regard to the multi-agency approach, 
the Wallen team, and later the Van Traa team, took the most suitable response: 
enforcing compliance, withdrawing permits, starting a criminal investigation or 
bringing into force additional collections by tax authorities.  
However, during this subproject, a major problem appeared in that the 
registers of the different local authorities were difficult to compare and they 
lacked information. In particular property registration needed updating. Licences 
for hotels, boarding houses and lodging houses had not been recorded for the 
past two years. This led the Wallen manager to start the basic property database 
subproject. 
 
Basic property database. To consistently enforce compliance with legal rules an 
accurate picture was needed of property registration, as ownership can help to 
uncover what actually happens beyond front doors of houses. However, holes in 
the various registers and the impossibility of connecting the registers of various 
local authorities hampered investigations. For example, in 5,000 cases the 
ownership of accommodations was unknown and 15,000 house numbers were 
wrongfully registered (Van Traa team, 2000: 11).289 Consequently, the 
registrations had to be improved first; missing information had to be completed 
and incorrect files deleted. This meant the Wallen manager needed to create a 
single reliable basic property database. Furthermore, this database had to be 
connected to other public registration systems, such as that of the chamber of 
commerce, the land registry and register of population (Van Traa 
team/Wallenproject, 2000: 4). In this way it would become possible to relate 
objects (premises) to subjects (owners, licensees), to uncover illegal activities in 
or from the premises and to uncover constructions to protect the anonymity of 
actual owners such as the use of front men. For example, a large amount of 
property without a clear business purpose in hands of one person or differences 
between names on the license and actual executives could indicate illegal 
activities (Van Traa team, 2000: 15). The fact that reliable and current 
information was assumed to be a basic condition for consistently enforcing 
compliance urged the city government to make this a city-wide project, under 
the responsibility of the Van Traa team. 
The need for a basic property database stemmed from organisational and 
administrative shortcomings, in particular, in the information position of local 
authorities. As such this subproject can be construed as a real policy-aimed 
project to overcome the bottlenecks that hindered the administrative approach.  
 
Urban renewal. Urban renewal is a common action by which local authorities 
attempt to combat degeneration and negative atmosphere in deprived urban 
areas. The Van Traa approach combined the ‘usual’ urban renewal activities 
executed by the Amsterdam city government with specific actions of the Wallen 
team. The subproject focused on degenerated neighbourhoods that, for example, 
                                                        
289  One premises can have more than one accommodation.  
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had a large concentration of cannabis retail outlets, suppliers of herbal drugs and 
providers of equipment to grow cannabis.  
In the framework of the ‘usual’ urban renewal activities, the city 
government invested extra resources in public places and in actions related to 
the safety and liveability of the area. Subsequently, these investments attracted 
private investors who refurnished privately owned property. This approach was 
implemented in combination with the other subprojects of the Van Traa 
approach such as the grey premises project and the purchase of premises, 
discussed next. The successes, described later, of the combined interventions 
resulted in selection of other areas in which the strategy was applied.  
 
Purchase of premises. The Wallen team established a framework for the rapid 
purchase of premises by the city government. Many problems of the Wallen area 
were considered the result of investments by criminal organisations in property 
in the area. The Wallen manager refers in a report to these problems, which were 
also described by the Fijnaut research team (Van Traa team, 2000: 8). The 
manager argued that investments of criminal organisations lead to an 
undesirable mixing of criminal and legal activities. Consequently, these 
investments push the prices of properties up to a point at which premises 
become unaffordable for bona fide entrepreneurs. Moreover, illegal activities in 
these premises lead to further crime and degeneration of the area.  
The Wallen team established a protocol for the purchase of premises by the 
city government. This subproject is certainly an example of a multi-agency 
approach. For the purchase of premises the Wallen team operates in close 
cooperation with two semi-governmental housing cooperatives. On the 
recommendation of the Wallen team the housing cooperatives buy premises that 
could otherwise fall into the hands of criminal organisations. Instead, the Van 
Traa approach passes the premises on to bona fide entrepreneurs in order to start 
legal and desirable activities.290 In these cases the Wallen team screens the 
buyers for possible connections with criminal organisations. Moreover, with a 
view to the future, lease contracts include a clause that the right to lease is 
dependent on permission of the city government (Köbben, 2002: 84). The 
protocol includes circumstances under which premises will be purchased. 
Because of possible negative effects, like price boosting, the precise content of 
the protocol is secret.  
 
4.5.1.3 Legal preconditions 
 
Competences to exchange of information. A crucial condition for the success of 
the Van Traa approach is the exchange of information. With the start of the 
approach the Wallen team tried to find out what information was available from 
                                                        
290  This strategy is not new as in the 1980s the Amsterdam city government already applied this method.  
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the different partners and to what extent this information could be exchanged.291 
With regard to the amount of information available, results were positive. In 
particular the different local authorities (the Building and Housing Inspectorate, 
Social Services, Environment Service, Licensing Department and Population 
Register) appeared to have a mass of information (Köbben, 2002: 76). To 
combine this information the Amsterdam City Council gave permission (15 
November 1997) to share relevant administrative data in the framework of the 
Van Traa approach.  
In addition, the Wallen team and later the Van Traa team needed 
information from the closed registers maintained by the police, the public 
prosecutor’s department and the fiscal authorities. These registers are closed and 
these authorities have a legal duty to maintain confidentiality. As a result, the 
Amsterdam city government in cooperation with the authorities in question 
established a framework to provide for the necessary data exchange.  
Regarding the police registers, the Data Protection (Police Files) Act is in 
force to protect this sensitive information.292 Article 15 of this act empowers the 
mayor to consult police records in the context of maintaining the public order. 
This power can be delegated to the chairperson of urban districts with the 
purpose of maintaining public order, a provision that appeared to be useful for 
investigating licenses in the hotel and catering industry and in the prostitution 
branch. However, the idea of delegating this power to the Wallen manager in 
order to prevent crime on the Wallen area was found unacceptable. The police 
argued that this interpretation went too far, certainly as the Wallen project was 
to be the basis of a general approach. Subsequently, the mayor applied article 18 
of the Data Protection (Police Files) Act. This article allows the Minister of the 
Interior or the Minister of Justice to give permission to share information with 
public authorities in the interest of public order. By ministerial regulation (11 
March 1998) the Wallen team was authorised to consult police information for a 
period of two years up to 1 January 2000. This was the first time that article 18 
was applied. In fact up until now it is still the only application. This permission 
has thus far been extended four times. It includes the sharing of police data with 
the mayor, the Wallen team and the Van Traa team. At first this competence was 
limited to activities in the red-light district. Later with the expansion of the 
approach city-wide, the competence came to involve all subprojects earmarked 
by the body of the tripartite consultations established to fight serious crime. 
The Judicial Records and Certificates of Good Behaviour Act protect the 
registers of the public prosecutor’s department.293 Base on article 14 information 
can be shared with mayors on certificates of good behaviour. Based on article 15 
of this act the Minister of Justice can determine whether to exchange 
information with others if there is a weighty public interest. From 2003, the 
                                                        
291  For this a conference was set up where 40 employees from different partners participated an 
interesting exercise illustrating the possibilities of gathering and exchanging information on the basis 
of a number of pre-selected cases. 
292  Wet van 6 juli 2000 houdende regels inzake de bescherming van persoonsgegevens (Wet bescherming 
persoonsgegevens). Stb. 2000, no. 302. 
293  Wet op de justitiële documentatie en op de verklaringen omtrent het gedrag (WJD). 
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Minister of Justice gave this permission to the Van Traa team where final 
convictions are concerned.  
 Regarding cooperation of the fiscal authorities, the State Taxes Act 
hindered the exchange of information, as the civil servants in question are not 
allowed to share this information with others.294 Article 67 section 2 of this act 
offers the possibility to grant a release of this prohibition. In cooperation with 
public agencies the Internal Revenue Service may exchange information if the 
cooperation in question contributes to the core tasks of this service. The State 
Secretary of Finance decided to discharge the civil servants that cooperated in 
the Wallen project from their legal duty to maintain confidentiality (28 April 
1998), which enabled the tax authorities to participate in the Van Traa approach. 
However, from 2000 the Internal Revenue Service withdrew from the Van Traa 
approach as in general the cooperation did not contribute to the service’s core 
tasks. As described later regarding the implementation it remained possible to 
exchange information with tax authorities on an ad hoc basis.  
 
Privacy regulations. With these permissions the Wallen team and later the Van 
Traa team had access to information maintained by all the partners involved. 
The fact that some of this information was sensitive implied that the Van Traa 
approach had to comply with the legal standards to protect privacy. According 
to the Personal Data Protection Act a privacy regulation had to be created for 
recording sensitive information. This privacy regulation describes how the 
Wallen team had to deal with the information it received to ensure it was treated 
with care. Moreover, a sub-covenant had to be established to arrange the passing 
on of information to the core team so it could undertake actions. With the 
publication of the privacy regulation in the Municipal Bulletin it came into force 
17 November 1997. Finally, the four partners involved drew up a cooperative 
covenant that set out the general objective and the related responsibilities and 
authorisations. This covenant outlines the balance between the interests of the 
city government and privacy and offers a clear framework in which information 
can be exchanged. With the signing of this cooperative covenant (8 June 1998) 
no formal obstacles remained to implementation of the Wallen manager’s action 
plan, at least up to the end date of the approach that was set for 1 January 2000.  
 
4.5.2 Implementation 
 
The Van Traa approach was the first approach to be based on integral and 
integrated enforcement of rules in the Netherlands. To execute this approach the 
city government installed the Van Traa project to develop instruments and to 
implement them. What became of these approaches? In accordance with the 
previous chapter and this study’s general methods this subsection provides 
insight into the main aspects that influenced the implementation, at least those 
aspects that are important with regard to the prevention of organised crime.  
                                                        
294  Algemene wet inzake Rijksbelastingen (AWR).  
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Because the Van Traa project was an experimental approach, its proper 
evaluation was of utmost importance. Much data for such an evaluation can be 
derived from the annual reports and the progress reports. In 1999 an interim 
evaluation study was performed. In 2000 an overall evaluation study was 
announced. Due to the importance of such evaluation for the further 
development of the administrative approach, the study was partly financed by 
the Ministry of Justice. The Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam performed the most 
extensive evaluation study, which will be finished in 2005 (Huisman et al., 
2005). As described above, due to the presentation of the general findings at 
seminars, we can already refer to some of them.  
 
4.5.2.1 Initiating subprojects 
 
The Wallen team’s first task was to create new instruments for the 
administrative approach. Because of a lack of examples from elsewhere the 
Wallen team had to experiment itself and learn from methods that succeeded or 
failed. The team operated thematically in certain areas and branches for which 
several subprojects were started. As a result the team designed a wide range of 
instruments: dealing with degenerated neighbourhoods, screening possible 
unreliable entrepreneurs, mapping economic positions of power of criminal 
organisations, purchase of premises, etc.  
The experimental nature of the Wallen project meant that the team had to 
deal with a lot of problems. Most of these involved basic conditions: 
organisational and judicial bottlenecks of the administrative approach, for which 
several subprojects were started. For example, the Wallen team had to deal with 
incomplete administrative databases and with problems in the processing of 
information within the law-enforcement authorities. While dealing with these 
basic conditions the Wallen team had to solve other problems, including those 
faced in applying its own instruments. As a result the Wallen team had an 
enormous range of duties. The fact that the Wallen team and the Van Traa team 
had to cooperate with other agencies made it even more difficult for them to set 
a clear agenda; all parties had their own interests (Huisman et al. 2005). The city 
government and urban district councils proposed areas and branches that 
reflected their own priorities for attention from the Van Traa approach. 
Furthermore, some subprojects were started at the request of police as a result of 
indications of criminal activity. In addition, various external forces influenced 
the Van Traa agenda. According to Huisman et al. (2005) issues of the day as 
well as suspicions and rumours of abuses led to the initiation of new subprojects 
as well. All these influences extended the range of tasks involved in the Van 
Traa approach. 
With the changeover from the Wallen project to the Van Traa project, the 
Van Traa team became responsible for the coordination of the administrative 
approach city-wide. Moreover, the team had to adjust from more operational 
activities to more strategic tasks, such as coordinating and supporting local 
authorities. The Van Traa team had to operate as a helpdesk for other urban 
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districts who wanted to actively install administrative measures; it also had to 
pass on its knowledge and techniques to other city areas. Consequently, the 
approach came to encompass even more tasks, even more varied in nature.  
This wide range of tasks was the result of the experimental design with 
which the Van Traa approach started and which can be evaluated positively. The 
opportunity for urban district councils and police services to become actively 
involved and contribute to new subprojects made the Van Traa approach 
multidisciplinary. Moreover, acting in conformance with the issues of the day 
resulted from the increasing insight into local problems. However, over time the 
wide range of tasks seems to have undermined the decisiveness of the approach. 
For various projects it is doubtful whether they fit the actual objectives of the 
Van Traa approach. Therefore, Huisman et al. wonder why the Wallen team did 
not make strategic decisions about its main tasks. In their opinion, the Van Traa 
team should draw up clear selection criteria of subprojects to undertake. Such 
decisions and criteria would strengthen the authority of their activities. 
Nonetheless, the Van Traa team must also safeguard the active involvement of 
the other parties in order to guarantee the multidisciplinarity of the approach.  
 
4.5.2.2 Executing subprojects  
 
Gathering information. The two-step approach used by the Wallen team firstly 
exists in collecting and analysing information. In practice, it turned out to be 
difficult for the authorities to gain insight into what goes on beyond the front 
doors of premises as it was it was not easy to gain relevant and recent 
information (Huisman et al., 2005). In fact this process took a lot of time and 
energy. First of all, the Wallen team had to deal with the lack of information in 
several administrative registers. As described, this even resulted in a subproject 
to compile a basic property database. Furthermore, it appeared difficult to gain 
information from police and tax authorities. Covenants between the different 
authorities and permission of the Minister of the Interior and the State Secretary 
of Finance to access the police records and records of the Internal Revenue 
Service proved to be no guarantees for cooperation and information exchange.295 
Not only did information processing within the police prove problematic, 
reservations about passing on information because of the harm that could be 
done to criminal investigations resulted a lot of knowledge on organised crime 
not being shared with the municipal services involved. To facilitate the 
exchange of information, participants in the core groups were adjusted for each 
subproject based on the information each could provide. For example, in the 
case of the police various representatives could be selected (Huisman et al., 
2005). In some subprojects local police officers joined the core team, as they 
had a good view of the specific problems in the areas in question. In other 
subprojects the police was represented by a detective from the criminal 
                                                        
295  Criticism on the exchange of information mainly applies to police and tax authorities. The Wallen 
team only recently discovered the actual value of the judicial databases. Up to now little use has been 
made of these databases (Huisman and Huikeshoven, forthcoming: 11).  
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investigation department, who could provide information on involvement of 
individuals or criminal groups in organised crime. The best option, however, 
was to include both types of representatives in the core group to combine the 
various types of information so as to obtain a complete picture, which is in fact 
the strategy of the Van Traa approach.  
 Notwithstanding the efforts of the parties involved, the exchange of 
information remained difficult, as the Wallen team, and later the Van Traa team, 
could not easily indicate what information was needed, let alone where this 
information could be found in the police organisation. The teams did not know 
to whom information requests had to be addressed and the police services had 
no central information desk to turn to. Recently, this has been addressed as an 
information desk is now functioning. All of these problems regarding gathering 
information and ongoing changes in situations gives the impression that projects 
sometimes got stuck in this first step (Huisman et al., 2005). 
 
Analysing information. Next to collecting information, the analysis of the 
information is crucial. After all, it is through the assessment of all information 
that the Wallen team and the Van Traa team could derive effective measures. 
Before initiation of the administrative approach, analysing information was 
mainly a preparatory activity to criminal investigations. In the administrative 
approach, these analyses had to be adjusted to map other elements. Whereas 
police analyses concentrate on criminal activities, administrative analyses focus 
on activities in the legitimate environment, such as property, use of legal persons 
and the use of public services. The different focuses prompted the Wallen team 
to develop its own instrument, which it did in the form of a matrix or fact sheet 
containing relevant information and which is constantly updated during a 
subproject. With the fact sheet in hand, registered information could be 
compared with the actual situation and inexplicable deviations could give rise to 
further research and interventions.  
 The most important aspect of the fact sheet is the interpretation of the 
information; when should the authorities involved interfere? According to 
Huisman et al. (2005), this process is characterised by a lack of assessment 
criteria. No indicators point out the extent of risk of intrusion by organised crime 
and the need for intervention. In practice the administrative approach depends 
on suspicions regarding the combination of persons and premises. The Wallen 
team depended mainly on the availability of police information on which to base 
their suspicions. Holes in their information position and the problems of 
information processing inside police departments meant that the correctness and 
completeness of the information was by no means guaranteed. Because the 
public administration was unable to verify facts, it is possible that it operated on 
the basis of imperfect information. As a result these analyses could have resulted 
in a degree of arbitrariness regarding the entrepreneurs who were investigated.  
To avoid such arbitrariness, action was needed in the police information 
handling to make information more conducive to the administrative approach. 
However, in proactive intervention, it is not always possible to arrive at clear 
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insights into possible problems. As a result, the Van Traa team must sometimes 
act on less reliable information where the intervention is the result of a 
balancing of possible threats. An example of such balancing was the purchase of 
the Oibibio premises near the Amsterdam Central Station. The city government 
bought these premises based on a rumour that Albanians involved in organised 
crime were interested in securing the premises. Although the premises are 
situated in a city area that could be interesting for the underworld, it was 
absolutely unsure to what extent these rumours were true.  
 
Undertaking measures. The second step of the Van Traa approach is taking 
strategic decisions regarding bringing into force the most effective instruments 
to end illegal or undesired situations. It is remarkable that in this step the Wallen 
team and later the Van Traa team played a crucial role in determining strategy. 
These teams, in cooperation with the local tripartite consultations, decided on 
the measures to be undertaken. In practice, the strategic decisions were taken at 
the same level as the subproject was executed, instead of by the steering 
committee and tripartite consultations. In fact the body of the tripartite 
consultations only showed interest in earmarking new projects, as this was 
needed to enable the exchange of information (Huisman et al., 2005). The 
progress and the strategic decisions in the subprojects were not structural issues 
on the committee and consultation agendas.  
Under supervision of the Van Traa team and the local tripartite 
consultations, a large scope of measures were brought into action. Most of the 
measures were of an administrative nature, mostly refusal and withdrawal of 
permits. The possibility to refuse or withdraw permits was already applied in the 
Licensing and Catering Act, which covered the criterion bad way of life as 
grounds for refusal.296 People’s lifestyle was assumed to be important with 
regard to their social manners and issues regarding health and social economic 
aspects (Huisman et al., 2005). As a result, different offences regarding 
discrimination, sexual violence, drunkenness, tax evasion, violence and handling 
stolen property could lead to refusal or withdrawal of permits. The city 
government introduced three additional municipal systems with similar grounds 
for refusal. These systems involve hotel and catering exploitation, prostitution 
and gambling. Based on the bad way of life grounds, the public administration 
can bar applicants with criminal records. As described below, with the Van Traa 
approach Amsterdam’s public administration has successfully barred applicants 
based on suspicions of involvement in criminal activities. The analysis of the 
way of life of applicants aims at maintenance of public order. According to 
article 15 of the Data Protection (Police Files) Act the mayor has direct access to 
police records in this framework.297 This is important since to use these grounds 
of refusal the Wallen team does not depend on the special permission of the 
Minister of the Interior, meaning this instrument can also be used in other cities 
in the Netherlands. 
                                                        
296  Wet van 13 April 2000 tot wijziging van de Drank- en Horecawet, Stb. 2000, no. 184. 
297  See the above-mentioned article 15 of the Data Protection (Police Files) Act. 
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The administrative instruments were expanded with the BIBOB Act coming into 
force in mid-2003. Obviously the Amsterdam city government, which 
contributed to the screening and auditing approach with the development of its 
own screening and auditing bureau (see previous chapter), makes use of this act. 
The BIBOB Act is particularly important since it covers areas for which there 
are no special grounds for refusal. Moreover, the act is important because the 
screening possibilities and the grounds for refusal or withdrawal are not limited 
to the direct applicant, but also extend to persons in the applicant’s environment. 
Thus, in contrast to the special municipal systems, with the BIBOB instrument 
front men can be barred as well.  
In addition to these administrative measures, the partners in this 
multidisciplinary approach have undertaken action as well. Tax authorities have 
submitted various fiscal claims and the police have initiated criminal 
investigations. The outputs of the Van Traa approach are described in more 
detail later.  
 
4.5.3 Bottlenecks in implementation 
 
From the beginning the Wallen team has carried out a range of subprojects. This 
wide range of tasks and duties even increased with the changeover from the 
Wallen team to the Van Traa team, when the approach was enlarged from the 
red-light district to the whole city. In their new position the Van Traa team 
became a helpdesk that had to pass on their knowledge to other city areas. 
Consequently, the team had to activate the municipal services instead of 
carrying out the subprojects themselves. Moreover, the team had to coordinate 
activities and interests regarding the different tasks it carries out.  
 
Activating urban district councils and municipal services. At the start of the Van 
Traa approach the Wallen team created a framework to support the urban 
districts and municipal services. Over time some of the urban districts became 
actively involved in initiating subprojects under the administrative approach. 
However, this was not true of all districts and services. Moreover, the 
involvement was sometimes limited to the initiation of projects; in most cases 
the subprojects were still carried out by the Van Traa team itself or with great 
support from this team. Few subprojects were carried out by the urban districts 
or municipal services themselves.  
The large range of tasks of the Van Traa team meant that strategic 
decisions had to be taken and selection criteria drawn up for initiating new 
projects. However, this implied a changeover in the activation policy of the Van 
Traa approach. Whereas at first the approach was focused on creating support, 
now it had to select subprojects – and thus turn down some requests. However, 
turning down requests for support from the Van Traa team does not have to 
hinder the execution of administrative action by the councils and municipal 
services themselves. The Van Traa team had to find a balance between 
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supporting projects that need specialised expertise and encouraging councils and 
municipal services to execute their own subprojects.  
 
Coordinating activities. The Van Traa approach is based on cooperation 
between various partners at different levels in fighting crime. Over time, it 
appears that the core team and in particular the Van Traa team became the key 
figure of the approach. That is not surprising, as this core team was charged with 
the actual execution of tasks and the Van Traa team was especially charged with 
the development and execution of the administrative approach. According to 
Huisman et al. (2005) setting up a special team has advantages and 
disadvantages. 
An advantage is that the team was able to develop and internalise skills and 
expertise. With the start of the Van Traa approach the Wallen team came up 
against several shortcomings, in particular involving the quality of municipal 
databases. Although repairing these shortcomings was not an objective of the 
approach, the Wallen team invested in solving these problems, since they 
involved basic conditions for the administrative approach. In addition to the 
subprojects focusing the preconditions for the administrative approach, the 
Wallen team developed various subprojects related to certain problems or 
problematic areas. A few years later, the team was executing a wide range of 
tasks, in addition to which, the later Van Traa team built up a large network of 
contacts among the involved parties.  
 A disadvantage of such a specialised team is the ease with which municipal 
services have left the specialised approach to the experts. Thus, instead of 
carrying out activities regarding the integral and integrated enforcement of rules, 
some services have left these activities to the Van Traa team. The consequences 
are described in the next subsection. 
 Finally, regarding the coordination of activities it must be concluded that 
the exchange of information was a problem. The permission of the competent 
ministers proved to be no guarantee that information would be exchanged. 
Unwillingness on the part of the partners and deficiencies in local registers and 
incomplete databases, as well as holes in the information position of police 
departments and problems in receiving information from these departments 
made it difficult to gain complete and recent insight into specific problems. 
Moreover, the exchange of police information was limited to the Van Traa team 
and to cases earmarked as Van Traa subprojects. This meant that parties brought 
into action, for example, the fire safety inspection or city planning department, 
could not be informed of this information. City councils and the municipal 
services were therefore less informed than the Van Traa team. Obviously, this 
could be a reason to leave Van Traa approach activities to the Van Traa team.  
 
Coordinating interests. From the start the Wallen team applied itself to various 
subprojects. Its wide range of tasks and duties was even increased with the 
changeover from the Wallen team to the Van Traa team; when the approach was 
enlarged to the whole city. Regarding cooperation in the Van Traa approach, 
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Huisman et al. (2005) conclude that some partners expressed their commitment 
in words but did not always put their words into action. Cooperation seemed to 
depend on individuals, as the enthusiasm of individual police officers and civil 
servants appeared to be key.  
Over time, the Internal Revenue Service, which was brought into action to 
submit additional fiscal claims, indicated its desire to focus on other tasks and 
that the Van Traa approach was not its priority. It decided to end its structural 
involvement in the approach. Nonetheless, with regard to individual subprojects 
the tax authorities deliberated on the benefit of their involvement.  
 Notwithstanding its many tasks, the Van Traa team has not yet made 
strategic decisions on its main duties and interests. Because choices on these 
duties remain forthcoming, the Van Traa team is now saddled with a lot of work, 
but lacks a framework in which to make decisions and set priorities. Only in late 
2003 did the team begin to question its wide range of duties and busy schedule, 
which resulted in reflection on its actual responsibilities and objectives 
(Huisman et al., 2005).  
 
4.6 Evaluation of the outcomes of the Van Traa approach 
 
To answer the third research question this section deals with the outcomes of the 
Van Traa approach. In accordance with the methods described in Chapter 1 and 
similar to the previous chapters, this section provides insight into the observed 
outputs and plausible outcomes. The outputs relate to the objectives described in 
section 4.2. The plausible outcomes involve the assumptions judged in light of 
pragmatic new criminological theories. Possible side effects are also discussed, 
and an overall conclusion is drawn with regard to the strengths and weaknesses 
of the intervention.  
 
4.6.1 Observed outputs 
 
The Van Traa approach is based on the assumed interaction between organised 
crime and the legitimate environment as well as the role of the negligence of the 
public administration in this interaction. The approach had two objectives: 
developing and executing instruments for an administrative approach and 
implementing these instruments in the existing civil service apparatus.  
 
4.6.1.1 Developing and executing instruments for an administrative approach 
 
In a rather short period the Wallen team managed to develop several strategies 
and instruments which were executed in several subprojects. After this first 
period the Van Traa approach was considered to be so successful that it was 
seen as a cure-all (Huisman et al., 2005). Although this was certainly not the 
case, the approach did achieve some positive results. In their evaluation 
Huisman et al. (2005) present a clear overview of the outputs up until May 
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2004. Regarding this overview Huisman et al. remark that it does not include 
outputs from interventions outside the main Van Traa framework. So in practice 
even more results could be found. In addition, they conclude that not all projects 
and outputs can be ascribed exclusively to the Van Traa approach as some of the 
interventions would have taken place without the Van Traa approach (Huisman 
et al. 2005). Their outputs are related to the two main activities of the two-step 
approach of the Van Traa approach: collecting and analysing data on the one 
hand and undertaking strategic decisions and interventions on the other.  
The collecting and analysing of data is mainly related to the mapping of 
ownership and exploitation. For these activities the Van Traa approach 
examined hundreds of premises consisting of all kinds of hotels and catering 
establishments, smart-shops, casinos and call centres. The strategic decisions 
included a range of interventions. According to the Van Traa team (2001: 6), the 
city government purchased 56 premises up until 2001. These premises housed 
several brothels and coffee shops that now, due to the Van Traa intervention, are 
replaced by legal and reliable businesses and houses (Van Traa 
team/Wallenproject, 2000: 9). Because of the success of this intervention, this 
method was later applied in other areas of the city. In the grey premises project, 
the Wallen team managed to restore situations in conformance with the rules. In 
one of the largest cases, an entrepreneur who owned 65 houses and 40 
commercial premises in the Wallen area was checked. Of these premises almost 
none was used in accordance with the rules (Projectbureau manager 
Wallengebied, 1999: 7). In fact they were used to accommodate illegal 
immigrants. Under threat of administrative fines the situation was restored in 
compliance with the licences.  
In a general overview of all interventions, various successes can be 
ascribed to the Van Traa approach (Huisman et al., 2005). First, tens of 
establishments housing illegal hotels, casinos and catering activities were 
closed. Among these closed establishments were four illegal casinos, which 
clearly illustrates the success of the administrative approach. For years the 
authorities were unable to cooperate to close illegal casinos, but now they 
succeeded. In addition, different administrative warnings were given, reports of 
offences regarding environmental rules were handed over and some 10 permits 
in the hotel and catering industry were refused or withdrawn. Moreover, tax 
authorities imposed various additional taxes and investigative services started 
two criminal investigations.  
 
4.6.1.2 Implementing the instruments in the regular structure of the civil 
service apparatus 
 
The Van Traa approach was set up as a temporary approach. From the start the 
city government wanted to implement its methods and instruments in the regular 
organisations of the civil service apparatus. The implementation of the methods 
and instruments was even seen as a basic condition for the success of the 
administrative approach in Amsterdam. In 2003 the Van Traa team indeed 
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became integrated in the regular organisation.298 What can we conclude about 
the integration and implementation of the methods and instruments?  
Two years after the start of the approach the interim evaluation showed that 
the methods and instruments had not yet been integrated into the regular 
organisations, and information provision still depended on personal contacts 
(Andersson Elffers Felix, 1999; Köbben, 2002: 89). The study recommended the 
further development of the approach by which successful experimental 
instruments were converted into structural methods embedded in the 
organisation (Andersson Elffers Felix, 1999; Köbben, 2002: 89). In the 
meantime, the team has been officially integrated into the existing civil service 
apparatus. The approach is now under the responsibility of the Inner City 
Service. However, the methods and instruments of the approach seem not yet 
fully implemented in the regular organisation or the various city councils and 
municipal services (Huisman et al., 2005). Notwithstanding the efforts of the 
Van Traa team, a separate subproject was even established to implement the 
approach in Amsterdam’s downtown district. After some years, however, the 
approach was pushed to the background. Once more it appeared that successes 
were related mostly to individuals (Huisman et al., 2005). With the departure of 
these individuals the execution of the instruments and methods often fell apart.  
In some cases new executives were even unaware of the implementation of 
the Van Traa approach. Obviously, this was fatal for development of expertise 
as well as maintaining and updating databases. However, the difficult 
implementation was also a result of the special position of the Van Traa 
approach in its first years (Huisman et al., 2005). On the one hand, the 
installation of the Wallen team to be alert to possible criminal intrusions could 
have been an excuse for other municipal services to not be alert. On the other 
hand, due to its increasing experience the Van Traa team preferred carrying out 
operations itself, to be sure that they were performed correctly. Also a part of the 
city councils and municipal services referred to the expertise of the Van Traa 
team and consciously left activities of integral and integrated enforcement of 
rules to the specialised team. Consequently, it cannot be said that the Van Traa 
approach is actually implemented by the civil service apparatus. 
 
4.6.1.3 Conclusions on the outputs 
 
The multidisciplinary measures taken in the framework of the Van Traa 
approach illustrate the success of this unique aspect of this approach. Based on 
these outputs one must conclude that the Van Traa approach gained clear insight 
into the ownership and exploitation of premises. The question, however, is to 
what extent these activities contributed insight into organised crime and 
impacted the organised crime problem? 
With regard to the projects focused on the rehabilitation of degenerated 
neighbourhoods, one must conclude that these subprojects were successful. The 
                                                        
298  From 2003, the Wallen team – or Van Traa team – was part of the department of public order and 
safety. 
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activities of the Van Traa approach helped to rehabilitate whole 
neighbourhoods; more premises are occupied, entrepreneurs show more 
commitment to their neighbourhood and perceived safety is increased (Huisman 
et al., 2005). These subprojects, which focus on ‘breeding grounds for crime’, 
confronted the team with problems related to drug abuse and with 
misadministration in the hotel and catering industry, but not with criminal 
offences, let alone organised crime (Huisman et al., 2005). Notwithstanding that 
for these subprojects it is possible to uncover the effects regarding common 
crime, it remains impossible to determine the extent to which these results affect 
organised crime. 
 In the subprojects focused on barring criminals from public services, the 
team was confronted with organised crime. Most of the time these subprojects 
concerned selected areas wherein organised crime was considered to have 
established positions of power. For example, by purchasing premises in which 
criminals seemed to be interested and by closing establishments used for 
criminal activities, the criminals were hindered in extending their positions of 
power. Also the closing of illegal casinos helped uproot organised crime. 
Consequently, the Van Traa approach has shown that it is possible to 
successfully bar certain entrepreneurs and stop certain activities. Where these 
entrepreneurs and activities are related to organised crime, it is also possible that 
the intervention affects criminal activities. A clear example of such success is 
the closing of four casinos that facilitated illegal gambling.  
 Notwithstanding the results regarding individual criminals it is hard to 
determine the effects of the Van Traa approach on the general problem of 
organised crime. First of all, the approach lacks a clear definition of the kind of 
crime on which it focuses. The Van Traa approach involves organised as well as 
common crime. Moreover, regarding organised crime it is unclear what 
definition is used. This is not surprising since there is a lot of discussion on the 
definition of organised crime in the field of criminology as well as in politics. 
Moreover, it is unclear which crime the approach needed to focus on. Due to the 
wide range of duties it concentrated on both organised crime and on common 
crime and even on degenerated neighbourhoods that were assumed to be 
breeding grounds for crime. According to Huisman et al. (2005), the failure to 
define the actual object of the approach – including the lack of a clear definition 
of organised crime – hinders determining the actual effects.  
 Efforts to uncover the impact on organised crime come against more 
problems. The main one is the limited amount of quantitative and qualitative 
insight regarding organised crime before as well as after the approach. The only 
option to deduce some results is to compare the extensive overview of the nature 
of organised crime in Amsterdam presented by the Fijnaut research team in 1996 
(Fijnaut en Bovenkerk, 1996) with a recent analysis of organised crime in 
Amsterdam. Such an overview suggests that it is unlikely that the positions of 
power of the criminal entrepreneurs uncovered by the Fijnaut research team 
have been pulled down. Notwithstanding the methodological differences it can 
be concluded that the problem of organised crime, in broad outline, remains the 
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same. Amsterdam still functions as an international marketplace where criminals 
from all over the world do businesses and still these businesses mainly involve 
trade in illegal goods and services (Huisman et al., 2004, Huisman et al., 2005). 
Hereby, the researchers refer especially to the Amsterdam infrastructure, which 
is ideal for the distribution of illegal goods and services and for displacing and 
laundering criminal proceeds. Finally, the recent killings on the streets of 
Amsterdam of people who are likely involved in organised crime illustrate that 
criminal organisations have not yet been chased out of the city.  
 
4.6.2 Plausible outcomes 
 
Although the Wallen manager and the Wallen team did not refer to clear 
theories on causes of crime and fighting crime at the start of the approach, the 
subprojects that were executed encompass two strategies. One is hindering 
criminals from using public administration’s services. By creating clear insight 
into what goes on in the city, by increasing supervision in economic dealings in 
particular areas where problems are observed and by bringing into action 
combined forces of the civil service apparatus, police, judiciary and tax 
authorities and even certain private companies, the city government has tried to 
prevent criminal activities. Second is fighting symptoms and activities that are 
assumed to be breeding grounds for crime: e.g. degenerated neighbourhoods. 
This section illustrates the extent to which these two strategies are based on the 
situational crime prevention approach.  
 
4.6.2.1 Situational crime prevention 
 
Table 4.6 presents the techniques of the Van Traa approach classified according 
to Cornish and Clarke’s (2003: 90) scheme. To a large extent the Van Traa 
approach’s techniques include elements similar to the previous interventions. On 
one hand, the approach tries to increase the costs of crime by increasing the risk 
and effort involved. On the other hand, it tries to decrease the benefits by 
depriving criminals of their rewards. Moreover, like the previous intervention, 
the Van Traa approach focuses on the public service actors to remove excuses 
not to apply the approach. However, in contrast with the other interventions the 
Van Traa approach includes techniques of reducing provocations. Because this 
technique is not evident in the other interventions, this technique is described 
most extensively.  
 
Increase the risk. The methods and instruments of the Van Traa approach focus 
on gaining clear insight into situations. Therefore, the approach includes the 
technique of strengthening surveillance. Surveillance comes from the civil 
servants charged with the enforcement of rules. Because the Van Traa approach 
includes an integral enforcement of rules, the civil servants must be alert to all 
kinds of violations. By virtue of their position they are able to supervise many 
activities. Cornish and Clarke (2003: 90) define this technique as the utilisation 
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of place managers. In addition the Van Traa approach strengthens formal 
surveillance, as the integrated enforcement of rules includes activities of police, 
judiciary and tax authorities (Cornish and Clarke, 2003: 90).  
 A second way of increasing risks is to reduce anonymity (Cornish and 
Clarke, 2003: 90). This plays an essential role in the Van Traa approach. To 
know with whom a city council or a municipal service is dealing, the actual 
owner of premises and establishments is revealed. Moreover, this applies 
economic dealings, as the public services must know what goes on in premises 
and whether valid licenses are present.  
 
Increase effort. With its integrated and integral enforcement of rules the Van 
Traa approach hinders the concealing of criminal activities or purposes. Simply 
phrased, it makes it harder to conceal irregularities and, for example, get a 
permit or subsidy. Clarke (1997: 17) defines this technique as target hardening. 
It implies that criminals must increase their efforts to achieve their aims. In 
addition, the increased supervision enables municipal services to control access 
to certain facilities (Clarke, 1997; 17). Obviously, the fact that these facilities 
are only accessible through the municipal services of a specific area means these 
services have a monopoly, which strengthens this technique to the maximum. In 
particular, criminal organisations must find other methods to achieve their 
criminal intentions or get access to the required facilities. This way of deflecting 
offenders is a technique for preventing crime (Cornish and Clarke, 2003: 90). 
 
Reduce the rewards. In addition to the previous strategies, some of the methods 
of the Van Traa approach have a direct effect on the rewards of criminal 
organisations. Similar to the Dutch screening and auditing approach the Van 
Traa approach enables the refusing or withdrawing of permits and the closing of 
establishments. With these competences, the municipal services can deny 
criminal organisations’ their benefits. Moreover, the integrated enforcement of 
rules enables the Van Traa approach to bring intervention of its partners into 
action: criminal investigations can be started, administrative fines can be 
imposed and tax authorities can resort to additional collection. All of these 
actions have their costs for the criminal organisations, and the knowledge that 
benefits can be denied can prevent some of the criminals to commit the offence 
(Clarke, 1997: 23).  
The uncertainty of gaining profits would influence the cost-benefit analysis 
and change the decisions of criminal organisations. Denying benefits would 
affect not only the criminal organisation in question, but could also serve as an 
example to other organisations. This might certainly be the case in a specific 
neighbourhood where entrepreneurs know one another. It sends a message to 
criminal organisations that they might reconsider establishing in Amsterdam, 
since there is a risk of losing their business. 
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Remove excuses. Similar to the previous interventions, this technique focuses 
not on the criminal organisations, but on the municipal services that could 
facilitate criminal activities. By implementing the Van Traa approach the city 
government aimed to activate the conscience of the various municipal services. 
In fact, for this technique the integrity approach was instilled as described 
earlier. 
 
Reduce provocations. In contrast to the previous interventions, the Van Traa 
approach includes activities that fit the strategy of reducing provocations. This 
technique is present in the subprojects involving rehabilitating degenerated 
neighbourhoods. Because of the special interest of the Wallen manger to visible 
crime and degeneration in the red-light district, the Wallen team and later the 
Van Traa team attached great significance to the relation between organised 
crime on the one hand and common crime and degeneration on the other. To a 
great extent this reasoning fit the technique of reducing temptation to commit 
crime (Clarke, 1997: 22) and discouraging imitation of crime (Cornish and 
Clarke, 2003: 90). These strategies mainly encompass rapid repair and good 
governance to prevent crime.  
Clarke (1997: 22) refers to Wilson and Kelling who argue for this 
technique as part of their ‘broken windows’ approach. This approach, also 
presented as the ‘fixing broken windows approach’ by Kelling and Coles (1998) 
has been successful in the United States. As this technique is an essential 
element of the Van Traa approach, its theoretical value is described in more 
detail later.  
The fixing broken windows approach involves the regulation of public 
places and is based on the idea that small disorder leads to larger disorder and 
that disorder results in city decay and even crime. The reasoning is simple 
(Kelling and Coles, 1998: xv). A broken window that is not fixed shows that no 
one is in charge and that no one cares. As a result more windows will be broken. 
Consequently, young criminals feel attracted to unprotected areas, while upright 
citizens abandon these areas. The approach is based on three step-wise relations: 
the relation between disorder and fear, the relation between disorder and urban 
decay and the relation between urban decay and (serious) crime. According to 
Kelling and Coles (1998: 20) the first two relations have clear empirical 
foundation. Aggressive begging, abandoned cars, graffiti, public drunkenness 
and street prostitution are signs of disorder that citizens must cope with and that 
citizens fear. Disorderly behaviour therefore disturbs individuals and indicates 
that an area is unsafe. Consequently, signs of disorder can affect social life in a 
whole neighbourhood. For example, merchants face financial losses if citizens 
abandon an area. Such a situation can result in urban decay. 
 However, the third step is put forth as a hypothesis that requires empirical 
testing (Kelling and Coles, 1998: 20). It involves the assumption that disorder 
and urban decay leads to common crime and even to serious crime. According to 
Kelling and Coles (1998: 25) the existence of this relation can be based upon 
different criminological studies. In neighbourhoods with higher crime levels, 
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disorder was linked more strongly with crime than with other characteristics, 
such as poverty and instability of the housing market. Based on this insight 
Kelling and Coles (1998: 25, 27) argue that ‘disorder does indeed precede or 
accompany serious crime’ and that restoring order prevents or reverses urban 
decay and subsequently, prevents serious crime.  
Similar to the fixing broken windows approach, the Van Traa approach 
focuses on decay or degeneration of neighbourhoods because they could serve 
as breeding grounds for organised crime. From this point of view the Van Traa 
approach seems plausible. However, the fixing broken windows approach is not 
generally accepted. In particular some criminologists doubt both its empirical 
validity and the theoretical foundation of the relation between disorderly, 
degenerated neighbourhoods and crime (Taylor, 2001; Harcourt, 2002). Critics 
of the fixing broken windows approach of Kelling and Coles mainly focus on 
the firmness of the assertions. Although empirical results show some support, 
this support is neither consistent nor as applicable as the theoretical statements 
suggest (Taylor, 2001: 367).  
 
4.6.2.2 Effects of the techniques 
 
Based on the techniques of situational crime prevention it seems plausible that 
Amsterdam is now less attractive to criminal organisations. Although there is no 
empirical evidence to confirm this reasoning, civil servants operating in the city 
and a field study of the red-light district give the impression that certain 
entrepreneurs have indeed refrained from some activities. Just the introduction 
of the Wallen manager would have caused commotion in the red-light district 
and for some entrepreneurs this would have been sufficient reason to close the 
doors of their establishments. Moreover, one subproject, the announcement of 
forthcoming action to enforce compliance with rules on hotel and catering 
establishments, has already resulted in the closure of five establishments 
(Huisman et al., 2005).  
Regarding the technique of recovering degenerated neighbourhoods, the 
results are less obvious. The subprojects involving recovering degenerated 
neighbourhoods are based on the observed relation between organised crime on 
the one hand and common crime and degeneration on the other. Often people 
say that organised crime is invisible. However, according to Fijnaut et al. (1998: 
213) this is only half true, especially with regard to traditional organised crime 
involving trade in illegal goods and services. Fijnaut et al. (1998: 213) pose that 
‘its invisibility might pertain to the producers of the goods and services, but not 
to people who distribute them’; the situation in the red-light district of 
Amsterdam is a perfect example. With this reasoning Fijnaut et al. argue that 
organised crime can affect neighbourhoods where illegal goods and services are 
distributed. Moreover, if organised crime leads to common crime and 
degeneration, the reasoning may be turned around. The Van Traa team assume 
that interfering in degenerated neighbourhoods will affect organised crime, as it 
would take away its breeding grounds (Huisman et al., 2005). This strategy has 
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been tried under the name of ‘fixing broken windows’. However, up to now 
there is no theoretical evidence that this strategy is effective.  
 
4.6.3 Side effects 
 
The Van Traa approach has various side effects. First of all, installing the 
Wallen team appears to have had a symbolic function. According to Huisman et 
al. (2005) some unreliable entrepreneurs left even before any instruments were 
put into action. However, the selection of sectors and areas as the working 
terrain of the Van Traa team could stigmatise these sectors and branches 
(Huisman et al., 2005). Subprojects of the Van Traa approach indicate 
suspicions of irregularities. However, media attention could place these areas 
and sectors in a bad daylight that is difficult to recover.  
The main negative side effect of the Van Traa approach is – like the 
previous measures – the possible displacement of criminal activities. It is likely 
that the Van Traa team approach would result in the geographic displacement of 
criminal activities (Huisman et al., 2005). In fact there are signs of such 
displacement. Some entrepreneurs who are refused permits in the inner city have 
tried to get a similar permit in another neighbourhood. The extent of 
displacement is hard to determine, in particular as criminals displace their 
activities outside of Amsterdam. Furthermore, the Van Traa team suspects 
certain criminals displace activities to other branches, in particular those 
branches that are as yet unregulated or that are not subject to the Van Traa 
approach (Huisman et al., 2005). This would seem plausible, as in these 
branches no barriers yet hinder their criminal activities. In reaction to suspicions 
of such displacement, the Van Traa team started some new projects, such as the 
examination of call centres and smart-shops. A third form of displacement 
involves methods. Criminals may adapt their business plan or bring front men 
into action to remove grounds for refusal. It is unclear to what extent this kind of 
displacement takes place in Amsterdam. Obviously, the Van Traa team as well 
as the municipal services should take account of such constructions.  
A second negative side effect involves the possible strengthened positions 
of power of some large entrepreneurs (Huisman et al., 2005). These 
entrepreneurs are not always the goods ones. In fact, these large entrepreneurs 
have at their disposal tools to perfect their legal activities and shield their illegal 
activities. After some time, the entrepreneurs in the red-light district became 
well informed of the instruments and methods focused on uncovering 
irregularities in entrepreneurs’ dealings. When entrepreneurs follow the rules 
and comply with the conditions of the local authorities and when they 
successfully hide possible connections with organised crime, the Van Traa 
approach has no point of application. In such cases grounds for refusal cannot be 
brought into action. As a result, the reallocation of property in the red-light 
district could be to the advantage of the more professional criminal 
organisations. The unintentional facilitation of these professional organisations, 
which are able to shield their activities in such a way that they are not found in 
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police records and which can afford judicial advisors to perfect their activities, 
cannot be prevented. The perfecting of legal activities has even resulted in 
persons who formerly were indicated as criminals, now discussing this problem 
with municipal services in the framework of new subprojects (Huisman et al., 
2005).  
 
4.6.4 Conclusion 
 
To what extent does the administrative approach of Amsterdam prevent 
organised crime? To answer this question one must take account of two aspects: 
the implementation of the instrument and the effects of the executed 
instruments. Although the Van Traa approach successfully developed 
administrative measures, the implementation of the approach appeared rather 
difficult. One of the most important shortcomings involves the exchange of 
information. Apparently, ministerial permission is no guarantee for a perfect 
exchange of information. Unwillingness and deficiencies in databases and 
limited information positions make it hard to gain solid oversight of the concrete 
problems. A second shortcoming involves cooperation. The instruments applied 
to eliminate undesirable situations were mainly administrative ones. For this, it 
is difficult to say that the Van Traa approach has resulted in a real joint policy 
(Huisman et al., 2005). Furthermore, it appears difficult to implement the 
activities of the Van Traa approach in the regular civil service apparatus. 
Moreover, little by little the Van Traa team developed a wide range of tasks and 
new objectives. In fact, it seems that the approach resulted in goal displacement. 
All attention was paid to developing new subprojects, with less attention paid to 
the results of the approach. Moreover, developing these different activities 
resulted in a net-widening. Consequently, the Van Traa team lost sight of its 
actual objective – the prevention of organised crime.  
 So, what were the results and effects of the Van Traa approach? In fact, 
uncovering the actual effects of the approach is difficult. The first strategy, 
barring criminals from public services, seems to have some positive effects 
regarding hindering organised crime. However, the lack of insight into 
developments of organised crime makes it impossible to determine the extent of 
this effect. Based on the situational crime prevention approach this strategy 
could be plausible; methods and instruments of the Van Traa approach could 
hinder organised crime. However, the hindering of criminal activities seems to 
have had the most impact on small-time criminals, as the big ones seem able to 
pass the barriers by increasing their shielding efforts. The second strategy, 
recovering degenerated neighbourhoods in order to take away the breeding 
grounds for organised crime, has resulted in some positive effects: 
neighbourhoods have been rehabilitated and more premises are occupied. It is 
however, impossible to determine the effects of this success with regard to 
organised crime. Moreover, this strategy as yet has no strong theoretical 
foundation on which to rest. Similar to the fixing broken windows approach it is 
uncertain whether this strategy actually works.  
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Chapter 5 Effectiveness of organised crime prevention in the 
Netherlands: overview of my research findings 
 
From the early 1990s the preventive approach to fight organised crime has been 
launched on many international fronts as well as national ones. This is certainly 
true in the Netherlands. For the past fifteen years Dutch authorities have 
developed a progressive preventive approach to complement repressive 
strategies to combat organised crime. Various preventive measures have been 
implemented with much enthusiasm and high expectations. Now critics are 
waiting for the results. This study has exposed the possible effectiveness of 
some of these preventive measures against organised crime.  
Determining the effectiveness of preventive programmes is no easy task. In 
particular it is difficult to establish a causal relation between the indicated policy 
programme and specific effects. This certainly goes for fighting organised 
crime, since it is impossible to erect classic experimental designs and statistical 
approaches with before and after measurements. Consequently, this study uses 
two other strategies to expose programmes’ effectiveness. The first strategy 
involves studying the preventive measures in the abstract. By exposing the 
programme theory of the measures and judging the underlying assumptions in 
light of the situational crime prevention approach, this study indicates the extent 
to which it is plausible that the measures are effective. These results are 
indicated as the ‘plausible outcomes’. Second, this study observes the outputs of 
the preventive measures. This part of the study looks particularly at ‘observed 
outputs’ by which the effectiveness of the measures can be related to objectives 
formulated beforehand. The outputs of the measures may illustrate their success 
and strengthen the plausibility of the final outcomes. In determining the output 
of preventive measures it is important to realise that the functioning of the 
measures depends on how they are implemented. If measures are not 
implemented well, one can speak of implementation failures, due to which the 
expected effects of the measure is no longer self-evident. Together the observed 
outputs and the plausible outcomes determine the programme impacts and 
effectiveness. 
To execute these two strategies this study includes a programme evaluation 
of the essential elements of executing an intervention: the programme theory, 
the programme process (implementation) and the programme impacts. These 
three essential elements form the basis of the research questions posed in this 
study. Consequently, answering the three questions for each of the selected 
measures – the anti-money laundering intervention, the screening and auditing 
approach, and the administrative approach of the City of Amsterdam – enables 
us to say something about the measures’ possible effectiveness.  
This final chapter firstly elaborates on the main conclusions regarding these 
three essential elements and illustrates the way in which these elements are 
handled in the evaluated measures. The first section exposes the programme 
theory or design of the studied preventive measures. The second section looks at 
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the implementation of the preventive measures. The third section provides 
insight into the impact of the preventive measures. Subsequently, the fourth 
section of this final chapter looks at some boundaries for organised crime 
prevention. These boundaries are the result of balancing safety with privacy. 
Lastly, the final section discusses expectations and further development of 
organised crime prevention. This discussion describes some overall thoughts and 
conditions for organised crime prevention. 
 
5.1 Exposing the programme theory of preventive measures 
 
To ascertain the effectiveness of preventive measures, first the programme 
theories or the programme designs must be evaluated. An adequate design is a 
necessary precondition for a measure to live up to expectations of it. The 
evaluation of the programme theory or design regards the rationale for expecting 
that the action undertaken will result in the desired results. This rationale should 
be based on empirical knowledge on organised crime as well as on 
criminological theories, in this case, the situational crime prevention approach. 
 
5.1.1 Judging preventive measures based on empirical knowledge on 
organised crime 
 
Insight into organised crime is necessary to point out the exact problems that 
need to be fought. Obviously, measures against organised crime should focus on 
exactly these problems. Early in the preventive approach to organised crime in 
the Netherlands there was no such insight, and the authorities were led by 
rumours and ghost stories about the problem. As described in Chapter 1, the first 
empirical study was performed only in 1996 (Fijnaut et al., 1996, 1998). This 
first study confirmed the presence of organised crime in the Netherlands and yet 
placed the problem in perspective. While no mafia-structured organisations had 
infiltrated the legitimate environment (racketeering), there were various criminal 
networks of changing composition that dealt in illegal goods and services 
(vices). To update authorities’ insights, the Research and Documentation Centre 
of the Ministry of Justice of the Netherlands began to monitor the problem of 
organised crime (Kleemans et al., 1998, 2002.). In addition, police departments 
have conducted various analyses of specific organised crime-related phenomena 
(Dienst Nationale Recherche Informatie, 2004, 2004a, 2004b). Furthermore, a 
nationwide analysis of the threats of serious crime and organised crime 
(Nationaal Dreigingsbeeld Zware of Georganiseerde Criminaliteit) was recently 
conducted and will be repeated every two years. This too should increase insight 
into current and future threats. According to all of this research, organised crime 
in the Netherlands can best be described as transit crime (Kleemans et al., 2002: 
139; Zaitch, 2002; Dienst Nationale Recherche Informatie, 2004: 85). This 
means that a large proportion of illegal goods are carried through the 
Netherlands to other countries via the normal infrastructure of the legitimate 
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environment. In particular Rotterdam and Amsterdam harbours and Schiphol 
airport facilitate the transport of goods. They are used as a gateway to the rest of 
Europe, not only for legal economic dealings but also for organised crime. 
The insight that the Netherlands is a marketplace for the international trade 
in illegal goods and services was an important impetus for the realisation of the 
administrative approach in the Netherlands and for applying best practices 
derived in other countries. The objectives of the screening and auditing approach 
of New York which focused on racketeering had to be adjusted when using this 
intervention in the Dutch context. Because racketeering manifests in the legal 
environment where it must conform with all kinds of regulations, it presents 
various opportunities to interfere when irregularities take place. In contrast, 
vices mostly take place in the illegal environment, meaning that there are fewer 
opportunities to interfere. Consequently, the expectations of the Dutch 
administrative approach have to be adjusted as well (Huisman, 2003: 36; Van de 
Bunt, 2004: 701). 
Unfortunately, insight is still lacking into many aspects of organised crime. 
For example, a lot is still unknown about the laundering and spending of 
criminal profits. Research shows that consumer spending cannot account for all 
use of criminal profits. While some of these profits are known to be invested in 
real estate, the investigative services have been unable to map the spending of 
the rest. 
With the rise of preventive measures, knowledge about organised crime 
cannot be limited to the criminal activities of criminal organisations. Unlike the 
repressive approach, which focuses only on criminal activities, the preventive 
approach aims at the facilitating activities that take place in the legitimate 
environment. This means that for organised crime prevention it must be clear 
what services are being abused by criminal organisations and what economic 
dealings facilitate organised crime. However, as this study has illustrated, it is 
not always easy to indicate the concrete sectors where such abuse takes place. 
For example, the screening and auditing approach was not based on strong 
empirical evidence, at least not on evidence regarding the situation in the 
Netherlands. The explanatory memorandum of the BIBOB Act refers to 
empirical evidence on racketeering by mafia-structured organisations in foreign 
countries, in particular Italy and the United States. The experiences in these 
countries point to the abuse of public business dealings, such as the government 
contracts awarded by administrative authorities. Although the Dutch legislator 
was aware that it had to deal with vices and not racketeering, it selected more or 
less the same sectors as in the United States: transport, waste disposal and the 
hotel and catering industry including the legitimate brothels and coffee shops. It 
justified this selection with the reasoning that preventive measures should not 
only hinder observed abuses, but should also focus on vulnerable sectors and 
possible future risks.  
This reasoning clearly illustrates that organised crime prevention is not 
based only on empirical research, but also on risk assessments that map the 
presence of risks and risk factors in concrete situations. Consequently, we may 
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conclude that the preventive approach seems to require less empirical evidence 
than the repressive approach. Still, the success of preventive measures will 
increase as the risk analyses include more empirical evidence. This is exactly 
what the Amsterdam government had in mind with its administrative approach. 
After an extensive risk analysis, the city government decided to impose the 
strategy for all of its municipal services, to avoid overlooking possible 
vulnerabilities.  
However, the danger of risk assessment is its possible stigmatising effect. 
For example, indicating certain economic sectors as vulnerable to abuse by 
organised crime can have adverse effects on these sectors (Van de Bunt, 2004: 
700). The same is true for screening procedures against an individual to learn 
about any possible involvement in criminal activities. A screening might raise 
suspicions of possible criminal involvement, which could harm an 
entrepreneur’s businesses even if the suspicions prove groundless. Possible 
media attention could strengthen such negative effects. Accordingly, 
policymakers should be aware of the problem of false positives and false 
negatives. 
 
5.1.2 Judging the measures in light of the situational crime prevention 
approach  
 
In the three preventive measures studied in this research, the Dutch legislator 
brought agencies and organisations into action to prevent the abuse of 
opportunities in the legitimate environment for committing criminal activities. 
The interfaces between organised crime and the legitimate environment thus 
became a main arena of organised crime prevention. By increasing supervision 
and raising barriers against possible abuse, the agencies and organisations turned 
these interfaces into the Achilles heel of organised crime. With this reasoning, 
organised crime prevention in the Netherlands was aligned with the situational 
crime prevention approach – one of the pragmatic new strategies for preventing 
crime. The situational approach argues that interfering in opportunities for crime 
will prevent crime. Thus, where organised crime abuses certain opportunities in 
the legitimate environment, interfering in this abuse will have an impact on 
organised crime. Based on this theoretical insight it is plausible that the 
preventive measures are effective. This section elaborates on the various 
strategies of intervention that the authorities have executed, by which these 
strategies are judged in the overall framework of situational crime prevention of 
Cornish and Clarke (2003: 90).  
 
Increasing supervision. In all three measures the legislator brought about 
increased supervision in order to increase the risk involved in committing 
offences. According to Clarke (1980) increasing the risks would increase the 
costs and influence decision-making in such a way that some potential criminals 
will give up further criminal activity. From the start of the development of the 
situational crime prevention approach, Clarke (1980) indicated that not all 
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motivated criminals would be hindered by situational crime prevention. Some 
motivated criminals will get around such measures to achieve their purposes by 
changing the place or time of their offences or by using other methods. 
Nonetheless, Clarke (1980: 141, 1987: 945) argues that displacement is not 
inevitable and various studies show that displacement is never 100%, meaning 
that at least some crimes are prevented (Hesseling, 1994). 
In the various measures the authorities focus on all kinds of supervision. 
First, the government emphasises the need for guardianship of various agencies 
and organisations, such as financial service providers and administrative 
agencies, as well as by their individual employees. With this technique the 
government introduces new ‘watchdogs’ to protect the legal environment. In 
addition, when these watchdogs suspect untrustworthy activities they must alert 
formal surveillance, which undertakes further action if necessary. For example, 
by reporting unusual transactions the financial service providers bring into 
action the investigative services, which can start criminal or financial 
investigations. In Amsterdam the Van Traa team can call in municipal 
authorities to close establishments and on tax authorities to impose additional 
taxes.  
To make supervision tasks more effective, the legislator has installed 
various measures to reduce anonymity. Based on the adage ‘know your 
customer’, agencies and organisations are charged to examine the reliability of 
clients. Accordingly, these agencies and organisations must not facilitate 
services for clients that appear unreliable. This is the case, for example, for the 
Dutch screening and auditing approach, which enables authorities to exclude 
unreliable applicants from tendering procedures and to refuse such persons 
permits and subsidies. Checking the identity of persons enables authorities to 
track clients later. Our main example of this technique is the customer 
identification obligation of the anti-money laundering intervention. By obliging 
customers to provide identification, it becomes possible to relate transactions 
and underlying offences back to persons.  
 
Alerting conscience. A second strategy of Dutch organised crime prevention 
involves increasing awareness of possible abuse and increasing the integrity of 
agencies and organisations. The basic idea of this strategy is that one has to be 
aware of problems before they can tackle them. In addition, the government has 
set clear rules to which these representatives must answer and introduced and 
installed techniques that assist compliance. With this strategy the Dutch 
authorities want to ensure that its representatives are constantly alert and 
therefore, less likely to be involved in criminal activities, knowingly or 
unknowingly. 
 These techniques of intervention come under Clarke’s strategy of removing 
excuses. This strategy responds to offenders’ efforts to neutralise feelings of 
guilt and shame. Under the guise of not knowing that something is forbidden 
and by maintaining that others break minor rules all the time, people can give in 
to everyday temptations to break certain rules. Removing such excuses hinders 
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this rule-breaking behaviour (Clarke, 1997). However, whereas Cornish and 
Clarke address this technique to potential criminals, the Dutch legislator focuses 
on agencies and organisations in the legitimate environment. This means that the 
technique is turned around. In Dutch organised crime prevention it is the 
agencies and organisations that must be alert for possible abuses from outside. 
Probably it is easier to influence agencies and organisation than willing 
offenders.  
 
Raising barriers. With the three preventive measures the authorities have 
erected barriers to abuse of certain services. The main barrier of the Dutch 
preventive measures is control of access to services, in particular, the financial 
services provided by the financial sector and the economic dealings requiring 
interference of administrative authorities. According to Clarke, increasing the 
effort required increases the costs of offending and some potential offenders will 
give up their intentions. Practice illustrates that these barriers are often 
insurmountable. To overcome or get around these access controls, potential 
criminals must invest in expertise. Therefore, money laundering operations have 
become increasingly complex, and for the granting of permits and participation 
in tendering procedures criminals must invest in complex constructions with 
front men and front stores. This aspect fits the technique that Clarke refers to as 
deflecting offenders.  
As described above not all offenders are able or willing to rearrange their 
plans. Moreover, empirical research shows the success of deflecting criminals. 
Criminal organisations often rely on a small group of people to facilitate the 
necessary logistical elements. When plans have to change criminal organisations 
must rely on new modus operandi and new facilitators who often turn out to be 
unreliable. 
 
Reducing rewards. A fourth strategy that appears in all three preventive 
measures is reducing the rewards. By reducing rewards the authorities hope to 
take away the main incentive of organised crime. The most obvious examples in 
the Dutch preventive measures are the refusal or withdrawal of permits and 
subsidies and exclusion from tendering procedures deriving from the BIBOB 
Act. Moreover, the Van Traa approach makes it more difficult for criminals to 
build positions of power. Subsequently, the rewards deriving from such a 
position would be beyond the reach of many criminals.  
The anti-money laundering intervention also focuses on reducing rewards. 
When illegal profits cannot be laundered it is much more difficult to invest them 
in the legitimate environment. In addition, the anti-money laundering 
intervention produces a paper trail with which criminal profits can be 
confiscated. According to Clarke (1997) reducing the rewards indeed influences 
decision-making, as it reduces the expected benefits. Consequently, based on 
this insight it is certainly plausible that organised crime prevention can be 
effective. 
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Question marks regarding the strategy of fixing broken windows. A last strategy, 
brought into action in the Van Traa approach, involves the rehabilitation of 
deprived urban areas to prevent crime. This strategy is based on the assumption 
that fighting symptoms and activities that are assumed to provide breeding 
grounds for crime will prevent crime, including organised crime. This reasoning 
is based on the more general idea that degenerated neighbourhoods and the 
absence of a government active in performing neighbourhood maintenance and 
repairs facilitate crime. In contrast, a strong government presence would hinder 
crime. This reasoning is an example of rapid repair, which according to Clarke 
(1997) discourages imitation and thus further crime. With regard to this 
technique Clarke refers to the fixing broken windows approach (Kelling and 
Coles, 1998), which connects disorder with urban decay and relates urban decay 
to (serious) crime. In other words  this approach assumes that disorder is a 
precursor of crime. Good management of public areas and restoration of these 
neighbourhoods would result in less crime.  
However, this approach is not generally accepted, as some criminologists 
doubt the relation between urban decay and crime. In addition it must be said 
that the Van Traa team expanded this reasoning. Whereas the original fixing 
broken windows approach states that disorder and degeneration encourages 
more serious crimes, the Van Traa team went a step further to connect the 
decline of areas to organised crime. Yet, in contrast to most of the elements of 
the preventive measures, this step has not been supported by criminological 
theories or empirical knowledge. In this case further investigation is needed to 
reveal the possible effectiveness of this approach against organised crime.  
 
5.2 Exposing the implementation of preventive measures 
 
From the previous section it appears that the preventive measures need an 
adequate programme theory and design that corresponds with empirical and 
theoretical insights. However, even such a design is no guarantee for successful 
impact. Preventive measures must also be implemented in the intended way. 
This study has illustrated that with regard to implementation the 
responsibilisation of all persons and organisations involved in prevention is 
important as well as the performance of the programme itself.  
 
5.2.1 Responsibilisation of persons and organisations  
 
A main characteristic of prevention is the so-called responsibilisation strategy 
towards non-law enforcement agencies. Garland argues that with this strategy, 
persons, agencies and organisations have to be activated and inter-agency 
structures must be established (Garland, 1996: 453). From the evaluation of the 
three preventive measures it can be concluded that responsibilisation does not 
come easy. First of all there are some basic conditions for successfully 
activating representatives. Representatives must be aware of abuses in order to 
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act against them. Furthermore, a certain level of integrity is needed to execute 
and comply with the measure. These two conditions for organised crime 
prevention were emphasised in earlier research (Van de Bunt and Van der 
Schoot, 2003: 70). In the early 1990s organised crime justly became an 
important topic on the political agenda, it was no surprise that before that time, 
there was a generally low level of awareness of the risks of organised crime. 
Consequently, increasing the awareness of financial service providers, 
administrative authorities and the civil service apparatus was an important first 
step.  
Findings here illustrate that the responsibilisation process and raising 
consciousness has not proceeded smoothly, neither in the private nor the public 
sector. Problems related to the private agencies were expected, as these are 
commercial institutions, organisations and persons with their own economic 
interests. This was especially the case with the financial service providers. 
Obviously, cooperating with law-enforcement authorities could interfere in these 
actors’ special relations with their clients. Moreover, the little responsibility 
ascribed to the institutions made them feel like unpaid ‘watchdogs’ that just had 
to pass on information to law enforcement. It is no wonder that financial 
institutions were at first unwilling to comply with the disclosure obligation. 
However, rather quickly these institutions changed their attitude as the new 
disclosure obligation gave them more responsibility for which they could apply 
the obligation for their own interest; it improved the transparency of the system 
and prevented internal fraud. This willingness was also supported by the 
awareness that any relationship with money laundering and organised crime 
would damage their reputation and subsequently harm their business. Thus, in 
addition to awareness and integrity, the findings of this study indicate another 
condition for responsibilisation: the preventive measure must align with 
agencies’ and organisations’ own interests. This is no easy task, as the 
preventive approach requires a change in business culture of the selected 
representatives. Nonetheless, when this is achieved good cooperation will 
follow.  
Lawyers, notaries and accountants argue that they have nothing to gain 
from their new reporting obligation. According to them the anti-money 
laundering intervention results only in more administrative effort and costs, like 
disturbed relations with clients. These professionals argue that criminal 
involvement only occurs incidentally, which probably does not strengthen their 
willingness to cooperate. Possibly, when the reputation of these legal 
professions is at stake and self-regulation falls short, these professions might 
adjust their opinion, like the financial institutions did.  
One might expect the responsibilisation process to proceed more easily in 
the public sector, since public authorities all have the same interests. However, 
this study has shown that this is not self-evident. The common interests that are 
assumed to be present in all layers of the government are not experienced as 
items of importance in each of these layers. The Dutch screening and auditing 
approach had to be postponed partly due to a lack of preparation of the 
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administrative authorities. This was probably not due to a true unwillingness, 
but rather, many administrative authorities argued that unintentional facilitation 
did not occur in their sector. This shows a lack of awareness, at least with regard 
to the legislator’s objectives. In Amsterdam, activating the civil service 
apparatus met difficulties as well. With regard to the Van Traa approach, the 
establishment of a special team responsible for the new approach became an 
excuse for other agencies to be less active and aware. Here, the preventive 
approach partly had the opposite effect of leaving the problem to others, 
specifically to the Van Traa team. Although this did not apply for all municipal 
services, the success of many of the subprojects depended on the involvement of 
the Van Traa team. As a result, the team did not succeed in implementing its 
new administrative instruments within the regular structure of the civil service 
apparatus. Thus, a lack of attention to common interests, poor cooperation and 
competition of competences disturbed the responsibilisation process in public 
agencies.  
 
5.2.2 Inter-agency structures 
 
Next to raising consciousness and activating persons and organisations, the 
responsibilisation strategy implies the establishment of inter-agency structures. 
For this, new structures of cooperation and information exchange have been 
implemented. Garland argued that such cooperation could be more difficult than 
bringing into action the traditional criminal justice system (Garland, 1996: 454). 
This study illustrates that this is indeed the case and much work is left to be 
done on these issues. 
Persons and organisations of the legitimate environment all have their own 
competences and instruments. In order to exclude those who are involved in 
organised crime, these persons and organisations must be informed of possible 
irregularities and involvement in criminal activities. This means that they need 
relevant and reliable information. Shortcomings in the available information can 
be crucial, since being informed is one of the basic conditions of organised 
crime prevention (Van de Bunt and Van der Schoot, 2003: 72). Moreover, 
whereas the police could provide some of this information, special arrangements 
had to be established enabling the exchange of sensitive information. This 
means that for the activation of new ‘watchdogs’ information from police 
departments might need to be made accessible. As a result, privacy regulations 
that limit the use of sensitive information (Personal Data Protection Act, Police 
Files Act, Judicial Data Act) must be adjusted. A structural basis needs to be 
created for the exchange of sensitive information between police, the public 
administration, judicial authorities and tax authorities, at least in the judicial 
framework of the screening approach.  
With regard to the Dutch screening and auditing approach and the 
Amsterdam administrative approach the authorities made special arrangements. 
The limitations of these arrangements determined the limitations of the 
intervention. In the Dutch screening and auditing approach the BIBOB Bureau is 
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given access to a wide range of information sources, including sources of 
sensitive information. However, because sensitive information cannot be 
included in the actual advisory report, the bureau cannot base its advice on this 
information. In the Van Traa approach, these special information access 
arrangements were limited to the Van Traa team. This meant that information 
could not be shared with other parties brought into action, for example, the fire 
safety inspectors or the city planning department. In this regard the city councils 
and the municipal services are less informed than the Van Traa team. Obviously, 
this has hindered the implementation of the Van Traa approach in the civil 
service apparatus. Regarding the anti-money laundering intervention things were 
much easier, as the legislator had just enforced legislation that obliged the 
financial service providers to share information.  
  The most important conclusion is that legal regulations and special 
permissions by ministers are no guarantee for the smooth exchange of 
information. The Van Traa approach clearly illustrates that the environment may 
hinder implementation. In this case various local registers were simply 
incomplete and the information position of police departments was lacking. 
Moreover, it appeared difficult to access police information as it was not always 
clear which department or unit had the needed information at its disposal. 
Nonetheless, a reliable and complete insight into ownership of premises and 
subjects was necessary to undertake action. The screening process of the BIBOB 
Bureau revealed various problems with consulting information sources. In 
particular, gathering information from abroad proved difficult. Foreign 
authorities are not always willing to share information with an administrative 
agency. In addition, receiving information from foreign authorities often takes 
time. Regarding information sources in the Netherlands, those obliged to share 
information with the BIBOB Bureau face a problem of time. In general it takes 
about two weeks to receive information from various sources, which is a 
considerable period relative to the total time span of four to eight weeks in 
which the screening should take place.  
 The problems of exchanging information clearly illustrate that organised 
crime prevention should become a multi-agency approach wherein the various 
parties cooperate. This study illustrates that up to now, this cooperation mainly 
takes place on an ad hoc basis. For a more effective preventive approach to 
organised crime, this ad hoc cooperation should develop into a continuing  
multi-agency approach. 
 
5.2.3 Performance of the programme  
 
In order to implement a programme it is important to define clear objectives at 
the beginning and to maintain them during the implementation. This is vital 
since lack of such clear objectives could result in net-widening. Net-widening 
implies that measures are broadened, due to which more subjects or behaviours 
are drawn in. A preventive approach based on controlling risks will always be 
subject to net-widening, unlike a repressive approach which is based on legal 
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definitions. However, regarding organised crime prevention it is necessary to 
remain focused on the possible impact of measures on the specific phenomenon.  
Unfortunately, this study found evidence of goal displacement in the 
measures studied. This means that authorities often lost sight of the objective of 
preventing organised crime. 
From the very beginning of each of the evaluated measures the authorities’ 
focus on organised crime had already started to become diffuse. The explanatory 
memorandum of the Dutch screening and auditing act indicates that the use of 
such an instrument need not be restricted to organised crime, but that it can also 
be made available to counter non-organised criminal activities that cause serious 
social effects. The Dutch anti-money laundering intervention involves a 
reporting system for unusual transactions as defined by objective and subjective 
indicators. This means that many transactions must be reported even when 
financial service providers know beforehand that they have nothing to do with 
money laundering.  
This study also shows how difficulties in implementation can distract 
persons and organisations from their original objectives. The Van Traa project in 
Amsterdam started as an innovative approach, originally aimed at the prevention 
of (organised) crime in the red-light district of Amsterdam. Towards this 
objective a wide range of projects were established. First of all, the Van Traa 
approach operated thematically in certain geographical areas and economic 
branches, for which several subprojects were started. In these subprojects large 
numbers of premises were examined for possible irregularities and possibly 
unreliable entrepreneurs were screened. Over time, many subprojects came to 
focus on the degeneration of deprived urban areas. As a result, the Van Traa 
approach exists in a wide range of tasks that concentrate not only on organised 
crime, but on all sorts of crime and even deviancy.  
There has been a net-widening in the Amsterdam integrity approach as 
well. The city government enlarged the concept of integrity time after time. The 
reporting obligation first focused on fraud and corruption, yet nowadays it 
encompasses all kinds of integrity problems, such as conflicts of interests and 
waste or abuse of municipal property. As a result it is hard to point out the core 
of the problem. In any case, over time the approach has lost its focus on fighting 
organised crime and aims at crime, deviancy and even non-deviancy. It is 
unclear to what extent interfering in crime, deviancy and non-deviancy 
contribute to the prevention of organised crime. This lack of clear objectives 
certainly impacts the effectiveness of the administrative approach of Amsterdam 
in preventing organised crime.  
With regard to the anti-money laundering intervention, goal displacement 
was the result of bureaucracy. By establishing a mixed system of objective and 
subjective indicators the authorities had to deal with an enormous number of 
reports. Instead of taking strategic decisions on the use of transaction data to 
prevent organised crime, the authorities instead focused on compliance by the 
financial service providers. Due to a lack of investments in personnel and 
expertise by the Dutch Financial Intelligence Unit, the FIU was unable to 
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conduct strategic analyses on a structural basis. Moreover, a lack of financial 
expertise by investigative authorities resulted in the limited use of transaction 
data in criminal investigations. 
 In contrast to the described disadvantages of net-widening, it must also be 
said that net-widening can contribute to the effectiveness of an intervention. 
Clarke (1980, 140) argues that displacement is influenced by criminals’ 
knowledge of alternatives. This means that protecting a whole class of 
facilitators reduces the alternatives available. Thus, bringing all financial service 
providers under the anti-money laundering obligations will hinder possible 
displacement and make the intervention more effective. Based on this reasoning, 
it is also likely that administrative authorities’ monopoly in certain economic 
dealings implies an enormous restriction of possible displacement. This 
reasoning is strengthened by the knowledge that offenders are not always 
attracted to other alternatives. Clarke (1987: 935) refers to choice-structuring 
properties, which implies that the readiness to substitute one offence for another 
depends on the mutual characteristics of the original planned offence and the 
alternative. With regard to the BIBOB screening and auditing approach, many 
criminals would not turn to other sectors simply because they have no 
experience and skills in other economic areas. A similar reasoning applies to the 
administrative approach of Amsterdam: not all criminals will leave Amsterdam 
to avoid the integral and integrated enforcement of rules. 
 
5.3 Exposing the impact of the preventive measures  
 
In this study the impact of the preventive measures was determined by the 
observed outputs and the plausible outcomes. Regarding the observed outputs, 
the programme evaluation uncovered the negative effect of problems in 
implementation. In fact, the various activities of the measures can be grouped 
into three categories. First are those for which it is impossible to ascertain the 
outputs, as there is simply too little insight. In other words, data are lacking from 
which to derive the outputs. For example, for the anti-money laundering 
intervention, no clear summary of the exact number and scope of money 
laundering investigations could be found; and it was certainly impossible to 
determine the extent to which these investigations are based on transaction 
information. The second category of measures is those for which enough 
information is available to show some of the outputs, but the outputs are not 
those implied by the original objectives. This goal displacement is ascertained in 
the anti-money laundering intervention, the integrity approach and in the Van 
Traa approach. Based on this goal displacement it is unlikely that these 
measures meet their actual objectives and in fact prevent organised crime. Third 
are the successful measures, which resulted in observed outputs that respond to 
the original objectives. Notwithstanding the problems in the implementation 
described above, the measures did result in some outputs. For example, the anti-
money laundering intervention has supported various criminal and financial 
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investigations. The BIBOB screening and auditing approach has resulted in the 
refusal and withdrawal of various permits. With the support of the Van Traa 
approach, the city government was able to issue various administrative warnings 
and closed a number of establishments housing illegal hotels, casinos and 
catering operations. These outputs illustrate that the preventive measures 
probably do have some effects. However, these outputs are related to individual 
cases, and it still is impossible to estimate the impact of these outputs on 
organised crime in general. 
Based on these aspects, we must conclude that organised crime prevention 
could be effective in theory, but problems in implementation have limited actual 
outputs. In other words, a plausible programme theory is a necessary condition 
for organised crime prevention, but it is not a sufficient one. Authorities must 
invest in the implementation of such measures. Up until now, implementation 
shows some shortcomings, which makes it unlikely that the evaluated preventive 
measures will have a great impact on organised crime. This implies that the 
preventive measures taken against organised crime are probably scarcely 
effective. However, this is no reason to give up on organised crime prevention. 
On the contrary, the plausibility of the programme theories justifies new efforts 
in further development of these measures and amelioration of the 
implementation problems.  
 
5.4 Some boundaries of organised crime prevention 
 
Organised crime prevention implies the exclusion of criminals and criminal 
organisations from services in the legitimate environment. Excluding people in 
order to control risks is the central aspect of the actuarial justice that 
characterises recent crime policy and the policies of safety and security in Dutch 
society. A main question of this actuarial justice is how to separate those who 
have criminal purposes from those who do not. With regard to organised crime 
prevention, this question is certainly important, as the measures discussed aim at 
services used by many upstanding people. Empirical research illustrates that 
organised crime is a complex phenomenon with complicated constructions that 
are difficult to uncover. This means that regarding preventive measures the good 
guys might suffer from the interventions aimed at bad guys. 
Because organised crime prevention interferes in the lives of many people, 
the authorities must guarantee a balance between protecting people’s privacy 
and protecting people’s safety, for instance, by fighting crime. According to the 
authorities the large threat emanating from organised crime justifies interference 
in people’s daily lives. However, as described earlier the measures are 
unspecific and, indeed, hardly focused on organised crime. The anti-money 
laundering intervention focuses on all kinds of predicate offences. The 
administrative approach of Amsterdam focuses on crime, deviancy and even 
non-deviancy. During the years the importance of the specificity of preventive 
measures seems to have gained interest, as it was extensively discussed during 
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the development of the Dutch screening approach. This approach aims at 
organised crime, but also at activities that can cause serious social impacts. 
Moreover, this approach is specifically focused on those sectors that are deemed 
vulnerable to abuses by criminal organisations, which already makes the 
measure much more specific than if no sectors had been selected. 
 It is remarkable that measures to prevent organised crime in general are so 
unspecific, since the measures imply a serious invasion of privacy. With the 
anti-money laundering intervention coming into force the legislator sacrificed 
part of banking secrecy. Professional secrecy was also partly forgone when in 
2003 legal professionals were mandated to comply with the intervention as well. 
The reporting obligation applies only to the financial advising activities of these 
professionals, which are comparable to services provided by other financial 
service suppliers. Professional secrecy regarding activities to defend a client’s 
legal position remains intact. Nonetheless, the reporting obligation interferes in 
the specific relationship based on trust between legal professionals and their 
clients. Accordingly, the professionals argue that the division of tasks into 
financial advising and judicial advising is theoretical and cannot hold in 
practice.  
 However, the costs of intruding on people’s privacy cannot be calculated, 
as it is not something material. Neither is the cost of invasion of people’s 
privacy fixed. Privacy interests and the need to protect privacy are subject to 
complex flows in the political arena, as well as in public debate. In fact, as long 
as crime control exists, authorities must find a balance between fighting crime 
and protecting people’s privacy. This process started as early as Rousseau’s 
social contract. Nowadays, people in our western society seem willing to give up 
a large part of their privacy for a more effective fight against crime. The terrorist 
attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. brought this willingness to new 
heights. Nonetheless, privacy is still the subject of heated debate. Such debate is 
necessary, since it forces the legislator to be aware of the problem, in particular 
since preventive measures are so unspecific. 
 Another aspect regarding people’s privacy involves the use of intelligence. 
In all of the preventive approaches discussed here, suspicions of unlawful 
activities are sufficient to put preventive measures into operation. This also 
applies to the repressive approach, though in this case we speak of a reasonable 
suspicion of guilt, as set out in the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure (article 
27). The preventive approach has no legal framework. At first, suspicion-based 
interventions were limited to the fight against organised crime. However, in all 
of the evaluated measures the scope was enlarged early on to include suspicions. 
The anti-money laundering intervention focuses on all predicate offences; the 
Dutch screening and auditing approach involves all offences that could seriously 
harm society; and the administrative approach of Amsterdam concentrates on all 
forms of crime. The two main projects of the Amsterdam approach have an even 
farther reach. The Van Traa approach includes projects that focus on deprived 
urban areas and the integrity approach includes problematic situations such as 
conflicts of interests and waste of municipal property.  
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Due to the enormous net-widening of these last two projects the focus has 
changed to even include behaviour that does not imply a criminal offence. It is 
remarkable that measures that intrude on people’s privacy can be put into action 
to counter undesirable situations or activities that are not even forbidden by law. 
Van Swaaningen (1999) argues that net-widening is no reason to reject 
prevention, as long as it contributes to a more social law enforcement. However, 
the findings here illustrate that in such cases preventive measures can cause 
more harm to subjects than a repressive approach. This could be interpreted as a 
‘hardening’ of the preventive approach. With regard to Amsterdam’s integrity 
approach an example from this study illustrates how reports of a possible 
integrity violation by a well-known individual resulted in public debate on the 
professional integrity of the person in question, though the presumed violation 
turned out to be only a disorderly transaction. Also the fact that a screening 
procedure is started could affect an involved entrepreneur. Moreover, 
withdrawal of a permit might be an economic death sentence for a business 
person.  
 
5.5 Expectations and further development 
 
Developments since the 1990s have firmly affixed prevention of organised 
crime in crime-control policy. The terrorist attacks in New York and 
Washington, D.C. served as an impetus for the preventive approach. All recent 
crime-control policy plans include preventive measures that target the 
facilitating circumstances present in the legitimate environment. This is logical, 
since it would be pointless to invest in the repressive approach when the 
legitimate environment facilitates unbridled criminal activities. From this point 
of view it is remarkable that the authorities are not extending this approach to all 
far-reaching governmental decisions, to ensure that these decisions have no 
criminogenic effects. In my opinion this should in fact be the starting point of all 
governmental policy, particularly since recent research has uncovered a low-
level accessibility of licit services to organised crime in the whole of society.  
 Regarding crime-control policy plans it should be remarked that organised 
crime prevention needs to be further developed. Obviously, in this further 
development and implementation authorities can draw valuable lessons from the 
past to meet the general conditions outlined above. This means that all policy 
plans should be based on adequate programme theories and that the process of 
implementation must be monitored accurately.  
Furthermore, in realising new preventive measures authorities should make 
more use of private agencies, given that these agencies offer services that might 
be abused by criminal organisations. It will probably be difficult to get through 
the commercial armour. However, when the ‘name and fame’ of agencies are at 
stake, they might quickly develop into reliable partners to fight crime.  
In addition, the authorities should realise that cooperation between various 
public agencies will not necessarily proceed smoothly. Preventive measures 
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require an approach supported at all levels of all authorities involved. Obviously 
the official decisions have to be taken at a higher level. But still the belief that 
preventive measures are useful, and in fact essential, in the fight against 
organised crime should be internalised at the other levels as well. Here, more 
effort should go out to the individual civil servants. The administrative approach 
of Amsterdam, more specifically its integrity approach, is directly aimed at civil 
servants, to involve them in the fight against (organised) crime. It could serve an 
example to other local governments.  
Finally, authorities should realise that an integral inter-agency approach is 
vital in preventive measures. On the one hand, the preventive approach aims at 
the facilitating circumstances provided by all kinds of public and private 
agencies and organisations. On the other hand, the preventive approach operates 
based on information extended by law enforcement agencies to help determine 
whether one is dealing with organised crime. Thus, preventive measures are 
performed independent of penal law, but they require criminal proceedings to 
achieve breakthroughs. Moreover, such an integral approach  is not self-
executing. This means that law enforcement agencies must actively pass 
information on to persons and organisations who can interfere in facilitating 
circumstances. For this, the law enforcement agencies should partly remove 
their focus from the core activities of criminal organisations to the logistic 
processes of these activities. Public and private agencies, in turn should not wait 
for information, but undertake action themselves. For this cooperation, 
particularly for the exchange of information, various collaborative initiatives 
have been established at different levels and on various subjects. Covenants 
have been established that offer the possibility to cooperate. In addition, 
experiences in some projects have illustrated the power of the existing local 
consultative body of mayor, chief of police and the head of the public 
prosecutor’s office to create the basic conditions needed to implement an 
integral approach to prevention. In the future, such consultative bodies should be 
exploited more systematically and effectively for promoting the preventive 
approach and exchanging best practices. 
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Samenvatting 
 
Vanaf het begin van de jaren 1990 is er zowel op nationaal als op international 
vlak geïnvesteerd in een preventieve benadering van georganiseerde 
criminaliteit. Nederland heeft hier een progressieve rol in gespeeld. Met veel 
enthousiasme en hoge verwachtingen zijn verschillende preventieve maatregelen 
ontwikkeld. Sommige van deze maatregelen worden uitgedragen als ‘best 
practices’ in andere Europese landen. De vraag is echter wat beleidsmakers 
precies verwachten van de preventieve benadering en of de preventieve 
maatregelen ook aan deze verwachtingen kunnen voldoen. Kortom, wat is 
eigenlijk het effect van preventieve maatregelen op het probleem van 
georganiseerde criminaliteit. Deze vraag behelst de centrale probleemstelling 
van mijn onderzoek. 
 
 
Het onderzoek 
Het vaststellen van effecten is geen eenvoudige klus, zeker niet als de 
maatregelen zijn gericht op het veranderen van sociaal gedrag. Allereerst moet 
er een effect kunnen worden vastgesteld. Neemt het probleem van 
georganiseerde criminaliteit in Nederland werkelijk af? Daarnaast moet de 
causaliteit tussen de eventuele verandering en de ingezette maatregel worden 
vastgesteld. Is het effect op het probleem van georganiseerde criminaliteit het 
gevolg van de geselecteerde maatregel? Helaas is er, ondanks de in het 
afgelopen decennium flink toegenomen kennis omtrent georganiseerde 
criminaliteit, nog te weinig inzicht in de omvang ervan om dalingen of 
stijgingen te kunnen vaststellen. Daarom is voor dit onderzoek gezocht naar 
alternatieve methoden om de effecten van preventieve maatregelen op 
georganiseerde criminaliteit te kunnen beoordelen. Concreet zijn daartoe twee 
wegen bewandeld. Ten eerste wordt een indicatie gegeven van de ‘mogelijke 
effecten’ door de maatregel in het abstracte te bestuderen. Met het bestuderen 
van de filosofie achter de maatregelen, de beleidstheorie genoemd, is gekeken of 
de doelen en verwachtingen van de maatregel plausibel zijn. Ten tweede is aan 
de hand van ‘concrete resultaten’ vastgesteld in hoeverre de doelstellingen in de 
praktijk zijn gehaald. Alhoewel deze laatste bevindingen door problemen met 
het vaststellen van causaliteit niets zeggen over de werkelijke effecten, zeggen 
ze wel iets over de plausibiliteit van de maatregel. Als doelstellingen worden 
gehaald, is het meer aannemelijk dat de maatregel effect heeft.  
 Voor het exploreren van deze probleemstelling is dit onderzoek opgezet in 
de vorm van een beleidsevaluatie van een aantal belangrijke maatregelen die 
zijn gericht op het voorkomen van georganiseerde criminaliteit. De eerste 
maatregel betreft de anti-witwasinterventie, die voornamelijk vorm krijgt door 
de Wet melding ongebruikelijke transacties en de Wet identificatie bij 
dienstverlening. Daarnaast wordt de Nederlandse screeningsprocedure, 
vastgelegd in de Wet BIBOB, geëvalueerd. Deze recent in werking getreden wet 
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behelst een screeningsvoorziening die is ontwikkeld ter voorkoming van het 
misbruiken van vergunningen, subsidies en aanbestedingen bij het plegen van 
strafbare feiten. In de praktijk betekent dit dat lokale overheden vergunningen en 
subsidies kunnen weigeren en mensen kunnen uitsluiten van aanbestedingen 
indien er een gevaar bestaat dat hiermee criminele activiteiten worden 
gefaciliteerd. Ten slotte is de bestuurlijke aanpak van Amsterdam onderwerp 
van de evaluatie. Deze aanpak bestaat uit tal van maatregelen en projecten. In 
mijn onderzoek komen twee grote projecten aan bod: het Van Traa-project en 
het integriteitsproject. Deze bestuurlijke aanpak bestaat uit een strikt 
handhavingsbeleid en een grootse integriteitsbewustwording waarmee wordt 
getracht te voorkomen dat criminele groeperingen kunnen infiltreren in de legale 
omgeving. Deze lokale aanpak wordt gezien als zeer vooruitstrevend en wordt 
vaak aangehaald als best practice.  
 De beleidsevaluatie omvat drie elementen: de beoordeling van de 
beleidstheorie, de beoordeling van de implementatie en de beoordeling van de 
uitkomsten van de maatregelen. Deze drie elementen zijn de rode draad van dit 
onderzoek. Door de systematische toepassing van deze elementen op de drie 
geselecteerde maatregelen, kan niet alleen iets worden gezegd over de effecten 
van de afzonderlijke maatregelen, maar is het ook mogelijk om de maatregelen 
te vergelijken en te komen tot meer algemene inzichten.  
 
Beoordeling beleidstheorie 
Een adequate beleidstheorie is een noodzakelijke voorwaarde voor maatregelen 
om aan de verwachtingen te voldoen en om gewenste effecten te sorteren. Voor 
het beoordelen van de beleidstheorie moet de filosofie van de beleidsmaker 
worden getoetst aan criminologische theorieën en empirische kennis over 
georganiseerde criminaliteit.  
 Preventie van georganiseerde criminaliteit is gebaseerd op de situationele 
criminaliteitsbenadering. Deze benadering berust op de aanname dat het niveau 
van criminaliteit wordt bepaald door de aanwezigheid van omstandigheden die 
gelegenheid geven voor criminele activiteiten. Met andere woorden: de 
preventieve benadering behelst het ingrijpen in maatschappelijke 
gelegenheidsstructuren zodat misbruik voor criminele doeleinden wordt 
bemoeilijkt. Moderne termen die hiervoor ook worden gebruikt, zijn het 
‘tegenhouden’ van criminaliteit en het ‘opwerpen van barrières’. De situationele 
criminaliteitsbenadering is gebaseerd op verschillende strategieën zoals het 
verhogen van toezicht en het wegnemen van beloningen. De Nederlandse 
maatregelen steunen grotendeels op deze strategieën. Financiële dienstverleners 
en het openbaar bestuur worden ingezet als nieuwe ‘waakhonden’ die de 
samenleving moeten beschermen tegen georganiseerde criminaliteit. Het 
ontnemen van criminele gelden is een voorbeeld van het wegnemen van een 
beloningen. Alleen het Van Traa-project berust mede op een innovatieve 
strategie die niet algemeen geaccepteerd is binnen de criminologie. Hier speelt 
de vraag in hoeverre verloederde buurten een voedingsbodem zijn voor 
georganiseerde criminaliteit en in hoeverre het aanpakken van verloedering een 
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effect kan hebben op georganiseerde criminaliteit. Deze vooruitstrevende 
Amsterdamse aanpak verdient nader onderzoek en eventueel kunnen concrete 
resultaten de effectiviteit aantonen.  
 Het toetsen van een beleidstheorie aan empirische kennis over 
georganiseerde criminaliteit is belangrijk om de werkelijke problemen aan te 
kunnen pakken. Uit empirisch onderzoek blijkt dat criminele groeperingen 
inderdaad gebruik maken van legale maatschappelijke structuren. In feite 
verschillen de logistieke activiteiten van de handel in illegale goederen en 
diensten niet van gelijkaardige handelsactiviteiten voor legale goederen; 
dezelfde transport- en opslagfaciliteiten worden gebruikt, dezelfde documenten 
worden ingevuld en dezelfde dienstverleners worden benaderd voor hun 
exclusieve expertise (advocaten, notarissen, accountants, etc). Dit betekent dat 
overheidsdiensten, bedrijven en zelfs individuele burgers criminele activiteiten 
faciliteren zonder zich daarvan in veel gevallen bewust te zijn. Dit geldt 
bijvoorbeeld voor het financieel stelsel, dat het mogelijk maakt crimineel 
vermogen wit te wassen, maar ook voor bestuurlijke overheden die door het 
verlenen van vergunningen criminele groeperingen onbedoeld de gelegenheid 
bieden om crimineel vermogen te investeren in de legale economie. Op andere 
gebieden is er echter nog een beperkt inzicht in georganiseerde criminaliteit. Zo 
is er weinig bekend over de bestedingen van criminele groeperingen en de 
interactie tussen groeperingen in bronlanden, doorvoerlanden en doellanden. 
Voor de preventieve benadering is een degelijke probleemanalyse een 
noodzakelijke voorwaarde, maar er komt meer bij kijken. De preventieve 
benadering veronderstelt ook een risicoanalyse op basis waarvan mogelijk 
toekomstig misbruik door criminele organisaties kan worden voorkomen. 
Uiteraard schuilt hierin het gevaar dat een maatregel is toegespitst op problemen 
die zich (nog) niet voordoet. Juist omdat dergelijke maatregelen mogelijk 
resulteren in het stigmatiseren van sectoren en individuen, zou hier een grote 
voorzichtigheid moeten worden betracht.   
 
Beoordeling implementatie 
Naast een adequate beleidstheorie is het noodzakelijk dat maatregelen worden 
uitgevoerd zoals de beleidsmaker heeft bedoeld. Dit onderzoek heeft aangetoond 
dat voor een goede implementatie vooral energie moet worden besteed aan de 
responsabilisering van personen en organisaties, aan de totstandkoming van een 
geïntegreerde aanpak en aan de uitvoering van de maatregel zelf.   
 Responsabilisering betekent dat personen en organisaties zelf de 
verantwoordelijkheid nemen om te handelen. Op het gebied van preventie van 
georganiseerde criminaliteit betreft het die personen die maatschappelijke 
structuren bieden waar criminele organisaties gebruik van maken. Zij kunnen  
het beste ingrijpen in deze omstandigheden. Dit betekent dat het aanpakken van 
georganiseerde criminaliteit niet langer de exclusieve taak is van het traditionele 
opsporingsapparaat. Responsabilisering is echter niet vanzelfsprekend, noch in 
de private sector noch in de publieke sector. Voor wat betreft de private sector 
had de overheid problemen met responsabilisering verwacht; tijd, geld en 
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menskracht moet worden geïnvesteerd in activiteiten om overheidsinstanties te 
helpen criminaliteit te bestrijden, terwijl deze activiteiten niet overeenkomen 
met de eigenlijke (commerciële) doelstellingen van de actoren. Zo heeft de reeds 
genoemde meldingsplicht ertoe geleid dat financiële instellingen een 
administratie moesten opzetten voor het registreren en melden van 
ongebruikelijke transacties. Dit onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat het in eerste 
instantie moeilijk kan zijn om instellingen in de private sector te activeren, maar 
dat deze instellingen wel bereid zijn mee te werken als er ook een eigen belang 
aan vast zit. Het gaat hier met name om de goede naam van een instelling of 
sector die verloren kan gaan als er een relatie met georgansieerde criminaliteit 
kan worden gelegd. Voor wat betreft de  responsabilisering van publieke 
sectoren waren geen problemen voorzien, aangezien zij dezelfde belangen 
zouden hebben. Dit onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat een dergelijke redenering 
niet vanzelfsprekend is. De inwerkingtreding van de Nederlandse 
screeningsprocedure is uitgesteld vanwege gebrek aan voorbereiding bij lokale 
overheden. Het argument dat zij niet te maken zouden hebben met 
georganiseerde criminaliteit, toont het gebrek aan responsabilisering. 
Ondertussen is deze bewustwording echter gegroeid en  worden er steeds meer 
screeningsonderzoeken aangevraagd.  
 De responsabiliseringstrategie vereist een integrale aanpak waarbij 
instellingen in private en publieke sectoren samenwerken met het traditionele 
opsporingsapparaat. Op basis van verschillende wettelijke bepalingen is de 
samenwerking en met name het uitwisselen van gevoelige informatie, juridisch 
goed geregeld. Echter in de praktijk blijkt dat dergelijke juridische regelingen 
geen garantie zijn voor een vloeiende informatie-uitwisseling. Uit het Van Traa-
project blijkt dat informatie soms gewoon niet aanwezig is of dat het niet bekend 
is waar relevante informatie gevonden kan worden. Daarnaast beperken deze 
regelingen zich tot Nederlands grondgebied en is het vaak moeilijk relevante 
informatie uit het buitenland te verkrijgen. Dit is uiteraard een probleem omdat 
georganiseerde criminaliteit wel vaak grensoverschrijdend is.  
 De problemen met de uitvoering van de maatregelen worden met name 
veroorzaakt door het gebrek aan duidelijke doelstellingen. In de bestuurlijke 
aanpak van Amsterdam is er sprake van ‘net-widening’. Door het ontwikkelen 
van steeds nieuwe maatregelen en het verruimen van deze maatregelen worden 
steeds meer personen en objecten aan de maatregelen onderworpen. Zo was de 
integriteitsbenadering in eerste instantie gericht op fraude en corruptie, maar is 
deze uitgebreid tot alle integriteitsproblemen, zoals persoonlijke 
belangenconflicten en verspilling van gemeentelijke eigendommen. De vraag is 
natuurlijk in hoeverre deze problemen nog gerelateerd zijn aan georganiseerd 
criminaliteit en wat het effect is bij het aanpakken van deze criminaliteit. Bij de 
anti-witwasinterventie is er sprake van bureaucratie die leidt tot 
doelverplaatsing. De beleidsmaker heeft zich voornamelijk gericht op de 
handhaving van de meldplicht waardoor slechts weinig geïnvesteerd is in de 
verwerking van de verkregen gegevens.  Dit heeft geresulteerd in een databank 
met een groot aantal ongebruikelijke transacties waarvan slechts een beperkt 
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gedeelte goed is geanalyseerd en wordt gebruikt in de aanpak van 
georganiseerde criminaliteit. Ook hier moeten vraagtekens worden gezet bij de 
effectiviteit ven deze aanpak.  
 
Beoordeling van de uitkomsten 
Op basis van de beoordeling van de beleidstheorie kan worden gesteld dat voor 
het grootste deel van de maatregelen het aannemelijk is dat gewenste effecten 
worden gesorteerd. Echter uit de beoordeling van de implementatie blijkt dat er 
vaak niet, of slechts in beperkte mate, kan worden gesproken over concrete 
resultaten. Voor bepaalde activiteiten van de onderzochte maatregelen is het 
wegens een gebrek aan inzicht onmogelijk om concrete resultaten vast te stellen. 
Zo kan niet worden achterhaald in hoeverre strafrechtelijke onderzoeken zijn 
gebaseerd op transactie-informatie die is gegenereerd met de anti-
witwasinterventie. Voor andere activiteiten waarbij sprake is van 
doelverplaatsing, is er wel voldoende inzicht in de resultaten, maar wijken deze 
resultaten af van de oorspronkelijke doelstellingen. Voor deze maatregelen is het 
niet waarschijnlijk dat ze een groot effect hebben op georganiseerde 
criminaliteit. Tenslotte zijn er de activiteiten die redelijk succesvol zijn 
verlopen. Ondanks de onduidelijkheid over het gebruik van transactie-informatie 
heeft de anti-witwasinterventie wel geleid tot verschillende financiële 
onderzoeken en ontnemingen. Daarnaast heeft het Van Traa-project bijgedragen 
aan het verstrekken van administratieve waarschuwingen, het sluiten van illegale 
hotels, casino’s en ander horecagelegenheden die niet aan de regels voldeden. 
Deze concrete resultaten zijn echter gerelateerd aan individuele gevallen en 
zeggen niet veel over de effectiviteit op georganiseerde criminaliteit in het 
algemeen. Wel versterken deze resultaten de aannemelijkheid dat de 
maatregelen gewenste effecten kunnen sorteren.  
 
Conclusie 
Het is logisch dat de Nederlandse overheid, in navolging van Amerikaanse en 
internationale initiatieven, invulling heeft gegeven aan de preventieve 
benadering. Zoals de ministers van Binnenlandse Zaken en Justitie in 1996 
stelden, zou onbevredigend zijn ‘dat de overheid enerzijds veel tijd, energie en 
geld steekt in de opsporing en vervolging van (al dan niet georganiseerde) 
criminaliteit, en anderzijds het risico loopt ongewild direct of indirect criminele 
organisaties en activiteiten te faciliteren’ (Kamerstukken II, 1996-1997, 25 056, 
nr. 1, p. 2). Dit geldt uiteraard ook voor het ongewild faciliteren door bedrijven 
en individuen die niet tot de overheid behoren.  
 Daarnaast moet de Nederlandse overheid rekening houden met een aantal 
beperkingen van de preventieve benadering. Het gegeven dat preventieve 
maatregelen niet zijn gericht op de persoon van de dader maar op 
maatschappelijke gelegenheidsstructuren, maakt dat deze maatregelen 
consequenties hebben voor het handelen van grote groepen mensen die zonder 
criminele bedoelingen gebruik maken van deze structuren. Dit betekent dat 
preventieve maatregelen vaak weinig specifiek zijn waardoor de goeden met de 
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kwaden moeten lijden. Zo wordt met het melden van ongebruikelijke transacties 
het bankgeheim ingeperkt en wordt voor het screenen van vergunningaanvragers 
gebruik gemaakt van gevoelige informatie uit politiebestanden. Voor dergelijke 
maatregelen moet een balans bestaan tussen het beschermen van 
privacybelangen en het beschermen van veiligheidsbelangen. In de westerse 
wereld is een groot deel van de mensen, zeker na de terroristische aanval in New 
York, bereid een deel van hun privacy op te geven ten behoeve van de 
veiligheid. De vraag is echter of dergelijke maatregelen wel bijdragen aan de 
veiligheid of dat er sprake is van schijn-veiligheid. In hoeverre draagt de 
meldplicht bij tot het aanpakken van georganiseerde criminaliteit en terrorisme? 
Het is daarom goed dat privacy nog steeds een belangrijk onderwerp van debat 
vormt. 
 Met het aanstippen van deze discussie over privacy wordt geenszins gesteld 
dat de preventieve benadering niet verder zou moeten worden ontwikkeld. In 
tegendeel, preventieve maatregelen die zijn gebaseerd op een adequate 
beleidstheorie en op een deugdelijke wijze worden geïmplementeerd kunnen wel 
degelijk een impact hebben op georganiseerde criminaliteit. Bij de verdere 
ontwikkeling van preventieve maatregelen zou de overheid kunnen aansluiten 
bij de belangen van de private sector. Daarnaast moet zeker aandacht worden 
besteed aan de totstandkoming van integrale overlegstructuren. Er zijn reeds 
verschillende overlegstructuren waarin opsporingsinstanties en bestuurlijke 
overheden deelnemen die de preventieve benadering verder kunnen ontwikkelen 
en uitdragen. In de toekomst zouden deze dergelijke overlegstruturen 
systematisch moeten worden ingeschakeld voor het bevorderen van de 
preventieve benadeirng en het uitwisselen van ‘best practices’. 
 
